Balog v Court in Okresny Sud, Humenne, Slovak Republic

MR JUSTICE HOLROYDE: This case has had a lengthy history. It came before Whipple J more than a month ago on 21 June for what was listed as a rolled-up hearing of the application for permission and, if permission be granted, the hearing of the appeal. The appellant sought an adjournment to obtain further evidence, the need for which had surely been self-evident for months. Whipple J made, helpfully, as much progress with the case as she could. She granted permission. She gave permission for the appellant to rely on fresh evidence. She then adjourned the hearing of the appeal to today's date to provide the appellant with the opportunity which he sought to obtain further evidence.

In the weeks since then, efforts have undoubtedly been made to obtain further evidence. The appellant's solicitor has done a great deal and has encountered various problems, some of an unusual nature. The end result, however, is that this morning Miss Iveson again applies for an adjournment for exactly the same purpose, namely to obtain the evidence which Whipple J provided an opportunity to obtain on 21 June.

The application, I am told and of course accept, was sent electronically to the Administrative Court Office late last night and no doubt it is around now being processed by someone in that office. The intended application first came to my attention at about 10.10 am this morning when Miss Iveson delivered by hand a further bundle of documents.

This is, I am afraid, a most unsatisfactory state of affairs. The terms of the European Arrest Warrant do not make it easy to distill the course of proceedings in Slovakia. The existence of an unusual issue between the parties not only as to whether a particular document is on the Slovakian court file but also as to whether anyone has recently inspected that file was identified a long time ago. The case has been listed for substantive hearing once. It had to be adjourned. There is, I have to say, a limit to the indulgence which can be granted to any party by way of further adjournment.

Amongst the other matters which the court has to consider is the proportionate use of the court's time and resources. This is the second time on which application is made to adjourn what has been listed as a substantive hearing before a judge prepared to conduct that substantive hearing.

Moreover, even now the application is made on what I will call a developing basis. Miss Iveson tells me that there is today available an apparently relevant document, which it seems must have been in the possession of the appellant since November of last year. Setting aside for the moment any of the points which Miss Hinton would wish to make about changes or developments in the appellant's evidence, this strikes me as a further indication that sufficient time has been granted to the appellant to prepare his case and no further time should be allowed.

I must, of course, endeavour to do justice between the parties. This is an important case for all concerned. I agree with Miss Iveson that Whipple J granted an adjournment because evidence which might potentially be important appeared to be capable of being obtained. But that does not mean that a further adjournment must be granted today. Enough time has been allowed. I am afraid for the appellant to come to court this morning and seek a further adjournment is a step too far.

I would add this: that Miss Iveson suggests that an adjournment of no more than about 4 weeks would suffice. That, of course, may be so from the point of view of the parties, but the court faces the prospect that this is the last full week of term and that any further delay in the case would probably be appreciably longer than 4 weeks.

For those reasons, the application for the adjournment is refused. Both parties must proceed on the basis of such evidence as is available. Both parties must cope with any difficulties which their respective cases face as a result of the incomplete nature of some aspects of the evidence.

MR JUSTICE HOLROYDE: On 18 November 2016, in the Westminster Magistrates’ Court, District Judge Tempia ordered that this appellant, Mr Balog, be returned to the Slovak Republic pursuant to a European Arrest Warrant based on his conviction and sentence for five offences. He now appeals against that extradition order by permission of Whipple J, who also granted permission for him to rely upon fresh evidence.

The European Arrest Warrant was issued on 17 June 2016 and certified in this country by the National Crime Agency on 24 June 2016. It was based on a judgment of the Slovak Court on 31 March 2010 under case reference 2T83/2004. It related to five offences committed by the appellant, who is now 36 years old, when he was aged between 21 and 22. Three of the offences were conduct which in this country would be described as fraud by false pretences. They were committed in April and May 2003. Two of the offences involved the appellant's obtaining electrical goods on credit with the assistance of false documents and then paying only the first instalment before appropriating the goods for himself.

The third of the fraud offences related to the conduct of the appellant in persuading someone to provide him with cash on the basis that the appellant would then make a purchase on behalf of that person, but in fact keeping the money for himself.

The fourth offence was one of burglary committed in January 2004. The appellant, with others, committed burglary and theft in an establishment which either sold or stored medical products.

The final offence is recorded as an offence of robbery committed on 20 March 2004. There is an issue about this offence because the appellant says that the allegation of robbery was, in reality, a malicious false allegation and that he was only convicted of a public order offence.

