Supawan, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department

This judgment is in 6 parts as follows:

By this claim for judicial review, Mr. Longrid Supawan, a citizen of Thailand (“the Claimant”), challenges the decision of the Secretary of State for the Home Department (“the Secretary of State”) on 7 May 2013 refusing his application for leave to remain in the United Kingdom as a Tier 2 (General) Migrant (“the Decision”).

The legal basis on which the Decision was made was that the Claimant’s restaurant sponsor employer provided a take-away service, and accordingly the Claimant did not meet the requirements under Appendices A and K of the relevant Immigration Rules, as interpreted by the Secretary of State.

The first issue in this claim is whether the Secretary of State has correctly construed Code 5434 of Appendix K of the Rules which sets out, as part of the Shortage Occupations List (SOL), certain requirements which must be fulfilled under the occupation code for skilled chefs. That Code excludes jobs which are “…in either a fast food outlet, a standard far outlet, or an establishment which provides a take-away service”. For ease of reference I will refer to this underlined part of the Code as “the Exclusion” in the remainder of this judgment.

The Claimant’s sponsor, Thai River Restaurant, offers a take-away service and thus, so argues the Secretary of State, a post in such an establishment falls within the Exclusion.

The Claimant challenges this construction and says that the Exclusion properly construed only operates to exclude posts in restaurants which provide “solely or predominantly” a take-away service. He further contends that the Exclusion is otherwise void for uncertainty.

In addition to the issue of construction and claimed uncertainty, the Claimant seeks, in the alternative, to argue that the Exclusion in Code 5434 should be struck down as unreasonable insofar as, properly construed, it would exclude posts in establishments which offer a take-away service in addition to service on the premises. The Claimant here invokes the well-known principles in Kruse v Johnson [1898] 2 QB 01.

Finally, by way of introduction, the Secretary of State takes a timing point in response to each of these challenges. She argues that there has been a 4 year delay in bringing this claim. The Decision was made on 7 May 2013 but the Claim Form was issued only on 9 February 2017.

In granting permission to apply for judicial review on 22 June 2017, Sir Alan Wilkie, sitting as a Judge of the High Court, observed that the procedural history preceding the claim justified it being brought out of time, but the question of whether the lapse of time should prevent a remedy being granted was for the court hearing the substantive judicial review.

The Claimant entered the United Kingdom as a student on 15 September 2005 and he obtained further leave to remain on that basis until 31 May 2010. He then became an overstayer. The Claimant made several further applications for leave to remain as a Tier 2 (General) Migrant and these were refused on 22 November 2010, 12 May 2011 and 16 August 2011. These applications are not in issue.

A yet further application to remain on this Tier 2 basis was made by the Claimant and refused by the Secretary of State on 17 January 2012; and that led to proceedings for judicial review which were withdrawn by consent on 18 October 2012 with the Secretary of State agreeing to reconsider her decision.

This reconsideration led to the Decision of 7 May 2013 which is the subject of the present claim. I will return to the substance of the Decision below, but the procedural chronology concerning the challenge to the Decision is somewhat involved and I will set that out here since it is relevant to the issue of delay and relief.

On 5 August 2013, the Claimant issued judicial review proceedings challenging the Decision. His Honour Judge Bidder QC refused permission to apply for judicial review on the papers and the Claimant renewed his application and sought an oral hearing.

On 23 December 2013, the claim was transferred to the Upper Tribunal and the Administrative Court closed the case file. However, an oral application was nevertheless listed before the Administrative Court. The Court was advised by the Claimant’s Solicitors that the proceedings had been transferred to the Upper Tribunal and the hearing was vacated.

After much delay, and for reasons which are unclear (but which do not seem to have been the responsibility of the Claimant) an oral permission hearing was finally listed before Upper Tribunal Judge Lane on 21 October 2016. At that hearing, Judge Lane granted permission to apply for judicial review.

Following service of witness evidence and detailed grounds from the Secretary of State (steps which followed an extension of time granted to the Secretary of State by the Upper Tribunal) the Claimant (with the leave of Upper Tribunal Judge Perkin) withdrew on 21 October 2016 his claim in the Upper Tribunal. The basis for that withdrawal was that a challenge was being made to the legality of the Immigration Rules which fell outside that Tribunal’s jurisdiction.

