IM Properties Development Ltd v Lichfield District Council & Ors

This is an application under section 113(3) of the Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act 2004 (“the 2004 Act”) to quash the Lichfield District Local Plan: Strategy (“the local plan”) made on 17 February 2015 by the defendant local planning authority, Lichfield District Council (“the Council”). The claimant is the promoter of development on a site to the north east of Lichfield, off Watery Lane, Curborough. Its application for planning permission for 750 houses on that site was refused by the Council. The claimant has appealed. The public inquiry for purposes of the appeal commenced on 10 March 2015 but the inspector’s report to the Secretary of State is delayed to await the outcome of the current claim.

The interested parties are Taylor Wimpey UK Ltd (“Taylor Wimpey”) and Persimmon Homes Ltd (“Persimmon”). Taylor Wimpey is promoting the development of land at Deanslade Farm, Lichfield, on a site allocated for housing under the local plan; Persimmon is promoting the development of land at Cricket Lane, Lichfield, pursuant to an option agreement with the landowners and St. Modwen Developments, on a site also allocated for residential and employment development under the local plan. Both these sites are to the south of Lichfield and are in the green belt.

The grounds of the application are that (1) the planning inspector appointed to conduct the examination into the local plan erred in failing to determine whether the Council’s sustainability appraisal complied with the relevant legal and procedural requirements; (2) the sustainability appraisal and the process of consideration of alternatives by the Council and the planning inspector were legally flawed and unfair; (3) the planning inspector adopted the wrong approach when considering whether it was appropriate to alter the green belt boundaries by releasing the Deanslade Farm and Cricket Lane sites for housing; and (4) the Council had no power to adopt the local plan with the main modifications proposed in respect of the green belt sites, since this departed fundamentally from the spatial strategy it originally set out. The last is said to be a novel legal point.

For part of the factual background I gratefully adopt relevant passages in a judgment of Patterson J in a judicial review brought by the claimant against the Council as defendant, R (on the application of IM Properties Development Ltd) v. Lichfield District Council [2014] EWHC 2440 (Admin); [2014] P.T.S.R. 1484. At appropriate points I have supplemented these passages, those parts appearing in italics.

“[9] In 2007 the Core Strategy Issues and Options document was published for consultation. Four alternative draft spatial options for how the district could develop up to 2026 were set out. They included a town focused development option which acknowledged that Green Belt release was likely to be required and a new settlement option. An advantage of the new settlement option was that it would not require any alteration to Green Belt boundaries.

[10] In 2008 the Core Strategy Preferred Options was published for consultation. That included option 4 which was for a new settlement. It had one realistic location for development only that would be deliverable to meet identified housing needs: that was the claimant’s land. The new settlement option was said also to require totally new infrastructure investment rather than making the best use of existing infrastructure.

[11] In April 2009 a Policy Directions document was published. The strategy proposed was for town focused development…

[12] In 2010 the defendant published “Shaping the District”. That recognised that about 41% of the district’s housing growth to 2026 would take place in and around Lichfield city. 59% of that was to be within the urban area with the remaining 41% to be delivered through the development of sustainable urban extensions to the south of the city.

[13] The important role of the Green Belt was recognised,

“With the majority of new development being channelled towards the most sustainable urban areas of Lichfield and Burntwood which are excepted from the Green Belt.”

The document continued,

“Detailed changes to the green belt boundary around the edge of Lichfield city urban area to meet the longer term development needs beyond 2028 will be considered through the local plan allocations document.”

[14] In November 2010 the defendant published a draft Core Strategy. That was subject to consultation until February 2011.”

In February 2011, the owner of the land off Watery Lane, Curborough, now promoted by the claimant put into the public domain proposals for it as an alternative to the Council’s strategy, the “new village or new settlement option”.

“[15] In November 2011 the claimant submitted a strategy report to promote a new village opportunity. That was followed up with a transportation study in January 2012.

[16] In March 2012 the National Planning Policy Framework (NPPF) was published. The claimant updated its submissions to take into account the contents of the NPPF in May 2012.

[17] A pre-submission Lichfield district Local Plan Strategy was published for consultation between July and September 2012.

[18] In November 2012 a revised sustainability appraisal of the proposed Local Plan strategy was published. That included an appraisal of updated information for the proposed new village to the north east of Lichfield for 2,000 dwellings.

[19] On the 22^nd March 2013 the draft Lichfield Local Plan Strategy was submitted to the Secretary of State. No Green Belt sites were included for development as part of that strategy because of the volume and strength of earlier objections to Green Belt releases.

…

[21] Examination hearings into the draft local plan took place between 24^th June and 10^th July 2013. One of those hearings was on the Green Belt. During that session the issue of whether there needed to be further release of land to meet future needs within the plan period was raised.

[22] On the 3^rd September 2013 the Inspector, Mr R Yuille, wrote to the defendant with his preliminary views. He was satisfied that the defendant had discharged its duty to co-operate, that the submitted sustainability appraisal was a reliable piece of evidence, that the strategic development areas, the adopted strategy and the broad development locations identified were soundly based. However, he was concerned that the submitted plan was unsound as it did not make adequate provision for the objective assessment of housing need contained in its own evidence base.

[23] The Inspector considered that finding a site or sites for an additional 900 houses was a strategic matter that should be dealt with through the plan itself.

…

[30] On the 4^th September 2013 the defendant wrote to the Inspector thanking him for his interim findings and confirmed that it was willing to identify a further site or sites to address the identified current housing shortfall. That required further sustainability appraisal work which had been commissioned. That was to be undertaken on the basis of the information supplied and available to the council by the close of the hearings sessions on the 10^th July. No further information was to be accepted.”

This is the so-called guillotine, which the claimant complained about in early January 2014.

