Sturgess, R (on the application of) v Swansea County Court & Ors

I have before me a number of claims and applications brought by the Claimant against various defendants, but which all arise out of essentially the same factual background.

In May 2002, the Claimant moved from Oxford to West Wales, where he renovated a property, Llwynteg, which he intended to be his home. Attached to that property was a cottage, Isfryn, which he hoped to let out as holiday accommodation. Shortly after he arrived, he was joined by a Ms Theresa Crick, also from Oxford. When the house was completed, they moved into it. Isfryn, as intended, was let out for holiday lets.

On Friday 12 September 2008, Ms Crick left Llwynteg; and, on the following Monday, she contacted the local Dyfed Powys Police to make various allegations against the Claimant. These included not only allegations of abuse of herself, but also that the Claimant had equipped rooms in Isfryn with a covert CCTV facility which enabled him to view and record holidaymakers in those rooms, for example undressing and engaging in sexual intercourse. The objects of this voyueristic activity included children. The following day Ms Crick made a statement in support of those allegations, and the Claimant was duly arrested.

On 13 May 2009, he was charged with 12 counts of voyeurism, three counts of making an indecent photograph of a child and one count of abstracting electricity. He pleaded guilty to the last offence, and was found guilty of all other counts by a jury after a trial. On 5 November 2009, he was sentenced to an aggregate term of 30 months’ imprisonment. Appeals against conviction and sentence were unsuccessful. However, he maintains his innocence, and continues to assert that his conviction for these offences was a result of perjured evidence by Ms Crick and a number of police officers. He has made an application to the Criminal Cases Review Commission, but without success.

The Claimant also made a formal complaint to the police about the perjury he alleged against Ms Crick and the police officers, with a view to their prosecution; but the CPS made a decision not to prosecute. Furthermore, following his initial arrest, during his term of imprisonment and following his release, the Claimant made a considerable number of complaints in relation to his arrest, period in police detention, the investigation of his case, the evidence given in his criminal trial, and the alleged failure of the police properly to investigate reports he made that as to harassment by neighbours since his release from prison. The Dyfed Powys Police Professional Standards Department identified a total of 58 complaints by the Claimant against the police, which were the subject of investigation and report by that Department. That report is not dated, but it was published in mid-2011. Two of the complaints were upheld: a complaint that a receipt was not given to the Claimant when his firearms were seized, and a complaint that the Claimant’s mattress was not returned to him in a timely manner. None of the other 56 complaints was upheld. The Claimant submitted a 450-page letter to the Independent Police Complaints Commission (“IPCC”) appealing against that police complaint investigation and its conclusions. The IPCC issued a decision on 6 March 2013, rejecting all grounds of appeal. Since then, the Claimant has made further complaints about the police, to which I shall return.

Considerable civil litigation arose from these events. Two claims particularly concerned the property, Llwynteg. First, an action was pursued by Ms Crick in Swansea County Court (Claim No 9CX00982), in which Ms Crick claimed that she was entitled to a beneficial interest in the property. That claim was settled by agreement in a consent order made by His Honour Judge Bidder QC dated 18 April 2011 (in places referred to as being the Order of 1 April 2011 – the precise date of the order is not relevant here) under which the Claimant was to pay Ms Crick £40,000 plus interest and costs by 14 May 2011, failing which the property was to be sold on specific terms, and Ms Crick was to obtain those sums from the proceeds of sale. The Claimant did not pay those sums by that date, and Judge Bidder duly made an order for sale. The Claimant sought to appeal the original consent order of 21 April 2011, well out of time; but permission was refused by His Honour Judge Seys Llewellyn QC in the county court on 14 February 2013. The Claimant sought to challenge that decision by way of judicial review. On 14 June 2013, I dealt with the application for permission, refusing it as totally without merit on the basis that, if the Claimant was dissatisfied with the decision of the country court judge to refuse permission to appeal Judge Bidder’s order out of time, the correct route was to renew the application in the High Court, and not by way of judicial review. I indicated, however, that any attempt to appeal Judge Bidder’s order would, in my view, be doomed to fail: not only would an appeal have been well out of time, but the order was a consent order made at a time when the Claimant was legally represented. That did not put the Claimant off. He sought to pursue an appeal. On 20 November 2013, permission was refused by Wyn Williams J, who declared the appeal totally without merit, which made his decision final.

