AM, R (on the application of) v The London Borough of Havering & Ors

The Claimant (“AM”) is a married man with two young children; at the date of the issue of the claim (29 July 2014), his daughter was 2 years 11 months old, and his son was 12 weeks old. The family is, and at the time of the claim was, homeless. AM seeks relief against the First Defendant (hereafter “LB Havering”), the authority in which he and his family were actually living at the time of the issue of the claim, on the basis that it unlawfully:

Three specific issues arise for determination in this claim, which have social, legal, practical and financial implications for the parties concerned. They are as follows:

I determine these issues as follows:

The facts of this claim, and the arguments marshalled by the parties, highlight a number of points to which I wish to give prominence:

In order to set a proper context for my discussion of the applicable law, and my conclusions, it is necessary to summarise the relevant facts.

Until November 2011, AM, his wife and daughter resided in a one-bedroom housing association flat in Birmingham; AM worked in the city. In November 2011, AM’s wife and daughter (then aged 3 months) moved to London (to LBTH) so that she could live with her sister. In early 2012, AM joined his wife; in May 2012, he gave up the Birmingham tenancy, moving full-time to LBTH to be with his family. Shortly thereafter, AM and his wife were given notice to leave that property, and in October 2012, AM made his first application to LBTH for housing, as a homeless person. LBTH provided the family with temporary accommodation, within its borough, under section 188(1) of the HA 1996 (see [24] below), pending the outcome of the application. In March 2013, LBTH considered the application, and concluded that AM was (a) homeless, (b) intentionally so, and (c) in ‘priority need’ (having a dependent child: section 189(1)(b) of the 1996 Act). That decision was later reviewed by the authority, but remained unaltered; the provision of accommodation continued, albeit under section 190(2) of the HA 1996 (see [25] below)).

At the same time as reaching its decision as to homelessness (i.e. in March 2013), the housing department made a referral to its own Children’s Social Care department (“CSC”) under section 213A(3) of the HA 1996, with a request for an assessment to determine whether the LBTH owed any duties towards the family under the CA 1989. In July 2013, the CSC replied indicating that it had “looked at the referral” from the housing department “and it is not considered that [AM’s] case meets the Children’s Social Care threshold for a Child in Need Assessment.”

Later that year, in October 2013, AM’s daughter who suffered encephalitis, and had been diagnosed with ‘rolandic epilepsy’, collapsed and was admitted to hospital, where for a number of days she was in intensive care. She remained in hospital for over two weeks, having contracted an infection there; while in hospital, nursing staff had concerns about the ability of AM and his wife to cope with the medical needs of their daughter, and about the stresses which they observed in the relationship between AM and his wife (who by then was four-months pregnant with their second child). The nursing staff made a referral to LBTH’s CSC. When seen later by a social worker from LBTH’s CSC, AM’s wife disclosed that she had been the victim of multiple forms of domestic abuse, and had separated from AM. Not long after the separation, towards the end of that year, AM’s wife indicated to CSC an intention to reconcile with AM; LBTH recorded in its social work records that “given the concerns relating to the alleged history of domestic abuse … an LBTH assessment should be considered.” AM and his wife did reconcile. In February 2014, LBTH made a referral for the mother to a local children’s centre “to help with her parenting”.

In February 2014, LBTH sought and obtained an order for possession in relation to the property which it had allocated to AM and his family as temporary accommodation in October 2012. AM once again applied again to LBTH for housing, presenting as a homeless family. Once again, the family were allocated housing under section 188(1) HA 1996 temporarily at an address which was out of the borough of LBTH (in LB Haringey), before being moved by LBTH on 2 May 2014 to a further address also out of borough, this time in Romford, in the area of LB Havering on a ‘nightly-let’ basis. In the meantime, in April 2014, AM’s son had been born. AM relied upon his expanded family as evidence of a change of circumstances which he invited LBTH to consider in determining his renewed homelessness application. AM was not working, and was in receipt of benefits; in these proceedings he has deposed (and indeed disclosed to the relevant authorities at the material time) that he had had access to a sum of about £1,100 as a loan from his sister-in-law which he had hoped to be able to use as a deposit on privately rented accommodation, but his experience has been that private landlords were unwilling to let to tenants on housing benefits.

