Bates & Anor, R (on the application of) v Langstaff

This is a case about the ability of two individuals who were infected, or affected, by contaminated blood or blood products during the 1970s and 1980s to be represented at The Infected Blood Inquiry, which is currently ongoing, by a specific legal representative who they have personally selected, and in whom they have placed their trust.

The first Claimant is Mr Bates, who is a haemophiliac who was infected with Hepatitis A, B

Despite the hardships which his illness has forced upon the Claimants and the many

The reason why they are here, represented before the Court today, is that the Defendant, the Chair of the Inquiry, has refused to recognise their selected solicitors as recognised legal representatives within the terms of the Rules.

The further background to this is that on 28 February 2019 the Claimants authorised a firm called MLaw to act on their behalf in relation to the Inquiry. I have had it explained to me, and I entirely accept, how much effort was put into that determination and how very important it is to them.

On 11 July 2019, MLaw applied for the Claimants to be recognised as “core participants” in the Inquiry, and those applications ask that MLaw be recognised as the legal representatives of the Claimants. Documents which evidence the lobbying and campaigning for address and for the public inquiry, evidencing the work which the Claimants had done, were attached to the applications. By determinations dated 29 August 2019 the Defendant decided that each of the Claimants would be grant “core participant” status, but he refused to designate MLaw as their “recognised legal representative”. This is an approach which he has taken in relation to some other applications for “core participant status” also. The terms of that refusal are set out at paragraph. 14 of the Claimants' skeleton:

The decision cross-refers to another decision in a related case, namely one of 22 March

The Claimants seek to challenge the Defendant's decisions refusing to designate MLaw as their recognised legal representative because of the very great concern which they have to have available to them those legal representatives they have so carefully selected, and in whose expertise they have so much faith. This is very clear to me, and their position is, I should make plain, entirely understandable.

The first and really main ground of challenge is that the Defendant misinterpreted and misapplied Rule 7 of the Inquiry Rules 2006 ,(“the 2006 Rules”). A further ground of review, although it was accepted that it is, in essence, hand in glove with the first ground, is that viewed in context, and in the light of the importance of the issues at stake for the Claimants, the Defendant's decisions were irrational.

Permission to apply for judicial review was refused on the papers by Chamberlain J on 18

On 25 October 2019 the Claimants filed this application to renew their application for permission, which has taken place before me this morning. During the course of the submissions which have been made, I have been very much assisted by detailed and careful skeleton arguments lodged by both parties, and by the oral submissions of Miss Kentridge, who appears for the Claimants.

The case, as now advanced, focuses on the first ground, the main issue being that the Rules were construed more narrowly than was necessary, and what is added by way of expansion, though the Defendant would say that they are new grounds in themselves, are four so-called anomalies:

The approach taken in relation to the Claimants was inconsistent with the approach taken by the Defendant in relation to the approval of four other legal representatives at an earlier stage.

The approach gives rise to unintended consequences, because if Rule 6 is the only gateway to the designation of an additional recognised legal representative for a “core participant”. The Claimants can never achieve this because, as between the two of them they necessarily fall within the terms of Rule 7.

The explanation adopted erroneously places upon “core participants” such as the Claimants, the burden of showing that the condition specified in Rule 7(1) are not met when the terms of Rule 7 make clear that the questions of whether these conditions are met are an assessment to be made by the Defendant at each case.

The approach fails to take into account the other language and effect of Rule 6(1)(b), in particular a dichotomy which is said to arise as regards to the approach to witnesses.

Despite the fullness and care with which this case has been argued, I am not persuaded that the points relied are arguable. I will start with the legal backdrop. The Inquiry is established under section 1 of the Inquiries Act 2005 (“the 2005 Act”). Pursuant to sections

Section 17(3) of the Inquiries Act 2005 (“the Act”) provides:

the person played, or may have played, a direct

the person has a significant interest in an

the person may be subject to explicit or

a core participant, other than a core participant

any other person required or permitted to give

This Rule applies where there are two or more core

their interests in the outcome of the inquiry are

the facts they are likely to rely on in the course

it is fair and proper for them to be jointly

The Chairman must direct that those core participants

Subject to paragraph (4), any designation must be

If no agreement on a designation is forthcoming within a

The Claimants’ first ground of challenge against the Defendant’s refusal to designated MLaw as their recognised legal representative is that it derives from an incorrect interpretation of Rule 7 of the 2006 Rules. Their second ground is that, views in its full context, and in light of the importance of the issues at stake for the Claimants, the refusal was irrational.

