Preston, R (On the Application Of) v Cumbria County Council

The Claimant says that the decision was unlawful in two regards. First, in that there had not been a "screening opinion" for the purposes of the Town and Country Planning (Environmental Impact Assessment) Regulations 2017 ("the EIA Regulations"). Second, in that there had not been an "appropriate assessment" for the ptrposes of the Conservadon of Habitats and Species Regulations 2017 ("the Habitats Regulations").

Although it initially took a different view the Defendant has now accepted that the decision was unlawful on both younds. At one stage the Defendant indicated that it was proposing to revoke the permission under section 97 of the Town and County Planning Act 1990 ("the TCPA"). it no longer intends to take that course. Instead it would consent to the quashing of the permission panted. Save for the provision of a position statement the Defendant has taken no part in these proceedinß.

Permission for this claim was given by MN. Justice Andrews on 8^th February 2019.

The Interested Party has resisted the claim. It says that the Defendant's decision was lawful. It says that the development for which permission was in October 2018 was outside the scope of the EIA Regulations meaning that no screening opinion was required. It also says that in the circumstances here the Habitats Regulations did not require there to be an appropriate assessment.

The relevant parts of the River Kent are within a Special Area of Conservation which is a European Site for the purposes of the Habitats Regulaüons. They are also of national note as part of the River Kent and Tributaries Site of Special Scientific Interest. This is primarily because of the presence of white-clawed a•ayfish supplememed by the presence of freshwater pearl mussels and bullhead.

There has been a wastewater Eeatment plant at the site of the Plant since 1898. The Plant is operated by the Interested Party and discharges treated sewage and effluent into the River Kent. That discharge is governed by an

Until December 2015 the discharge had been through a pipe running by means of a syphon across the river bed adjacent to the Plant to the opposite bank and then overland to discharge into the river a little way downstream from the plant. In December 2015 Storm Desmond hit Cumbria and the damage caused by that storm included substantial damage to the pipe running under the river.

A new outfall had to be installed and this was installed so as to discharge into the river at a point almost immediately adjacent to the Plant. This point is approximately upstream from the previous point of discharge. The Claimant says that this involves a discharge into the Angling Association's prime salmon beat and at a point where the river is slower flowing than it is at the point of the previous ouffall.

The Interested Party had sought permission for the new ouffall by an application of May 2016. This said that a ''temporary new outfall" was required for a period of up to twelve months while the existing outfall was reinstated. The temporary outfall had been installed a few days before the application was made having replaced emergency works which had been installed in the immediate aftermath of the storm. The application stated that there was a reasonable likelihood of adverse effects on protected and priority species and designated sites, important habitats, and other biodiversity features "on land adjacent to or near the proposed development".

The Interested Party had provided an Assessment of Likely Significant Effect ("the ALSE"). The stated purpose of this was to determine whether the proposed activities were considered to have a effect for the purpose of the Habitats Regulations. In the portion of the AISE addressing "changed water chemistry" in relation to the vegetation of the water course it stated that the AISE related "to the constucdon of the temporary oufall structure only and does not include the potential impact from the discharge itself'. The document explained that the construcüon would have "no effect" on sundry matters relati.ng to the habitat. In the section addressing the potential impact on the white-clawed and the bullhead there was a further passage also addressing "changed water chemis&y". The document repeated there the point that it was not addressing the discharge. It said 'the of the temporary outfall is approximately Ikm upstream of the original outfall ... therefore approximately of river which was previously unaffected is now being affected by the It explained that thQ was currently no choice but to discharge into the river at that point and then said "despite this it is felt that under typical flow condiüons and when the discharge is being maintained at 'normal' levels dilution is suficient for there to be no siY1ificant effect on the species. The quality of the discharge itself is to be addressed in a separate HRA

The Defendant consulted Natural England and by a letter of 16^th June 2016 that body advised the Defendant to have under the Habitats Regulations to any potential impacts that there might be. It said that it assumed that the Defendant was adopüng the AISE as its assessment under the Habitats Regulations. Natural England said that the ALSE contained "adequate to protect the River Kent . .. from the adverse effees of consÜuction associated with the proposal." It was also saüsfied that carrying out of the development in accordance with the details of the application would not damage or demy any features for which the site was notified as a Site of Special Scienüfic Interest.