Second, the property was the subject of a mortgage with the Bank of Scotland, and the bank commenced possession proceedings in Carmarthen County Court (Claim No 3PB24702). On 31 October 2013, District Judge Lloyd Davies made a possession order, and refused the Claimant’s application for a stay declaring that application to be wholly without merit. He also ordered the Claimant to pay the bank just over £170,000 due under the mortgage loan. On 11 December 2013, Judge Seys Llewellyn refused permission to appeal against that order, declaring the appeal totally without merit. Eviction was due to take place on 5 March. On 25 February, the Claimant issued a claim seeking judicial review of the refusal to stay the eviction (Claim No CO/836/2014). On 4 March 2014, His Honour Judge Cotter QC granted a stay until 5pm today. I shall also return to that claim, in due course.

The claim by Ms Crick seeking a beneficial interest in Llwynteg was, unfortunately, not the only litigation between the Claimant and her. The Claimant appears to have launched three separate actions against her, for (amongst other things) libel, which resulted in His Honour Judge Vosper QC on 21 February 2012 not only striking out the claims but also making a civil restraint order (“CRO”) against the Claimant, restraining him from issuing claims or making applications in any county court in South and West Wales concerning any matter involving or relating to or touching upon the issues between him and Ms Crick which were the subject of Claim No 9CX00982, without the permission of Judge Vosper or Judge Seys Llewellyn. That order was to run for two years, but it did not apply to proceedings in the High Court, including the Administrative Court.

In addition, the Claimant appears to have issued the following claims in Swansea County Court arising out of the same facts and matters, the details I give being the claim number, date of issue, the defendant(s), the amount claimed and the disposal:

I should explain that the Evans family are the Claimant’s immediate neighbours. Hannah Crick is Ms Crick’s daughter. Mark Saunders is Ms Crick’s solicitor.

There are two other county court cases (Claim No 1SA01555 against the Chief Constable of Dyfed Powys, and Claim No 2SA00513 against the Ministry of Justice) to which again I am afraid I shall have to return. From the Claimant’s submissions today, I understand that there may have been other county court claims brought; but, if so, none is now extant.

However, in addition, there were a number of claims for judicial review. On 14 June 2013, as well as the challenge to the order of Judge Seys Llewellyn of 14 February 2013 to which I have already referred, I dealt with renewed applications for permission to proceed in the following two claims:

Having refused permission to proceed in respect of each of the three claims, and declared each claim to be totally without merit, I revoked the earlier CRO of Judge Vosper and imposed a new Extended CRO in these terms:

“David Alan Sturgess is forbidden for a period of two years from the date of this Order (i.e. until 13 June 2015), whether personally or through any servant or agent, from issuing any proceedings in the High Court of Justice or in any County Court in England and Wales against Theresa Crick or concerning any matter involving or relating to or touching upon his arrest, investigation, prosecution and conviction of offences for which he was charged on or about 13 May 2009 or proceedings relating to seizure of his firearms, or from issuing any application, appeal, or other process in this action or in any other action in any such Court concerning any of the above matters without first obtaining permission in accordance with paragraph 2 below.”

Paragraph 2 and following set out the mechanism by which permission could be obtained.

However, Mr Sturgess is anxious to continue his litigation. I have before me now, four claims that he has recently issued in the Administrative Court, and several he wishes to pursue in the county court. I will deal first with the Administrative Court cases.

This claim requires me to return, briefly, to County Court Claim No 1SA01555. On 12 August 2011, the Claimant sued the Chief Constable of Dyfed Powys. The particulars of claim are not easy to follow, but they appear to focus on the allegation that the police took and damaged some of his personal property when they arrested him at Llwynteg. On 17 December 2012, “the claim form and particulars being incoherent and disclosing no cause of action recognised by the law of England and Wales”, District Judge Llewellyn required the Claimant to file and serve an amended claim form and amended particulars by 9 January 2013. The order made provision for the Defendant to make an application to strike out the amended claim, if so advised. An amended claim was filed and served, and the Defendant did make an application to strike it out or for summary judgment. That application was heard by Judge Seys Llewellyn on 20 January 2014. He struck out most of the amended claim, as going beyond the original claim and/or falling within the CRO; but left the claim for damage to chattels. That claim is due to come back before the District Judge on 29 May 2014 for further directions. As I understand it, the Defendant proposes to pursue his applications to strike out and for summary judgment in respect of the outstanding balance of the claim at that hearing.

