Dhar v National Office of the Public Prosecution Service the Netherlands

The appellant appeals under section 26 of the Extradition Act 2003 (the Act) against the decision of the 7^th of September 2011 of District Judge Tubbs sitting at the City of Westminster Magistrates’ Court to order under Part 1 of the Act the appellant’s extradition to the Netherlands for the purpose of being prosecuted in relation to one offence of money laundering.

The appellant’s extradition is sought pursuant to a European Arrest Warrant (EAW). The warrant is an accusation warrant that is to say it seeks extradition for the purpose of a prosecution.

The warrant was issued on its face by the judicial authority described as ‘the National Office of the Public Prosecution Service’ and its representative Mr G C Bos, holding the post of Public Prosecutor. On this see box (i) of the warrant, headed ‘the judicial authority which issued the warrant’.

Again on its face, on its last page, in the box headed ‘Signature of the issuing judicial authority and/or its representative’, the warrant is dated the 9^th of June 2011 over which appears an official stamp, in the name of Mr G C Bos, again described as holding the post of Public Prosecutor. It is however apparently signed by Mr G Visser, or at least Mr Visser’s name is stamped and a signature appears over it. Mr Visser is described as “Officier van Justitie”. In other words the warrant appears have been stamped and signed on the 9^th of June 2011, by someone describing himself as “ Justice Officer” on behalf of Mr Bos described as ‘Public Prosecutor’.

Again on its face, the warrant has been annotated by hand at box (b) under the heading ‘Decision on which the warrant was based’, to give the information apparently not present in the warrant when it was signed on the 9^th of June 2011, namely that of an Arrest Warrant ‘issued by Public Prosecutor GC Bos on 9^th June 2011’. These handwritten particulars are signed and dated by hand the 13 of June 2011. The identity of the signatory is not given.

The EAW was certified pursuant to section 2(7) of the Act by the Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA) on the 13 of June 2011. SOCA is the designated authority for the purposes of Part 1 of the 2003 Act.

Under section 2(7) of the Act the designated authority “may issue a certificate under this section if it believes that the authority which issued the Part 1 warrant has the function of issuing arrest warrants in the category 1 territory”. Under section 2(8), a certificate under this section “must certify that the authority which issued the Part 1 warrant has the function of issuing arrest warrants in the category 1 territory.

In this case the certificate read as follows:

“On behalf of the Serious Organised Crime Agency I hereby certify that the Part 1 warrant signed by Mr G Visser, Justice Officer on behalf of Public Prosecutor G C Bos, National Office of the Public Prosecution Service, The Netherlands on the 9th June 2011 and further annotated by Public Prosecutor Bos on 13 June 2011 for the arrest of Sanjay DHAR for one offence against article 420 of the Dutch Criminal Code was issued by a judicial authority of a category 1 territory which has the function of issuing arrest warrants”

The warrant was executed the next day, that is to say the appellant was arrested under the EAW on 14 June 2011 and produced before the City of Westminster Magistrates Court the same day; The appellant did not consent to his extradition and the hearing was opened and adjourned to the 1^st June 2011. Following further adjournments the extradition hearing at which the appellant was represented was heard on the 2nd of August 2011. DJ Tubbs reserved judgment and handed down judgment ordering extradition on 7 September 2011.

Under section 27 of the Act the High Court may allow an appeal or dismiss an appeal (27(1)).

Under subsection (2) the court may allow an appeal only if the conditions in subsection (3) or those in subsection (4) are satisfied.

The subsection (3) conditions as applicable to this case, are that the District Judge ought to have decided a question before her at the extradition hearing differently and in addition that if she had decided the question in the way she ought to have done, she would have been required to order the appellant’s discharge.

The subsection (4) conditions (again as they apply to this case) are that an issue is raised that was not raised at the extradition hearing or evidence is available that was not available at the extradition hearing; the issue or evidence would have resulted in the District Judge deciding a question before her at the extradition hearing differently; if she had decided the question in that way, she would have been required to order the appellant’s discharge.