The report of the Defendant's planning said that the Defendant had adopted the assessment in the ALSE and that this had concluded that there was no sißlificant effect from the development on the interest features of the river. It said that Natural England concurred with this conclusion. The report made no reference to the fict that the AISE was confined to consideration of the effects of the consfruction of the The report also said that the development would have "no unacceptable quantitaüve or qualitative adverse effeMs on the water environment." That comment was, however, made in the context of comparing the proposed with the emergency works which had been installed in the immediate aftermath of Storm Desmond.

Permission was given on 5^th July 2016 subject to a condition that the development should be limited to a period of twelve months from the date of that permission.

On 5^th June 2017 the Defendant permission under section 73 of TCPA providing for the period for which the development should be limited to be extended to 31^st October 2018. That permission was not preceded by any opinion under the El.A Regulaüons nor by any appropriate assessment under the Habitats Regulations other than the ALSE.

The decision under challenge was made in response to the Interested Party's application of 18^th July 2018. This desmibed the proposal as being for a "temporary outfall for up to 12 months while existing one is reinstated". It stated that the development in had been on 29^th April 2016. It said that there had been unforeseen complications in attempting to reinstate the previous outåll and that the Interested Party was assessing the feasibility of making the temporary outhl.l permanent.

The Defendant's delegated decision report explained that Natural England had been consulted and had no comment to make. It confirmed that the Environment Agency had no objection and noted that that Agency had mmmented that it had allowed the permitted discharge to be continued unül 1^st October 2019. The report expressed the view that the miteria of the relevant policy for cases where "there are no adverse environmental or landscape impacts or other impacts on sensifr,^re land uses" had been met It also stated that the application accorded

Permission was given on 17^th October 2018 invoking section 73 of TCPA; varying the condition of the earlier planning permission; and providing instead that the development was to be limited to the period to 31^M October 2019.

It follows that the process leading up to the permission of 17^th October 2018 did not include any screening opinion under the EIA Regulations and that the AISE was the only potential appropriate assessment for the purposes of the Habitats Regulations, The Claimant says that the ALSE was not an appropriate assessment for those purposes and that the absence of such an assessment and of a screening opinion rendered the decision unlawful. Initially the Defendant resisted this contention saying in correspondence that 'the quality of the discharge is subject to an environmental permit issued by the Environment Agency. The [Defendant) is entitled to rely on the competence of that organisation to regulate the permit". However, as already explained the Defendant now that its decision was unlawful and that both younds of challenge to its decision are well-founded.

For the Claimant Mr. Hunter contended that the decision should be regarded as having $ven retrospective permission under section 73A of TCPA rather than permission under section 73. This line of argument appears to have been raised for the first time in Mr. Hunter's skeleton argument.

The relevant parts of section 73 provide that:

An application under section 73 is an application for planning permission and a permission granted under that secdon is a fresh permission with the effect that the applicant has a choice of proceeding under the earlier permission or relying upon the new permission (see Pye v Secretary of State for the Environment & North Cornwall DC [1999] PCLR 28 at 44A - G).

By way of contrast the relevant provisions of secüon 73A are:

The Interested Party's application was on a form identifying it as an application for the removal or variation of a condition following the gant of planning permission. That is patently language apt to invoke the Defendant's powers under section 73 reflecting as it does the heading of that section rather than the powers under section 73A to øve planning permission for development already carried out before the date of the application. Moreover, the Defendant's decision was avowedly made by reference to section 73 and no other provision as appears from the Notice of Planning Permission and the Delegated Decision Report. It is also of note thm the Claimant's Statement of Facts and Grounds describes the application as having been made under secüon 73.