On 30 May 2014, LBTH once again decided that AM was intentionally homeless (the defining moment of homelessness being the point at which the family left the flat in Birmingham in May 2012), and gave notice of the withdrawal of temporary accommodation after 28 days (later confirmed for 3 July 2014). AM sought a review of that decision, which was not in fact completed until 31 October 2014.

On 2 June 2014, LBTH’s housing department made a further referral (under section 213A(3) of the HA 1996) to its own CSC department. Pursuant to that referral, on 6 June 2014 a housing social worker from CSC (who I shall refer to as ‘SW1’) interviewed AM at its Shadwell Family Centre in the borough. SW1’s file-note reads as follows:

“[AM]’s daughter suffers from seizures and has been diagnosed with epilepsy which is currently under control. Wife has had two C-sections and she appeared to be very emotional and distant to the conversation. When I asked her about her views she did not say much and kept referring me to [AM] who had control of the full [conversation]. Mother appeared to be of low mood and seemed to [me] as though she may be suffering from post natal depression. She was advised to see her GP to discuss her feelings. I asked mother if she wanted to speak to me alone (taken into account the previous DV [domestic violence] disclosures) but she declined…”.

On 11 June 2014, SW1 sent an e-mail to her managers in these terms:

“I would recommend that this case is allocated for an assessment as there are concerns around previous DV disclosures and mother presented with low mood and may be suffering from post-natal depression after [giving] birth to her second child … Our last contact in December made recommendations that if mother is to reconcile with father than an assessment will be required. The child suffers from epilepsy…”

On the following day, SW1 sent an e-mail to LBTH’s housing department requesting that temporary accommodation be kept open for the family pending assessment by CSC. The housing department’s Senior Assessments Officer replied on the same day indicating that he would not ‘halt the procedure’ (i.e. the withdrawal of temporary accommodation). On 18 June, CSC, having accepted the recommendation of SW1, allocated the task of assessment to another social worker (‘SW2’). SW2 immediately formulated a plan of assessment, by which it appears that she would (a) read the case history concerning AM and his family, (b) visit the family on 1 July, (c) consider how to meet AM’s wife separately (given the allegations of domestic abuse) and (d) explore housing options. In fulfilment of this plan, SW2 conducted her home visit on 1 July 2014. It is notable that in spite of the imminent withdrawal of temporary accommodation, by now 29 days had passed since the housing authority had made the referral to CSC, and 25 days since SW1 had recommended the assessment. SW2 recorded:

“Mum appeared very worried about their housing as they have been told to leave their temp accomm by Thursday 3^rd July i.e. in two days time. She looked very tired and depressed and was tearful during the meeting….

…. I called [interpreter] to speak with Mum as I was concerned about her. [Interpreter] advised me that mum feels very worried about their housing, she is not sleeping or eating and is very down…

… I apologised to mum for not having an interpreter with me today, and explained that when we meet again I will have a Bengali speaker with me.”

From the documents disclosed in these proceedings, it is possible (and revealing) to piece together the following important sequence of events which occurred on the next day, 2 July 2014:

This ‘standoff’ was confirmed on 3 July when both local authorities informed AM and/or his solicitor that they were not accepting responsibility for him and his family, and were ‘closing the case’ (LBTH) and ‘taking no further action’ (LB Havering). The lawyer for LB Havering wrote to AM’s solicitors in these terms:

“[LB Havering]’s position is that this is a clear case of attempting to dump responsibility for assessment and provision by transferring homeless clients out of the borough from which they originate. The family originate from [LBTH]…. As long as the family attend the [CSC] in [LBTH] upon eviction they will have physical presence in that Borough and there could be no doubt in those circumstances that [LBTH] will have responsibility for both assessment and provision.”