The questions before the District Judge material to this appeal arose first under section 2(2) of the Act defining what is meant by a Part 1 warrant for the purposes of Part 1 of the Act under which this extradition was ordered, the question being whether this warrant was such a Part 1 warrant; and secondly, under section 10 of the Act, under subsection (3) of which the judge had to decide whether the offence specified in the Part 1 warrant was an extradition offence.

As will be seen, it is not in dispute that if any of these questions had been decided differently, the District Judge would have been required to order the appellant’s discharge.

Section 2 of the Act applies ‘if the designated authority (that is to say SOCA) receives a Part 1 warrant in respect of a person’. See section 2(1).

This appeal concerns an accusation warrant. Section 2(2) provides as far is material to such a warrant as follows:

(2)

A Part 1 warrant is an arrest warrant which is issued by a judicial authority of a category 1 territory and which contains –

(a)

the statement referred to in subsection (3) and the information referred to in subsection (4)…

(3)

The statement is one that that –

(a)

the person in respect of whom the Part 1 warrant is issued is accused in the category 1 territory of the commission of an offence specified in the warrant, and

(b)

the Part 1 warrant is issued with a view to his arrest and extradition to the category 1 territory for the purpose of being prosecuted for the offence.

(4)

The information is –

(a)

the particulars of the person’s identity;

(b)

particulars of any other warrant issued in the category 1 territory for the person’s arrest in respect of the offence;

(c)

particulars of the circumstances in which the person is alleged to have committed the offence, including the conduct alleged to constitute the offence, the time and place at which he is alleged to have committed the offence, and any provision of the law of the category 1 territory under which the conduct is alleged to constitute the offence;

d)

particulars of the sentence which may be imposed under the law of the category 1 territory in respect of the offence if the person is convicted of it;

It is common ground that the District Judge was obliged at the outset of the extradition hearing to satisfy herself that the warrant with which she was dealing was a Part 1 warrant within the meaning of section 2(2) (see Lord Hope in Dabas v High Court of Justice in Madrid Spain [2007] UKHL 6, [2007] 2 AC 31. If it was not, the remaining provisions of Part 1 could not have applied to it and the court would have had no jurisdiction to make the order it purportedly did (see again Lord Hope, supra). This is why it is not in dispute that if this particular warrant were not a Part 1 warrant within the meaning of section 2(2), the District Judge would have been obliged to have discharge the appellant.

Consistent with the above, it is established that the requirements which have to be met under section 2(2) are strict mandatory requirements which go to the jurisdiction of the court and if on the face of the warrant, they are not met, the warrant is invalid and the proceedings can go no further. This principle must apply to the requirement that the warrant be issued by a judicial authority (see the opening lines of section (2)(2)) as much as to the requirement that it contain the information referred to in subsection (4).

Further such is the strictness of this principle, it is equally well established that if the warrant does not on its face contain the information required by subsection (4), the deficiencies cannot be made good by recourse to extraneous information. To quote the words of Lord Hope in Dabas in paragraph 50 already referred to:

“A warrant which does not contain the statements referred to in that subsection cannot be eked out by extraneous information”

Section 10(2) required the District Judge at the extradition hearing to decide whether the offence specified in the Part 1 warrant was an extradition offence and under subsection (3) she was obliged to order the appellant’s discharge if she answered the question in the negative.

The meaning of an extradition offence for these purposes is to be found in section 64 of the Act which, in subsections (2) and (3) respectively sets out two sets of conditions referable to the conduct of the requested person, according to whether or not ‘no part of the conduct occurs within the United Kingdom’(see subsection (2)). Where as in this case part of it is alleged to have taken place in this country, the applicable conditions which must be satisfied are those set out in subsection (3), which include, material to this appeal, what is known as a dual criminality test requiring that the conduct is not only an offence under the law of the requesting state, but would also constitute an offence under the law OF England if it occurred in England (see section 64(3)(b) below).