In this judicial review, the Claimant seeks to challenge the decision of Judge Seys Llewellyn to strike out the majority of the claim. The claim is accompanied by an application for urgent consideration, requiring the permission application to be dealt with in “10 hours/days” and, if granted, for the substantive judicial review to be heard by 4 March 2014.

The grounds and statement of facts are again not easy to follow; but the answer to the claim is straightforward. As the Claimant knows from the 14 June 2013 hearing before me, the Administrative Court is a court of last resort; and where, as here, there is a right of appeal, that route of challenge must be pursued, rather than a claim by way of judicial review.

I should however stress that, in my judgment, an appeal would be legally hopeless. The District Judge had directed an amended claim to be prepared only to clarify the existing claim. However, the proposed amendment sought to open the claim out widely. Judge Seys Llewellyn merely restricted the Claimant to the claim he initially made, further indicating that, if he wished to pursue any wider claim, then that claim would largely if not wholly fall within the scope of the 14 June 2013 CRO and he would need permission under that order to pursue it. Therefore, I give the Claimant no encouragement to appeal. Any appeal would in any event require permission to proceed under the CRO.

In the meantime, for the reasons I have given, I refuse permission to proceed with this judicial review, which is totally without merit. The order should be so marked. I should add that there is no possible reason why this claim should have been expedited, and the application for urgent consideration – which would mean that deserving cases would be delayed – is in itself an abuse.

The Claimant seeks to judicially review various orders of Judge Seys Llewellyn and Judge Jarman which have found that various claims and applications that he seeks to make fall within the 14 June 2013 CRO. The claims and applications are not identified in the application, and therefore the claim is bound to fail. I will deal with the substance of the new claims he wishes to bring, together with the terms of the CRO for the future, later in this judgment.

In the meantime, I refuse the application to proceed, as totally without merit.

The Claimant seeks to challenge the failure of the police to investigate the conduct of 15 police officers or staff which, he asserts, the IPCC has ordered them to investigate. He makes a specific application for urgent consideration, seeking a decision on the application to proceed within 5 days and, if granted, a substantive hearing by 7 March 2014.

I have already set out the relevant history of complaints about the police, and the IPCC involvement. Between 20 June and 7 August 2013, the Claimant made further complaints to the Defendant about police behaviour. Of the 40 complaints made, the IPCC considered that 27 were vexatious or repetitious – and thus required no further investigation or action – but the balance are currently being investigated by Dyfed Powys Police in accordance with usual procedure. They are keeping both the Claimant and his Member of Parliament informed as to progress, writing to them on 16 and 19 December 2013, and 4 March 2104.

This claim, quite clearly, falls within the terms of the 14 June 2013 CRO. The Claimant did not seek permission to issue it. In that failure, he breached the earlier Order, and was in contempt of it. That is sufficient to refuse permission to proceed with it. However, for the reasons I have given the claim is in any event, at very best, premature; and, again, there is no possible basis for seeking urgent expedition of this claim, as the Claimant has done. That again is, in itself, abusive.

In the circumstances, I shall refuse permission to proceed. Given that the claim was made in breach of the 14 June 2013 Order, it is both abusive and totally without merit.

These proceedings only came to the attention of the Defendant on 3 March. Although, because of time constraints, he has not lodged an Acknowledgment of Service with Summary Grounds nor appeared at this hearing, he has, through his Legal Services Department, lodged written submissions. He has done so particularly as a result of the Claimant’s contention that this claim should be greatly expedited. He seeks his costs of making those submissions.

The Claimant sent no pre-action protocol letter, and the claim is bad. In the unusual circumstances of this case, and particularly in the light of the contention of the Claimant that the application for permission should be considered within 5 days, it seems to me that the Defendant was clearly entitled to respond to this claim as he has done, and is entitled to his costs of doing so.