Notwithstanding the position which LB Havering took later (see [17] below), the author of this letter appeared to recognise that the ‘physical presence’ of a family in its area would trigger relevant statutory duties. AM’s solicitor replied confirming that the duty fell on LB Havering to assess the family given the physical presence of AM and his family in that borough at that time, “regardless of [LBTH]’s poor behaviour”. Later that day, AM’s solicitor sent a letter before action to LB Havering.

On 4 July, LB Havering wrote to LBTH requesting information about any child protection concerns; LB Havering indicated that a referral had been made relating to “potential safeguarding concerns”, prompting a Multi-Agency Safeguarding Hub (“MASH”) enquiry.

On 7 July 2014, senior managers of LB Havering met and concluded that “case responsibility remains with [LBTH]”; the reasoning for that conclusion appeared in the subsequent letter to AM’s solicitors and to LBTH. To AM’s solicitors they relied upon the family having its “ordinary residence” in the area of LBTH:

“This family are from [LBTH]. They retain ordinary residence there, all their connections are there, and if they attended upon [LBTH], [LBTH] would have a responsibility to assess” (emphasis by underlining added)

In the letter of even date to LBTH, LB Havering made the better point (in my view) that LBTH had failed to inform LB Havering “in a timely manner” of the existence of this family in their area, but went on to say that:

“Although we appreciate the family resides (temporarily) in our area, the responsibility remains with [LBTH CSC] to complete the assessment … the family remain ‘Ordinarily Resident’ in [LBTH]…” (emphasis by underlining added).

On 9 July, AM telephoned LB Havering CSC, and spoke to SW3; he informed SW3 that he and his young family were on the point of eviction: agents of the landlord had attended to change the locks. SW3 advised AM to speak to LBTH. AM phoned LBTH, who advised him to contact LB Havering CSC, and to obtain legal advice. On 11 July 2014, AM and his family were evicted, and were rendered street homeless. LB Havering placed the family in a hotel over the weekend.

On 14 July 2014, a different social worker from LB Havering (‘SW4’) became involved; she interviewed AM and his family. She concluded that the children were not ‘children in need’, because the family would be able to obtain accommodation through their own efforts (using the borrowed funds, see [9] above), and that in any event the responsibility for providing accommodation lay with LBTH. SW4 requested various information from AM, including bank statements and birth certificates. When AM returned to the office of LB Havering two days later with the information he was “advised to present at [LBTH CSC] to inform them of the outcome as they are case responsible”. AM followed that advice; he went to the offices of LBTH to be told that temporary accommodation would not be provided by them.

On 21 July 2014, AM’s solicitors wrote to LB Havering, requesting a child in need assessment of AM’s children. LB Havering replied on the following day, stating that SW4 had not considered a ‘child in need’ assessment necessary, adding that “there are absolutely no concerns as to [AM and his wife’s] parental capacity”, adding: “[q]uite simply put, these children are not in need” and denying any duty towards the family.

On 29 July 2014 the Claim was issued. By order of Mrs Justice Andrews (same date), LB Havering were directed to provide suitable accommodation for AM and his family until determination of this dispute, without prejudice to the respective claims of the Defendants. On 17 October 2014, James Goudie QC, sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge, granted permission to AM to apply for judicial review.

Finally, it should be noted that on 4 July 2014, LB Havering wrote to LBTH (marked ‘Very Urgent’) requesting information about the extent of CSC’s involvement. LBTH did not reply to this letter until 12 August 2014, that is to say after the issue of this Claim, and the threat of a mandatory order requiring the disclosure of the data.

I turn to the relevant statutory provisions, guidance, and case-law. The issue is primarily focused on the ‘Homelessness’ provisions of Part VII of the HA 1996 (see [24]-[30] below) and the ‘Local Authority Support for Children and Families’ provisions of Part III of the CA 1989 (see [31]-[33] below).