Following a pre-action letter and response the present (third) claim for judicial review challenging the Decision was issued on 9 February 2017 and, as indicated above, Sir Alan Wilkie granted permission to apply for judicial review on 22 June 2017.

Returning to the substance of the Decision under challenge, the establishment which wishes to employ the Claimant as Head Chef is the Thai River Company Limited based in Latimer Road, North Kensington. On the evidence of the owner of the restaurant, this is a 30-45 cover restaurant which primarily provides freshly cooked Thai meals to seated customers. However, it also provides freshly cooked take-away meals which account for under 10% of turnover.

Under the points-based system for Tier 2 (General) applicants, as described in more detail in Part III of his judgment below, the occupation in respect of which an application is made must meet the conditions of “shortage occupations” as specified under Appendix K of the Immigration Rules.

In the Decision, the Secretary of State explained that as regards skilled chefs, there is not a recognised shortage if the job is “…either in a fast food outlet, a standard fare outlet, or an establishment which provides a take-away service”.

Given that the chef post was in the Thai River Restaurant, which (as a matter of common ground) provided a take-away service, that role fell within the Exclusion (and hence the Claimant received no sponsorship points). This led to the rejection of his application for leave to remain.

Given that the Exclusion forms part of the Immigration Rules made under primary legislation, it is necessary to begin with that primary legislation. That process will identify how the Exclusion (as part of the Points Based System) operates within the wider framework of immigration controls. It will also be necessary to set out some basic case law regarding the legal nature of the Immigration Rules.

Section 1(2) of the Immigration Act 1971 (“the 1971 Act”) provides that those not having the right of abode in the United Kingdom may live, work and settle in the United Kingdom with permission and subject to such regulation and control of their entry into, stay and departure from the UK as is imposed by the 1971 Act.

Section 1(4) of the 1971 Act provides that the rules laid down by the Secretary of State as to the practice to be followed in the administration of the 1971 Act for regulating the entry into and stay in the United Kingdom of persons not having the right of abode, shall include provision for admitting persons coming for the purposes of taking employment.

Pursuant to section 3(2) of the 1971 Act the Secretary of State is required to lay before Parliament rules or statements of changes of the rules regulating the entry into and stay in the United Kingdom of persons who require leave to enter.

These rules (known as the Immigration Rules HC395) are introduced by way of negative resolution before Parliament and are published as House of Commons papers. Statements of Changes are regularly laid before Parliament pursuant to section 3(2) of the 1971 Act updating and amending the Rules. As explained further below, the Immigration Rules are essentially the Secretary of State’s administrative practice.

The nature of the Immigration Rules was considered by the Supreme Court inAli (Iraq) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2016] UKSC 60; [2017] 3 All ER 20. Lord Reed explained as follows at §17:

“The Rules are not law (although they are treated as if they were law for the purposes of section 86(3)(a) of the 2002 Act: see para 8 above), but a statement of the Secretary of State’s administrative practice: see Odelola v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2009] UKHL 25; [2009] 1 WLR 1230, paras 6 and 7; Munir, para 37; Mahad v Entry Clearance Officer [2009] UKSC 16; [2010] 1 WLR 48, para 10; R (Aguilar Quila) v Secretary of State for the Home Department (AIRE Centre intervening) [2011] UKSC 45; [2012] 1 AC 621, para 61; and R (Alvi) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2012] UKSC 33; [2012] 1WLR 2208, paras 32 and 33. They do not therefore possess the same degree of democratic legitimacy as legislation made by Parliament: Huang v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] UKHL 11; [2007] 2 AC 167, para 17. Nevertheless, they give effect to the policy of the Secretary of State, who has been entrusted by Parliament with responsibility for immigration control and is accountable to Parliament for her discharge of her responsibilities in this vital area. Furthermore, they are laid before Parliament, may be the subject of debate, and can be disapproved under the negative resolution procedure. They are therefore made in the exercise of powers which have been democratically conferred, and are subject, albeit to a limited extent, to democratic procedures of accountability”.

In 2008, Tier 2 of the Points Based System (“the PBS”) governing applications for entry clearance and leave to remain was introduced though amendments to the Immigration Rules. A primary objective of the PBS system is transparency in decision making. The aim is to minimise subjectivity, inconsistency and error in decision making. To this end the PBS sets out in detail the criteria that applicants need to meet to succeed in their applications, and requires both applicants and decision-makers to adhere strictly to the criteria set out in the Rules.