The Defendant has submitted a costs schedule for summary assessment. I make it clear that, although a summary assessment, in the light of the abusive nature of this claim, I assess the Defendant’s costs on an indemnity basis: there is simply no reason why a public body should have to bear any costs reasonably incurred in responding to this claim. The preparation of the written response – a substantial document – was assigned to external counsel, who charged £438.75 plus VAT for nearly 7 hours work. Neither the rate nor time could be criticised as being unreasonable. The internal charges comprise 6.14 hours at £111 per hour for a grade D fee earner. The rate, again, is unexceptional. Given the nature of the case, and the urgency engendered by the Claimant himself, I do not consider the time spent in any way unreasonable. Although I make the assessment on an indemnity basis, I should emphasise that I do not consider any element of the costs disproportionate either.

I shall award the Defendant his costs, to be paid by the Claimant, summarily assessed in the sum of £1,208.04.

I have already referred to this claim, which seeks to judicially review the decision of the county court to refuse the Claimant a stay of the eviction order in respect of Llwynteg. The Bank of Scotland is not properly a defendant in any event; it is an interested party. I direct that the parties be amended accordingly.

To recap, the District Judge made a possession order on 31 October 2013, District Judge Lloyd Davies, and refused the Claimant’s application for a stay of execution, declaring that application to be wholly without merit. On 11 December, Judge Seys Llewelyn refused permission to appeal against that order, declaring the appeal totally without merit. Eviction was due to take place on 5 March 2014. On 25 February, the Claimant issued a claim seeking judicial review of the refusal to stay the eviction (Claim No CO/836/2014). On 4 March 2014 – two days ago – Judge Cotter granted a stay until 5pm today.

I quite understand why Judge Cotter ordered a stay, given that I have been involved in these various actions and was due to consider multiple applications only the day after the proposed date of eviction. I mean no criticism of that judge at all. However, on the basis of all I know, this claim is very clearly an abuse of process. The grounds relied on are that the property is “still the subject of fraud and perjury by Theresa Crick Case 9CX00982 and the contempt of court by Mark Saunders Solicitors”. The Claimant then recites the history of the proceedings concerning the property, which I have briefly outlined above. However, there are no proceedings outstanding in relation to Ms Crick and her interest in the property. In that regard, although in reality over long before, the order of Wyn Williams J on 20 November 2013 was an order beyond which the Claimant could not go. All of the complaints in the particulars of claim have been aired before, many times, in many claims. There is not a shadow of an argument as to why the eviction should be stayed. Misconceived collateral challenges by way of judicial review to perfectly good orders for possession, and to refusal of stays of eviction, are to be deprecated. This application has no possible merit. The bank is fully entitled to possession of the house, and there is no good reason to deny them such possession.

For those reasons, I shall refuse permission to proceed with this judicial review, which is totally without merit. I also remove, with immediate effect, the stay on eviction imposed by Judge Cotter on 4 March 2014.

As I have made a declaration that several claims are totally without merit, and such declarations have been frequently made before, I am bound by CPR Rules 3.3(7) to consider whether to impose a CRO on the Claimant. That is an extant obligation despite the fact that the Claimant is already subject to the Extended CRO imposed on 14 June 2013.

I repeat what I said on that earlier occasion. A civil restraint order does not prevent a person having access to a court. However, it requires that person to apply for and obtain permission of the court before applying to court. Such orders are made to prevent abuse of the court by parties who make claims and applications lacking merit. Of course, where a claim or application has some merit, then permission, if required, will be granted. An Extended CRO prevents that party from issuing any claim concerning any matter involving or touching upon or relating to the proceedings in which it is made, or application in any such proceedings, in a specified court or courts without permission. A General CRO prevents an individual from making any claim, application or appeal in any court below the Court of Appeal without first obtaining the permission of an identified judge. Where that individual issues a claim or makes an application without obtaining such permission, the claim, application or appeal can be struck out without the judge having to make any further order and without any other party having to respond to it.