Section 188of the HA 1996sets out the ‘Interim duty to accommodate in case of apparent priority need’ as follows:

Section 190 of the HA 1996 deals with the duties to ‘persons becoming homeless intentionally’; the definition of when that occurs is to be found in Section 191 (ibid.), and deals with the situation where the person “deliberately does or fails to do anything in consequence of which he ceases to occupy accommodation which is available for his occupation and which it would have been reasonable for him to continue to occupy”. Section 190 provides:

Section 208 of the HA 1996 deals with the discharge of functions in relation to out-of-area placements, as follows:

Section 213 of the HA 1996 deals with co-operation between relevant housing authorities and bodies:E

Section 213A was inserted into the HA 1996 Act by the Homelessness Act 2002 (“the 2002 Act”), requiring housing authorities to have arrangements in place to ensure that the relevant social services authorities are made aware of cases where the housing authority are dealing with an application from an applicant whose household includes a child under 18, and the authority have reason to believe that they may be homeless (or threatened with homelessness) intentionally. Section 213A(5) placed a new duty on the housing authority to provide advice and assistance to the social services authority, where the latter are aware of the situation of the intentionally homeless family

“… and the social services authority ask for assistance in the exercise of their functions under Part 3 of the Children Act 1989.” (reference para.36 of the Explanatory Notes to the 2002 Act).

In R(G) v London Borough of Barnet (& others) [2003] UKHL 57, [2004] 2 AC 208 (“R(G) v Barnet”), Lord Hope described the effect of this provision (section 213A HA 1996) thus (at [44]):

“… in these cases the local housing authority must ensure the local social services authority is made aware of the case, if the applicant agrees. Then, if the social services authority requests the housing authority to provide advice and assistance in exercise of its functions under Part III of the Children Act 1989, the housing authority is obliged to provide the social services authority 'with such advice and assistance as is reasonable in the circumstances'. In the case of a unitary authority the housing department must provide the social services department with such advice and assistance as the social services department may reasonably request”.

The ‘Homelessness Code of Guidance for Local Authorities’, published in 2006 by the Department for Communities and Local Government, and to which the Defendants in this case were obliged to have regard when exercising their functions relating to homelessness and the prevention of homelessness (see section 182 of the HA 1996) contains this guidance [5.13]:

“Section 213A applies where the housing authority has reason to believe than an applicant with whom a person under the age of 18 resides, or might normally be expected to reside, may be ineligible for assistance, or homeless, or threatened with homelessness, intentionally. Housing authorities are required to have arrangements in place to ensure that all such applicants are invited to agree to the housing authority notifying the social services authority of the essential facts of their case. This will give social services the opportunity to consider the circumstances of the child(ren) and family and plan any response that may be deemed by them to be appropriate”.

And [5.16]:

“Children and young people should not be sent to and fro between different authorities (or between different departments within authorities). To provide an effective safety net for vulnerable young people who are homeless or at risk of homelessness, housing and social services will need to work together.”

Further in relation to the person with a priority need who is found to be eligible but homeless intentionally and therefore caught by section 190(2) (see [25] above), [13.4] and [13.5] of the Guidance provides:

“… there is a possibility that situations could arise where families may find themselves without accommodation and any prospect of further assistance from the housing authority. This could give rise to a situation in which the children of such families might become children in need, within the meaning of the term as set out in s.17 of the Children Act 1989”.

“In such cases, it is important that local authority children’s services are alerted as quickly as possible because the family may wish to seek assistance under Part 3 of the Children Act 1989, in circumstances in which they are owed no, or only limited, assistance under the homelessness legislation. This will give local authority children’s services the opportunity to consider the circumstances of the child(ren) and family, and plan any response that may be deemed by them to be appropriate.”