On 7 January 2014, the Council’s Environment and Development (Overview and Scrutiny) Committee considered a report to update it on the progress of the local plan and to identify a series of main modifications to it, including those required to address the housing shortfall identified by the planning inspector. To achieve this, the report proposed the release of green belt land at the Cricket Lane and Deanslade Farm sites.

The claimant formally submitted an application for outline planning permission for up to 750 dwellings with associated infrastructure on 16 January 2014. As mentioned earlier, the application was refused – on 20 May 2014 – and the claimant has appealed.

The Council’s cabinet considered the main modifications proposed to the local plan and these were endorsed by a meeting of the full Council on 28 January 2014. A six week consultation began on the Local Plan Strategy: Main Modifications on 6 February 2014. The letter/email announcing the consultation said that it was to address issues of legal compliance and soundness. In bold type there appeared this statement: “Representations should only relate to the main modifications. This consultation is not an opportunity to repeat or raise further representations about the published plan…” It referred to the documents available as including the main modifications, together with the sustainability assessment, the Habitat Regulations assessment and the Equalities Impact assessment. The letter/email added that the additional modifications were minor changes and not the subject of consultation.

A further version of the sustainability appraisal was available in February 2014 to take account of the main modifications. There was an explanation of how the appraisal framework evolved from a group called the Lichfield Sustainability Working Group and the use of the relevant European Directive’s objectives. The group assessed a considerable number of sites, with various scorings and comments for each. In relation to the claimant’s land, there was an assessment of its scheme for 750 dwellings.

There was a volume of responses to the consultation, many objecting to the sustainability appraisal in some way. Indeed the sustainability appraisal attracted the most comments in the consultation. The issue of scoring was raised (not by the claimant). All the responses were sent to the planning inspector, along with a summary and the Council’s response to each. These were published on the Council’s website.

The claimant’s response to the consultation dated 20 March 2014 made specific points about the sustainability appraisal. It asserted that it was based on inaccurate, partial and out of date information; that the assessment process had not been carried out in an impartial and fair way; that the assessment of alternatives had not been based on proportionate evidence; that the scoring of alternative sites was flawed; and that the Deanslade Farm and Cricket Lane sites had been scored very highly with an overtly positive assessment, rather than one which was more measured and balanced. As an appendix, the claimant submitted a revised assessment applying the criteria and scoring method used in the sustainability appraisal.

Meanwhile, the claimant had launched a judicial review of the Council’s decision of 28 January 2014 to endorse the main modifications, to which reference has already been made: [2014] EWHC 2440 (Admin); [2014] P.T.S.R. 1484. On 18 July 2014, Patterson J dismissed the claim on the basis of the ouster provisions in section 113 of the 2004 Act, although she went on to make adverse findings in relation to the substance of the grounds the claimant pursued. In particular she held that it was a matter of planning judgment in a local plan exercise whether the release of green belt land was necessary ([100]) and there was no doctrine that a reduction of green belt could not arise unless the fundamental basis on which the land was originally included in it was subsequently falsified or its release was a last resort: [102]. As regards the guillotine, Patterson J held that there was no unfairness:

“[112] There is a distinction between applying a guillotine in relation to developer submissions on individual sites and applying that rigorously across the board which is clearly fair and the more strategic task which the defendant had to carry out to repair its local plan. To have permitted further evidence to be adduced on the claimant’s planning application before members in January 2014 would be to place the claimants at an unfair advantage compared to other sites promoted by other developers. That would clearly be an inappropriate approach on behalf of the defendant and it was right not to adopt it.

…

[114] The fact of the pending further examination is the answer to the claimant’s complaints. The claimant will have ample opportunity at that hearing to raise all of these issues, if it thinks it is appropriate to do so, and to have the inspector’s findings upon them. I do not find that there has been any lack of fairness in the process thus far which seems to me to have been carried out in a thorough manner on the part of the defendant. However, the claimant is not deprived of any opportunity to make representations on the main modifications as the examination process is ongoing. In truth, the claimant has an alternative remedy for its complaints.”

On 22 August 2014, the claimant wrote to the planning inspector that it was wrong for information that had arisen after the guillotine date of 10 July 2013 relating to alternative sites, including the claimant’s, to be left out of account. It set out a list of the relevant material that had been submitted with the planning application, which it contended was relevant to the assessment of the relative sustainability of its proposals.

In reply, on 2 September 2014 the planning inspector endorsed the Council’s approach to the guillotine on developer submissions insofar as that related to its work of assessing alternative sites. He indicated that, since the Council did not object, he was prepared to take into account post-guillotine information as part of his own assessment. He said:

“The Council has responded to this letter with admirable alacrity and confirmed that it has no objection to the introduction of such evidence. I agree that this is sensible as the ‘guillotine’ was only intended to apply to the work undertaken in assessing sites necessary to meet the identified housing shortfall. I would, however, point out that I am not determining a planning application and much of the detailed evidence you refer to will not have a place at a Local Plan Examination. I will be relying on you, therefore, to concentrate on drawing out only the main points necessary to make your case.”

In anticipation of the resumed hearings before the planning inspector, the claimant’s hearing statements, dated September 2014, included details of its planning application and environmental statement. It asserted that the ongoing local plan examination was the appropriate forum to present further evidence to allow for the proper interrogation of the matters relevant to the assessment of the main modifications being proposed by the Council. The matter could not be responded to properly without using accurate and full information in respect of the alternatives available.

An application for permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal was dismissed by Sullivan LJ on 6 October 2014. The guillotine point was not one of the points appealed.

The hearings before the planning inspector resumed in October 2014. He issued his final report on 16 January 2015: Report on the examination into the Lichfield district local plan: strategy (“the planning inspector’s report”). The Council formally adopted the local plan in accordance with the planning inspector’s report on 17 February 2015.

