Leeds City Council v Persons Unknown

The 2014 Act makes provision about “anti-social behaviour, crime and disorder”. Part 4 is concerned with “community protection”. An appreciation of the 2014 Act is assisted by the Explanatory Notes to the 2014 Act; the May 2012 Home Office White Paper which preceded the 2014 Act (Explanatory Notes §12); and the Statutory Guidance. The 2014 Act took 19 pre-existing powers (summarised in Annex B of the Explanatory Notes and listed in Annex B to the White Paper) and replaced them with 6 new powers. These are civil law powers can come to be used “as a means of preventing or punishing criminal conduct” (see Birmingham City Council v James [2013] EWCA Civ 552 [2014] 1 WLR 23 at §21), something which will properly calls for judicial vigilance. There had been 7 pre-existing powers for dealing with anti-social individuals: (1) the anti-social behaviour order on conviction; (2) the drinking banning order on conviction; (3) the anti-social behaviour order on application; (4) the anti-social behaviour injunction; (5) the drinking banning order on application; (6) the individual support order; and (7) the intervention order. In the 2014 Act these were replaced by: (i) civil injunctions to prevent anti-social behaviour (described as ‘crime prevention injunctions’ in the White Paper) (Part 1 of the 2014 Act); and (ii) criminal behaviour orders (Part 2 of the 2014 Act, later relocated to the Sentencing Code 2020). The basic purpose of civil injunctions to prevent anti-social behaviour is to stop or prevent individuals engaging in anti-social behaviour quickly, nipping problems in the bud before they escalate. Criminal behaviour orders are orders of a criminal court against a person convicted of an offence, to tackle the most persistently anti-social individuals who are also engage in criminal activity. There had been 12 further pre-existing statutory powers for dealing with anti-social behaviour in the community. In the 2014 Act these were replaced with 4 new powers. Three pre-existing powers – (8) the litter clearing notice; (9) the street litter control notice; and (10) defacement removal notices – were replaced by (iii) Community Protection Notices (Part 4 Chapter 1 of the 2014 Act). The basic purpose of a Community Protection Notice is stopping a person, business or organisation committing anti-social behaviour which spoils the community’s quality of life. Two pre-existing powers – (11) the dispersal order and (12) the direction to leave – were replaced by (iv) Dispersal Powers (Part 3 of the 2014 Act). The basic purpose of Dispersal Powers is to require a person committing or likely to commit antisocial behaviour, crime or disorder to leave an area for up to 48 hours. Three pre-existing powers – (13) the designated public place order; (14) the gating order; and (15) the dog control order – were replaced by (v) PSPOs (Part 4 Chapter 2 of the 2014 Act). The basic purpose of a PSPO is to stop individuals or groups committing anti-social behaviour in a public space. That leaves four pre-existing powers to make closure orders in relation to premises. These were: (16) the crack house closure order (Part 1 of the Anti-Social Behaviour Act 2003); (17) the anti-social behaviour premises closure order (Part 1A of the Anti-Social Behaviour Act 2003, as amended in 2008); (18) the noisy premises closure order (sections 40-41 of the 2003 Act); and (19) the section 161 closure orders (section 161-170 of the Licensing Act 2003). The 2014 Act replaced these four powers with (vi) Closure Orders (Part 4 Chapter 3 of the 2014 Act). The basic purpose of a Closure Order is to allow the police or council quickly to close premises which are being used or likely to be used to commit nuisance or disorder. Not all species of premises closure orders were replaced by Closure Orders pursuant to Part 4 Chapter 3 of the 2014 Act. In particular, closure orders pursuant to Part 2A of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 remained regulated by that Act.

A Part 4 Chapter 3 Closure Order must be preceded by a Closure Notice. Section 76 of the 2014 Act confers on a police officer of at least the rank of inspector, or the local authority, the power to issue a Closure Notice (s.76(1)):

When a Closure Notice is issued, an application must be made to a magistrates’ court for a Closure Order (s.80(1)). The application must be heard by the magistrates within 48 hours (s.80(3)). The magistrates may make a Closure Order (s.80(5)):

When a Closure Order has been made, an application can be made to the magistrates’ court (s.82(1)) to extend – or further extend – the period for which it is in force. The magistrates may extend the Closure Order (s.82(7)), for an overall maximum duration of 6 months (s.82(8)), if:

The “interpretation” provision for Part 4 Chapter 3 of the 2014 Act is s.92. It contains this, within s.92(1):

“premises” includes – (a) any land or other place (whether enclosed or not); (b) any outbuildings that are, or are used as, part of premises.

I am going to use the shorthand “Limb (a)” for “‘premises’ includes – (a) any land or other place (whether enclosed or not)”; and “Limb (b) for “‘premises’ includes … (b) any outbuildings that are, or are used as, part of premises”. One feature of “premises” under Part 4 Chapter 3 is that Parliament empowered the Secretary of State by regulations to “specify premises or descriptions of premises in relation to which” a Closure Notice “may not be issued” (s.76(8)). As the Court recorded, no such regulations have been made.

Pursuant to s.86, a person who “without reasonable excuse” enters or remains on premises “in contravention of” a Closure Notice or a Closure Order commits an offence, imprisonable for up to 3 months in the magistrates’ court or for up to 51 weeks in the crown court. A Closure Order means that presence on the premises can, of itself, constitute the crime.

Ms Bhogal KC for the Council emphasises that the new Part 4 Chapter 3 Closure Orders power was designed by Parliament as a more flexible response by comparison to the four pre-existing powers to make closure orders in relation to premises (§7 above). This can be illustrated by taking ss.2(4)(5) and 11B(5)(6) of the Anti-Social Behaviour Act 2003, under which a closure orders was “an order that the premises in respect of which the order is made are closed to all persons for such period (not exceeding three months) as the court decides”, subject to “such provision as the court thinks appropriate relating to access to any part of the building or structure of which the premises form part”. That was an ‘all or nothing’ power. A closure order under the Sexual Offences Act 2003 s.136D(2) still is. But the New Flexibility allows for a Part 4 Chapter 3 Closure Order to be a tailored order, by reference to (i) persons (ii) times and (iii) circumstances: see the 2014 Act s.76(3) (§8 above) and s.80(7) (§9 above). The difference can be seen from R (Leary) v Chief Constable of West Midlands Police [2012] EWHC 639 (Admin), a case under the Anti-Social Behaviour Act 2003. There, the tenant’s argument was that a closure order could lawfully prohibit visitors to a flat, while permitting the tenant to continue to live there (see Leary §15). The police argued that there was “no power under the statute to exclude from its ambit certain individuals such as the tenant” (§20). The Court agreed with the police (§26).