Mr. Hunter cited the decision of the Court of Appeal in Lawson Builders Ltd v Secretary ofState for Communities and Local Govemment [20151 EWCA Civ 122. Mr. Hunter said that decision was authority for the proposition that on an application made under section 73 permission can be øven for development already carried out by reference to the power conferred by section 73A. In my that proposition is an elaboration of the actual effect of the Lawson Builders decision. Rather the effect of the of Pitchford IJ at [361 is that it is open to a planning authority considering an applicaüon under section 73 to make a gant of retrospective planning permission under section 73A. That does not mean that a decision under section 73 can be made using the section 73A powers nor does it mean that a decision under section 73 is to be interpreted as a grant of retrospective planning permission. The decision is simply to the effect that faced with a section 73 application a planning authority may instead make a grant under section 73A.

As a matter of if a planning authority is choosing to exercise the power idenüfied in Lawson Builders then it must do so expressly and the consequent decision must be idenüfied as having been made under secüon 73A rather than secüon 73. That was not done here. The Defendant was being asked to exercise its section 73 powers and it purported to do so. There simply is no basis for approaching the decision as having in fact been an exer& of the section 73A powers.

Mr. Hunter's attempt to characterise the permission as having been ganted under section 73A was made with a view to countering the Interested Party's arguments based on the EIA's definition of "Schedule 2 development" and on the European Court of Justice decision in Brussels Hoofdstedelijk Gewest v Vlaams Gewest [2011) Env L R 26. Those arguments will, however, have to addressed on their merits and on the footing that the permission which is being challenged was ganted under section 73.

The ELA Regulations éve effect to Council Directive 2011/92/EU ('the EIA Directive"). That provides, at Article 2, for member states to adopt all measures necessary to ensure that projects likely to have effects on the environment are made subject to development consent and to an assessment with regard to their effects. Article 1 (2)(a) of the Directive defines "project" as

Mr. Barrett said account was to be taken of that definition in the interpretation of the ELA Regulations. In particular he prayed it in aid in support of his contention that the EIA Regulations and the requirements under them were to be interpreted as requiring the Defendant to consider the effects of the construction of the ouffall and as not requiring consideration of the discharge which was to flow through and from it. Thus he said that it was the construction and maintenance in place of the ouffall which were to be considered and that the ELA Regulations did not require consideration of the effects of the discharge, Mr. Barrett bolstered that argument by reference to the decision in Brussels Hoofdstedelijk Gewest v VLams Gewest (supra). The issue in that case was whether a predecessor to the EIA Directive required an environmental impact assessment to be carried out before a permit was given for the continued operation of Brussels airport. The European Court of Justice held that an assessment was not needed because the term "project" was limited to works or physical interventions and "constuction" was limited to the carrying out of works not previously existing and to physical alterations to existing installations.

I find that neither that decision nor the EIA Direcdve's of ''project" assist me in my interpretation of the El.A Regulations. Those Regulations do not use the term "project" to define the mattes falling within their scope. Rather they refer to "development". Regulation 2 (2) and (3) are of note in this regard. Regulation 2(2) provides that expressions used both in the Regulations and the TCPA are to have the same meaning for the purposes of the Regulations as they do for the TCPA. That is subject to 2(3) which provides that expressions used both in the Regulaüons and the Direcüve are to have the same meaning for the purposes of the Regulations as they do for the Directive. As I have just said the ELA Regulations use ffe term "development" but not "project". Conversely the

The effect of Regulations 6 aid 8 is that where there is an application for Schedule 1 or Schedule 2 development which is not accompanied by an environmental statement within the meaning of the Regulations and in respect of which there has not been a screening opinion then the relevant planning authority must adopt a screening opinion which is a written statement of the authority's opinion of whether the development in question is a EIA development. EIA development is development falling within the scope of Schedule 1 of the Regulations or falling within the scope of Schedule 2 and being "likely to have significant effects on the environment by virtue of factors such as its nature, size, or location."