As the Defendant submitted, the exercise which I have to perform is, to some extent, informed by the fact that the Body whose decision is sought to be challenge is an Inquiry. The Defendant has referred me in this connection in its ground, to some relevant law, in particular R(On the Application of Associated Newspapers) v The Rt Hon Lord Justice

I note the submission made on behalf of the Claimants that this test places the hurdle too high. I do not accept this submission. While I do accept, as I must, what Lord Mance said in

Although the challenge here concentrates on the question of error of law, which must be

I conclude, as I have said, that the hurdle cannot be met, but I will also add that, even were the standard of review not quite so high as those authorities suggest, my conclusion on this matter, which is effectively a question of construction, would not be different in any respect.

One of the things which is noteworthy about this application is that, really, not a huge attempt has been made by the Claimants to construe the relevant provisions of the Rules as a coherent whole, so as to explain or justify the conclusion to which they come.

The way that the argument is put forward is, in some ways, an argument based on a misreading of the facts. The Claimants say that because other firms were appointed, for example, and because Rule 7(4) contains the word "may" it somehow follows that the Chairman can simply continue to add legal representatives for each new “core participant” recognised. This is an approach which flies in the face of sense, as well as of a coherent

I have said that this Court would obviously be unwilling to come to this conclusion if another sensible construction offered itself. There is another sensible construction. A sensible construction is that offered by the Inquiry, and so very carefully set out by

The scheme set up by the Rules is clear. Rule 7(1) works out the question of who can, and should sensibly, in the interests of justice, expedition and maintaining reasonable costs, be regarded as sufficiently aligned as to be represented by one legal representative. Rule 6 ensures that where core participants are not aligned, each can have legal representation of their choice.

Rule 7(2) then, on its face, and in the most explicit terms, imposes a duty; that duty in any

The potential complications are imposed by sections 7(3) and 7(4). They are essentially procedural expansions of how that power is to work. If possible, the legal representation is to be agreed. If there is no agreement within a reasonable time section.7(4) expands the “may”, which appears in section7(2). The result is that the Chair does not have to designate a lawyer but he may do so, and any lawyer that he may designate must comply with certain provisions, in the sense of being an appropriate lawyer who, in his opinion, has sufficient knowledge and experience to act in this capacity. What is, however, clear there is no provision, as was tacitly submitted, that it should be the case for any participant to have representation by a lawyer whom he could trust, that is, that there is no provision guaranteeing a participant of the lawyer of his choice.

It appears to me, looking at the decision that, (perhaps unsurprisingly,) the Respondent's application of the Rules was faultless. First, there is the question of whether the Claimants fell within Rule 7(1). Chamberlain J said:

This is plainly right. There can be no challenge to the Respondent's determination that the Claimants fell under Rule 7(1), nor has one ever been suggested. I note that the Claimants accept that they “necessarily fall within Rule 7”, however this acceptance appears to be on a different basis to that advanced by the Defendant, and a somewhat fallacious one. Their position within Rule 7 does not rest on their shared interest inter se, but on their shared interest with other core participants, as is apparent from the way the Defendant dealt with the matter, which was to give separate determinations to Mr and Mrs Bates - considering each of their applications in the context of the other core participants already established and who already had legal representation, thereby dovetailing with the provision of Rule 7(1).

As for the suggestion, which was effectively the “third anomaly” which was raised on behalf of the Claimants that the Claimants did not have an opportunity to establish that they did not fall within Rule 7(1), it was admitted that this is effectively a new ground raised at a late stage. I do not need to rule on that because it is hopeless for the reasons which I give. To the extent that it was a new ground I would, for that reason, refuse permission, and also because it is raised at a very late stage.

In terms of the merits of this argument, the problem for the Claimants is this: they plainly provided details about themselves and their interests with the application of a core participant status. The Defendant only had that material and the material from the Inquiry to date to work on. That is plainly the material which the Rules contemplate him using as the basis for his decision. He made that decision. The decision was one within his discretion.

This intersects also with the Claimants' argument that there was an inconsistency between this decision and previous decisions to allow separate representation. The fact that the conditions were not satisfied in some previous cases cannot assist the Claimants. The question is whether, on the material before the Defendant, he could be satisfied that the conditions of Rule 7(1) were satisfied. He made that decision and no rationality challenge has ever been made. Any rationality challenge of that decision is now hopelessly out of time. Even now the Claimants do not actually say that they were within Rule 6.