Turning to the present case, a problem of anti-social behaviour lay behind the Closure Notices and Closure Orders. As recorded in the Stated Case, there had been:

In each of the Closure Orders made on 4.2.22 the Court had recorded (at §1) that the statutory criteria for making a Closure Order were met. That meant (s.76(1): §8 above):

The three Closure Notices, the three Closure Orders and the three applications for extensions all identified the “premises” as an “Exclusion Zone” coloured yellow on a plan. Lines had been drawn on a map. Sometimes the lines followed a feature visible on the map, and visible ‘on the ground’, such as the edge of a road. Sometimes the lines were drawn across the map without following a visible feature, for example by drawing a straight line across the map between two points or features on the map.

First, there were “the premises known as Knowsthorpe Gate and the public highways of Cross Green Industrial, Leeds LS9 as shown coloured yellow on the attached plan”. This is an area south-east of Leeds City Centre, in the direction of Castleford. The Council gave me this helpful description:

Secondly, there were “the premises known as Low Fields Road, Leeds LS12 from the junction with Gelderd Road to the north and the M621 underpass to the south”. This is an area south-west of Leeds City Centre, in the direction of Huddlesfield. It is across the M621 from Elland Road Football Ground. The Council gave me this helpful description:

Thirdly, there were “the premises known as Thorpe Park and ‘The Springs’ Retail Park, Leeds LS15”. This is an area east of Leeds City Centre, in the direction of Garforth. The Council gave me this helpful description:

The Closure Orders were each expressed in the same way. I will illustrate it by taking the Knowsthorpe Gate Exclusion Zone (emphasis added). This was the operative text of the Closure Order:

So, in each case, the Prohibition as framed is that “the premises” are “closed to”, and “entry” to “the premises” is “prohibited” to:

As has been seen, the Court’s Reason [4] was that “the type of behaviour to be addressed is provided for by PSPOs in the same Act” (§2 above). The Council’s Ground (2) is that the Court “erred in taking account of the availability of PSPOs as a reason to reject the Council’s application for an extension to its closure orders” (§4 above). The Court has not posed a Question about PSPOs (§3 above). But the Court’s reasoning on the Premises Issue, reflected in the Stated Case at §7c (§24 below) is that: “The type of behaviour the Council are seeking to prohibit and regulate, in wide sections of the City, is provided for by way of PSPOs, under Part 4 Chapter 2 of the same Act”. I will need to address this as part of the analysis of the case.

The Council’s position in relation to PSPOs, adopted at the hearing before the Court (26.4.22), is recorded in the Stated Case (at §4c) as follows:

I have described (§§16-19 above) the three exclusion zone “premises” in respect of which the Closure Notices were issued, the Closure Orders were made, and the Extended Closure Orders were sought. The Court’s Reason [1] was that the applications for the Extension did not “meet the definition of particular premises, as set out in the 2014 Act”. As encapsulated in Question (a), the Court’s approach involved:

The Council’s argument on the Premises Issue, as advanced before the Court at the hearing on 26.4.22, is summarised in the Stated Case (at §§4b and 6) as follows:

Ms Bhogal KC maintains that argument on this issue in this appeal. The essence, as I saw it, of her argument on the Premises Issue was as follows. First, the word “premises” has a context-specific meaning. The meaning of “premises” must be the most natural meaning in the context of the 2014 Act, and specifically in the context of Part 4 Chapter 3 of the 2014 Act. No material assistance can be derived from meanings which “premises” has or may have in other statutory contexts. This is for the reason explained in Spring House and recorded in the Stated Case at §6 (§25 above). The golden rule is to identify the ordinary and natural meaning of “premises” in the particular statutory context. No assistance is derived from seeing what meaning “premises” may have in other contexts, or from cases addressing that question.

Secondly, there is no great significance in Parliament’s use of the word “particular” in the phrase “particular premises”. The Court emphasised that phrase repeatedly: see Reason [1]; Question (a); and Stated Case §7b (where it is described as “conclusive”). It was wrong to do so. It is true that Part 4 Chapter 3 uses the phrase “particular premises” in two places. One is s.76(1)(a), which sets out the test for issuing a Closure Notice. The other is s.81(2)(a), which sets out the circumstances in which a Closure Notice may be ordered by the magistrates to continue for up to a further 48 hours. In each case, Parliament has framed the test as including being “satisfied … that the use of particular premises has resulted, or (if the notice is not issued [or continued]) is likely soon to result, in nuisance to members of the public”. However, “particular” premises is simply being used to mean the premises “in question”. It ensures that the premises “in question” must be the source of the problems. This is about there being an existing causal connection. The word “particular” does not inform the meaning of “the premises” and the Court was wrong to think that it did.

Thirdly, and crucially, Limb (b) of the statutory definition of “premises” in s.92(1) (§11 above) is universal and all-embracing. It supplies the answer. It gives the contextual meaning of “premises”. It contains an express definition of “premises”. The definition is deliberately wide. Parliament has made clear in Limb (a) that “any land” will fall within the meaning of “premises”. Parliament has also made clear in Limb (a) that “any … place” will fall within the meaning of “premises”. The word “any” is unmistakeable and deliberate. It applies to “land” and “other place”. The word “place” itself includes “land”, which is why Parliament has included any “other” place. The phrase “any other place” includes anywhere which is not “land”. An example would be a watercourse, such as a reservoir. Limb (a) plainly includes open land. The “land” or “other place” may be “enclosed or not”. That means an open space – land or a place which is not “enclosed” – is included within “premises”. That includes the types of land identified in the White Paper (p.67) as “requiring special consideration” in the context of PSPOs: “registered common land”, a “registered town or village green” or “open access land”. Limb (a) is therefore a universal and all-embracing definition. It will cover anywhere on a map or plan where a line could be drawn and the area within that line could be shaded in yellow. No “land” is excluded. No “place” is excluded. There is no limitation of type, or of size, or of distinctiveness. A line can be drawn on a map or plan, and it need not match any existing distinct feature on the ground, or on the map or plan. None of this is undermined by the fact that Parliament included Limb (b); nor that Parliament used the word “includes”. Limb (a) remains universal and all-embracing. Limb (b) and the word “includes” were used by Parliament ‘for the avoidance of doubt’. If anything, they serve to emphasise the all-embracing scope of “premises”.