Regulation 3 prohibits the granting of planning permission for EIA development unless an environmental impact assessment has been carried out in respect of the development. Indeed, any failure to comply with the requirements of the Regulations will lead to a permission being quashed on the yound of illegality.

The provisions governingwhatan environmental impact consists of are contained in Regulation 4. Regulation 4 (1) explains that the process is to include the preparation of an environmental statement; any consultation, required by the Regulations or any other enactment; and the steps required under Regulation 26 which include consideration of the environmental information; assessment of the sWficant effects of the proposed development; and of whether monitoring measures are needed. Of relevance for current purposes are Regulation 4 (2) and (3) which provide that:

The core dispute here is whether the development was Schedule 2 development.

The relevant terms are defined in Regulation 2 and Schedule 2 as follows;

The Defendant did not adopt a opinion in respect of the application. The Interested Party accepts that if the development permitted by the permission was Schedule 2 development for the purposes of the EIA Regulations then there should have been such a opinion and its absence would render the grant of permission unlawful. However, the Interested Party says that the development was not Schedule 2 development and that a screening opinion was, accordingly, not required.

The first question in this is whether the permission was for development any part ofwhich "is to be carried out in a sensitive area" and which, therefore, falls within the first limb of the definition of Schedule 2 development.

There was no dispute as to the presence of the sensiüve area but there was dispute as to the interpretaüon of the first part of that provision. The Interested Party says that the language of this part of the definition is clear. Mr. Barrett placed considerable emphasis on the use of the future tense in the words "is to be carried out". He said that the permission which was sought and granted was not for development which was to be carried out. The Plant has been in place for many years and at the time of the July 2018 applicadon the temporary ouffall was already in place. Mr. Barrett says that there was no development which was to be carried out in a sensitive area.

For the Claimant Mr. Hunter sought to counter that argument by saying that the permission was for development within the first limb of the definition because it was to be seen as having been retrospective permission under section 73A. As I have explained above I reject this interpretation of the permission. The permission was given under section 73 and its legality is to be determined on that footing.

However, approaching the matter on that fo±g Mr. Barrett's argument is nonetheless unpersuasive. In my it fails to take proper account of the operation of 73 and the effect of permission under that section. A permission øven under section 73 is a fresh permission which can be relied on in its own right and in substitution for the earlier position (see [221 above). An application under section 73 has to be an applicadon "for planning pa•mission for the development of land" (section 73 (1)). It follows that the Interested Party's July 2018 application and the permission granted in response to it had to be an application for permission for the development of land and the grant of such permission. Unless they were that they would not fall within section 73. Mr. Barrett countered this point by contending that the relevant development was the maintenance of the temporary ouffall in place and so was not work which was to be carried out. I reject this contention as contrary to the definition of "development" in 55 (1) of the TCPA which govems the meaning of development for the purposes of the EIA Regulaüons. That section defines development as:

Mr. Barrett was compelled to argue that the maintenance in place of the existing temporary outfall was a building operation. He did not that such an interpretation was supported by authority but said that it followed as a matter of first principle from interpretation of the language used. I do not accept that the maintenance in place of an exisdng sfructure can properly be said to be a building operation.

If the relevant development for the purposes of the July 2018 application and subsequent permission was not the maintenance of the temporary outfall in place what was it? Having regard to the effect of secüon 73 it is to be seen as the construction and of the temporary outfall. It is only that which could be regarded as development in this context and it was that for which permission was being sought and #y^ven. If a permission is being given under

Moreover, even if Mr. Barrett's argument as to the nature of the relevant development were to be accepted it would still be caught by the first limb of the definition. If Mr. Barrett is right to say that the maintenance in place of the temporary outfall is to be seen as a building operation then that is development for which permission is being sought and given. In considering the definition in the EIA Regulations one then has to ask whether there is development which is to be carried out in a sensitive area. The answer then is that there is such development here because, on the basis of Mr. Barrett's approach, the maintenance in place of the outfall is development and that is to be carried out pursuant to the permission.

It follows that I am satisfied that the permission gave permission for development which was Schedule 2 development within the meaning of limb (a) of the definition.