It is not easy to extract the details of relevant court orders from the European Arrest Warrant and the various bodies of further information which have been provided by the respondent. There is, however, a significant gulf between the appellant's evidence that upon his conviction for the public order offence all other charges against him were dropped and he was sentenced to a term of 3 years' imprisonment, itself the subject of an immediate application for leave to appeal; and the evidence contained in the European Arrest Warrant itself, which shows the five convictions to which I have referred and shows that on 31 March 2010 the court imposed an aggregated sentence for all matters of 7 years' imprisonment.

It is common ground that the appellant was not present in court when that sentence was imposed, though he was represented. It is also common ground that the sentence is to be reduced by the period of time which the appellant spent on remand in custody for these matters. That period was from 20 March to 18 November 2004, with the result that the sentence remaining to be served is 6 years 122 days.

I am extremely grateful to both counsel for their very helpful written and oral submissions in this case and for the industry which they have shown in researching matters raised by the court.

Miss Iveson, for the appellant, realistically does not seek to argue against the information contained in the warrant as to the convictions and as to the total sentence remaining to be served. She points out that the documents provided by the respondent show a good many hearings from which the appellant was absent and suggests it is therefore possible that his understanding of the outcome of proceedings was simply overtaken by subsequent events.

It is relevant to note what happened after the period when the appellant was remanded in custody for these matters. That period ended, as I have said, on 18 November 2004. At some stage thereafter, and it may have been very shortly thereafter, he was placed in custody under sentence for one or more unrelated offences. He certainly spent some time in custody pursuant to an 8-month sentence, from which he was released early in March 2006. It may be that he was also in custody after November 2004 on another offence of which he had been convicted. The position is far from clear from the documents provided to the court.

The documents do, however, make clear that in the months immediately preceding his departure from Slovakia to the United Kingdom, which was in late March 2006, the appellant spent some time in custody on an unrelated matter. The potential significance of this, as will become apparent, is that the District Judge in her judgment mistakenly referred to his having been released from the period of remand in relation to these offences only days before he left Slovakia. He had, in fact, been released from his pre-trial detention on these offences well over a year before his departure.

The District Judge in her decision dealt first with challenges to extradition based on a suggested insufficiency of particulars given in the European Arrest Warrant. She accepted the appellant's arguments in relation to offences 3 and 5 and accordingly discharged him on those two offences. Offence 5, as I have indicated, was the offence of robbery, which on the face of it was the most serious of the various offences of which the appellant was convicted. In relation to offences 1, 2 and 4, the District Judge considered but ultimately rejected submissions on behalf of the appellant based, first of all, on the passage of time and, secondly, on the Article 8 rights of the appellant, his partner and their young daughter.

In summary, the appellant's evidence to the Magistrates' Court was as follows. He came to the United Kingdom in March 2006. His parents had already come to this country at some earlier stage. The appellant's arrival was precipitated by serious ill health affecting his father. The appellant's case is that before leaving Slovakia he told the court of his intentions and gave the court his English address. I will return to this topic shortly.

In the early months of his residence in this country the appellant committed a drink driving offence and an offence of driving whilst disqualified. These are to be added therefore to the picture of previous offending shown by the record of convictions from Slovakia. The last of those convictions, however, was in 2007, about a decade ago, and all the evidence before the court was to the effect that over the last 10 years or so the appellant has led a settled and law-abiding industrious life. He has been at the same address throughout. He has been in employment throughout. His present employer speaks highly of him and took the trouble to make a statement for the assistance of the court describing the appellant's hard work and importance to the employer.

In his domestic life, the appellant has been settled with his partner Ingrida for about 6 years. They have a daughter born on 21 April 2012 and therefore now aged 5. The prospect of separation from his partner and child is, of course, a most unhappy one for the appellant and for them. Miss Iveson rightly points out that the effect on the child may be significant. The child's welfare is, of course, a very important consideration, though not the only consideration, when it comes to the appellant's arguments under Article 8. There is also a significant financial concern, in that the income of the appellant's partner Ingrida is not in itself sufficient to maintain her and the child. They are dependent upon the appellant's income as well.

Returning now to the important topic of whether the appellant told the Slovakian court about his imminent move to the United Kingdom. The appellant's evidence before the District Judge was that he personally attended the Slovakian court. He told them he was going to go to England and gave the court his father's address, which, as I understand it, is the address at which he has lived ever since. Even if I am wrong in that understanding, giving his father's address would have been amply sufficient as a means of contacting him.