Fourthly, there is no basis for any other restriction. (1) There is no reason to interpret Limb (a) as meaning “adjacent” land or place. The Court (Stated Case §7b) referred to the “example” of “a structure and its adjacent land or outbuildings”. In the first place, “premises” is nowhere defined as meaning a “building or structure”. In the second place, “any land” and “any … place” in Limb (a) of the definition of “premises” does not say “any adjacent land” or “any … adjacent place”. It would have been very easy for Parliament to include the word “adjacent” in Limb (a). Especially because Limb (b) was, by contrast, deliberately describing “outbuildings” which are associated with other “premises”. To take an example, a privately-owned open-air car-park – without any building or structure and not “adjacent” to any building and structure – would itself be “premises” under the section 92(1) definition. (2) The word “premises” is not, as the Court reasoned, limited to a “place” which has “access points to which any notice/ order could be affixed” (see Stated Case §7b). This follows from the fact that the “land” or “other place” need not be “enclosed” (see Limb (a)). It may be open land or an open place. Parliament has deliberately referred to “any” land or “other place” and has not restricted the definition to land or places attached to buildings or locations where there are defined points of entry or egress to enable the notices to be displayed. True it is that Parliament imposed notice-fixing requirements in s.79(2)(a)-(c). But Parliament was careful to say in s.79(2) that these steps were to be taken “if possible”, recognising that it may not be “possible”. And Parliament also allowed for other options: including (section 79(2)(d)) giving notice to any person who “appears” to have “control or responsibility for the premises”. (3) Nor is there any basis to exclude a highway from “premises”. Limb (a) – being universal and all-embracing – includes a “highway”. A highway is “land”, as well as being a “place”. A highway falls within “any” land and “any” place. It follows that a highway can, in principle, be the subject of a Closure Order. This analysis is supported by the fact that Parliament did not make any express provision for a modified approach or process where Closure Orders restrict the public right of way over a highway. By contrast, Parliament did precisely these things in s.64 of the 2014 Act in relation to PSPOs. (4) Nor is there any basis to restrict “premises” to a “building or structure”. The word “premises” is not limited to “building or structure”. True, Parliament used the phrase “building or structure”, recognising that “premises” could “form part” of a “building or structure”: see ss.80(8)(b) and 87(1)(b). These are provisions concerned with persons securing access to other parts of the “building or structure”. They apply if the “premises” are “part of a building or structure”. That is why s.87(1) uses the word “where”, to mean ‘in the situation where’. These provisions do not say that “premises” means a “building or structure” or “part of a building or structure”. It is true that the use of the word “premises”, on its own, might have suggested a “building or structure”. But the section 92(1) definition puts the position beyond any possible doubt. It does not say or refer to “building” or “structure”. It would have been easy to say this. And this is what Parliament would have said, had Parliament intended this restricted meaning of “premises”.

Fifthly, a narrowed interpretation – and the narrow interpretation of “premises” adopted by the Court – would undermine the purpose of the statutory scheme. That is because serious anti-social behaviour could not be met with this species of statutory intervention. Closure Orders are an agile, flexible and immediate power. They are designed to protect against anti-social behaviour quickly. This is reflected by the near-immediacy of a Closure Notice, with its coverage for the first 48 hours, followed by the mandatory urgent consideration before the magistrates’ court. The Closure Order is a form of control which can be carefully tailored and targeted (as will be seen in the context of the Prohibition Issue). There is the important New Flexibility (§13 above). This is not an ‘all-or-nothing closure’ of the “land” or “place”. The 2014 Act has, purposefully, provided safeguards. The Closure Order needs to be preceded by a Closure Notice with the required notification and consultation (s.76(6)(7)). Closure Notices have a maximum of 48 hours, Closure Orders a maximum of 3 months, and Extended Closure Orders an overall maximum of 6 months. The Closure Order must be justified as necessary on the grounds in the 2014 Act. The necessity test may be harder to satisfy for a larger, more open or less distinct piece of “land” or “place”. The “premises” will be “situated” so as to be “within” the “area” of a relevant “local authority” (s.92(2)). The Closure Order will need to meet legal standards of certainty and clarity.

Sixthly, the applicability of PSPOs is legally irrelevant. Insofar as Reason [4] and Stated Case §7c indicate that the Court relied – in its interpretation of “premises” – on the provision made for PSPOs, it was wrong to do so, as has been explained (§23 above). A PSPO will apply to a “public place” (s.59(4)), which “means any place to which the public or any section of the public has access, on payment or otherwise, as of right or by virtue of express or implied permission” (s.74(1)). There is a clear overlap, because Limb (a) of the definition of “premises” for Closure Orders (section 92(1)) includes “any … place” and a “public place” is a “place”, as Parliament has made clear. Closure Orders were one of the suite of responses being introduced and made available so as to be able to deal with anti-social behaviour, including in “public places”. PSPOs are available only to the local authority; not the police. PSPOs involve a statutorily-prescribed “necessary consultation” (including of owners and occupiers of land within the restricted area), and “necessary publicity”, before making a PSPO (see s.72(3)(a) and (4)). Special “expedited” PSPOs are available only in cases of public spaces involving protests or demonstrations in the vicinity of a school or vaccination or test and trace site (s.59A(2)(3)). PSPO consultation has been understood, for good reason, to be a careful and lengthy process. The March 2023 Revised Guidance now describes (at pp.65-66) “two weeks” or “shorter” if the “matter is particularly urgent”, but that is new and ambitious. There is no “closest fit” principle by which the existence of PSPOs “cuts down” the statutory power to adopt Closure Orders whose “statutory conditions are satisfied”: see James (§23 above).