The planning inspector began his report with the statement that it contained his assessment of the local plan under section 20(5) of the 2004 Act. He would consider, first, whether the plan’s preparation had complied with the duty to co-operate, in recognition that there was no scope to remedy any failure in this regard, and then whether the plan was sound and whether it was compliant with the legal requirements: [1]. In accordance with section 20(7C) of the 2004 Act, the Council had requested that he should make any modifications needed to rectify matters that made the plan unsound and thus incapable of being adopted. Those main modifications were set out in the Appendix to his report: [3]. Following discussions at the examination hearings, the Council had prepared a schedule of proposed main modifications and carried out the sustainability appraisal, and that schedule had been subject to public consultation. He had taken account of the consultation responses in coming to his conclusions in the report: [4]. The report incorporated his interim findings either unchanged or, where either a review of existing evidence or new evidence dictated, in a modified form: [7].

Issue 2 in the planning inspector’s report was headed “Sustainability Appraisal”. The Inspector began this part of his report as follows:

“61.

Although the Sustainability Appraisal is not the only piece of evidence underpinning the selection of the spatial strategy and the sites allocated in the Plan, it is the document that attracted the most comment, much of it highly detailed, at both sets of hearings. I will, therefore, deal with these comments before considering the appropriateness of the strategy. I made it clear at both sets of hearings that while it is not my role to comment on the legality of the Sustainability Appraisal it is necessary to establish whether it is a reliable piece of evidence. On neither occasion was the correctness of this approach challenged.”

As to the 10 July 2013 Council’s guillotine, after which developers could not submit more information in relation to their schemes, the planning inspector said that he supported it because he was concerned that the Council would not be able to complete its appraisal if the nature and extent of these sites continued to change as they had done in the past. At the resumed hearings, he said, he did allow evidence produced after the guillotine to be introduced and had taken it into account: [64].

The planning inspector then examined a number of criticisms of the sustainability appraisal. These included its comprehensibility and whether all the alternatives had been afforded an equal examination: [74]. Prepared over a long period, he said, its scope was broad and its methodology complex and some errors and inaccuracies had inevitably crept in, but there was no evidence of major flaws or that not all suitable alternatives were assessed: [74]-[75]. He concluded that all options had been appraised against the same sustainability objectives and the same appraisal framework had been applied to each option. While the amount of commentary might vary between options, he was satisfied that they had been assessed in the same level of detail: [76], [79].

The planning inspector then considered the various criticisms of the sustainability assessment made at the resumed hearings. One related to the implications of the information guillotine. Although information submitted in support of the claimant’s outline planning application, for which planning permission was refused, for dwellings off Watery Lane was caught by the guillotine, he had taken it into account in preparing his report: [97]-[98]. In this regard the planning inspector said:

“[99] It was suggested that this information indicates that the Sustainability Appraisal treats the site at Watery Lane in an unfair and unequal way particularly in relation to its transportation credentials. However, no detailed evidence to support this point was drawn to my attention at the resumed hearings. Broadly speaking, the Sustainability Appraisal does not indicate that the Watery Lane site is unsustainable but rather that it is less sustainable than the sites selected by the Council. I see no reason to dispute this judgement.”

In his conclusions on the sustainability appraisal, the planning inspector stated that its purpose was to provide a reasonably consistent analysis of the sustainability credentials of alternative sites and the likely impacts of development upon them. He was satisfied that it “assess[es] a range of alternative sites and groups of sites in an equal manner and on a like for like basis and that this purpose is achieved”: [100]. Having examined the minutiae of the sustainability appraisal at some length, the planning inspector said he was of the opinion that the disagreement about it came down to honest differences in planning judgment, for which there was a reasonable basis. There was no support for the suggestion that the Council had used the sustainability appraisal to bolster predetermined decisions: [101]. The planning inspector concluded this part of his report as follows:

“[102] The Sustainability Appraisal is not a simple document. The commonest criticism of it is that it is hard to understand. There is some truth in this. Indeed the Council was itself hard pressed at times to explain the intricacies of the Sustainability Appraisal and only did so by way of additional explanatory notes - although to be fair it needed to do so only when the document was subjected to forensic examination. However, a document of this scope is necessarily complex and while parts of it require close reading, its main points are clearly drawn out in the non-technical summary. Having considered the various criticisms made of the Sustainability Appraisal, and mindful of the point that the preparation of such a document is not to be treated as an obstacle course, I am of the opinion that it is a reliable piece of evidence.”

Later in his report the planning inspector examined the claimant’s proposals. There was nothing to suggest that such a scheme would not be viable. It was common ground that such a proposal would be developable and it may well be that the 750 dwelling scheme was deliverable although, at the time of the initial hearings, little in the way of detailed evidence was provided about matters such as how it would link to the A38 and the local road network: [169]. It was common ground that this was a sustainable site but there was disagreement as to whether it was more sustainable than the strategy proposed by the Council. The sustainability appraisal concluded that it was not. The promoters of the site disagreed and had carried out their own sustainability appraisal to demonstrate their point: [170]. The planning inspector said:

“[171] However, this exercise simply makes the point that such assessments are based on a series of judgements and such judgements can vary. There is, however, no substantial evidence to suggest that the judgements in the Council’s sustainability appraisal are awry or that they are based on inaccurate information.

…

[175] However, on the information available, there is no clear indication that the proposed new village at north east Lichfield would be a more suitable or sustainable alternative than the strategy selected by the Council in the Plan.”

The planning inspector also examined the sites promoted by the interested parties, the Deanslade Farm and Cricket Lane sites, which involved taking land out of the green belt. There was relatively little in the way of suggestions at the resumed hearings that these sites were not in suitable locations, that they were not deliverable or developable or that they were not viable. The focus of concern at the resumed hearings was not with these matters but with the fact that the allocation of the sites involved taking land out of the green belt: [190]. The planning inspector noted that an essential characteristic of the green belt was its openness and its permanence and that, once established, the green belt boundaries should be altered only in exceptional circumstances through the preparation or review of a local plan. Referring to the National Planning Policy Framework (“the NPPF”), the planning inspector said that it was also agreed that, when reviewing the green belt boundaries, account should be taken of the need to promote sustainable patterns of development or, to put it another way, that the revised boundaries should be consistent with the local plan strategy for meeting the requirements for sustainable development: [191].

