Director of Public Prosecutions, R (on the application of) v Crown Court at Caernarfon & Anor

This claim for judicial review challenges a decision made by His Honour Judge Huw Rees sitting at the Caernarfon Crown Court on 3^rd October 2018. On that date, the judge determined an application for disclosure under s.8 of the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 (CPIA) made in the context of an appeal against a conviction for a speeding offence contrary to s.89(1) of the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984. The Interested Party (Mr Davies) had been convicted of driving at 38mph on a 30mph zone of the A546 at Deganwy. The trial had taken place on 18^th July 2018, and had been preceded by a disclosure application similar to that which HHJ Rees allowed during the appeal proceedings, which had been rejected by the District Judge (Crime) who dealt with it.

The evidence on which the prosecution relied came from a speed enforcement session on the 31^st August 2017 when designated civilian officers observed a stretch of the road and used an approved measurement device, an LTi 20.20 Ultralyte 1000, with a Ranger system to make a video record of the use of the device and its results. It appears that two different people were able to say they had observed Mr. Davies’ car and formed the view that it was exceeding the speed limit. The device was then targeted on his car and produced the speed reading of 38mph. The justices having heard the evidence of one of them, a Mr. David Hoole, convicted Mr. Davies. They also heard evidence from Mr. Stephen Langdon, an expert called on behalf of the prosecution. He was called as an expert in the use and reliability of the Ultralyte device, and in response to the service of an expert report from Mr. William Campbell on behalf of the defence. In the event, Mr. Campbell was not called at the trial.

The application for disclosure decided by HHJ Rees was made in writing and sought, so far as relevant:-

The speed enforcement session had taken some hours and involved observing and filming a number of vehicles, in addition to that of Mr. Davies. The whole of the video footage of the 12 seconds or so when his car was filmed had been disclosed, and was viewed by HHJ Rees during the hearing of the disclosure application. In addition, the report of Mr. Langdon contained stills from that section, and also two stills from a section about an hour before the appearance of Mr. Davies which he said contained “some evidence of a fixed distance check/0mph check, cross hair alignment and scope alignment”. Apart from that, despite repeated requests from the solicitors for Mr. Davies communicated in various ways, the prosecution had refused to disclose any more of the recording. This is the dispute which HHJ Rees resolved in his ruling which is now the subject of this challenge.

It is necessary first to set out something about the statutory warrant for the admissibility of “speed gun” evidence, which is found in s.20 of the Road Traffic

a record produced by a prescribed device, and

(in the same or another document) a certificate as to the circumstances in which the record was produced signed by a constable or by a person authorised by or on behalf of the chief officer of police for the police area in which the offence is alleged to have been committed; but subject to the following provisions of this section.

A record produced or measurement made by a prescribed device shall not be admissible as evidence of a fact relevant to proceedings for an offence to which this section applies unless—

the device is of a type approved by the Secretary of State, and

any conditions subject to which the approval was given are satisfied.

Any approval given by the Secretary of State for the purposes of this section may be given subject to conditions as to the purposes for which, and the manner and other circumstances in which, any device of the type concerned is to be used.

In proceedings for an offence to which this section applies, evidence—

of a measurement made by a device, or of the circumstances in which it was made, or

that a device was of a type approved for the purposes of this section, or that any conditions subject to which an approval was given were satisfied,

For the purposes of this section a document purporting to be a record of the kind mentioned in subsection (1) above, or to be a certificate or other document signed as mentioned in that subsection or in subsection (6) above, shall be deemed to be such a record, or to be so signed, unless the contrary is proved.

The Ranger device produced the record permitted by s.20(1)(a), and the certificate permitted by s.20(1)(b) was signed by Mr. Overton, one of the officers involved with Mr. Hoole in the speed enforcement session. The provision makes admissible the record and certificate to prove a “fact relevant to the proceedings”. The Ultralyte device is a prescribed device of a type approved by the Secretary of State, and there is no evidence that any conditions subject to which approval was given were not satisfied.