I am not able to accept the submissions advanced on behalf of the Council as to the legally correct meaning of “premises” within Part 4 Chapter 3 of the 2014 Act. I do not accept that the use of the words “any land” and any… place” in s.92(1) Limb (a) has the universal and all-embracing meaning attributed to them. I do not accept that the police, local authority or magistrates are being empowered by Part 4 Chapter 3 to draw any line around any chosen area or locality on a map or plan and identify it, by reference to it being “land” or a “place”, as “premises” for the purposes of the statutory powers. Nor do I accept that the police, local authority or magistrates are being empowered to identify or include a highway or highways as “premises” for the purposes of the statutory powers. In my judgment, “premises” for the purposes of Part 4 Chapter 3 calls for decision-makers to focus on whether there is somewhere objectively identifiable as being a distinctive property or distinctive part of a property. That means a property objectively identifiable, in the ‘real world’, ‘on the ground’. I accept that the police, local authority or magistrates can take something which is a distinct part of an objectively identifiable property. So, it could be a floor within a block of flats or even a room in a bed and breakfast. I also accept that police, local authority or magistrates can take a building or structure. So, it could be the entire block of flats or a shopping centre. I also accept that premises can be identified so as to encompass adjoining or linked land or an adjoining or linked building or structure. Or premises can be identified which is land or a place which is open, or which is enclosed. But what, in my judgment, is always necessary is to identify somewhere, objectively identifiable ‘on the ground’ and ‘in the real world’, as a property. Beyond that, whether the facts and circumstances fit with the statutory language is a question of reasonable application for the primary decision-makers (§6 above). Above all, “premises” are not an “area”; they are not a “locality”; they are not ‘any line drawn on a map or plan’. Nor, in any event, do they include a “highway”. I will identify the reasons which have led me to these conclusions.

But first, I will identify a potential argument about the word “includes” in s.92(1). This is an argument which could be raised on behalf of the Persons Unknown, had they a voice in these proceedings, but which I would reject. The argument runs as follows. Limb (a), on its correct interpretation, is doing no more than spelling out that the “premises” – to which a Closure Notice or Closure Order can apply – can include “land” or a “place” which goes with the “building or other structure” necessarily already identified. The word “includes” in s.92(1) is not being used as a non-exhaustive definition of “premises”. It is being used as a permissible inclusion with “premises”. The word “includes” in s.92(1) means “can carry with them”. This interpretative provision is really saying that in a Closure Order “‘premises’ can carry with them (a) any land or other place (whether enclosed or not); and (b) any outbuildings that are, or are used as, part of premises”. Parliament was not saying that “land” could be “premises”. Rather, it was saying that “premises” with which land is associated can be grouped together with that land, as “the premises” identified in a Closure Notice or Closure Order. To see what “premises” means, Parliament has clearly spoken about a “building or other structure” or “part of [a] building or other structure” (s.80(8)(a)). That is why s.79(3) says “the building or other structure in which the premises are situated” and s.80(8)(b) says “the building or structure of which the premises form part”. Note the word “the”; not “any”. It follows that Ms Bhogal KC’s paradigm example of the open-air car-park cannot be “premises”. This approach to “premises” in s.92 is supported by the following. Section 92 is headed “interpretation”. Every other interpretative provision within s.92(1) is a definition: the language chosen is “means” or “has the meaning”. The “interpretation” of “premises” is structured differently. Parliament did not say “means” or “has the meaning”. Parliament said “includes”. What the word “includes” means is that something else can permissibly be included with the “premises” so as to ‘go together with’ them. In that way, Limb (a) and Limb (b) are of the same ‘genus’. Limb (a) is about land or a place which ‘goes with the premises’. Limb (b) is about a building (outbuilding) which ‘goes with the premises’. The “premises” are not “land” or a “place”. They are a building or structure or part of it. That is why the interpretation provision is needed. It means it is not necessary to stop at the building or structure; the yard or garden or outbuilding can be ‘included’ too.

I do not think this line of argument is correct. In my judgment, s.92(1) is an express, but inclusive, definition of “premises”. The word “includes” is used because this is a non-exhaustive definition. Limb (a) is not limited to “land” or a “place” which is adjacent to and associated with “premises”. Limb (a) does not say “adjacent land” or “an adjacent place”. It does not say “land” or a “place” which “is, or is used as, part of premises”. Had Parliament wanted to insist on an associational link, it would have said so. After all, it did so in Limb (b), in referring to “outbuildings that are, or are used as, part of premises”. I note that Parliament also did so in Part 4 Chapter 2 (PSPOs), when using the word “place” in speaking of “a place within the curtilage of premises” (s.62(1)(c)). I also note that the definition of “housing accommodation” for the purposes of Part 1 (civil injunctions to prevent anti-social behaviour) is expressly associational: s.20(1) speaks of “any yard, garden, outhouses and appurtenances belonging to the accommodation or usually enjoyed with it”, as well as “any common areas used in connection with the accommodation”. Parliament did not adopt an associational approach in Limb (a). Nor did it do so for “premises” in Part 4 Chapter 1 (community protection notices) when it said that “‘premises’ includes any land” (s.57). That was in the context of provision about conduct on or affecting premises, the condition of premises and the use to which premises have been put (see ss.44 and 45). Nor is it right that “premises” in Part 4 Chapter 3 must involve a “building or other structure”. The open private car-park is a good example of “premises”. It can be “land” or a “place” which is not “enclosed”. This is notwithstanding ss.79(3) and 80(8)(b) which speak of “the building or other structure in which the premises are situated”. There may be a building or structure; but there may not be. That is why s.87(1) speaks of a situation “where” – ie. if – premises “are part of a building or structure”. For these reasons, I reject this first line of argument as being a reason for dismissing the appeal and resolving the Premises Issue against the Council.

I think the correct analysis does – as Ms Bhogal KC submits – start with the interpretation provision in s.92(1) of the 2014 Act, where express provision is made as to the word “premises” in Part 4 Chapter 3. I also accept that this is a definitional provision. I accept that Limb (a) is saying that “any land” or “any other place” can itself constitute the “premises”. Further, I accept that Parliament conferred power “by regulations to specify premises or descriptions of premises in relation to which a Closure Notice may not be issued” (s.76(8)), which could have narrowed down the scope of “premises” to which the Part 4 Chapter 3 powers could apply, and which has not happened.