The planning inspector also noted that it was agreed at the resumed hearings that the question of whether or not exceptional circumstances existed was a matter of planning judgement taking into account the objective of contributing to the achievement of sustainable development [193]. He dealt with the various points of disagreement: one was that too much credence had been given to the urban/key centre focused strategy in the draft plan. He said that it was entirely legitimate for the Council to seek to find additional sites that are consistent with the strategy of the submitted plan, particularly as he had already endorsed that strategy in his interim findings: [196]. The other side of the coin was that too little credence had been given to the plan’s strategy, since this sought to minimise green belt releases. He said that while the strategy sought to minimise green belt releases, it has never ruled them out in the longer term. The need to find additional housing sites had simply brought the process forward: [198].

Another issue the planning inspector considered was not so much that Cricket Lane and Deanslade Farm were unsuitable, undeliverable, undevelopable or unviable, but rather that there were better sites which should have been selected, including the claimant’s site at Watery Lane. The planning inspector said that these arguments were not, however, borne out by the findings of the sustainability appraisal, which he had examined at length and concluded were reliable. Those findings indicated that the additional sites selected by the Council were the most suitable: [204]. The planning inspector concluded on this point as follows:

“[207] Nonetheless, the additional sites selected by the Council are in Green Belt and land should be released from Green Belt only in exceptional circumstances. In my judgement the lack of more sustainable sites outside the Green Belt to meet the identified need for housing in a way that is consistent with the Plan’s urban and key centre strategy amounts, in this instance, to the exceptional circumstances that justify the release of Green Belt land at Deanslade Farm and Cricket Lane and their allocation for development (together with additional housing land at Fradley East) as proposed in [the main modifications]. I am also satisfied that the additional sites selected by the Council are the most suitable having considered reasonable alternatives.”

At paragraph 250, the planning inspector concluded that the local plan met all the legal requirements, which he set out in a table, which included compliance with the Statement of Community Involvement 2006, and the legality of the sustainability appraisal. At paragraphs 251 and 252 he concluded that, with the main modifications set out in the appendix, the plan would satisfy section 20(5) of the 2004 Act and the criteria for soundness in the NPPF.

The statutory framework for the preparation, examination and adoption of a local plan is set out in the 2004 Act. Section 15(1) requires a local planning authority to prepare and maintain a scheme to be known as their local development scheme. Section 15(2)(aa) requires the scheme to provide for “the local development documents which are to be development plan documents”. Section 17(8) provides that “a document is a local development only in so far as it or any part of it – (a) is adopted by resolution of the local planning authority as a local development document…” Under section 19(1) development plan documents must be prepared in accordance with the local development scheme. Section 19(2)(a) provides that in preparing a development plan document or any other local development document the local planning authority must have regard to national policies and advice contained in guidance issued by the Secretary of State. Under section 19(5)(a), the local planning authority must also carry out an appraisal of the sustainability of the proposals in each development plan document.

Section 20 provides for the submission of every development plan document to the Secretary of State for independent examination. In particular:

(5)

The purpose of an independent examination is to determine in respect of the development plan document –

(a)

whether it satisfies the requirements of sections 19 and 24(1), regulations under section 17(7) and any regulations under section 36 relating to the preparation of development plan documents;

(b)

whether it is sound…

(7)

Where the person appointed to carry out the examination –

(a)

has carried it out, and;

(b)

considers that, in all the circumstances, it would be reasonable to conclude –

(i)

that the document satisfies the requirements mentioned in subsection (5)(a) and is sound, and

(ii)

that the local planning authority complied with any duty imposed on the authority by section 33A in relation to the document's preparation,

(iii)

the person must recommend that the document is adopted and give reasons for the recommendation

(7A) Where the person appointed to carry out the examination –

(a)

has carried it out, and

(b)

is not required by subsection (7) to recommend that the document is adopted, the person must recommend non-adoption of the document and give reasons for the recommendation.

(7B) Subsection (7C) applies where the person appointed to carry out the examination –

(a)

does not consider that, in all the circumstances, it would be reasonable to conclude that the document satisfies the requirements mentioned in subsection (5)(a) and is sound, but

(b)

does consider that, in all the circumstances, it would be reasonable to conclude that the local planning authority complied with any duty imposed on the authority by section 33A in relation to the document's preparation.

(7C) If asked to do so by the local planning authority, the person appointed to carry out the examination must recommend modifications of the document that would make it one that –

(a)

satisfies the requirements mentioned in subsection (5)(a), and

(b)

is sound.”

Section 39 provides for sustainable development.

“(1)

This section applies to any person who or body which exercises any function –

(b)

under Part 2 in relation to local development documents;

…

(2)

The person or body must exercise the function with the objective of contributing to the achievement of sustainable development.

…

(3)

For the purposes of subsection (2) the person or body must have regard to national policies and advice contained in guidance issued by –

(a)

the Secretary of State for the purposes of subsection (1)(b)…”

Directive 2001/42/EC on the assessment of the effects of certain plans and programmes on the environment. It requires an environmental assessment to be carried out in relation to plans and programmes which set a framework for future development consent of projects to which the Environmental Impact Assessment Directive 85/337/EEC applies (recital 10). Article 3 provides:

“1.

An environmental assessment, in accordance with Articles 4 to 9, shall be carried out for plans and programmes referred to in paragraphs 2 to 4 which are likely to have significant environmental effects.

2.