Thus section 64(3) provides as follows:

‘(3) The conduct also constitutes an extradition offence in relation to the category 1 territory if these conditions are satisfied:

(a)

the conduct occurs in the category1 territory

(b)

the conduct would constitute an offence under the law of the relevant part of the United Kingdom if it occurred in that part of the United Kingdom

(c)

the conduct is punishable under the law of the category 1 territory with imprisonment or another form of detention for a term of 12 months or a greater punishment…’

It is further common ground that the Act was enacted to give effect to the European Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002. Hence although it is the provisions of the Act which must be construed material to the issues raised on this appeal, and Parliament did not in those provisions mirror word for word the Articles of the Framework Decision, nonetheless the wording of those provisions must be construed purposively in the context of the objects of the Framework Decision and its material Articles.

These objects are identified in the recitals to the Preamble of the Framework Decision. The overall objective was to simplify and expedite procedures for the surrender between states, of those accused of crimes committed in other member states, and to this end to abolish extradition between member states and substitute a system of surrender between judicial authorities and a system of free movement of judicial decisions in criminal matters (see recital (5). As Lord Bingham said in Dabas (paragraph 4) by reference to recital (6), “this is to implement the principle of mutual recognition… the corner stone of judicial co-operation” and “the important underlying assumption of the Framework Decision is that member states, sharing common values and recognising common rights, should trust the integrity and fairness of each other’s judicial institutions”.

Against these considerations must be set those of which Mr Farrell QC on behalf of the appellant reminded the court, namely that the liberty of the individual is at stake in extradition proceedings and a person whose removal is sought under these procedures has the right to “expect that the procedures are adhered to according to the requirements laid down in the statute” (per Lord Hope in Office of the King’s Prosecutor (Brussels) v Cando Armas [2005] UKHL 67).

The written grounds of Appeal identified three issues:

1.

The European Arrest Warrant is invalid as when it was issued on the 9^th of June it did not contain an indication of the judicial decision on which it was based as required by section 2 of the Act. It was thus void ab initio. This ground is translated in the Appellant’s skeleton argument as whether the warrant is invalid for failure to comply with section 2(4)(b) of the Act;

2.

The EAW is invalid as the conduct described in the warrant is not adequately particularised as required by section 2 of the 2003 Act. This ground is translated in the skeleton argument as whether the warrant is invalid for failure to comply with section 2(4)(c) of the Act;

3.

The conduct described in the EAW does not satisfy the necessary requirement of “dual criminality” as required by section 64(3) of the Act. This ground is translated in the skeleton argument as whether the conduct for which the Appellant’s extradition is sought is an extradition offence for the purposes of section 10 of the Act.

These were all grounds for resisting extradition raised at the extradition hearing before the District Judge, albeit unsuccessfully.

In addition the appellant’s skeleton argument seeks to raise a further ground which was not raised before the Magistrates Court namely “whether the Prosecutor in The Netherlands is a ‘judicial authority’ for the purposes of section 2(2) of the Act”. This can be translated as whether the warrant is invalid for failure to comply with the requirement of section 2(2) that it be issued by a judicial authority.

For my part I consider the appellant is entitled to raise this new issue having regard to the provisions of section 27(2) and (4) of the Act. This is an issue for reasons already explained which went to the jurisdiction of the court to proceed under Part 1 and to order the extradition it did.

I turn now to consider these individual grounds of appeal.

It is convenient to start with the additional issue. Mr Farrell invited us to allow him to have this issue adjourned, pending the outcome of any appeal to the Supreme Court from the recent decision of this court in Assange v Swedish Prosecuting Authority [2011] EWHC 2849 in which the question of whether a Prosecutor can be a judicial authority for these purposes was extensively considered and answered in the affirmative. I for myself however see no reason not to consider this issue in this particular appeal. Asssange is not a decision binding upon us, but is nonetheless of considerable persuasive authority.