But what I cannot accept is that Limb (a) has a universal and all-embracing meaning, so as to include as “premises” any ‘line drawn on a map or plan’, around any chosen ‘area’ or ‘locality’. If Limb (a) were universal and all-embracing, then the definitional provision in s.92(1) itself immediately presents a conundrum. That is for two reasons. In the first place, why would it be necessary or appropriate for Parliament to use the word “includes”? The word “includes” is because other things can also be, or be within, “premises”. The word “includes” in a definition straightforwardly connotes a meaning which is non-exhaustive. In the second place, why would Parliament have included Limb (b) at all? If Limb (a) were – in and of itself – universal and all-embracing, Limb (a) would have been the single and sole content of the definition, with nothing left to say. I cannot accept Ms Bhogal KC’s ‘for the avoidance of doubt’ explanation of Limb (b). There would be no ‘doubt’ for which Limb (b) would be for the ‘avoidance’. The function which Limb (b) is fulfilling is to ensure that any property constituting the premises carries with it any outbuildings that are part of the premises or are used as part of the premises. The function which Limb (a) is fulfilling is to ensure that any property, constituting the premises, may be – or carry with it – land or a place. Limb (a) does not say “adjacent” land or an “adjacent” place. It does not say “land which is or is used as part of premises” or a “place which is always used as part of premises”. However, there is good reason for that. Limb (a) embraces adjacent land or an adjacent place, or land or a place which is or is used as part of premises. But Limb (a) also embraces freestanding land, or a freestanding place. Ms Bhogal KC’s privately-owned open-air car park is, I agree, a paradigm example of “premises” which are open “land”. However, none of this – in my judgment – means “premises” has become ‘anything drawn on a map’, as describing an ‘area’, or a ‘locality’.

The conundrum is resolved, as soon as “premises” is understood as a distinctive property or distinctive part of property. This can be a building or other structure; or part of a building or structure. It can be, or can carry with it, “land” or a “place” (Limb (a)). It can carry with it any relevant “outbuildings” (Limb (b)). This analysis explains the word “includes”. This analysis explains the utility of Limb (b), alongside Limb (a). Everything falls into place.

There are other virtues of treating “premises” as needing something objectively identifiable as a property – or identifiable part of a property – in the ‘real world’ and ‘on the ground’. One virtue is that this – in my judgment – reflects the ordinary and natural meaning of the word “premises” in this particular statutory context. It “includes” land or a place. It need not be a “building or structure” or “part of a building or other structure”. But it must be objectively identifiable as a property or a distinct part of a property. As a matter of ordinary language that is what is understood by “premises”. Especially in this statutory context. Another virtue is that the approach fits with the statutory purpose and function of Part 4 Chapter 3 Closure Notice and Closure Order powers. This part of the 2014 Act is empowering the compulsory closure of premises, by way of action by police or by a local authority. The basic consequence of the compulsory closure of premises – reflected in the statutory scheme – is that the mere act of entering, or being present on, compulsorily-closed premises can constitute a criminal offence. This function and these consequences, in my judgment, bring with them a sense of ‘real-world’ practicality, ‘on the ground’. They call for the “premises” to be distinctive and objectively identifiable ‘on the ground’. There needs to be a distinct property or distinct part of a property which, by its nature, can sensibly be thought of as being compulsory-closable. It needs to be capable of being sensibly thought of as having been compulsorily closed. It needs to be capable of being identified to those who might enter or by present, as having been compulsorily closed. This fits with the four powers which were consolidated into the new power. And the New Flexibility (§13 above) – to which I will return under the Prohibition Issue – is not a ‘game-changer’. The idea of “premises” was the same from 2014 as it was before the 2014 Act. The same interpretative provision was found in the Anti-Social Behaviour Act 2003 ss.11(3), 11L(13); and is still found in the Sexual Offences Act 2003 s.136R(12). There is a principled continuity, so far as “premises” is concerned.

In this way, the word “premises” in part 4 Chapter 3 of the 2014 Act fits against other concepts which Parliament used in relation to other powers, now found as simplified powers within other parts of the 2014 Act. That is another virtue. It involves reading and interpreting statutory provisions alongside what were previously provisions within the same area of regulated concern, and which since 2014 have been within the same enactment. Part 3 of the 2014 Act (dispersal powers) involves action being taken in relation to an “area” or “locality”: see s.35. Part 4 Chapter 1 (community protection notices) involves action being taken in relation to conduct in a “locality”: see s.43. Part 4 Chapter 2 (PSPOs and expedited PSPOs) involves action taken in relation to a “public place” (see s.74(1)) which becomes designated as a “restricted area” (see ss.59, 59A). These are all regulated responses to anti-social behaviour where what can be identified is an area or locality. That can be a line drawn on a map. And Parliament has made that clear. There is another clue about “locality”. Parliament has made provision about occupiers of relevant “premises” within a “locality”: see ss.44, 47 and 57 (for “premises” in the context of Part 4 Chapter 1 community protection notices) and see s.62 (for “premises” in the context of Part 4 Chapter 2 PSPOs). What is striking is that when Parliament in the 2014 Act wishes to regulate anti-social behaviour in an “area” or “locality”, it does not use the concept of “premises” as being the controlling concept to connote the “area” or “locality”. Part of this analysis involves considering PSPOs. In my judgment, the Court’s observations about PSPOs (Reason [4]; Stated Case §(7c)) were legally legitimate as part of an exercise in interpretation of “premises” in Part 4 Chapter 3.

This approach to “premises” fits with the clues within the rest of Part 4 Chapter 3 itself. One clue is that the word “premises” is accompanied by the word “particular” in s.76(1)(a). The Court placed considerable weight on the word “particular” (see Reason [1]; Question (a); and Stated Case §(7b)). I agree with the Court that the word “particular” is illuminating. Section 76(1)(a) is the very first provision contained within Part 4 Chapter 3. It is also a ‘gateway’ provision since it governs the question of whether a Closure Notice can lawfully be issued. Closure Orders (s.80), and extended Closure Orders (s.82), are measures which necessarily (s.80(1)(3)) flow from the Closure Notice. The word “particular” did not appear in the Anti-Social Behaviour Act 2003 ss.1(1) or 11A(1); nor does it appear in the Sexual Offences Act 2003 s.136B. I would agree that Part 4 Chapter 3 is not some new departure from the scope and reach of those other schemes, so far as the meaning of “premises” is concerned. But I think the fact that Parliament would naturally use the word “particular” before “premises” is an indicator. And I do not agree that what “particular” is reflecting is the premises ‘in question’. In my judgment, it is reflecting the ‘distinctive’ nature of premises. So that is one clue. I have noted the provisions which say that a Closure Notice can be varied so as not to apply to “a particular part of the premises” (s.78(1)(b) and (3)) and that a Closure Order “may be made in respect of the whole or any part of the premises…” (s.80(8)(a)). I note that the original Closure Notice applies only to “the particular premises” (s.76(1)(a)). I think Parliament contemplated that a distinctive part of a property could constitute the “premises” in the original Closure Notice, and that “part” of what was identified in the Closure Notice could then be used for a varied Closure Notice or a Closure Order. Be that is may, none of it supports an expansive meaning, allowing any area or locality or any line drawn on a map or plan. Another clue can be found in the repeated references to the “use of” or “behaviour on” premises, alongside repeated references to disorder “near” premises: see ss.76(1), 80(5), 81(2), 82(3), 83(7). I think these support the view that “premises” – in terms of the behaviour and the Closure Notice or Closure Order – are distinctive and not simply anywhere where a line could be drawn on a map or plan.