The appellant's evidence also was that he was told by the Slovakian court that it was necessary for him to send a letter from the United Kingdom and thus bearing a United Kingdom postmark confirming his address there. His evidence was to the effect that he did what was required of him. He heard nothing from the court. He knew he had been convicted of at least one offence and sentenced to 3 years' imprisonment. He knew that he had not served that sentence, even taking into account the time on remand. He knew that he had given instructions to his Slovakian lawyer to appeal against that sentence but made no further enquiries. It was part of his evidence that he thought that after 5 years of silence from the Slovakian court he would no longer be wanted to return. He gives no indication of the basis on which he formed that view. It was, of course, during the period when he was resident in this country and receiving no communications from the court that he formed his settled and happy family life on which he now, understandably, relies.

It should be added that the documents provided to the court by the respondents show that after March 2006 there were ten further hearings of the case before the Slovakian court, at each of which the appellant was represented, culminating in the order of 31 March 2010 to which I have referred.

The District Judge had at the outset of the hearing before her refused an application by the appellant for an adjournment to enable him to obtain further evidence in support of his contention that he had given the Slovakian court his English address before he came to this country in late March 2006. In her judgment, the learned District Judge summarised the appellant's family circumstances. Then at paragraph 30 of her judgment, she indicated that she did not accept the appellant's evidence that he had notified the Slovakian court of his UK address. She noted, as indeed is the case, that the appellant's employer had confirmed that he had at the appellant's request written a letter stating the appellant's UK address; but she also noted that the employer did not know what that letter was for or to whom precisely it was to be sent. The District Judge said this:

The learned District Judge went on to find that she was satisfied so as to be sure that the appellant was a fugitive "having left the country weeks after he was released from prison knowing he was going to be prosecuted". She referred to the clear evidence from the respondents that the appellant had been summonsed on numerous occasions at the Humenne address which he had given to the Slovakian police but, of course, did not respond to those summonses because he was in the UK.

At paragraph 37 of her decision, having referred to familiar case law, the District Judge found that the appellant became unlawfully at large on 31 March 2010 when the judgment of the court to which I have referred was given. He therefore could not rely on the passage of time bar under section 14 of the Extradition Act 2003. She went on at paragraph 39 to consider, lest she was wrong in finding the appellant to be a fugitive, whether it would be oppressive to extradite him. She concluded that it would not.

In relation to the submissions under Article 8, the District Judge conducted the balancing exercise required of her by the decision in Polish Judicial Authority v Celinski [2015] EWHC 1274 (Admin). In favour of extradition, she identified the weighty public interest in honouring extradition arrangements and in discouraging persons from seeing the UK as a state willing to accept fugitives. She pointed to her finding that the appellant was a fugitive, to the fact that he was not of entirely good character in the UK, that he was wanted to serve a sentence for two offences of fraud and a commercial burglary and that "a lengthy sentence remains to be served even taking account of two offences being discharged". She was not aware what the individual sentences were because the only record is of the single aggregated sentence for all five offences.

As to the factors militating against extradition, the District Judge referred to the appellant's age, to the fact that he has been in this country since March 2006, and has worked for the same company throughout. She referred to his family ties and the emotional and financial bond between the appellant, his partner and their daughter. She referred to the fact that all of the appellant's family live in this country, his father being in ill health and that the appellant contributes to the financial support of a brother who also lives in this country. She noted that the offences date back to 2003 and 2004, that there was delay in concluding the Slovakian proceedings until 2010 and that the warrant was not issued until 2016, when she found that the authorities became aware of the address in the United Kingdom. She noted that no explanation had been given of why the warrant had not been issued prior to 2016.

In reaching her decision in relation to Article 8, the learned District Judge took into account her finding that the appellant had not told the Slovakian authorities of his address in this country and that when the exact address was ascertained the European Arrest Warrant was speedily issued. She concluded that there were no strong counterbalancing factors to set against the public interest in honouring extradition arrangements and that extradition would not be disproportionate to the Article 8 rights of the appellant and his family.

The application for permission to appeal took a little time to resolve but on 20 or 21 June 2017, Whipple J, at an oral hearing, granted permission to appeal and granted permission to the appellant to rely on further evidence which was then before the court. Yet further information and evidence has been provided by both sides in the weeks which have passed since Whipple J's decision. I gave permission for each party to rely on all material presently before the court so that I could consider what weight should be given to it. At the outset of today's hearing, I refused a further application for another period of adjournment so that the appellant could make further enquiries.

