Royal Courts of Justice
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL
Before:
MRS JUSTICE MCGOWAN
Between :
Dr Shreedhar Vaidya | Claimant |
- and - | |
General Medical Council | Defendant |
The Claimant appeared in person
Ivan Hare (instructed by GMC Legal) for the Defendant
Hearing date: 7 February 2017
Judgment
Mrs Justice McGowan:
A General Civil Restraint Order, (“GCRO”) was made against the Claimant, Shreedhar Vaidya at the instigation of the General Medical Council, (“GMC”), by Nicola Davies J on 16 November 2010, it was extended by Cranston J on 14 November 2012 and again, by Mitting J on 12 November 2014.
By an Application Notice of 27 October 2016, the GMC sought a further extension of the GCRO of two years and that an Order should be granted under the Court’s inherent jurisdiction applying to the Employment Tribunals (“ET”). That application was set down for hearing on 9 November 2016 before Collins J. Shortly before the hearing it became apparent that Dr Vaidya was not in the country and therefore the GMC sought an extension of the order for two months to enable Dr Vaidya to return. Collins J extended the order until 9 February 2017. The application for an Order extending to the ET was not pursued at the hearing before Collins J.
For the reasons given below the order was granted in the terms sought on 7 February 2017.
The Court has power under CPR PD 3C 4.10 to grant an extension of a GCRO in certain proscribed circumstances.
The Court may extend the duration of a GCRO, if it considers it appropriate to do so, but it must not be extended it for a period of greater than 2 years on any given occasion.
Before granting such an extension to a GCRO, even if it follows several earlier extensions, the court must consider whether it is appropriate to make such an order, even if not bound strictly to apply the same test as for the grant of the original order,
…..where the party against whom the order is made persists in issuing claims or making applications which are totally without merit, in circumstances where an extended civil restraint order would not be sufficient or appropriate.
In any event the test is met as Dr Vaidya has continued to issue many further proceedings as follows;
he has sought to appeal against the decisions of Mitting J, described as “totally without merit” by Hallett LJ on 20 October 2016
he has appealed to the Employment Appeal Tribunal, (“EAT”), refused by HHJ Eady QC on 18 February 2015 and pursued to the Court of Appeal, described by Lewison LJ on 15 December 2015 as “totally without merit”,
the remainder of that claim was struck out by the EAT on 16 April 2016 as having “no reasonable prospect of success”,
he has brought proceedings in the ET against 28 individuals which were struck out and then sought to appeal that ruling,
he has threatened on 16 August 2016 to bring a challenge by way of judicial review of the proceedings in relation to his request for an adjournment of his restoration hearing before the Medical Practitioners’ Tribunal (“MPT”) and
he has sought to appeal and/or review the MPT’s decisions which applications were described by Lang J as “totally without merit” on 1 September 2016.
It is clear that despite the GCRO and notwithstanding the penal notice attached to it, Dr Vaidya has continued to seek to initiate new claims or pursue review or appeal proceedings in respect of old claims.
The history of events before the grant of the first GCRO of 16 November 2010 is set out in the judgment of Nicola Davies J, Vaidya v GMC [2010] EWHC 2873 and need not be set out again here. It again continued as set out in the judgment of Cranston J, GMC v Vaidya [2012] EWHC 4155. It shows a pattern which has been followed, with some modification but no less persistence since that date.
One of the modifications is that Dr Vaidya has started to bring proceedings in the ET. The GMC seeks to extend the order to cover such tribunals. That is not resisted by Dr Vaidya who concedes that if the extension is granted it should cover the tribunals also. There is authority for such an order in NMC v Harrold [2015] EWHC 2254 (QB).It must be right that such protection be afforded to those who may suffer from such persistent and vexatious claims in the tribunals as well as the courts. Any distinction would be artificial and unfair.
Although Dr Vaidya makes that concession he seeks to oppose the grant of the extended GCRO. His primary application is to set aside the order of Collins J of 9 November 2016, but all that did was cover the period while Dr Vaidya was out of the country and could not attend the hearing of the substantive application. There is no merit in that ground of opposition.
Dr Vaidya also seeks to go back and re-argue the bases upon which the earlier orders were made. That argument is also without merit and cannot be entertained here.
He seeks to argue that he has done nothing wrong and that he has a constitutional right to bring claims against the trustees of the GMC, including those who were not even members at the time decisions about him were made. He does not have any such right to bring claims against those who are not and never have been involved in his case. He has no right to bring persistent and vexatious claims against individuals or groups if there is no merit in such claims. He has shown no sign whatsoever of desisting in the bringing of such claims and the only and essential course is to grant the application for the General Civil Restraint Order to be extended for a further two years and to extend it to cover the ET.
Dr Vaidya has persisted in his behaviour and must pay the costs of this application and hearing (and the costs of the hearing before Collins J on 9 November 2016), to be assessed if not agreed.