In my judgment, there is a further and specific problem as to “premises” being or including highways. Once it is recognised that “premises” connotes an objectively identifiable property, or part of a property, this problem disappears. A highway is not in my judgment an objectively identifiable property, or an identifiable part of a property, in any ordinary or natural sense. It is not, in my judgment within the reach or purpose of Closure Orders that they can target a highway (as with Lowfields Road: §18 above) or can identify an area include highways (as with Knowsthorpe Gate and The Springs: §§17, 19 above). If Parliament had been contemplating that a Closure Order might apply to, or include, a public highway it becomes very striking that Parliament made no provision relating to the implications of that. Part 4 Chapter 2 (PSPOs), by clear contrast, contains these very detailed and specific provisions:

I cannot accept that this approach undermines or defeats the statutory purpose of Closure Orders. Closure Orders pursuant to Part 4 Chapter 3 of the 2014 Act are one of a suite of – frequently overlapping – powers conferred by Parliament (§7 above). This is a series of bespoke powers, accompanied by relevant and appropriate safeguards. In relation to “premises” which are or are part of an objectively identifiable property there are the Part 4 Chapter 3 powers with their safeguards. For an “area” or “locality” there are the powers – and safeguards – found elsewhere within the legislation. This is not to adopt a ‘closest fit’ approach, where one overlapping power would impermissibly cut down on the scope of another (§23 above). Rather, it is a ‘correct fit’ approach, where an overlapping power is given its ordinary and nature meaning, in its contextual setting, including in reading the legislation as a whole.

At this point I will address an argument made by Ms Bhogal KC about Closure Orders compared with PSPOs. Ms Bhogal KC does not maintain the point that was made to the Court about financial penalties, but she does maintain the point about consultation and delay (§23 above). She submits as follows. There is a contrast between the “necessary consultation” and “necessary publicity” required for PSPOs by s.72(3)-(6) and the less arduous consultation requirements required for Closure Notices by s.76(6)-(7). Until the most recent Statutory Guidance there was no indication that a PSPO could be used with any urgency. The expedited PSPO is a very narrow category (s.59A) for public places near schools or vaccination sites. A PSPO is not an order taking immediate effect, whereas a Closure Notice can be issued at speed. I have not found these points persuasive on the Premises Issue (or the Prohibition Issue). The fact is that Parliament has conferred powers to prohibit specified things being done within a restricted area, based on consultation steps which Parliament required as necessary. Within the consultation duties and associated regulations there are duties, but also judgment calls, about the nature and degree of consultation. Nothing in the old Statutory Guidance said or suggested that PSPOs could not be deployed with urgency. The current Statutory Guidance reflects the fact that they can, making clear the appropriate length of consultation will depend on the particular circumstances and that if the matter is particularly urgent a consultation period shorter than two weeks is likely to be proportionate (pp.65-66).

Returning to “premises”, I do not think there is ambiguity or obscurity. I think the discernible ‘mischief’ at which Closure Orders are directed involves premises which constitute an objectively identifiable property or objectively distinct part of a property. But there is a degree of reassurance in the Explanatory Notes to the 2014 Act. This is the given example of a Part 4 Chapter 3 Closure Order (at §188):

The history is reassuring too. There was Home Office Guidance in relation to the Anti-Social Behaviour Act 2003 (see Leary at §17). Ms Bhogal KC helpfully found and supplied the 2008 Home Office Guidance on the new Part 1A of that Act, inserted by the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008. It contained this, in a section entitled “the definition of premises” (§3.3):

There is also this historical reference point regarding “highways” and “premises”. It concerns gating orders (§7 above), a pre-2014 Act power governed by Part 8A (ss.129A to 129G) of the Highways Act 1980, inserted by s.2 of the Clean Neighbourhoods and Environment Act 2005. By s.129A, the highway authority was empowered to make a gating order in relation to “any relevant highway”, where satisfied that “premises adjoining or adjacent to the highway are affected by crime or anti-social behaviour” and “the existence of the highway is facilitating the persistent commission of criminal offences or anti-social behaviour”. What is interesting is that Parliament did not there treat the “highway” itself as simply being “premises”, notwithstanding an interpretative provision (s.329) which provided that “‘premises’ includes land and buildings”.

Another reassuring cross-check, so far as concerns “premises” in Part 4 Chapter 3, is the White Paper. It spoke of “particular premises” (at §3.36) when it said: “In some communities there are particular premises that are a constant focus for severe [anti-social behaviour], making the lives of those living nearby misery”. Then, in describing the “community protection order (closure)” – which became the Part 4 Chapter 3 Closure Order – it said this, making repeated reference to a “property”.

So far as authority is concerned, I agree with Ms Bhogal KC that the golden rule (§26 above) is that the Court must find the meaning – the ordinary and natural meaning – in the context of the statutory scheme. This was seen in Spring House (§25 above). There is certainly no ‘read-across’ from other contexts and the Court must proceed with caution in looking at authorities from other contexts. Having said that, I have found it reassuring to find that one theme which has assisted in other contexts is about objective-identifiability on the ground. In February 2008 the House of Lords grappled with the meaning of “premises” within s.47(1) of the Leasehold Reform, Housing and Urban Development Act 1993. The case was Majorstake Ltd v Curtis [2008] UKHL 10 [2008] 1 AC 787. The statutory provision spoke of a landlord’s intention to “redevelop any premises in which the tenant’s flat is contained”. The House of Lords embraced a legal meaning of premises which emphasised “a physical space which is objectively recognisable at the time when the tenant served his notice” (§33) and “an objectively recognisable physical space, something which the landlord, the tenant, the visitor, the prospective purchaser would recognise as ‘premises’” (§39). That was of course a very different distinct statutory context. The golden rule applies: see Majorstake itself at §§44-45. I am not saying for a moment that “premises” in Part 4 Chapter 3 of the 2014 Act has the same meaning as it had in s.47(1) of the 1993 Act in Majorstake. The point is a more subtle one. It is that an idea of objective identifiability on the ground may be a feature of the legally correct contextual understanding of “premises” in a statutory scheme.