In Kaur v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2015] EWCA Civ 13, Burnett LJ explained the rationale underlying the PBS at §41 of his judgment:

“The points based system for determining whether to grant leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom, which applies to students as well as a number of other categories of applicant, is designed to achieve predictability, administrative simplicity and certainty. It does so at the expense of discretion, that is to say it is prescriptive. The consequence is that failure to comply with all its detailed requirements will usually lead to a failure to earn the points in question and thus refusal: see e.g. Sullivan LJ in Alam v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2012] EWCA Civ 960 at [44], Davis LJ in Secretary of State for the Home Department v Rodriguez [2014] EWCA Civ 2 at [100]; Sales LJ in EK (Ivory Coast) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2014] EWCA Civ 1517 at [28] and Briggs LJ at [59]. It was that important background which informed the decision in EK (Ivory Coast).”

Tier 2 is the primary immigration route under the Immigration Rules for non-EEA nationals seeking leave for the purpose of working in the UK. Employers do not have freedom to recruit Tier 2 migrants to fill any type of job. It is not in dispute that the Tier 2 criteria are focussed on highly skilled jobs only and have been set to give effect to the Government’s broader objectives of:

As at the date of the Decision, the relevant Tier 2 Rules and appendices provided as follows. Paragraph 245HD of the Rules stated:

“Requirements for leave to remain.

To qualify for entry clearance as a Tier 2 (General) Migrant … an applicant must meet the requirements listed below. If the applicant meets these requirements, entry clearance will be granted. If the applicant does not meet these requirements, the application will be refused.

Requirements:

(a)

The applicant must not fall for refusal under the general grounds for refusal.

(b)

If applying as a Tier 2 (General) Migrant, the applicant must have a minimum of 50 points under paragraphs 76 to 79D of Appendix A.”

Appendix A to the Immigration Rules provided that 30 of the required 50 points would not be granted unless the job being applied for appeared on the list of occupations skilled to NQF 6 (which skilled chefs do not), unless transitional arrangements apply (which they do not in this case), or the job being applied for appears on the list of shortage occupations published by the UK Border Agency and specified under Appendix K.

Appendix K of the Rules sets out the Shortage Occupation List (SOL). The section of Appendix K which is relevant to these proceedings is Code 5434. This provides (with underlined emphasis added):

“Chef, cooks (5434):

ONLY the following job in this occupation code:

•

skilled chef where: -

•

Only the pay is at least £29,570 per year after deductions for accommodation, meals etc.; and

•

the job requires five or more years’ relevant experience in a role of at least equivalent status to the one they are entering; and

•

the job is not in either a fast food outlet, a standard fare outlet, or an establishment which provides a take-away service; and

The job is in one of the following roles:

•

executive chef - limited to one per establishment

•

head chef - limited to one per establishment

•

sous chef - limited to one for every four kitchen staff per establishment

•

specialist chef - limited to one per speciality per establishment

A fast food outlet is one where food is prepared in bulk for speed of service, rather than to individual order.

A standard fare outlet is one where the menu is designed centrally for outlets in a chain / franchise, rather than by a chef or chefs in the individual restaurant. Standard fare outlets also include those where dishes and / or cooking sauces are bought in ready-made, rather than prepared from fresh/raw ingredients”.

Counsel for the Secretary of State submits that the purpose of Code 5434 (and the Exclusion as part of that Code) is to identify criteria for highly skilled chefs. He accepts that the Exclusion is a “blunt” way of doing this. This is an important point because in due course it will become necessary to consider whether the Exclusion is fit for that purpose as a matter of rationality.

I now turn to the two grounds of review, construction and ultra vires/unreasonableness.

The issue is a short one. Code 5434 provides in material respects that “…the job is not either in a fast food outlet, a standard fare outlet, or an establishment which provides a take-away service” (underlining supplied). I have considered the guidance provided by Lord Hoffmann in Odelola v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] 1 WLR 1230 at 1233, para.4 and the language of the Exclusion within the context of the Rules and immigration policy.

Applying these principles, in my judgment this provision is clear and unambiguous. A restaurant which provides any form of take-away service is excluded. The decision-maker is not required to consider matters of fact and degree such as what proportion of business is take-away or questions as to whether the restaurant is “only” or “primarily” a take-away establishment.