It was in this legal context that the application was determined by HHJ Rees. It was dealt with in written arguments which he read and by quite brief legal submissions from counsel who prosecuted, Mr. Rothwell. The judge did not call upon Mr. Ford to supplement his written submissions, which were dated 23^rd September 2018 and which we have seen.

It is important to record that after Mr. Campbell’s report was disclosed as expert evidence, an attack on his expertise was mounted by the prosecution and supported by material in the report of Mr. Langdon. He was not called as a witness before the magistrates when Mr. Davies was convicted. His report was, therefore, abandoned. The Defence Statement had asserted an intention to rely on the evidence of Mr. Campbell and was not updated. By the time the case arrived in the Crown Court the position so far as expert evidence for the defence was concerned had changed, but there had been no new report from any other expert served. This change of position is discernible in three places.

First, Karen Dixon, District Crown Prosecutor with oversight of this case for the prosecution says this in her statement prepared for these proceedings:-

Secondly, in Mr. Ford’s written submissions in support of the application dated 23^rd

Finally, in the Response to this claim served on behalf of Mr. Davies, it is said, at paragraph 19(ii) that

Taking these three sources together, it appears that a decision had been taken not to rely on Mr. Campbell in support of the appeal, but to consider calling a Mr. Watkinson instead. He was therefore a “potential defence expert” only. The Defence

Nothing of that kind was ever said about Mr. Watkinson, and, importantly, no report from Mr. Watkinson was ever served.

In order to explain the terms of the judgment on the application, it is necessary also to record that Mr. Ford’s submissions had said, in addition to seeking disclosure of the material under s.8 of the CPIA 1996 as unused material:

The Judge when deciding the application, saw the footage of Mr. Davies’ car twice, and then read a skeleton argument supplied by Mr. Rothwell for the prosecution. That had not reached him although it had apparently been emailed to the listing office on the day before the hearing. There was then this exchange between the judge and Mr.

After a discussion about the significance of the fact that the prosecution expert had formed an opinion without apparently viewing the whole of the footage, the judge said that he did not need to trouble Mr. Ford. He then gave the following ruling:-

There is nothing wrong with very brief rulings in applications of this kind, but they must make clear what the ruling is, and the basis on which it was made. I interpret this ruling as follows:-

The judge did not base himself on a finding that the undisclosed footage of other cars was “primary evidence”. Footage recording the use of a prescribed device is admissible as a record of the measurement taken by the device of Mr. Davies’ speed under s.20(1)(a) of the 1988 Act, see [5] above. It is hard to see

The judge ruled that the unused footage was disclosable because he believed that an expert (he did not say who) had said that he needed it to form an opinion on “this piece of evidence”. He did not say why that brief observation resulted in a decision that the disclosure test in s.3 and 7A of CPIA was met.

Mr. Heptonstall, appearing for the Director of Public Prosecutions in these judicial review proceedings, submits that this was a decision which was not properly open to the judge. He accepts that, as an interlocutory decision in proceedings which, though appellate, amount to a new trial it is reviewable only in the circumstances explained by the Divisional Court in R (oao DPP) v. Manchester and Salford Magistrates’

As to the substance of the challenge, he submits that this case is indistinguishable from the Manchester and Salford Magistrates’ Court decision. He invites the court to reject the attempts to distinguish that decision contained in paragraph18 of Mr. Davies’ Response to these proceedings.

As to the two stills of the siting check referred to at [4] above which are included in the report of Mr. Langdon, Mr. Heptonstall says that a focussed application for that 10 seconds of footage would not have been resisted. He submits that this, however, was not the basis on which the application was made or dealt with by the judge. He accepts that if this request is made now, it will be complied with.

At an earlier stage in these proceedings, and in writing, it appeared that some procedural complaints might be advanced, but Mr. Heptonstall has accepted that in view of CrimPR Part 15.5(4) the court has a broad discretion as to the procedure it adopts when ruling on an application under s.8 of CPIA and he does not pursue his procedural complaints.