Miss Iveson challenges the decisions made by the District Judge. She relies upon a body of evidence which she says supports the appellant's contention that before leaving the Slovak Republic he informed the court of his intended address in England and therefore argues that the District Judge was wrong to find that the appellant had failed to do so. She also points to the apparent misunderstanding on the District Judge's part as to when the appellant had been released from his pre-trial detention on these matters and submits that that misunderstanding related to an important factor which plainly influenced the District Judge's decision.

She argues therefore that the appellant was not a fugitive and that he is entitled to rely on a lengthy period of delay in seeking his return. She points out that one of the requests for further information elicited a response from the respondents which makes it clear that they knew in 2006 that the appellant was in the United Kingdom. Miss Iveson argues that although the exact address may not have been known at that stage, it would have been a very straightforward matter for the respondents to make a single enquiry of the United Kingdom police, which would immediately have revealed the address at which he has lived since March 2006.

Miss Iveson goes on to submit that the same errors are important flaws in the District Judge's reasoning in relation to the Article 8 rights of the appellant and his family. She also relies heavily in this regard on the fact that the appellant is only to be returned to serve his sentence on three of the five offences. Although, as I have indicated, there is no precise breakdown of the aggregate sentence, Miss Iveson submits that it is clear that the robbery sentence must have played a significant part in that aggregate total. The fact that the appellant is not to be returned on that charge or on one of the fraud charges must therefore result in a significant reduction in the term to be served.

She relies, moreover, on evidence very recently received from a lawyer in the Slovak Republic, Mr Gdovin. He helpfully explains that a comparatively recent decision of the Constitutional Court of the Slovak Republic has the effect that the method by which the court calculated the appellant's sentence in 2010 is now plainly impermissible. Mr Gdovin suggests that if the appellant were returned to serve his sentence on offences 1, 2 and 4 he would be facing a sentence of between 6 months and 3 years' imprisonment.

Miss Hinton, on behalf of the respondents, argues against the submissions. She invites my attention to the details of the evidence both before the District Judge and before this court and submits that the District Judge was entitled to make the finding which she did and that none of the further information undermines those findings.

I turn to the areas of the evidence which have been the subject of detailed submissions. The first relates to the question of whether or not the appellant informed the Slovak court of his proposed address in the United Kingdom. There has recently been provided to this court a photocopy of an envelope which is said to have been seen on the file of the Slovakian court relating to this case. The envelope is addressed to the judge of that court. It shows in the top left-hand corner the name of the appellant and his address in this country. It shows in the bottom left-hand corner the case reference number of these proceedings before the Slovak court. It bears what appears to be an adhesive sticker printed with a barcode which is said to be the Post Office's record of payment and posting. Above and below the barcode itself there appear a sequence of letters and numbers. The last two letters are SK. It is suggested that this is a reference to the unit of currency in the Slovak Republic before that state's accession to the European Union in 2008. Thus, Miss Iveson is able to submit that there is evidence that the court file does contain an envelope supportive of the appellant's evidence.

The evidence about the envelope is, however, most unusual. It is said to come from a woman, Julia Buckova, who was originally said by the appellant to be a lawyer in the Slovak Republic but who appears not to be. Her statement is to the effect that although she saw the envelope on the court file and photographed it, she was not permitted by the court to open it.

This evidence is roundly rejected by the respondents. Their information in a nutshell is that there is no such envelope on the court file, that there is no record of anyone having inspected the court file and that there is no record of any lawyer in the Slovak Republic called Julia Buckova.

The appellant now feels that he has been deceived by the woman Buckova, to whom he transferred money via Western Union to pay for her services in the belief that she was a lawyer qualified to make this enquiry on his behalf. He points to information relating to very recent further enquiries by Mr Gdovin. It is said by Mr Gdovin in a very recent letter to the appellant that he is able to confirm that there is an envelope on the court file which shows the appellant's English address. He describes the envelope as being "visually similar" to the one shown in the photograph which is before the court. Surprisingly, however, Mr Gdovin is not able to confirm that it is exactly the same envelope. It is suggested that when making enquiries of the Slovak court, he misunderstood precisely what was required of him and therefore devoted his attentions to other aspects of the court file and failed to appreciate the significance of this envelope.

This is a quite extraordinary conflict of evidence. The appellant relies upon the presence in the court file of a document. The respondents deny that there is any such document. The court must grapple with those conflicting assertions as best it can on the information available.