Subject to paragraph 3, an environmental assessment shall be carried out for all plans and programmes,

(a)

which are prepared for agriculture, forestry, fisheries, energy, industry, transport, waste management, water management, telecommunications, tourism, town and country planning or land use and which set the framework for future development consent of projects listed in Annexes I and II to Directive 85/337/EEC, or

(b)

which, in view of the likely effect on sites, have been determined to require an assessment pursuant to Article 6 or 7 of Directive 92/43/EEC. ”

The process for carrying out an environmental assessment is contained in the Environmental Assessment of Plans and Programmes Regulations 2004 SI 2004 No. 1633 (“the 2004 Regulations”). That process includes the preparation of an environmental report. The content of the report is prescribed by regulation 12:

“(2)

The report shall identify, describe and evaluate the likely significant effects on the environment of –

(a)

implementing the plan or programme, and

(b)

reasonable alternatives taking into account the objectives and the geographical scope of the plan or programme.

(3)

The report shall include such of the information referred to in Schedule 2 to these Regulations as may reasonably be required, taking account of –

(a)

current knowledge and methods of assessment;

…”

The obligation to consult is contained in regulation 13. In particular regulation 13(2) provides:

“(2)

As soon as reasonably practicable after the preparation of the relevant documents, the responsible authority shall

…

(d)

invite the consultation bodies and the public consultees to express their opinion on the relevant documents, specifying the address to which, and the period within which, opinions must be sent.”

Paragraph 8 of Schedule 2 provides that the sustainability appraisal shall include “an outline of the reasons for selecting the alternatives dealt with…”

The NPPF states that it is highly desirable that local planning authorities should have an up-to-date plan in place: [12]. Where the development plan is absent, silent or out of date, generally speaking the default position is that the decision-maker must grant planning permission unless the adverse impacts would significantly and demonstrably outweigh the benefits of the development: [14]. Green belt policy is dealt with in paragraph 83:

“[83] Local planning authorities with Green Belts in their area should establish Green Belt boundaries in their Local Plans which set the framework for Green Belt and settlement policy. Once established, Green Belt boundaries should only be altered in exceptional circumstances, through the preparation or review of the Local Plan. At that time, authorities should consider the Green Belt boundaries having regard to their intended permanence in the long term, so that they should be capable of enduring beyond the plan period.”

The planning inspector’s role in examining the local plan is to assess whether it has been prepared in accordance with the duty to cooperate, legal and procedural requirements, and whether it is sound: [182].

The Planning Inspectorate’s document Examining Local Plans. Procedural Practice, 2013, states at paragraph 4.27:

“4.24

The Inspector examines the Plan (including any addendum he/she accepts) ‘as submitted’. Where the Inspector identifies that there may be a need for MMs [major modifications] to the Plan in order to resolve problems that would otherwise make the Plan unsound or not legally compliant, the nature and likely extent of the MMs should be fully discussed at the hearings. These may consist of redrafted text, the omission of a policy or section of text (or the inclusion of a new one).

…

4.27

There could be circumstances where the Plan is so flawed that it is in effect irreparable; for example, the MMs that would be required might be so significant or extensive that they would amount to a re-write of the Plan. In this case an Inspector would have great difficulty in complying with a section 20(7C) request and in any event to do so would not be within the meaning of the Localism Act 2011. There is no discretion to reject a request under section 20(7C) but in practice in these circumstances, the Inspector would indicate to the LPA [local planning authority] that such a request would be inappropriate. Withdrawal of the Plan would normally be expected in such cases.”

The claimant’s first ground of challenge is that the planning inspector failed in his duty under section 20(5) of the 2004 Act to determine whether the Council’s sustainability appraisal complied with the relevant legal and procedural requirements. Focusing on paragraph 61 of the planning inspector’s report, Mr Crean QC contended that the planning inspector in this case made plain that he construed his role more narrowly when he stated that it was not his role to comment on the legality of the sustainability appraisal, but it was necessary to establish whether it was “a reliable piece of evidence”. That was fundamentally incorrect, and consequently he failed to comply with his duties under section 20(5). In paragraph 61 the planning inspector asserted that his approach to his role was not challenged at the hearings; but in fact the claimant and other objectors sought to impugn the sustainability appraisal on various legal grounds before him.

The planning inspector’s expression of his role in paragraph 61 is perhaps unfortunate. However, and this is the first answer to Mr Crean, it echoed the claimant’s submissions before him, which was that the weight of the detailed technical evidence prepared for its land brought into question the credibility and reliability of the sustainability appraisal “as a robust evidence base”. Secondly and importantly, it does not represent what happened. At the hearings the planning inspector was faced with legal issues. Thus there were written legal submissions regarding strategic environmental assessment by Persimmon. These summarised the broad thrust of the submissions made by the other parties and cited some of the most recent authorities in respect of strategic environment assessment. Persimmon’s submissions concentrated on the written submissions made by BDW Trading Ltd, a major developer with a substantial land interest at Brookhay Villages, not allocated in the local plan, who were also represented by experienced specialist planning counsel and who in turn had submitted their own legal arguments. There were shorter legal submissions by the claimant, which was not represented by counsel before the planning inspector.

Thirdly, the planning inspector in his report undertook an assessment of these competing submissions, from paragraphs 61 to 102, summarised earlier in the judgment. He considered and reached conclusions on the issues relevant to the lawfulness of the sustainability appraisal. It is trite law that a planning inspector’s report must be read sensibly and in a down to earth way: e.g., South Somerset District Council and David Wilson Homes (Southern) Ltd (1993) 66 P&CR 83, 85, per Hoffman LJ; Clarke Homes Ltd v. Secretary of State for the Environment (1993) 66 P&CR 263, 271-2, per Sir Thomas Bingham MR; South Bucks District Council v. Porter (No.2) [2004] UKHL 33; [2004] 1 WLR 1953, [36], per Lord Brown. Here in considering the competing submissions of the parties on whether the sustainability appraisal was, as he put it, a “reliable piece of evidence”, the planning inspector was addressing the competing legal submissions and meeting his duty set out in the 2004 Act. Deciding that a sustainability appraisal is a reliable piece of evidence is to appraise it. And, of course, at the very end of his report, at paragraph 250, the planning inspector concluded that there was legal compliance, specifically of the sustainability appraisal. There is nothing in this first ground.