The circumstances in which the court may make such an order are set out in CPR 3 PD 3C. A CRO involves a two-stage process. First, the court must consider whether it has jurisdiction to make the order it is considering. For a General CRO, it must be satisfied that the relevant party “persists in issuing claims or making applications which are totally without merit” (CPR 3 PD 3C, paragraph 4.1). “Persistence” for these purposes requires there to have been more than two applications or claims that were totally without merit (Courtman v Ludlam [2009] EWHC 2067 (Ch)). The Claimant has, of course, had claims and applications marked a totally without merit on many more than two occasions. Furthermore, more restrictive orders have not stemmed the flow of meritless claims and applications, the spread of the net if anything widening; and the Claimant resorting to fine arguments, many clearly meritless themselves, as to whether a claim or application falls within the terms of the existing order. He has shown himself determined to do what he can to pursue his campaign of litigation in the face of a CRO with limits, both by seeking to manipulate claims so that he can argue that they might fall outside those limits and also by simply issuing proceedings which clearly fall within the scope of the CRO to which he is subject.

The formal requirement for a General CRO is well met, in that the Claimant has been found by several judges to have issued claims and applications in relation to his arrest, investigation and conviction of the sexual offences, and the aftermath including the repossession of his house, to which I have referred; and he has shown a clear persistence in making such.

However, even if the court has jurisdiction to make an order, there is a second stage: the court must exercise its discretion as to whether to make an order or not. In this case, in all the circumstances, the appropriate course is to make a further CRO, and it must be a General CRO. I am satisfied that, without such an order, the Claimant is likely to continue making meritless claims and applications. In coming to that conclusion, I take into account not just the sheer number of claims and applications he has made in the past, but the seriousness of the allegations made in them, which have included perjury and worse; and his failure to stop in the face of two previous orders. It is noteworthy that he has brought these claims within the period covered by an Extended CRO, and that he now regularly seeks to argue that new claims, which cover the same subject matter, fall outside the current CRO to which he is subject. It is also noteworthy that his net is extending in terms of defendants he wishes to pursue in relation to these matters.

In all of the circumstances, I am quite sure that it is appropriate and necessary to make a General CRO against the Claimant, covering all courts. Without such an order, I am satisfied that the Claimant will continue to issue meritless claims and applications, and seek ways in which to manoeuvre round any limits of a lesser order. In my judgment, nothing less restrictive will now do.

Meritless claims are unfair to those who have to respond to them – the effort that the defendants have put into the various claims and applications is obvious, and is reflected to an extent in the various cost orders made – but such claims are also seriously detrimental to the interest of justice. The court is required, by CPR Rule 1.1, to deal with cases justly which includes dealing with cases proportionately, ensuring that an appropriate share of the court’s resources are allocated to a case (CPR Rule 1.1(e)). That is because the resources of the court are finite: indeed, they very limited and precious. Where those resources are expended on a claim which lacks any merit, then that robs the parties of a claim with merit of timely justice.

Mr Sturgess, the terms of the order I will impose is that you be restrained from issuing claims, or making applications or appeals, in the High Court or any county court concerning any matter without first obtaining the permission of Judge Jarman or, if unavailable, another Senior Circuit Judge at Cardiff Civil Justice Centre. There will be a right of appeal to me, or another High Court Judge. The order will last for two years, and will consequently expire on 5 March 2016, unless renewed. I formally revoke the Extended CRO imposed on you on 14 June 2013.

The new order means that you must obtain the permission of a judge before issuing any claim or application in any claim. If an application is made without that permission, it can automatically be dismissed. Furthermore, if you issue such a claims, application or appeal without permission, that will constitute a contempt of court for which you are liable to be punished, by imprisonment in an appropriate case.

I stress that this order will not prevent you from pursuing any claim, application or appeal that has any merit. It will, however, prevent you frustrating the rights of the Defendants and the interests of justice by making claims and applications of no merit.

I now proceed to consider the various new claims you seek to commence. I understand that the Claimant has been refused permission to proceed in respect of each of them, under the old CRO, but he wishes me to review them.

The only other proposed claim is against the Swansea County Court for returning claim forms to the Claimant without issuing them, because they fall under the CRO. I assume the claim forms involved are those I have dealt with above. None should be issued. The claim is, now, entirely empty.

For those reasons, I refuse the Claimant permission to issue any of the claims he wishes to pursue.

The order I consequently make is as follows. One composite order can be drawn, with a copy placed on each file.