Demeter v Okresny Sud Humenne (Slovakia)

This is an appeal by Lubomir Demeter under the Extradition Act 2003 against a decision by District Judge Gareth Branston in the Westminster Magistrates’ Court on 5^th April 2017. By that decision, the district judge dismissed an appeal against a decision returning Mr Demeter to Slovakia pursuant to a European Arrest Warrant.

The matter will be of importance to Mr Demeter as he is required to be returned to serve a 6-month prison sentence. Permission was granted on one ground only: namely, that under s.20 of the Extradition Act 2003 the appellant was not deliberately absent from the trial, although he was not present at the trial, and it is said that there were doubts as to whether or not he would have a right of retrial if he were returned.

There has been further information provided by the Judicial Authority in Slovakia. That may well resolve matters as, subject to any arguments that Mr Demeter wishes to put, it appears to be saying that Mr Demeter would be served with a decision and allowed to apply for a retrial. I make no further comment on that matter as there has not been any argument on it and Mr Demeter may or may not have things he wishes to say about it.

The problem that arises with the appeal today is as follows. Mr Demeter has had solicitors acting for him, but on 3^rd November 2017 they applied to come off the record. Today, I have been very greatly assisted by Mr Jonathan Swain from Drystone Chambers. Even though he has no instructions, he has been able to outline to the court what the position is. He has explained that he has made as clear as he can in the documents that he has drafted in English that there was a court hearing today, and those have been translated and given to the appellant. Furthermore, the instructing solicitors spoke to the appellant with a person present who spoke Slovakian, and they made him aware of the hearing today. The appellant is not in custody. However, Mr Swain very fairly draws to my attention that there was a note on the solicitors’ record of the telephone conversation that they had with him that he was unable to attend today because of the short notice of the hearing.

In those circumstances, as it is through no fault of anyone’s that this matter has come about at short notice in the way it has, it would, in my judgment, be unfair to proceed today, and Ms Townshend for the defendant, who has been equally helpful, also accepts that it may well be unfair to proceed today. Ms Townshend submitted that a short adjournment of about a week would be sufficient, providing Mr Demeter was informed of the hearing; and she submitted (although she will check before the next hearing) that, provided there had been notice of the hearing to the appellant, the hearing could proceed in his absence.

In all the circumstances, in my judgment, the appropriate course of action is to adjourn this matter until Thursday, 16^th November. I would ask that the Administrative Court Office notify the appellant in writing immediately of the hearing on 16^th November; and I will invite the defendant, if they have an address for him, to write confirming what has happened today and saying that they too have been asked to notify him of the hearing on 16^th November.

I finally simply wish to express my gratitude again to Mr Swain, who attended without instructions but doing the best he can to assist the court. In that regard, I grant the application of 3^rd November 2017 by ACA Law Limited to come off the record.

So the order will be: the hearing adjourned to 16^th November; the Administrative Court Office to notify the appellant in writing immediately of the hearing on 16^th November; and the application by ACA Law Limited dated 3^rd November 2017 to come off the record is granted.