In my judgment, the following factors are material. First, there has been a significant change in the appellant's evidence on this topic. His initial proof of evidence and his oral evidence to the District Judge was to the effect that he personally went to the Slovak court and personally told them his UK address. He was told he would have to confirm it by sending an item from the United Kingdom with a postal date stamp so that future hearings could be notified to him at that address and he asserts that he did so soon after his arrival in this country.

However, having seen the photograph of the envelope said to be on the court file, he now says that he went to the court in Humenne, where he was told that he could leave Slovakia only if the court had an address to write to him to notify him of future hearing dates. He asked his then girlfriend Antonia to write the letter for him as her handwriting was better than his own. He posted the letter by recorded delivery from the local Post Office and he believes that payment for the postage is shown in the Slovak unit of currency at that time.

This is, on any view, a significant change. Miss Iveson suggests that it may be no more than a case of the photograph of the envelope jogging the appellant's memory. If this were the only feature of the evidence, her submission would be perhaps more persuasive. It is not, however, the only feature.

The second matter which seems to me to be important is that the latest account given by the appellant seems to me to make no sense whatsoever. Although it is perhaps slightly surprising, there is at least a certain logic in the assertion that the Slovak court required a letter bearing the UK address to be sent from the UK. But there is no logic whatsoever in a Slovak court official telling a man who was physically present in front of the official that he must leave the court building and go and send a letter from the Post Office in the same town to inform the court of an address which he could have perfectly well given there and then.

Thirdly, there is unequivocal evidence from the Slovakian court that there is no relevant envelope on the court file and there is no record of Ms Bukova, or indeed anybody else, having inspected the file. There is equally unequivocal evidence that any inspection of the file would be recorded, as one might well expect.

Fourthly, the appellant, as I have indicated, now believes he has been duped by Ms Bukova and has parted with money to no good end. I am bound to say that mystery surrounds the circumstances in which such events could have occurred. It must be borne in mind that although the lawyer originally instructed by the appellant in the Slovak proceedings appears no longer to be available, it would have been a simple matter for him to contact a qualified lawyer in Slovakia rather than someone who is not a lawyer at all and whose stated telephone numbers are now said to be inoperative.

Fifthly, so far as Mr Gdovin's recent evidence is concerned, I have to say that I find it quite extraordinary that he could have so far misunderstood his instructions as to fail to take note of the single most important document said to exist in the court file.

Sixthly, the information provided by the respondents shows, as I have indicated, that there were no fewer than ten hearings of this case before the Slovak court after the appellant left that state in March 2006. Throughout those hearings, which cover a period of 4 years and more, the court had been unable to elicit any response from the repeated efforts to summons the appellant at the address in Humenne which the court says is the only address he had ever provided to them. It would be a quite remarkable state of affairs if at each of those ten hearings there had been present on the court file the envelope shown in the photograph presently before this court, on which the English address of the appellant is plainly to be seen.

Seventhly, the appellant has always known that he had been convicted of at least one offence. He has always known that he had been sentenced to a term of imprisonment substantially in excess of the period of time he had spent remanded in custody. He has therefore always known that, subject to a successful appeal against that sentence, he was at risk of having to return to serve it. He gives no explanation of his asserted belief that after 5 years he could regard himself as immune from further proceedings. He clearly made no enquiry at all of either the court or any lawyer in Slovakia to find out what, if anything, was happening in the proceedings against him.

Finally, I accept Miss Iveson's submission that the District Judge fell into error when she misunderstood the evidence as to the date when the appellant was released from his pre-trial detention in this case. Her misunderstanding is easily explained, because the appellant's own evidence on the topic did not make it at all clear that, although released from custody in relation to these matters, he was thereafter in custody on an unrelated matter or matters.

But that misunderstanding by the District Judge is, in my view, of no real significance in the case. The important point is that the District Judge relied on the unequivocal evidence of the Slovakian court to the effect that upon the appellant's release from custody on 17 March 2006 he stated his contact address as an address in Humenne and did not give the court any other address.

Drawing these threads together, I cannot say precisely what has happened. I am, however, entirely satisfied that the appellant's evidence, either in its original or in its changed form, is flatly contradicted by the information provided by the respondents in circumstances where the court could have no reason to deny the existence of the letter if it was over many years the means by which they could easily have contacted the appellant. The evidence on the appellant's side is wholly unsatisfactory. The District Judge was, in my view, plainly entitled to find that the appellant did not notify his English address to the court. Nothing in the further evidence now before the court, as explored in detail before me today, undermines that position. The District Judge was accordingly entitled to conclude that from the date of the final judgment the appellant was a fugitive, as that term is loosely used for these purposes.