Turning now to the provisions of Part III of the CA 1989, the key provision for present purposes is section 17, the relevant parts of which are set out below:

Section 17 is to be read with Schedule 2, Part 1 which contains the following:

The “spurious” clarity of section 17 (see King LJ in R(J) v Worcester County Council (Equality and Human Rights Commission Intervening) (“R(J) v Worcester”) [2014] EWCA Civ 1518, [2015] PTSR 127 @ [30]) has necessitated multiple attempts at its construction over the years. There are very many cases in which judges have had cause to consider this section. Among the relevant cases considered in argument in the presentation of this application are Pulhofer v Hillingdon LBC [1986] AC 484; R v Northavon District Council, ex p Smith [1994] 2 AC 402, [1994] 3 All ER 313, [1994] 3 WLR 403 (“Northavon ex p Smith”); R (on the application of Stewart) v LB Wandsworth, LB Lambeth, LB Hammersmith & Fulham [2001] EWHC Admin 709 (“Stewart”); R(M) v LB Barking & Dagenham, Westminster Cty Council [2002] EWHC 2663 (Admin) (“R(M) v Barking & Dagenham”); R(G) v Barnet (see above); R(A) v LB Croydon (Secretary of State for the Home Department), R(M) v LB Lambeth [2009] UKSC 8, [2009] 1 WLR 2557 (“R(A) v Croydon”); R(G) v Southwark LBC [2009] 1 WLR 1299 (“R(G) v Southwark”); R(VC) v Newcastle City Council, R(K) v Newcastle City Council [2011] EWHC 2673 (Admin) [2012] 2 All ER 227 (“R(VC) v Newcastle”); R(HA) v LB Hillingdon & Others [2012] EWHC 291 (Admin) (“R(HA) v Hillingdon); R(MK) v LB Barking & Dagenham [2013] EWHC 3486 (Admin), (“R(MK) v LB Barking & Dagenham”); R(J) v Worcester (see above), together with R(Westech College) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] EWHC 1484 (Admin), and the London Child Protection ProceduresGuidance (5^th edition: 2015) (although it was the 2013 edition in force at the time of the events giving rise to this claim). While not intending to produce a complete review of relevant judicial analysis, it seems to me that the following key points emerge from the authorities:

The expectation of co-operation (see [4](ii)/(iii) above) and the obligation on a local authority to discharge its functions in accordance with the core aims of the CA 1989 is re-inforced by section 10(1)/(2) and section 11(1)/(2) of the CA 2004 so that each children's social services authority and housing authority must make arrangements to ensure that their functions are discharged co-operatively having regard to the need to safeguard and promote the welfare of children in their area.

One further, non-statutory, legal principle is engaged on these facts, on which I have heard argument. It is trite law that once a public law duty has been engaged (i.e. such as a duty to assess), it is incumbent upon the authority on whom the duty is placed to act reasonably in discharging that duty; where the duty on the authority changes (by virtue for instance of a change of the law, or a change of specific circumstance - i.e. the family moves from one local authority area to another), the authority remains under a duty to act reasonably and rationally in discharging or relinquishing its duties (see R v Secretary of State for the Environment ex parte Shelter [1996] (Aug 23) (unreported), and R v Newham LBC ex p Ojuri (No.5) [1998] 31 H.L.R. 631 at 637). Therefore, where (as here) a local authority has commenced a child in need assessment, it is under a public law obligation in my judgment to act reasonably in deciding whether to complete it, where the legal obligation on that authority has changed (or is assessed to have changed). In such circumstances, the relevant local authorities in relation to whom the burden falls should liaise over who should complete the assessment, and how it should best be done, to avoid duplication of effort while ensuring that the child does not ‘fall between two stools’. Quite apart from this public law duty to act reasonably, there is much to be said in terms of practicality and urgency for the first (originating) authority completing the assessment (see Crane J in R(M) v Barking & Dagenham LBC (above) at [18] and [21]). On the separate but linked point of the originating authority having the power to provide services to a child in a receiving authority after assessment, see R(J) v Worcestershire CC at [32].

The Claimant asserts that LB Havering was and is primarily responsible for assessing the children as ‘children in need’ under section 17 of the CA 1989 as the area in which the children are physically present. He further claims that the LB Havering failed in its duty to provide suitable interim accommodation pending the outcome of the assessment, and failed to provide a response to the need for assessment in a timely way (in accordance with the guidance in Working Together (March 2013)). He contends that the purpose of section 213 and section 213A would be defeated if an authority to whom a referral is made had no duty then to assess.