However, even if I am wrong in that I am satisfied that the development fell within limb (b) of that definition. The Plant is of a type identified at column 1 paragaph 11 (c). The temporary outfall is a change of the kind identified in column 1 paragraph 13 (b). Accordingly, the relevant threshold is that at column 2 (13) (b) (i) namely whether the Plant as changed or extended by the introduction of the temporary oufall "may have siB1ificant adverse effects on the environment". This is a low threshold because the context in which it operates is that of the process of tricering the need for a screening opinion which in turn is the material forming the basis for a decision as to whether there is to be an environmental statement. Putting it rather more shortly the threshold is a low one because its application is the start not the end of the process and is the trigger for determining that fuller investigation is needed rather than the determinant of the outcome of such investigation.

As I noted at [29] above Mr. Barrett contended for the Interested Party that the EIA Regulations are to be interpreted such that the only effects of the outfall which are to be considered are those resulting from its consüuction but that no regard was to be had to the effect of the discharge from it. He said that this

The position is made even clearer by the provisions of Regulation 5 (4) and Schedule 3 and Regulation 18 (3) and Schedule 4. The former provides that when determining whether a Schedule 2 development is ELA development the relevant planning authority is to take of such of the criteria as are set out in Schedule 3 as are relevant. Schedule 3 paragraph 1 describes the relevant characteristics of the development in the following terms which clearly have regard to the effects of the use and operation of the development and not just of its construction thus:

Regulation 18 (3) sets out the information which must be contained in an environmental statement inter alia by reference to Schedule 4 and it suffices for present purposes to note that paragraph 1 (c) of that Schedule requires the description of the development to include:

The operational effects of the outfall are its use to discharge üeated sewage and trade emuent into the River Kent at a particular point. It follows that in considering whether the temporary outfall may have significant adverse effects on the environment regard is to be had not just to the consequences of the physical installation of the ouffall but also to the consequences of the discharge through it at that point.

The Interested Party says that even if there is to be consideration of the effects of the discharge from the ouffall it was not open to the Defendant to conclude that the discharge might have sigificant adverse effects and that the threshold was accordingly not crossed. In this regard Mr. Barrett again placed emphasis on the position of the Environment Agency and the contention that the position of that agency meant that the Defendant should proceed on the basis that the discharge would not have an adverse effect. Mr. Barrett developed that argument most fully in relation to the question of whether there should have been an appropriate assessment for the purposes of the Habitats Regulations. Accordingly, I will address the argument and set out the reasons for my conclusions in relation to it in that context more fully below. Those reasons and conclusions also apply to the application of •the argument to the EIA Regulations. However, the decision in R (Champion) v North Norfolk D C & another [20151 UKSC 52, [2015] 1 WLR 3710 is of particular note with to the EIA Regulations. There the Supreme Court addressed the then current EIA Regulations. At [481 — [531 Lord Carnwath JSC addressed the relevance of measures including the imposition of conditions of various kinds on developments. It is of note that the approach of Sullivan J in R (Lebus) v South Cambridgeshire D C 120031 Env L R 366 was expressly approved. The tenor of the approach laid down by Lord Carnwath, particularly when seen in context, was that although mitigation measures could be taken into account in the screening opinion the more appropriate course would normally be for them to figure in the environmental statement which followed a screening opinion which had concluded that there might be significant impacts. The decision does not provide authority for the proposition that the r61e of the Environment Agency meant that the Defendant was bound to conclude that there would be no adverse effects and so removed the need for a screening opinion. Rather it is

In my judgnent the r61e of the Environment would be a relevant consideration potentially for the purposes of any screening opinion and also more clearly as part of the environment impact assessment process following upon a screening opinion. However, the existence and powers of that agency did not remove from the Defendant the to have regard to the effects of the discharge nor did it mean that in considering those effects the only rational course was for the Defendant to conclude that the discharge could not have significant adverse effects such that the threshold for a screening opinion was not required.