That is wording which the Claimant seeks unjustifiably to read into the provision. Had the draftsman intended to introduce a level of judgment on the part of the decision-maker as to the nature of the take-away service provided (and how this impacted on the grant of sponsorship points) one would expect express wording making that clear and for there also to be an indication as to how the assessment was to be made, for example by specifying that certain identified percentages of take-away turnover or business permitted the job to still be recognised.

I accordingly respectfully agree with Collins J’s observation in an earlier stage in these proceedings (when they were in the Upper Tribunal on 29 June 2016) that there was no basis for reading the word “only” into the Exclusion.

The simple construction leads to a workable and practical rule. I do not consider the Exclusion to be vague or uncertain so as to be void.

Whether the consequences of this construction (and the width of the Exclusion it leads to) render the Code provision ultra vires on grounds of unreasonableness is a separate matter, to which I now turn.

Before considering the arguments made by the Claimant, it is necessary to set out the relevant legal test under his head.

A convenient summary can be found in Simon Brown J’s judgment in R. v. Immigration Appeal Tribunal ex parte Manshoora Begum [1986] Imm. AR 385. That case concerned a challenge to the lawfulness of provisions in the Immigration Rules.

At pages 393-394, Simon Brown J set out the governing legal principles:

“This rule, unlike a statutory provision to which effect must be given however absurd, is amenable to the court’s power under its review jurisdiction to condemn it, in whole or in part, as invalid for unreasonableness. This principle is well-established. In the leading case of Kruse v Johnson …., Russell LCJ, said this:

‘I do not mean to say that there may not be cases in which it would be the duty of the Court to condemn by-laws, made under such authority as these were made, as invalid because unreasonable. But unreasonable in what sense? If, for instance, they were found to be partial and unequal in their operation as between different classes; if they were manifestly unjust; if they disclosed bad faith; if they involved such oppressive or gratuitous interference with the rights of those subject to them as could find no justification in the minds of reasonable men, the Court might well say, ‘Parliament never intended to give authority to make such rules; they are unreasonable and ultra vires.’

‘But it is in this sense, and in this sense only, as I conceive, that the question of unreasonableness can properly be regarded. A by-law is not unreasonable merely because judges may think that it goes further than is prudent or necessary or convenient, or because it is not accompanied by a qualification or an exception some judges may think ought to be there. Surely it is not too much to say that in matters which directly and mainly concern people of the country, who have the right to choose those whom they think best fitted to represent them in their local government bodies, such representatives may be trusted to understand them in their local government bodies, such representatives may be trusted to understand their own requirements better than judges.’

That passage well expresses not only the court’s power, but also its limitation…. It should be recognised that where the relevant power is given, as here, to a Minister responsible to Parliament, the court is even less willing to intervene, a fortiori where, as is also the case here, the rules in question were laid before Parliament and subject to a process akin to negative resolution”.

The caution with which the courts approach challenges to the Immigration Rules which give effect to Government policy objectives was also recently underlined by Lady Hale in MM (Lebanon) & Ors v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2017] UKSC 10 at §75 where she observed:

“As Lord Reed has shown (Hesham Ali, paras 46f), although the tribunal must make its own judgment, it should attach considerable weight to judgments made by the Secretary of State in the exercise of her constitutional responsibility for immigration policy. He cites Lord Bingham’s reference in Huang to the need to accord appropriate weight to the judgment of a person “with responsibility for a given subject matter and access to special sources of knowledge and advice”. As that passage indicates, there are two aspects, logically distinct: first, the constitutional responsibility of the Secretary of State for setting national policy in this area; and secondly the expertise available to her and her department in setting and implementing that policy. Both are relevant in the present case, but the degree of respect which should be accorded to them may be different. The weight to be given to the rules or Departmental guidance will depend on the extent to which matters of policy or implementation have been informed by the special expertise available to the Department”.