The first string to Mr Crean’s bow on ground 2 concerns what he alleged were procedural flaws. The process, as he characterised it, was “ludicrously unfair”. He majored on the guillotine the Council imposed on any information not available to it at the close of the hearing sessions on 10 July 2013 when preparing the updated sustainability appraisal. Mr Crean was critical that the guillotine was now being presented as applying to developers equally. Further, he submitted, after the guillotine the Council had taken account of post-guillotine information in respect of its preferred options. Since a lawful sustainability appraisal was the prerequisite to the adoption of the local plan, and since the effect of sections 20(7) and 20(7A) of the 2004 Act is that a planning inspector has no power to amend it or carry out any part of the required assessment, what he did could not remedy the failure of the Council.

As to the planning inspector, Mr Crean accepted that in his letter of 2 September 2014 the planning inspector had said that he was prepared to take into account post-guillotine information, but submitted that he discouraged the claimant from submitting the information it had referred to in its letter. That information, in its view, was very relevant to an assessment of the relative sustainability of its proposals. Subsequently, Mr Crean submitted, at paragraphs 99 and 169 of his report, the planning inspector had criticised the claimant for not providing detailed evidence to support its point about the unfair and unequal way the sustainability appraisal treated its proposal, in particular, to transport. All this, in Mr Crean’s submission, was a manifest, obvious and stark breach of the due process principles in the common law: see Hopkins v. Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government [2014] EWCA Civ 470, [2014] P.T.S.R. 1145; [47], per Jackson LJ.

The second string to Mr Crean’s bow was that the sustainability appraisal was in breach of the 2004 Regulations. Regulation 12(2) required the Council to identify, describe and evaluate the likely significant effects on the environment of both the Council’s proposals and the alternatives. Yet the sustainability appraisal could not be understood in relation to important matters. Thus the scoring used was undertaken by the Lichfield sustainability working group away from the public eye, with reference to criteria contained in extraneous documents. Mr Crean took me to explanatory notes, which he said had not been made public. He underlined the obstacles to understanding the scoring mechanism for the claimant’s land, as well as that of the interested parties, which raised the question of how any comparison was made. There was documentation of Byzantine complexity, as Mr Crean put it, not the single and accessible compilation required by Berkeley v. Secretary of State for the Environment [2001] 2 AC 603, 617D-E, per Lord Hoffman, and R (Lebus) v. South Cambridgeshire District Council [2002] EWHC 2009 (Admin), [38], per Sullivan J.

Moreover, the imposition of the guillotine meant a breach of regulation 12(3)(a), which required that the report should take account of “current knowledge”. In Mr Crean’s submission, the Council was not permitted to close its mind to new information, least of all on the basis of administrative convenience. As a result of the guillotine the updated sustainability appraisal reached less favourable conclusions regarding aspects of the sustainability, deliverability and environmental effects of the claimant’s proposals than it might have if it had had regard to the up-to-date information that was available. Post-guillotine the Council did take into account information regarding other developers’ land. That the information originated not from the developers, but elsewhere, and that it was contextual information, were, in Mr Crean’s submission, irrelevant. Using that post-guillotine information was a clear breach of the principle that alternatives should be examined on a comparable and equal basis to preferred options: Heard v. Broadland District Council [2012] EWHC 344 (Admin); [2012] Env LR 23, [71], per Ouseley J. The information contained in the material the claimant had submitted to the Council was just as relevant to the local context of its site and its sustainability as the new information taken into account in respect of the Council’s preferred options.

Finally, Mr Crean submitted that there was a failure under regulation 13(2)(d) properly to consult on the updated sustainability appraisal issued in February 2014. The letter/email of 6 February 2014, which the Council sent out, did not, as it was expressed, meet the requirement of regulation 13(2)(d), when it said, in bold letters, that representations should only relate to the main modifications of the local plan. The ability to comment on the main modifications or to raise issues regarding the sustainability appraisal in the examination hearings were patently inadequate substitutes for the right to be properly consulted. As a matter of law, Mr Crean submitted, the process of environmental assessment under the 2004 Regulations is not complete until consultation responses have been considered and taken into account, and a responsible authority is prohibited from adopting a plan unless it has taken account of those responses: see regulation 8.

As to Mr Crean’s submissions about the guillotine, I make three points. Firstly, the guillotine was raised before Patterson J in the judicial review R on the application of IM Properties Development Ltd v. Lichfield District Council [2014] EWHC 2440 (Admin); [2014] PTSR 1484. Patterson J rejected any unfairness arising from an across the board guillotine, insofar as it related to the period in which the Council proposed the major modifications to the local plan: [112]. She also held that the hearings before the inspector could remedy matters: [114]. No appeal was taken on this aspect of her judgment. Although Patterson J was considering the position as at July 2014, I regard her approach as highly persuasive.

Secondly, following the judicial review, and consistently with Patterson J’s findings, the planning inspector wrote on 2 September 2014 that he was prepared to accept post-guillotine information from the claimant. I do not read his letter, quoted earlier in the judgment, as discouraging the submission of information from the claimant. Rather, it states in terms that the Council has no objection to the claimant submitting the information referred to in its letter; that the planning inspector regarded that as sensible; that the guillotine was only intended to apply to the work undertaken in assessing sites necessary to meet the housing shortfall; that he was not determining a planning application; that much of the detailed evidence referred to by the claimant would be relevant to a planning application but not to his task; and that therefore he was relying on the claimant “to concentrate on drawing out only the main points necessary to make [its] case”. To my mind, that letter gave the claimant the choice as to how to proceed. I accept the Council’s submissions that placing reliance on the claimant to draw out the main points necessary to make its case is perfectly reasonable, given the nature of the inspector’s task, and that doing so cannot conceivably be characterised as discouraging the claimant from submitting further, relevant information.