It follows that re was to be had to the effects of the discharge with a view to considering whether it met the low threshold requirement that it "may have siYiificant adverse effects". Not only was there no such consideration but it was not suggested by the Interested Party that the threshold was not subject to the contentions as to the effect of the role of the Environment Agency which I have rejected. It follows that the second limb of the definition of Schedule 2 development was also satisfied and that the application fell to be treated as a Schedule 2 application on that basis as well.

My conclusion that the permission sought and øven was permission for Schedule 2 development for the purpose of the EIA Regulations is determinative of the matter. The Interested Party correctly accepts that if the development was Schedule 2 development (or more pre&ly that if the application was a Schedule 2 application) then there should have been a screening opinion and that the absence of such an opinion was a fundamental flaw in the process with the consequence that the permission was not granted lawfully.

Although that conclusion is determinative of the applicaüon the position under the Habitats Regulations was fully argued and I will set out the conclusions I have reached in that

Regulation 9 (1) of the Habitats Regulations required the Defendant to exercise such of its functions as were relevant to nature conservation so as to secure compliance with the requirements of Council Directive 92/43/EEC ("the Habitats Directive"). Regulations 61 (1) and 70 (1) (a) have the effect that the assessment provisions in 63 apply to applications such as that made under section 73 by the Interested Party. The relevant parts of Regulation 63 itself provide that:

The effect of the relevant authorities was summarised and an explanation of the approach to be taken øven by Peter Jackson LJ in R (Mynydd & Gwynt Ltd) v Secretary of State for Business, Enerv, & Industrial Strateo [2018] EWCA Civ 231, [2018] 1274 at [8 - 91 thus:

Drawing matters together, the task of the decision-maker is first to consider whether die risk of åe project having a significant effect on fre site's objeües be excluded. If it cannot, an must be undertaken to ascertain the impact of the project and identify whether it is consistent with maintaining the site's conservation measures must be taken into account and considerable weight should be attached to the views of the nature conservation body. Once the assessment has been carried out, approval can only be if the authority is convinced that the project will not adversely affect the inteyity of the site concerned. Absolute certainty is not required, and where it cannot be achieved aner all scientific efforts, the must work with reasoned probabilities and estimates; but where doubt remains, authorisation will be refused."

The AISE was expressly confined to considering the potential effects of the construction of the temporary ouffall and did not consider the potential impact from the discharge. It said that the quality of the discharge would be addressed in a separate submission under the Habitats Regulations but there was, in fact, no such submission. Similarly, the assessment by Natural England that the ALSE contained adequate mitigaüon measures was expressly related to mifigation of the adverse effects of the acüvities.

The aucial question is whether there should have been a further appropriate assessment addressing the potential effects of the discharge through the outfall.

The Interested Party says that there was no need for such an assessment because the discharge would be regulated by the Environment Agency and the Defendant should have proceeded on the basis that such regulation would be effective and would preclude any discharge which would have an adverse effect. Mr. Barrett's argument was that the Defendant was entitled and, indeed, bound to assume that the discharge would be properly controlled by the Environment Agency with the consequenæ that there was simply no prospect of any adverse effects resulting from the discharge. The Interested Party's argument was that even though the Defendant appears not expressly to have addressed its mind to the potential consequences of the discharge or to the question of whether to rely on the control to be exercised by the Environment Agency it would have been irrational for the Defendant to have come to any conclusion other than that an appropriate assessment was not required. The Interested Party contends that in considering the matter the Defendant was bound to have regard to the role of the Environment Agency and that if that had been done the only rational conclusion would have been that there was no risk of any adverse effects.

At first sight those contentions would appear to conflict with the approach laid down in Mynydd & GwyntLtd The approach indicated there was that the initial question should be whether a effect was likely and if that could not be excluded then an appropriate assessment would be needed. The potential for mitigation measures and the views of the relevant regulatory and nature conservancy bodies would mme into play in the course of the appropriate assessment as part of the high standard of investigation required but would not preclude or remove the need for an appropriate assessment unless the risk of significant effect could be excluded on the basis of objective information. Do the authorities on which Mr. Barrett relied indicate that Peter Jackson LJ's propositions are to be read in some different way or that the approach indicated there is not applicable in cases such as the present?