46. Given that the Secretary of State in this case received advice from an expert body, The Migration Advisory Committee (“the MAC”) in formulating the Code, it is also appropriate for me at this stage to set out from MM (Lebanon)certain further observations from the judgment of Lady Hale and Lord Carnwath at §98 (with italicised emphasis):

“It is apparent from the MAC report, and the evidence of Mr Peckover, that the reasons for adopting a stricter approach in the new rules were matters of practicality rather than wider policy, reflecting what the MAC acknowledged to be the relative uncertainty and difficulty of verification of such sources. That did not make it unreasonable or irrational for the Secretary of State to take them into account in formulating the rules. The MAC recognised the strength of the case for taking account of other sources, but it did not in terms advise against the approach ultimately adopted by the Secretary of State. In considering the legality of that approach, for the reasons already discussed (para 59 above) it is necessary to distinguish between two aspects: first, the rationality of this aspect of the rules or instructions under common law principles, and secondly the compatibility with the HRA of similar restrictions as part of consideration outside the rules. As to the first, while the application of these restrictions may seem harsh and even capricious in some cases, the matter was given careful consideration by both the MAC and the Secretary of State. As Aikens LJ said (para 154), the decision was “not taken on a whim”. In our view, it was not irrational in the common law sense for the Secretary of State to give priority in the rules to simplicity of operation and ease of verification”.

I now turn to the substance of the Claimant’s rationality case which is based on a powerful, attractive and simple submission. The Claimant says that excluding restaurants which provide a high quality of cuisine but which also incidentally happen to offer a take-away service is arbitrary and unreasonable.

It is said that many restaurants which employ highly skilled chefs providing fine dining also provide take-away meals; and it is further argued that judicial notice can be taken of the fact that it is now common for highly skilled chefs (via delivery services such as Deliveroo) to provide quality cuisine, and that accordingly the real focus should be on the nature of the establishment and not the fact that it also incidentally provides take-away food.

The Claimant argues that the Exclusion is not fit for the purpose of isolating skilled chefs because it is so broad it will irrationally exclude many highly-qualified chefs who happen to work in establishments offering a take-away service. Examples were cited to me of well-known fine dining establishments which would fall within the Exclusion.

This is a persuasive submission. I note that Collins J, at an earlier stage in related proceedings, considered the Exclusion to be arguably unreasonable for essentially this reason. There is clearly a burden on the Secretary of State, by way of evidence, to justify the Exclusion as being rationally linked to furtherance of her migration and social policies. The Secretary of State needs to satisfy the court that the Exclusion is a rational way of identifying skilled chefs.

Before looking to that evidence it is important to be clear about the context in which the evidence is to be examined. It is common ground that no human rights of the Claimant are engaged in the present case. It is rightly not argued that the Secretary of State bears the higher burdens of justification which arise in such a context, as opposed to common law rationality standards.

I drew the attention of the parties to R (Tigere) v Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills [2015] UKSC 57; [2015] 1 WLR 3820. Although that was a case involving interference with human rights (where article 2 of the First Protocol was engaged) and there is no relevant human rights dimension to the present claim, there is useful discussion in that judgment of the use of bright line rules such as the Exclusion. There are valuable observations in that judgment as to the importance of bright line rules both as a matter of practicality and as part of the principle of legality. I refer here to the joint judgment of Lord Sumption and Lord Reed at §§87-91, and their observation that such rules provide substantial benefits in terms of clear and consistent applicability, as opposed to potentially arbitrary individual discretionary decisions. See also Lord Hughes’ observations at §60. I accordingly proceed on the basis that there is a substantial virtue in having a clear exclusionary or inclusionary rule system even if there are hard cases which fall outside the rule.

I now turn to the evidence and submissions on behalf of the Secretary of State in response to the reasonableness challenge. The evidence was provided by Mr. Richard Jackson of the Migration Policy Unit of the Home Office. Mr. Jackson has provided a number of statements for the current and related litigation concerning the legality of the Exclusion. I have been provided with three witness statements from Mr. Jackson. These statements are dated 29 June 2012 (submitted in the case of Thairama Restaurants), 4 May 2016 (submitted in the Upper Tribunal proceedings concerning the present Claimant), and finally a statement dated 19 May 2017 (submitted in the case of Imam). Counsel for the Secretary of State relied on this final statement as the main evidence for these proceedings and as containing the justification for the Exclusion. There are minor differences between the statements but they essentially contain the same justification for the Exclusion; and there has been no objection from the Claimant to my considering each of these statements. I will seek to summarise the Secretary of State’s position basing my summary principally upon the final statement and the submissions made on her behalf.

Mr. Jackson identifies the objective of the SOL as being to limit entry under Tier 2 to applicants who are genuinely required to fill a job that cannot be done by a resident worker. The PBS system seeks to identify objective criteria which can be applied consistently and in a manner that is transparent and proportionate to the resources available, and minimises the risk of abuse of the immigration system.