For all these reasons, the Court was correct in law in my judgment to identify the “premises” (§§16-19 above) as not being capable of constituting “premises” for the purposes of Part 4 Chapter 3 Closure Orders. My answer is “yes” to Question (a). I reject Ground (1) and, so far as it relates to the Premises Issue, Ground (2).

I have described (§20 above) the “Prohibition” in respect of which the Extended Closure Orders were sought. The “premises” are described as “closed to all persons … when participating in car cruising or ‘car meet’ events on [the premises]”.

The Court rejected the Prohibition as incompatible with the scope of the statutory powers. Its Reasons [2] and [3] were that “the legislation is designed to prohibit access by all people/ at all times/ in all circumstances except to those specified by the court”; and that “there is a positive expectation that the court will detail the access allowed and not, as in these cases, that which is not allowed”. As encapsulated in Question (b), the Court’s approach involved “construing s.80(7) of the 2014 Act, to require a positive exception of specified access permitted, detailed in the Order” so that the Order could not “be phrased so as to exclude only those persons (unknown) engaged in a specified activity, such as ‘car cruising’”. The Stated Case explains (at §§(3a), (7a), (7c) and (8)) that the Court’s reasoning was as follows:

The Council’s argument on the Prohibition Issue, as advanced before the Court at the hearing on 26 April 2022, is summarised in the Stated Case (at §(4a)) as follows:

Ms Bhogal KC maintains the argument in this appeal. The essence, as I saw it, of her argument on the Prohibition Issue was as follows. Closure Notices and Closure Orders can operate so as to ‘prohibit specific things being done’ on the premises. That is for the following reasons. First, the Part 4 Chapter 3 powers have the New Flexibility (§13 above) seen in s.76(3) (§8 above) and s.80(7) (§9 above). This allows for Closure Notices and Closure Orders to be tailored by reference to “persons”, “times” and “circumstances”. Although the word is “closure”, these are not ‘all or nothing’ powers. They can be highly tailored and targeted. Police officers and those authorised to enter and carry out essential maintenance or repairs are already “authorised persons” who can enter (s.85). Other entry can be permitted: (i) by reference to specified persons or specified descriptions of persons; (ii) by reference to specified times; and (iii) by reference to specified circumstances. The idea of specified “circumstances”, moreover, materially adds to what is meant by specified “persons” and “times”. Suppose for example there is a tenant whose flat is being exploited by drug dealers (cf. Leary: §13 above). There could be a Closure Order, but it could specify the tenant, family members and social workers as being permitted to enter the “closed” flat. Or suppose there is a car-park which is used by drug-dealers at night. There could be a Closure Order, but it could specify that the car-park remains open to anyone between 6am and 10pm. There are many ways in which a Closure Order could be tailored and targeted by reference to persons, times and circumstances. There could be a prescribed category of person to whom the premises are not closed, defined by reference to their actions: eg. any person while conducting a visit as a social worker. A Closure Order in relation to a flat could be targeted and tailored to prohibit actions (drug-dealing) or specified persons (those participating in drug-dealing) on the premises. A Closure Order in relation to a car-park could be targeted and tailored to prohibit actions (participating in ‘car racing’) or specified persons (those participating in ‘car-racing’) on the premises. These are prohibitions on access by identifying “circumstances” and/or “specified descriptions” of “persons”.

Secondly, it is true that ss.76(3) and 80(7) (§§8-9 above) are powers described by Parliament on an ‘all-except-this’ basis. But it is entirely consistent with that statutory design for the Closure Order to ‘prohibit specific things being done’ on the premises. After all, that which is ‘prohibited’ and that which is ‘permitted’ are two sides of the same coin. An ‘all-except-this’ prohibition is, in substance, the same as an ‘only-this’ prohibition. To prohibit entry to premises except in the hours 6am-10pm (‘all-except-this’) is exactly the same as prohibiting entry only in the hours 10pm-6am (‘only-this’). To prohibit entry to all persons except those aged 18 and over (‘all-except-this’) is exactly the same as prohibiting entry only to those aged 17 and under (‘only-this’). To prohibit entry to all persons except family members (‘all-except-this’) is exactly the same as prohibiting only non-relatives (‘only-this’). It follows that whether a Closure Order is expressed as ‘all-except-this’ or ‘only-this’ is not a question of substance, but of drafting. The scope of the statutory power is a question of substance, not drafting. Provided what is being prohibited fits – in substance – with the statutory power, the drafting of the Closure Order can be done in whatever language promotes certainty and clarity. Neither s.76(3) nor s.80(7) requires drafting in any particular way. They speak of what a Closure Notice or Order “may prohibit”. Indeed, unlike the parallel provision for PSPOs (s.59(6)) they do not speak of how an Order “may be framed”. Accordingly, Closure Notices and Closure Orders can be framed to ‘prohibit specific things being done’ on the premises. In rejecting that possibility, the Court confused drafting with substance. It spoke of prohibiting people, times and circumstances “except … those specified by the Court” (Reason [2]; Stated Case §§(3a), (7a) and (8)), so that “the court will detail the access allowed” (Reason [3]; Stated Case §(7a)), with “a positive exception … detailed in the Order” (Question (b)). But these are all concerned with the way in which the Order is drafted. And s.76(3) and s.80(7) are concerned with substance, not drafting.

Thirdly, this approach reflects and promotes the purpose and policy of the 2014 Act and of Part 4 Chapter 3. The purpose and policy are for anti-social behaviour within premises to be eliminated with flexibility and immediacy, applying a necessity test (ss.76(1), 80(5)). The purpose and policy are promoted if – and undermined unless – Closure Notices and Closure Orders can operate so as to ‘prohibit specific things being done’ on the premises. So, if the relevant anti-social behaviour on the premises is drug dealing, the Closure Notice or Closure Order can prohibit access to the premises for persons of a specified description (those participating in drug-dealing) or in specified circumstances (when participating in drug-dealing). Or take the example that the Council gave to the Court: “begging” (Stated Case §(4a): §52 above). The Closure Notice or Closure Order can prohibit access to the premises for persons of a specified description (those participating in begging); or it can prohibit access in specified circumstances (when participating in begging). An offence will be committed where a person enters or remains on premises “in contravention of” a Closure Notice or Closure Order (s.86(1)(2)). In the present case, the “contravention” – spelled out in the Closure Orders – was participating in car cruising or car meet events. The Closure Orders provide that all persons are prohibited entry to the premises in the following circumstances: when participating in car cruising or car meet events. That is a tailored and targeted prohibition. It fits with the statutory powers. It ensures the promotion, rather than the frustration, of the statutory purpose and policy. The prohibition was squarely within the statutory powers, albeit overlapping with PSPOs. The Court was wrong to find otherwise.