Before I tum to the cases on which Mr. Barrett relied it is to be noted that they all predated Peter Jackson IA's analysis of the law and moreover that analysis made reference to Champion and to Smyth v Secretary ofStatefor Communities and Local Government [2015] EWCA Civ 174, [20151 PISR 1417 on both of which Mr. Barrett relied. It is also of note that in a judgment given two months after that in Mynydd & Gwynt Ltd the European Court of Justice considered the stage at which mitigtion measures should be taken into account for the purposes of the Habitats Directive. Thus in People over Wind & Sweetman v Coillte Teoranta [2018] yrSR 1668 the court echoed the approach which I have deduced from Peter Jackson LJ's and said at [361 that:

This approach is also supported by the wording of Regulation 63. Regulation 63 (1) provides that the for making an appropriate assessment is that the relevant plan or project "is likely to have a significant effect on a European site".

I turn to the authorities on which Mr. Barrett relies to see if they require any reinterpretation or recasting of that approach.

The effect of the decision of the Court of Appeal in Gateshead MBC v Secretary ofStatefor the Environment [19951 Env L R 37 is that the existence of a regime for controlling the impact of harmful emissions or other harmful effects of a development is a relevant planning consideration. In that case the Secretary of State was entitled to have re to the powers of I-nyl Inspectorate of Pollution (whose powers have now passed to the Environment Agency) and to conclude that those powers were suffcient to address the about emissions which had been expressed in that case. It does not, however, provide authority for the proposition that a planning authority is bound to conclude that the powers of a particular regulatory body will be sufficient to address concerns in a different case. Still less is it authority for saying that a planning authority should have no regard to such concerns. Rather it indicated that the rational approach was for the relevant body to consider the concems and then to consider whether the powers of the relevant body were suffcient to address those concerns with the conclusion that the powers were suffcient being one which it was open to the relevant body to reach in an appropriate case.

In Champion the Supreme Court drew a distinction between the triggering of an appropriate assessment under the Habitats Regulations and the need for a screening opinion under the EIA Regulations. The former was reed as being a markedly less formal process than the latter. I do not read the decision as indicating that there can be no need for an appropriate assessment under the Habitats Regulations in cases where the activity which has the potential to affect the relevant site is subject to controls by a statutory body of some form. It is of note that Peter Jackson IJ clearly had the decision in Champion well in mind when setting out his analysis of the relevant law. He referred to it twice in his list of propositions and noted the high standard of investigation to which Lord Camwath adverted as being required in an appropriate assessment.

Mr. Barrett said that the relevant leading case was R (Morge) v Hampshire CC [2011] UKSC 2, [20111 1 WLR 268. The Supreme court there held that regard was to be had to the views of Natural England as the body responsible for enforcing compliance with the Habitats Directive. The planning authority was entitled to take account of Natural England's view that a development would not contravene the It is clear that the Supreme Court was holding that a planning authority was entitled to assume that satisfaction expressed by a relevant regulatory body was suffcient indication that there would be compliance. It was not, however, saying that a planning authority was

There was more force in Mr. Barrett's invocation of the judgnent of Sales LJ in Smyth v Secretary ofStatefor Communities and Local Government at [851 where he said:

Mr. Barrett relied on the last part of that passage. That was in reality the high point of the support he could derive from the authorities. However, even that does not provide authority for the proposition that the existence or views of a relevant regulatory body obviate the need for an appropriate assessment. Account has to be taken of those views but Sales IJ does not say that such views must prevail. Read strictly the passage is indicadng that if it had a good reason to do so a relevant authority could choose not to place weight on the views of an expert national agency. That might be too strict a reading but even if what was meant was that a relevant authority should adopt the views of an expert agency unless it has a good reason not to do so it is not being said that a relevant authority is bound by such views but rather that they should only be rejected if there is a good reason for so doing. It follows that the relevant authority has still to exer& its own judgement albeit giving due weight to the views of a body such as the Environment Agency.