It is not enough to say, as was argued before me this morning, that the Claimants took it that the Defendant was not open to this argument, when there is no sign at all of any basis for a distinction being made by any means, including, indeed, orally this morning. Further, when one considers the fact that one of the groups identified by the Defendant, which is already interested and represented, is a group of people who were infected via blood products supplied by the NHS, which is, of course, how Mr Bates was infected, it is hard to see how the conclusion that the Claimants shared interests with this group could have been subject to an irrationality challenge.

That being the case, the Defendant was entirely right to conclude that Rule 7 applied, and that he “must direct” the Claimants be represented by the same legal representative as those with whose interests they were aligned.

The Claimants suggest that the Defendant could simply have added MLaw to the list. However, again, the basis for this approach is not explained, I am afraid, remotely adequately, and Miss Kentridge, despite some pressing on my part, was not able to assist me in any great measure as to how that argument was said to sit within Rule 7.

I accept, as did Chamberlain J, the Defendant's submission that, on the proper construction of the Rules, if MLaw were designated as the Claimants’ representatives, it would then have been necessary to consider the position of other parties who were already represented by other lawyers, and the result would have been for other participants who had been represented by other firms for some time to move from those firms to MLaw. The Claimants have naturally shied away from this conclusion, as it is obvious that the result, involving a waste of time and costs, would have been neither fair nor desirable. Although that was not spelled out in section 8 of the determination, it was part of the known factual background against which the determination must, as Chamberlain J said, be read. In that context, in my judgment, the Chairman was correct to say that, having been satisfied that the conditions were met, he could not recognise MLaw as the Claimants' representative.

I should also deal specifically with what was identified as the “first anomaly”, which was really where most of the argument advanced on behalf of the Claimants fell, and that was the fact that other lawyers had been instructed, and the approach to the instruction of those other lawyers. The first point is that what the Defendant did in directing the other groups to have separate representation appears to have been to decide that they did not fall within Rule 7(1). He was, therefore, not exercising, as was submitted before me, a discretion under Rule 7, but under Rule 6. Although Miss Kentridge has tried to persuade me that the recognition could readily be read as occurring under Rule 7, I do not find that argument at all persuasive against the background of the lack of a coherent way of explaining how the decision works under Rule 7, against the background of the Statements of Approach and Intent, which make

The fact that the conclusions in relation to those groups are expressed within the Statement of Approach and Statement of Intent as collective conclusions rather than individual conclusions does not affect this. What we see is effectively a grouping of individual decisions. It does not affect the basis on which the decision is made. The basis for the way in which the conclusion was arrived at is clear from the Defendant's grounds, in the Statement of Approach and, even more so, from the Statement of Intent, which explains the different groups which were represented by each firm of solicitors. I would add that on the materials which I have seen and, in particular, looking at the Statements of Approach and

The approach sought to be taken to Rule 7 was unconvincing. What Rule 7 is plainly

Like Chamberlain J, I do not accept that the challenge to the decision will significantly disadvantage the Claimants. They have the choice of being represented at public expense by any one of a number of reputable and experienced firms, which have been engaged in work on the Inquiry for some time, and who have satisfied the Chair of the Inquiry as to their suitability. The fact that the Claimants are not to be represented by their first choice firm is simply a consequence of Rule 7, which is a Rule which properly promotes the public

I reiterate I do entirely understand the Claimants’ wish for separate representation. I entirely understand that in an ideal world this would be possible. However, the Defendant has to operate within the framework of the rules which are designed to prevent the process being slowed, and rendered unfeasibly expensive by proliferation of legal teams, much of whose work would overlap.

I should also deal with the supposed clash between Rule 6(1)(b) and Rule 7(2). Again, were this a question of amendment, I would not permit the amendment on the basis that it is raised late and that it is hopeless. It is simply a case of comparing apples with oranges. Witnesses will (i) have different interests to each other; and (ii) generally have little involvement in the process. Separate representation is, therefore, (i) appropriate, and (ii) cost effective. It also may not be publicly funded. Core participants, on the other hand, will be integrally involved, and their legal bills, which will be publicly funded, will be significant. It therefore makes perfect sense for there to be an arrangement for them to share representation. That is what the Rule very clearly states there is, and what must happen if the conditions of Rule 7(1) are met.

As to the second ground, this is not arguable in the light of my conclusion on ground 1 but, in any event, the hurdle for this argument is even higher than the hurdle for an error of law. The argument that the effect is that core participant status is being denied is not arguable, given that there is a perfectly adequate basis for the Claimants to have effective legal support. Rule 7 explicitly makes clear that a core participant is entitled to an appropriate lawyer who, if he cannot agree that lawyer with the Chairman, will be one who, in the

For those reasons I dismiss the application.