The Act does not itself define a judicial authority or contain any deeming provision. The argument for the appellant is that the ordinary principles of statutory construction whereby the words must be given their plain and ordinary meaning, must apply. On these principles a warrant issued by a Public Prosecution Office in the name of a Public Prosecutor cannot be a warrant issued by a judicial authority since such a body would not be recognised as such in this country. Such a body, so the argument runs, lacks the essential characteristics of a judicial authority which is that it should be independent of both the Executive and the Prosecution and should be a person or body exercising judicial power, such as a court or a judge. In support of this submission Mr Farrell prayed in aid the record in Hansard of various statements made by ministers in Parliament during the passage of the bill which was to become the 2003 Act, to the effect that all EAWs were to come from a “judicial source”. I doubt whether he was entitled to do that, since he did not suggest that he could bring this case within the principles set out in Pepper v Hart [1993] A.C. 593 but these passages together with others were referred to by this court in Assange (at paragraph 26).

The respondent accepts that in principle such a new issue can be raised on appeal but this acceptance is subject to the submission that this particular issue cannot so be raised because of the conclusive nature of the certificate issued by SOCA under section 2(7) of the Act. This it is said is conclusive evidence that not only does the authority issuing the warrant in the requesting state have the function of issuing such warrants, but that such authority is a judicial authority for the purposes of the Act. The respondent submits that the only way to raise this issue is by way of challenge to the certificate by an application for permission to judicially review the decision of the designated authority to grant the certificate. In support the Respondent relies upon the decision of this court in Harmatos v Office of the King’s Prosecutor in Dendermond,Belgium [2011] EWHC 1598 (Admin) where this approach was accepted following on the habeas corpus procedure in Enander v The Governor of Her Majesty’s Prison Brixton,The Swedish National Police Board In Harmatos [2005] EWHC 3036 (Admin) [ paragraph 17] this court accepted the need for it to reconstitute itself as an Administrative Court for the purpose of such an application .

For myself I do not accept the correctness of this submission, accepted though it has been in the decisions of this court referred to. It depends upon the premise that the certificate issued under section 2(7) and (8) of the Act is certifying that the warrant’s issuing authority is a judicial authority for the purposes of section 2(2) of the Act. However in my judgment this cannot be correct having regard to the words of those subsections. The certificate can do no more than certify that for which those subsections provide. This is limited to certifying that the warrant’s issuing authority has been given the function of issuing such warrants under the law of the requesting state, without saying anything about the quality of the body which has been given that function.

The Respondent relied upon the terms of Article 6 of the Framework Decision in support of the alleged conclusive nature of the certificate on this question but in my judgment this is to take the terms of Article 6 one stage too far. Article 6 does not mention any certificate of the sort provided for under section 2(7) and (8) of the Act.

Article 6 provides as follows:

1.

The issuing authority shall be the judicial authority of the Member State which is competent to execute a European Arrest Warrant by virtue of the law of that state.

2.

The executing judicial authority shall be the judicial authority of the executing Member State which is competent to execute a European Arrest Warrant by virtue of the law of that state.

3.

Each Member State shall inform the General Secretariat of the Council of the competent judicial authority under its law.

True it is that the certificate must be certifying that the issuing authority has been designated by the law of the requesting state as the competent judicial authority for the purpose of issuing such warrants and that the requesting state has given notice to this effect to the General Secretariat of the European council pursuant to Article 6(3) of the Framework Decision, but this is not the same in my judgment as certifying that such designated authority is as a matter of fact a judicial authority within the meaning of section 2(2).

Hence in my judgment it must be open, the grant of the certificate under section 2(7) notwithstanding, to this appellant to raise on this appeal (as he could have done before the District Judge) the issue whether the warrant was an invalid Part 1 warrant on the grounds that the purported issuing authority was not a judicial authority within the meaning of section 2(2) of the Act.

This approach would appear to be consistent with the approach of this court in Assange at paragraph 48 where it is expressly stated that the certificate “does not certify it is a judicial authority” and that it had been permissible for Mr Assange to raise the issue in the course of the appeal, although I accept that the paragraph is not entirely clear on whether judicial review is still the correct avenue of challenge.