Thirdly, it is evident that the process of the examination by the inspector, which as he said at paragraph 61 of his report attracted highly detailed comment, not only constituted the transparent decision-making required by the European Directive 2001/42/EEC and the 2004 Regulations, but also addressed the specific concerns of the claimant. As summarised earlier in this judgment, the planning inspector did consider post-guillotine material, specifically relating to the sustainability of the claimant’s site: see [64], [170]. He also considered and rejected submissions that the alternatives had not been fairly or equally appraised: see [74]-[76], [79]. In particular, he noted that no detailed evidence had been drawn to his attention at the resumed hearings that the sustainability appraisal treated the claimant’s site other than fairly and equally, particularly in relation to transportation: see [99]. Broadly speaking, the sustainability appraisal indicated not that the claimant’s site was unsustainable, but that it was less sustainable than the Council’s selected sites, and as a matter of planning judgment, he saw no reason to dispute this: [99], see also [170]-[171]. The planning inspector then concluded that the sustainability appraisal assessed the range of alternative sites in an equal manner and that there was no support for the suggestions that the Council had used it to bolster predetermined decisions: see [100]-[101].

The planning inspector’s conclusion that the alternatives were assessed on an equal and comparable basis puts paid to Mr Crean’s argument about unfairness. The Council had accepted further information on its preferred sites, although that information did not derive from the other developers. However, the claimant was given the option of advancing further information in the planning inspector’s letter of 2 September 2014, although he reminded it that he was not conducting a planning inquiry. In as much as the claimant did not take the opportunity to submit all information it would have wanted, specifically on transport links from its site, the planning inspector did not criticise that. Indeed, he reached the conclusion not that the site was unsustainable, just that it was less sustainable than the other sites.

There are then the arguments about regulation 12. The planning inspector conceded at paragraph [102] that the sustainability appraisal was not a simple document, that there was some truth in the criticism that it was hard to understand and that the Council had at times to resort to additional explanatory notes to explain the intricacies. In my view it is significant that he added that it needed to do so only when the document “was subjected to forensic examination”, that its main points were clearly drawn out in the non-technical summary and that it was a reliable piece of evidence. The claimant’s criticism that an essential element of the evaluation in the sustainability appraisal could only be found in the explanatory notes is at odds with this. In fact, the claimant’s criticism falls away in the light of the evidence of Clare Eggington, the Council’s planning policy manager, evidence which I accept. She explains that the explanatory notes were required by the planning inspector to assist him to navigate his way around the sustainability appraisal. Moreover, they were produced at the previous hearings, referred to in his interim findings and added to the list of hearing documents. In other words, they were available to the public and the claimant. This is miles away from the paper chase deprecated in Berkeley and Lebus.

As to the “current knowledge” point in regulation 12(3)(a) of the 2004 Regulations, it is well to see the phrase in context: “current knowledge” is relevant to a consideration of whether the sustainability appraisal has included such information referred to in Schedule 2 as is “reasonably required”. In my view, the 2004 Regulations recognise that a local planning authority will be identifying and evaluating reasonable alternatives with limited resources, since paragraph 8 of Schedule 2 refers to an “outline of the reasons” for selecting the alternatives dealt with. Thus, as both Patterson J and the planning inspector recognised, the guillotine imposed on developers was a sensible cut-off since, as the planning inspector put it, the Council “would not be able to complete its appraisal if the nature and extent of these sites continued to change as they had done in the past”. In any event, as mentioned earlier, the planning inspector allowed and considered post-guillotine information. In this context we are concerned not with any single document but with the whole of the process of constituting a sustainability appraisal meeting the requirements of the 2004 Regulations: see Cogent Land LLP v. Rochford DC and Bellway Homes Ltd [2012] EWHC 2542 (Admin), [2013] 1 P&CR2, [112]-[113], per Singh J; No Adastral New Town Ltd v. Suffolk Coastal District Council and Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government [2015] EWCA Civ 88, [48]-[54], per Laws LJ.

As to consultation, it was invited from all statutory and non-statutory consultees and all who had made representations at any stage in the process. There were links to all relevant documents on the Council’s website. At first blush, the claimant has a good forensic point about the expression of the consultation letter of 6 February 2014. But the reality is that the sustainability appraisal was consulted upon as part of the larger exercise for the statutory six week period during February and March 2014. The claimant itself made specific submissions upon it in its response of 20 March 2014 and did not read the 6 February 2014 letter/email as in any way preventing it from doing so. Others did so as well. The claimant’s case that no proper regulation 13 consultation took place is factually incorrect.

In Gallagher Homes v. Solihull MBC [2014] EWHC 1283, Hickinbottom J helpfully gathered together a number of the relevant principles regarding the green belt at paragraph [124]. Firstly, the test for redefining a green belt boundary has not been changed by the NPPF. Secondly, the mere process of preparing a new local plan is not in itself to be regarded as an exceptional circumstance justifying an alternative to a green belt boundary. Thirdly, the test for redefinition of a green belt under the NPPF remains what it was previously: exceptional circumstances are required which necessitate a revision of the boundary. That is a simple composite test because, for this purpose, circumstances are not exceptional unless they necessitate a revision of a boundary. Fourthly, whilst each case is fact-sensitive and the question of whether circumstances are exceptional for these purposes requires an exercise of planning judgment, what is capable of amounting to exceptional circumstances is a matter of law, and a plan-maker may err in law if it fails to adopt a lawful approach to exceptional circumstances. Fifthly, once a green belt has been established and approved, it requires more than general planning concepts to justify an alteration. Hickinbottom J’s fifth point was endorsed on appeal: [2014] EWCA Civ 1610, [33], [36].