In setting the Tier 2 and SOL criteria the Secretary of State sought advice from the MAC. The latter is a non-statutory, non-departmental public body, sponsored by, but independent from, the Home Office, which advises the government on migration issues. A specific aspect of the MAC’s work was to advise on the occupations to be included on the SOL, and the criteria to be applied. In the context of chefs, the MAC has consistently concluded that chefs in general do not meet the necessary skills criteria (i.e. the NQF 6 skills threshold). This means that it is only if the post being applied for falls within the exceptions provided in the SOL, that a chef can be sponsored under Tier 2. The MAC has also on a number of occasions expressed reservations as to whether chefs should even appear at all on the SOL.

Mr. Jackson explains that the MAC had suggested the exclusion of chefs in fast food or standard fare outlets and the Secretary of State not only accepted these recommendations but augmented these exclusions to add the take-away Exclusion which is in issue in the present case.

As to the specific justification for the Exclusion, Mr. Jackson’s evidence needs to be cited in full because I will need to consider it with some care below. He explains at para. 27 of his statement of 19 May 2017 as follows:

“This [the Exclusion] was a clear, objective and easily verifiable test. It was considered appropriate as take-away services were considered to be far less associated with the finest cuisine prepared by the top 5% to 8% of skilled chefs, and much more with establishments offering fast food or alternative fare. The offer of a take-away service was therefore considered to be a strong and clear indicator of the quality of cuisine on offer, and by association the level of skill needed in preparing it. The SSHD considered that this exclusion of restaurants offering a take-away service was consistent with the approach recommended by the MAC”.

It was also submitted on behalf of the Secretary of State that the MAC, in their September 2013 review, endorsed the Exclusion. MAC expressed the following conclusion (with italicised emphasis):

“The UK Border Agency added to our criteria in order to try and prevent abuse. They state that a highly skilled chef must also not be working in an establishment offering a take-away service. In addition, they must be an executive, head, sous or specialist chef and there is a limit on the numbers of each per establishment. We understand the basis for these additional requirements. We accept that there is an argument that the very best global talent should be recruited and, pragmatically, we believe the current definition adequately identifies the very best whilst providing measures for preventing abuse”.

The Secretary of State argued that the evidence was that take-aways had been associated with abuse of the system in the past. This is said in the evidence but to be fair the examples Mr. Jackson gives of abuses do not relate to take-away services. I accept however that although the evidence could have been more clearly expressed, a general point was being made that the Secretary of State had typically found abuses in the take-away sector.

It was said that the Secretary of State also expressly considered alternative criteria for identifying fine dining restaurants which provided take-away services but could not define such establishments in an objective and readily identifiable way. She recognised that the Exclusion would potentially operate against certain fine dining restaurants (and might therefore be very broad) but the need to have an objective and transparent rule outweighed this unfairness. On the evidence, the examples of definitions that were considered by the Secretary of State included establishments such the following:

Overall, the Secretary of State concluded that the requirements of enforcement and operational need justified the Exclusion. The Secretary of State accordingly argued that this was an area of immigration and social policy where the court should be reluctant to interfere.

I should observe that, as appears from the summary above, specific consideration had been given by the Secretary of State to alternative criteria but an overall value judgment had been made that even if there were harsh consequences for some high-quality establishments which also offered take-away services, the overall benefits of a bright line rule (including transparency, enforcement and operational efficiency) justified the Exclusion.

In my judgment, and adopting the less intensive Wednesbury standard of review in assessing the reasonableness of the Exclusion, the Secretary of State’s evidence does in my judgment establish rationality of the Exclusion at common law, despite its accepted breadth.

My reasons for this conclusion are as follows:

Overall, I conclude that the Secretary of State has demonstrated the benefits of having a bright-line rule in the form of the Exclusion and therefore that it is lawful even though it will in certain cases lead to what may seem an unfair outcome as regards high-quality restaurants.

Accordingly, the Kruse v Johnson reasonableness challenge fails.

The claim is dismissed.

I should add that on the basis of the procedural chronology I set have out in Part II above, I consider that the delay in bringing these proceedings was justified and in large part not the fault of the Claimant or his advisers. I would not accordingly have declined relief on grounds of delay had that issue arisen.