I am not able to accept the submissions advanced on behalf of the Council as to the legally correct meaning of the prohibition described in s.80(7). I do not accept that it falls within the scope of the statutory power to make a Closure Order (or issue a Closure Notice) which “prohibits specific things being done” on the premises. I do not accept that this – and the Prohibition in this case – is consistent with the power in s.80(7). I will explain why. In doing so, I will focus on Closure Orders and s.80(7). But the same points can be made in relation to Closure Notices and s.76(3).

First, Parliament’s expression in s.80(7) of the nature of the prohibition being empowered is careful and specific. A Closure Order can (s.80(7), emphasis added):

Secondly, Parliament’s expression in s.80(7) involves a clear and unmistakeable contrast with what was said in relation to PSPOs, in s.59(4) and (6) (emphasis added):

Interestingly, the Explanatory Notes give aggressive begging as a paradigm example of anti-social behaviour (§8) and describe PSPOs as intended to deal “with particular nuisance or problem in a particular area… by imposing conditions on the use of that area” (§173). Similarly, the White Paper gives as an illustration a PSPO “to prevent groups from using a public square as a skateboard park” (§3.26), explaining (p.63) that PSPOs can be “targeted against certain behaviours by certain groups at certain times”. I have found no indication in any material that Closure Powers have that function.

Thirdly, there is an obvious reason why the flexibility of Closure Orders does not extend to the sort of tailoring and targeting seen for PSPOs. The answer is that these are – by their nature and description – orders for compulsory “closure”, of premises. It makes sense that they should have a nature which reflects a common sense understanding of “closure” of premises. It makes sense to say that a “closure of premises” can involve “exceptions”. The “exceptions” can involve specified “times”, specified “persons” or specified “descriptions of persons”, or specified “circumstances”. Such “exceptions” are consistent with the idea that the “premises” have compulsorily been “closed”. The “closure” – having regard to its “exception” or “exceptions” – must meet the test of necessity (s.80(5)). A measure whose necessary essence involves prohibiting access only by a specified person or specified persons or a specified description of person, or (subject to a point to which I will return) only at a specified time or times, or only in specified circumstances presents this problem. It would involve so-called “closure” not being, in nature, closure at all. As has been seen, the powers within Part 4 Chapter 3 are part of a suite of powers to deal with anti-social behaviour. Other powers allow the targeting of persons, and of actions. Parliament could easily have chosen to make orders under Part 4 Chapter 3 capable of being a “prohibition” on an activity. In the Council’s examples, that would be begging or drug-dealing. Parliament could have chosen to make orders under Part 4 Chapter 3 capable of “contravention” (s.86(2)) through the activity of begging or drug-dealing. The New Flexibility (§13 above) could have extended this far. It could have extended as far as the nature of PSPOs. But this would have been an odd type of “closure of premises” order. What matters is that this was not the “closure of premises” order for which Parliament was making provision. Parliament would not have designed the prohibition as it did. It would have language equivalent to that which is found for PSPOs in s.59.

Fourthly, this means there is a real significance – as a matter of substance – in the fact that s.80(7) is expressed, in all three respects (persons, times and circumstances), as empowering an ‘all-except-this’ prohibition. I agree with Ms Bhogal KC that it is important to focus on substance. I accept that ‘all-except-this’ and ‘only-this’ can be two sides of the same coin. I also accept that it would not be unlawful for a Closure Order prohibition, whose substance matches the power conferred by Parliament, to be ‘drafted’ differently for clarity and simplicity. I accept, moreover, that a Closure Order may be tailored so that – viewed in the round – the premises are more ‘open’ than they are ‘closed’. These points are well illustrated by considering prohibited access “only at specified times” (s.80(7)(b)). To speak of prohibited access ‘at all times except 6am-10pm’ (‘all-except-this’) is, I accept, exactly the same as to speak of prohibited access only at ‘10pm-6am’ (‘only-this’). A Closure Order using the latter formulation would be clear and, in my judgment, lawful. It would also mean premises ‘open’ 16 hours a day (6am-10pm) and ‘closed’ only 8 hours a day (10pm-6am). It may be (and this is the point to which I said I would return) that a prohibition on access “at all times except” could always instead be framed as “only at specified times”, in which case those two phrases are always identical. But there is, in my judgment, an acid test which unlocks all of this. The acid test is to ask whether the prohibition can be framed as an ‘all-except-this’ prohibition on access only by having an ‘exception’ which is itself an ‘all-except-this’ exception. I will explain:

Take the example of a prohibition on entry of premises by Jo Smith. How could this ever be a Closure Order which “prohibit[s] access … by all persons except those specified”? It could only do so if it were framed as follows:

Fifthly, the Court was recognising precisely this problem on this aspect of the case. The Court, rightly in my judgment, recognised that it does not fall within the scope of the statutory power to make a Closure Order which “prohibits specific things being done” on the premises. It recognised, rightly in my judgment, that the Prohibition in this case was not consistent with the power carefully conferred by Parliament in s.80(7). It comes to this. How could the Prohibition in this case be a Closure Order which prohibits access “by all persons except those of a specified description”? How could the Prohibition be a Closure Order which prohibits access “in all circumstances except those specified”? I put this to Ms Bhogal KC. Necessarily, in my judgment, she has to seek to fit the Prohibition with the statutory power by impermissible contortion. She has to characterise these – in substance – as Closure Orders by which (in terms of “circumstances”):

For all these reasons, the Court was correct in law in my judgment to identify the Prohibition (§20 above) as not falling within the powers to make Part 4 Chapter 3 Closure Orders. My answer is “yes” to Question (b). I reject Ground (3) and, so far as it relates to the Prohibition Issue, Ground (2).

This is a case where the Court spotted two distinct legal problems with the Closure Orders whose extension was being pursued by the Council. One was about whether these were in law “premises”. The other was about whether this was in law “closure”. The Court saw these as fundamental problems, either of which was fatal to the legality of the Closure Orders. I have concluded that the Court was in substance correct on both issues. My conclusion is that the Court made no material error of law and the Council’s appeal must be dismissed. Having circulated this judgment as a confidential draft, there was no consequential matter raised. The appeal is dismissed.