In response, LB Havering essentially make three points:

In relation to LBTH, the Claimant contends that the CSC of LBTH:

LBTH, which has filed no evidence in this claim, describes the claim as “specious”. It denies having acted unlawfully; it attempts to place the responsibility for the family squarely on LB Havering, under the provisions of section 17 of the CA 1989.

When intentionally homeless applicants fall within a priority-need category, the housing authority is under a duty to provide them with short-term accommodation, for as long as is necessary to afford them a reasonable opportunity to find accommodation of their own. The homelessness legislation often, as here, dovetails with the children in need legislation in respect of these families. Problems arise where, as here, the family crosses local authority boundaries while the duties are being discharged.

On these facts, in the period up to early 2014, the dual statutory responsibilities for housing (under the Part VII HA 1996) and assessment of need (under Part III CA 1989) fell on LBTH. For a brief period in early 2014, the duty under CA 1989 passed to LB Haringey, when the family moved there. When AM’s family moved home again on 2 May 2014, the duty to assess the family as a family with ‘children in need’ fell upon LB Havering, as this was the area “within” which the children were physically present. The law in my judgment is, in this respect, clear.

Simultaneously, and on the unusual facts of this case, a duty remained with LBTH after 1 July 2014 to assess the children as children in need; this arose for the reasons spelt out above (at [35]); a public law duty arose on LBTH by virtue of it having commenced an assessment of AM’s children as ‘children in need’, to complete that assessment. LB Havering did not, and does not, however, avoid its statutory responsibility because its neighbouring authority (LBTH) had owed a duty on which it had defaulted; in any event, after a period of time it almost certainly ceased to be ‘practical’ for LBTH to resume that assessment (per Crane J in R(M) v Barking & Dagenham LBC). I reject LB Havering’s argument that the duty under Part III of the CA 1989 remained solely with LBTH because LBTH had requested the family to return to its area on one occasion (i.e. to the Shadwell Family Centre on 6 June 2014) for the purposes of assessment, and had for that short period (of perhaps a few hours) the family had been “within the area” of LBTH. This argument is misconceived for two reasons:

Nor was LB Havering entitled to avoid responsibility by claiming that the family had remained ‘ordinarily resident’ in the originating authority area (see 7 July 2014 letter: [17] above); in this respect, it appears to have confused Part III CA 1989 responsibilities with those which arise, for instance, under section 21 of the National Assistance Act 1948.

The statutory threshold, across which the obligation on a local authority to assess a child in need arises, is a relatively low one: i.e. “where it appears to a local authority that…” (Schedule 2, para.3 CA 89). While acknowledging the broad spectrum of discretion afforded to professionals exercising their judgment on the ground when assessing a child in need (ranging from the obvious to the debatable to the just conceivable: see [33](ix) above), LB Havering’s conclusion on 22 July 2014 (see [19] and [20] above) that these children did not cross that threshold was in my judgment unsustainable given that (in combination):

On the information available to LB Havering on 2 July it would surely have ‘appeared’ that AM’s children were children in need. Even if that were not so, surely as soon as the additional information was available from LBTH (12 August 2014), this would in my judgment have put the question beyond doubt. SW4’s second witness statement (filed in February 2015, i.e. well after 12 August 2014) does not acknowledge either possibility. The factors which I have outlined at [44] above are so stark that in reaching a different conclusion on what is, as I have said, a low threshold, LB Havering must have either “taken into account matters which they ought not to take into account” (I mention here that SW4’s statement appears infused with the belief that the duty was only owed by LBTH not by them), or, conversely, “have refused to take into account or neglected to take into account matters which they ought to take into account” or otherwise have reached a conclusion which is unreasonable in a Wednesbury sense (Associated Provincial Picture Houses Limited v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223) that is to say, “so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could ever have come to it” (per Lord Greene MR). It follows that LB Havering’s conclusion that these children did not appear to be ‘in need’ cannot in my judgment stand.