When Patterson J considered the claimant’s judicial review, R (on the application of IM Properties Development Ltd) v. Lichfield District Council [2014] EWHC 2440 (Admin); [2014] PTSR 1484, she endorsed Hickinbottom J’s enunciation of the relevant principles in Gallagher Homes, see at [90]. In Calverton Parish Council v. Nottingham City Council [2015] EWHC 1078 (Admin), Jay J considered Patterson J’s judgment where at paragraph [100] she considered the issue of planning judgment and slightly recast the issue as follows:

“[W]hether, in the exercise of planning judgment and in the overall context of the positive statutory duty to achieve sustainable development, exceptional circumstances existed to justify the release of Green Belt: [44]”

It will be recalled that Patterson J rejected at [90] what the claimant had advanced as an additional principle, that to justify an alternative of the green belt boundary the Council had to identify a basis for concluding that the assumptions upon which it had been drawn had been falsified. The claimant had drawn this falsification principle from obiter remarks of Simon Brown LJ in Copas v. Royal Borough of Windsor and Maidenhead [2001] EWCA Civ 180; [2002] 1 P&CR 16, [40]. In refusing permission to appeal from Patterson J’s judgment, Sullivan LJ said that the claimant “erroneously elevates judicial dicta which were a response to the particular factual circumstances of the Copas case into a legal principle of universal application.”

So any submission that Mr Crean would make that the planning inspector was in error for not asking himself whether something had occurred to undo an assumption on which the green belt boundary had originally been drawn would fall at the first hurdle. Mr Crean focused instead on the contention that the planning inspector erred in not asking himself whether it was necessary to alter the green belt boundary. Instead, he submitted, the jurisdiction he gave for endorsing the change was based on general planning concepts, such as suitability and sustainability. Even in that context, he relied not on the lack of suitable or sustainable alternative sites, since he accepted, Mr Crean recalled, that the claimant’s land was a sustainable location for development, but merely that the Council’s judgment was that the interested parties’ green belt sites were relatively more sustainable. Moreover, Mr Crean submitted, insofar as the planning inspector also sought to justify his conclusion by reference to the fact that removing the sites from the green belt would be consistent with the Council’s strategy in the local plan, this was self-evidently circular reasoning.

In my judgment these submissions fly in the face of how the planning inspector approached his task in considering alteration of the green belt boundaries for the Deanslade Farm and Cricket Lane sites. There is no doubt that he demonstrated that he was well aware of the relevant legal and planning policy tests. After referring to the openness and permanence of the green belt, he stated at paragraph [191] the test of exceptional circumstances and the statutory need to promote sustainable patterns of development. Two paragraphs on, he identified that the question of whether circumstances were exceptional for these purposes required an exercise of planning judgment. Given this, I cannot accept that in considering the material before him the planning inspector then failed to apply the test of exceptional circumstances but instead invoked a simple planning balance. The matter is placed beyond doubt because he completed the picture by summarising at paragraph 207 of his report the exceptional circumstances as he had found them. Nor can I find any circular reasoning. The green belt sites were consistent with the local plan’s urban and key centre strategy. These are material land use planning benefits and locational advantages of the green belt sites, which can lawfully form part of a package of exceptional circumstances.

The claimant’s final ground is that the planning inspector exceeded his powers in recommending the main modifications to the local plan. Section 20(7C) of the 2004 Act permits a local planning authority to request an inspector to recommend modifications to a plan in order to make it sound or legally compliant. However, Mr Crean submits, the statutory power is intended to apply to the redrafting of text, or the deletion of a particular policy and cannot be used to make changes that are either so significant or so extensive that they amount to re-writing the plan. In support, he referred to the passage in the Planning Inspectorate’s Examining Local Plans Procedural Practice, quoted earlier in the judgment.

In this case, Mr Crean submitted, the draft plan sought to recognise the existing green belt and did not propose any major changes to its boundary. The strategy of the adopted plan, by contrast, fundamentally conflicted with the original strategy in the draft plan by proposing major changes to the boundary in respect of the Cricket Lane and Deanslade Farm strategic development areas. It was outside the Council’s powers to adopt the plan with those main modifications. Since the planning inspector considered that the plan would be unsound without modifications to identify allocations to meet the Council’s need for housing, the plan as a whole had to be quashed.

In my judgment section 20(7) – 20(7C) contemplates that changes of substance can be made to the local plan. The legislative history is that subsections (7) – (7C) were introduced into section 20 by section 112 of the Localism Act 2011. As originally enacted, section 20(7) provided as follows:

“(7)

The person appointed to carry out the examination must –

(a)

make recommendations;

(b)

give reasons for the recommendations.”

The amendments to section 20 increase the scope for planning inspectors to recommend changes so as to enable local plans to be found sound. Previously plans would have to be found to be unsound and therefore unable to proceed to adoption. The Localism Act 2011 has changed that. There is no limitation in the statutory language preventing a “rewrite” of the local plan (whatever that language might mean, when any change is a rewrite). The 2013 Planning Inspectorate guidance does not compel a contrary conclusion. While under section 19(2)(a) regard must be had to guidance, such guidance must give way to the legislative intention. In any event it does not purport to be exhaustive (“may consist…” in paragraph 4.24).

In any event, the nature and extent of the modifications were a matter of judgment for the planning inspector. He grappled with the rival submissions about strategy, especially at paragraphs [197] – [198] of the report, as summarised earlier in the judgment. At paragraph 207 he concluded that the release of the green belt sites was consistent with the plan’s urban and key centre strategy, and at paragraph 250 said that he was satisfied as to compliance with legal requirements. It is horn book law that the courts will not interfere with an exercise of planning judgment: Tesco Stores Ltd v. Secretary of State for the Environment [1995] 1 WLR 759; 780H, per Lord Hoffmann.

For the reasons I have given I refuse the application.