I would add that even if I had been persuaded that the District Judge had been wrong to reach the conclusion as to the appellant's fugitive status, I can see no basis to challenge her conclusion that his extradition would not be oppressive.

The question of whether his extradition would be disproportionate to the Article 8 rights of the appellant and his family is, of course, a different matter. The passage of time is, as Miss Iveson rightly says, a factor to be taken into account in this regard. Its relevance is in principle twofold. First, if there has been delay on the part of the respondents in seeking extradition, that may reduce the weight to be given to the public interest in honouring extradition arrangements. Secondly, the passage of time may be significant as showing that the appellant has during that period developed the private and family life which lies at the heart of the Article 8 considerations.

The second of those factors is a significant consideration in this case. Miss Iveson has a powerful point to make when she submits that during the period between 2006 and 2016, the appellant has put behind him his youthful offending, has worked consistently and industriously and has formed a settled family unit, which will be sadly disturbed if he has to return to serve the outstanding sentence.

As against that, the respondents are entitled to point out that that family life has been developed in the knowledge that there was all the time an outstanding sentence in the Slovak Republic to which the appellant might have to return.

The District Judge, in considering this difficult issue, took into account all relevant circumstances. The errors she made about the time spent in custody in relation to these offences was, as I have indicated, immaterial to her final decision. Her conclusion that there were no strong counterbalancing factors to outweigh the public interest in extradition was one which she was entitled to reach on the evidence before her. The further evidence now before this court does not, in my judgment, undermine or alter that decision. Indeed, as this hearing has gone on, the close attention given to the particular circumstances of the case has, to my mind, made it clearer that there was no good reason to delay these proceedings further and that the appellant's case does not stand up to close scrutiny.

I have been troubled, as I have indicated to counsel, by the absence of any information as to the breakdown of the aggregate sentence and therefore as to the effect upon that aggregate sentence of the appellant's discharge in relation to offences 3 and 5.

I entirely accept Miss Hinton's submission that there was no obligation upon the respondents to try to provide a breakdown of the sentence in advance of the hearing before the District Judge. I do, however, note and agree with the observation of Whipple J when granting permission to appeal, that:

At my request, counsel have researched this point, and I am very grateful to Miss Hinton for providing me with copies of decisions in three comparatively recent cases: Kucera v Czech Republic [2008] EWHC 414 (Admin), Brodziak v Poland [2013] EWHC 3394 (Admin) and Cortas v Poland [2017] EWHC 1356 (Admin). Of those three, the most recent, Cortas v Poland, is the one which comes closest to being concerned with the point which has troubled me, namely the impact upon the Article 8 balancing exercise of a lack of information as to the breakdown of an aggregated sentence where the appellant has been discharged in relation to one or more of the relevant offences.

Having reflected on these matters, and having considered the judgments helpfully provided to me, my conclusion is this. Although it would have been helpful to have at the hearing of this appeal more information as to the breakdown of the sentence and as to the effect of recent developments on the period of time to be served, the important consideration is that the appellant is being returned to serve the outstanding sentence for three offences each of which is punishable by up to 2 years' imprisonment. The calculation of his sentence no doubt reflects, as the District Judge rightly observed, the aggravating feature of the appellant's earlier convictions.

In those circumstances, it is, in my judgment, clear that whatever the precise calculation of the remaining sentence may yield, it will be a sentence of some significant length and not a sentence to be measured in only days or weeks. The precise impact on an Article 8 balancing exercise of a decision to discharge an appellant on some but not all offences may one day have to be addressed in detail; but I am satisfied that the need for that detailed consideration does not arise in this case because, on any view, there is a significant term still to be served.

I am, as I have said, grateful to both counsel for their assistance with this case.

The conclusion to which I have come is that the District Judge cannot be said to have been wrong in the decision which she reached on the evidence which was before her and that nothing in the further evidence and information provided to the court since then has undermined or altered that position.

The appeal accordingly fails and is dismissed.

MISS HINTON: Thank you, my Lord.

MR JUSTICE HOLROYDE: Is there anything further that needs to be dealt with?

MISS HINTON: No, my Lord, thank you.

MR JUSTICE HOLROYDE: May I repeat my thanks to you both for dealing with my innumerable interruptions and with researching the matter so thoroughly.

Miss Iveson, I do not know if it is Mr Wong who sits behind you, is it?

MISS IVESON: It is, yes.

MR JUSTICE HOLROYDE: Mr Wong, let me just say, I fully recognise from the material you have put before the court that this has not been an easy task for you to grapple with. Thank you.