As to the primary evidence issue, Mr. Heptonstall submits that this was not the basis on which the decision was reached by the judge on what was, in any event, an application under s8 of CPIA for disclosure of unused material.

Mr. Mark Ford, appearing for Mr. Davies, relies on Crim PR 19.3(d) which he says requires production of the footage from which earlier stills of the siting check were taken by Mr. Langdon. He submits that this should have been disclosed as material on which the prosecution expert had relied. He invites the court to infer that this was the basis on which the judge ordered disclosure, in the absence of any indication in the ruling that this was so.

In relation to the Manchester and Salford Magistrates’ Court decision, he adopts his paragraph 18 of his Response to this claim which says:-

In DPP v. MSMC the court was concerned with requests for material in prosecutions for driving with excess alcohol. The disclosure requests related to comprehensive documentation concerning the Lion Intoxilyzer device used in the breath testing procedure. The court considered a prosecution expert report from Dr Williams de bene esse. It explained that the Itoxilyzer carries out a calibration check before and after the subject provides his or her breath specimens to ensure each are accurately analysed for the alcohol content. If faulty, the device will not work at all. Thus, the evidential proof that the device was working properly was served as part of the prosecution case. In the present matter, the distance checks referred to in Mr .Langdon’s report have not been served; that is one aspect of the evidence the defence expert would be invited to consider;

The certificates and engineering logs sought by the defence in DPP v. MSMC were not in the possession of the prosecution, but were obtained by request from the manufacturer of the device, Lion Laboratories Limited. Therefore, none of it came into the prosecutor’s possession in connection with the case against the accused. By contrast, the footage in the present case was generated for the purpose of prosecuting the defendant; all that the Crown has done is to select a part of it;

The defence experts in DPP v. MSMC [named] whose reports were also considered by the court de bene esse simply ignored the printouts. The disclosure request was made to enable the defendant to examine the evidence that purports to establish his speed accurately.”

In summary of that argument he says that the decision really decides that a vague hope that material helpful to the defence may emerge cannot justify an order for disclosure of material not in the possession of the prosecution. In this case, he says, the point is different because the material has always been in the possession of the prosecution.

As to jurisdiction, I am entirely satisfied that this is an appropriate case in which to permit a challenge by judicial review to an interlocutory decision. The tests identified by Sir Brian Leveson in Manchester and Salford Magistrates’ Court cited above at [19] are clearly met. The disclosure issue potentially affects a large number of similar cases and it is important that it should be resolved, whether ultimately the appeal against conviction by Mr. Davies succeeds or not.

As to the substance of the challenge, it seems to me that the issue raised is fully covered by authority and the Criminal Procedure Rules. It is unfortunate that the judge was not referred to either, by either side. It is, however, fair to point out that the judge was referred, by prosecuting counsel who then appeared, to the defence statement and the test for disclosure in the CPIA, which he appears to have been referring to by the phrase “various procedural aspects” in his exchange with Mr. Rothwell set out at [15] above. The matters to which he was then alluding did not feature explicitly in his decision.

It does not seem that the judge ever asked to see a report from the expert he referred to in his decision. I have set out the references to that expert in the skeleton submissions of Mr. Ford, and in the hearing of 17^th September at [8]-[12] above. That appears to be the sole basis on which the judge concluded that he should order disclosure so that an expert could examine the footage recorded by the device of vehicles other than that of Mr. Davies. It is understandable that he may have wished to deal with this speeding case with a degree of despatch in what may have been a busy list, but it is unfortunate that he did not reflect with rigour (at least in his reasons for his decision) on the factual basis on which the application was made and the test for ordering disclosure of unused material. He did not decide that the material sought was “primary evidence” only that it may have been. The decision, therefore, is to be understood as a decision about unused material, which is disclosable only if it might reasonably be considered capable of undermining the case for the prosecution against the accused or of assisting the case for the accused. Even without the benefit of authority, it is questionable whether an opinion from an expert which has not been disclosed, and which is rejected by that of an expert whose opinion has been disclosed could be a basis for reasonably considering that the unused material was capable of satisfying the test. Once authority is considered, the position is very clear.