It follows that the authorities relied upon by the Interested Party do not cause any change in my interpretation of the propositions expounded by Peter Jackson LJ nor do they indicate that the approach they envisage is not applicable to the circumstances of this case.

Accordingly, the Defendant was to consider whether the through the ouffall had the potential for a effect upon the site. If there was such potential then an appropriate assessment was required. The views of Natural England and the role of the Environment Agency would have had great siYiificance in that exercise but they did not remove the need for it. The position and powers of the Environment Agency did not remove the need for the Defendant to engage in an appropriate assessment unless the Defendant was enabled to say that any risk of a effect was excluded on "objective (see proposition 2 per Peter Jackson LJ). The existence and powers of the Environment Agency without more be reed as having necessarily been objective information for that purpose.

As something of a fallback posidon for the Interested Party Mr. Barrett contended that there had been consideration by the Defendant with the conclusion having been reached that because of the views of Natural England and the Environment Agency there was no risk of sWcant effects. The material on which Mr. Barrett to construct that argument was markedly limited. The Decision Report of 9^th October 2018 noted that Natural England had made no comment. It noted that the Environment Agency had no objection and noted that the agency had extended the permit for the outfall to 1^st October 2019. The planning expresses the view that there were no adverse environmental or impacts or any other impacts on sensitive land uses. It is also said that there had been compliance with the Biodiversity and Geodiversity policy "as there are no alternafr.^res and there are no addidonal adverse effects on the SAC". There is, however, no indication of any actual consideration of the potential impact of the discharge from the outfall. I remind myself of need to avoid an unduly narrow reading of such reports and that they are not necessarily a place for detailed reasoning. The 2018 report is to be seen in the light of the 2016 report which dealt with matters at a little greater length and whose terms I have summarised at [13] above. The Defendant had responded to the initial correspondence from the Claimant by saying that "the quality of the discharge is subject to an environmental permit issued by the Environment Agency. The [Defendant] is to rely on the competence of that organisation to regulate the permit". It is apparent that the Defendant did not in fact have regard to the question of the effects of the discharge through the ouffall. The Al-SE did not address those effects but said that there would be a separate assessment in that The approval of Natural England was Ü,.^ren by reference to the AISE and was addressing the effects of the consü•uction of the ouffall rather than the effects of the discharge. Although reference was made to the permit by the Environment Agency this was a passing reference. It was not stated that consideration had been $.^ren to the effects of the discharge and that the conclusion had been reached that the role of the Environment Agency enabled the Defendant to be satisfied that there was no risk of a significant effect resulting. It is of parficular note that the Defendant accepts that both younds of challenge are made out including the contention that it failed to carry out its obligations under the Habitats Direcüve. It is open to the Interested Party to argue that notwithstanding this admission the material shows that there was engagement with those obligations. However, that argument depends on the interpretation being placed on the thin material here and the Defendant's view of what it did or did not do is of assistance in that

If the potential effects of the discharge had been considered it might have been a rational (in the sense of one that could not be challenged on the ground of Wednesbury irrationality) for the Defendant to conclude that by reason of the involvement of the Environment Agency there was no need for an appropriate assessment. It is questionable whether the Defendant could properly have reached that conclusion in the light of the absence of any detailed information from the Environment Agency and in the light of the reference in the ALSE to the fact that a further assessment directed to the effects of the discharge was to be forthcoming. However, that would certainly not have been the only permissible or rational conclusion. It follows that it cannot be said that even if the matter had been expressly considered by the Defendant the conclusion must have been that there was no need for an appropriate assessment.

It follows that there was a hilure to comply with the requirements of the Habitats Regulations and the second ground of challenge is made out.

Both grounds of challenge having been established the grant of permission was unlawful and the Claimant is entitled to the relief sought by way of quashing of the permission subject to such submissions as the parties make on handing down as to the appropriate form of order.