The CSC of LBTH had assumed a duty to assess the family prior to the withdrawal of the temporary accommodation. SW2 had conducted a first assessment visit to the family on 1 July 2014; it is quite obvious that she planned to return to continue her assessment with an interpreter, having indeed explicitly told the family that she would do so. Even though there was no ongoing duty on LBTH to assess the family once it had left its area, it was nonetheless, in my judgment, an inexcusable failure of good social work practice to ‘wash its hands’ of the family in this way; continuity of social work involvement and practice best meets the obligations under statute and is indeed the most cost-efficient. While it is clear that by this time no statutory obligation fell on LBTH to assess the family, by reference to the public law principles outlined in [35] (and mentioned again at [42]) above, it was only reasonable that the authority should continue and complete its assessment, or at the very least offer to LB Havering that it should do so, if necessary on LB Havering’s behalf (see ex parte Shelter and ex parte Ojuri No.5 above). The culpability of LBTH in failing to act reasonably in this regard was significantly aggravated in my judgment by:

As the authorities reviewed above reveal, duties can fall under section 17 of the CA 1989 and under the HA 1996 upon more than one authority at the same time (see Stewart at [28]). I do not accept Mr. Knafler’s argument that section 213A has had the effect of overruling Stewart, creating a self-contained regime for the determination of responsibility towards intentionally homeless families (I note, incidentally, that no party in the case of R(J) v Worcester sought to challenge the long-standing ratio of Stewart). On the contrary, section 213A creates a regime for:

As I have earlier indicated, numerous judges before me have called on local authorities to co-operate in their discharge of functions in respect of the vulnerable and needy; it appears that these exhortations continue in some quarters at least to fall on deaf ears. Judicial encouragement to good practice is underpinned by statutory expectation (see generally section 11 of the CA 2004, and specifically in relation to the requirement for prompt notification: section 208 and section 213 HA 1996). Regrettably the financial implications on receiving authorities of accepting responsibility for those with needs prove to be a significant deterrent to demonstrable good practice. Statutory duties have not been designed, or interpreted, to operate in insulated silos, nor should they be discharged in this way. Even though local authorities have wide powers to act in the best interests of children (see the Localism Act 2011, and the section 11 of the CA 2004), they sometimes fail to do so. This is one such lamentable example, with the effect that the children were pushed from ‘pillar to post’ (see [33](xvi) above, and R(G) v Southwark at [28(3)]). Indeed, the strategy which each authority adopted on 2 July 2014 (rehearsed extensively at [14] above) to avoid responsibility for AM and his family was shameful.

Although I conclude that the primary responsibility for assessing the children as children in need fell on LB Havering, which also had the power to accommodate them, it seems to me that the primary duty to provide short-term housing for AM and his family continued to fall on LBTH under the provisions of Part VII of the HA 1996,notably section 188 and/or section 190(2)(a) (ibid.). This conclusion is consistent with the provisions of the agreed (2013) London Child Protection Procedures which specifically provides for housing provision to remain the responsibility of the originating authority until it is resolved, even where the receiving authority may become responsible for other parts of service delivery (see para.6.1.5 and para.6.4.3, which is in complementary terms). As indicated above, neighbouring London or other metropolitan councils should take steps to devise plans and contingencies for such situations, which are said not to be uncommon and perhaps to share the cost of funding pending the resolution of such disputes as they arise (see A v Leicester City Council & London Borough of Hillingdon [2009] EWHC 2351 (Admin) at [51]).

I have set out my essential conclusions at [3] above.

For the reasons discussed above, I propose to declare that LB Havering’s failure to assess the needs of AM’s two children was unlawful; I shall further quash its refusal to assess the needs of the children.

I propose further to declare that LBTH breached its statutory duty by failing to give notice to LB Havering that the family had been placed in its area as required by section 208 of the 1996 Act and later by failing to make a lawful referral to LB Havering as a relevant children’s services authority. LBTH further failed to secure that accommodation was available for AM and his family pending the assessment of needs by LB Havering.

I shall deal separately with the claims as between the Defendants as to re-imbursement for the cost of interim accommodation during the currency of these proceedings.

That is my judgment.