This is an issue which goes beyond the facts of the present case. If the unused footage should be disclosed in this case, on this basis, it should be disclosed in many, many other cases. This will cause delay and expense and will stretch the resources of the criminal justice system. If that result must follow from a proper application of the rules, so be it. It should not, however, be brought into being by a decision which does not properly apply the law. The rules represent a carefully balanced mechanism whereby the disclosure necessary in the interests of a fair trial is given, without imposing substantial and unnecessary burdens. The interests of justice require a fair trial in all cases, but this will generally be achieved by a proper application of

S.3, 7A and 8 of CPIA; ii) CrimPR Part 15;

The Attorney General’s Guidelines on Disclosure;

In cases such as the present, CrimPR Part 19, which deals with experts;

The law explained by the Divisional Court in the Manchester and Salford

Second, it is not enough for one or more experts to say that the material is necessary to verify that the device was reliable in the language used in the reports of Dr Mundy and Miss Dale in support of the application for disclosure. Nor does the written application for s8 disclosure provide any evidential basis for it. It is not enough to say that the defence case is that the amount drunk would not put the defendant over the limit or anywhere near it, and therefore the machine must be unreliable. What the evidence needed to do, in order to provide a basis for such a disclosure order was to address two critical features.

The first requirement is the basis for contending how the device might produce a printout which, on its face, demonstrated that it was operating in proper fashion, but which could generate a very significantly false positive reading, where, on the defence case, the true reading would have been well below the prosecution limit. The second requirement is to identify how the material which was sought could assist to demonstrate how that might have happened. Those are the two issues which arise and which the expert evidence in support of disclosure should address. Unless that evidence is provided, the disclosure is irrelevant.”

Crim PR part 19.3 provides

the court officer, and

each other party;

In the absence of a report served in support of the application for disclosure which established the matters identified in paragraph 56 of the Manchester Justices case it was not properly open to the judge to grant the order sought. Mr. Davies relied upon the opinion of an expert, apparently Mr. Watkinson, to show that he needs all of the footage in order to express an opinion on any of it. That opinion was essential to the disclosure application. In breach of CPR 19.3(3)(b) no report setting it out in proper terms so that it could be evaluated by the court was ever served. In these circumstances the disclosure application was entirely misconceived and the only proper course open to the judge was to reject it.

That is a sufficient basis on which to deal with this claim, but I deal briefly with some of the other issues which have been raised.

I do accept that there is a factual distinction between this case and the Manchester and Salford Magistrates’ Court case in that here, the unused material was in the possession of the police and was therefore prosecution material, contrary to some suggestions made earlier in the proceedings. In the earlier case, the prosecution did not have it, but were able to call for it. This factual distinction does not affect the principles enunciated in that decision. In the absence of some evidential basis for concluding that the unused material might undermine the prosecution case or assist that of the defence, there is no proper basis for ordering disclosure in a case of this kind. That is the essence of the decision in the Manchester and Salford Magistrates case and that is indistinguishable in principle from this case.

I do not consider that Mr. Ford’s first submission has merit. The judge did not make an order for the production of the material which had been examined by the prosecution expert under CrimPR Part 19.3(d). He ordered disclosure of it all, whether examined by Mr. Langdon or not, because of the assertion that an expert witness had said that he needed it in order to form an opinion. That conclusion was flawed by the fundamental error of relying on expert evidence without seeing it, as I have said.

For these reasons, this application for judicial review succeeds and the judge’s order is quashed. We make no order in relation to the siting check footage because no specific application limited to that has ever been made, and it is accepted that, if the request is made, it will be complied with.