Although, for the reasons stated, the certificate cannot in itself be conclusive on whether the Prosecutor’s Office is a judicial authority for the purposes of section 2(2), the question still remains as to the significance that the material Member State has designated the particular Prosecutor’s Office as the judicial authority competent to issue EAWs.

The approach adopted by this court in both Enander and Harmatos, having regard to the objects of the Framework Decision with the emphasis on mutual recognition, co-operation and trust between member states, and the particular terms of Article 6 which leaves to the individual member states the right to designate its own judicial authority, is that it would not be appropriate for this court to go behind such designation by investigating whether the function of issuing the warrant in the requesting state was undertaken by someone who would be recognised in this country as a person exercising a “judicial” function.

Mr Farrell boldly submits that both Enander and Harmatos (and indeed Assange) were wrongly decided even in the context of the Framework Decision, since the mutual co-operation embodied in its objects is that “between judicial authorities properly so called (that is judges or courts) and not between judicial authorities and overseas prosecutors”.

I for myself however agree with the approach in Enander and Harmatos, subject only to the one qualification recognised in Assange.

The fallacy in Mr Farrell’s argument, confining itself as it does to the meaning and functions of a prosecutor in this jurisdiction, is that it ignores the diversity within the common area of justice with which Part 1 warrants are concerned as to the bodies by whom judicial functions can be performed and for what purpose. As this court in Assange observed after its extensive review of the Framework Decision and the meaning of the term ‘judicial authority’, there is a considerable diversity within the common area as to whether prosecutors are ‘judicial authorities’ for various purposes and it would be, contrary to the principle of mutual confidence and recognition to confine the term “judicial” in section 2(2) only to a judge who adjudicates. Again as was held in Assange, Article 6 must have been intended to allow Member States to designate authorities in their state which were ‘judicial authorities’ having regard to their own national laws and traditions. Hence it is entirely consistent with the principles of mutual recognition and confidence to recognise as valid an EAW issued by a prosecuting authority under Article 6. To do otherwise would be to construe the word “judicial” in section 2(2) out of context and look at it simply though the eyes of the common law (see Assange at paragraphs 33 – 43, but in particular at paragraphs 38, 40 and 41).

The one qualification which Assange recognised, and with which I agree, is that the designation under Article 6 does not always compel its recognition by another member state as conclusive, if the authority is “self evidently not a judicial authority within the meaning of that broad term in the Framework Decision” (Assange at paragraph 46). The example given in was that of a warrant self evidently issued by the Executive, such as the Ministry of Justice.

Such qualification cannot, however, assist the present Appellant. For the reasons given in Assange, I would reject this ground of appeal. No evidence having been produced by the Appellant that contrary to the certificate, the Prosecution Office which issued this warrant does not have the power to issue EAWs or has not been designated as a judicial authority for this purpose by The Netherlands, this court should accept that it has been issued by a judicial authority within the meaning of section 2(2).

I might add that even if the appellant had had such evidence available to him, this would have been a challenge to that which is certified by the certificate and hence would have required a challenge by judicial review rather than by way of appeal under the Act.

I can see no substance in this ground of appeal.

The argument is that for the warrant to be valid, the requisite information must be contained within the warrant as at the time it was issued and that any defect by way of omission as at that time cannot be cured by some later handwritten annotation, albeit one on the face of the warrant, since this would be to offend the principle (see paragraph 19 above) that a warrant which does not contain the information referred to in section 2(4), cannot be eked out by “extraneous information”.

Central to this argument is the proposition that the warrant in this case was issued (by reference to the contents of the final box (see paragraph 5 above)) on the 9^th of June 2011 when the requisite particulars were missing, and that the handwritten annotation making good the omission was inserted after the event on the 13^th of June 2011.

This in my judgment is to take the scrutiny of the warrant required by section 2(2) of the Act too far.

It must be a matter of debate when this particular warrant was issued before it was received by SOCA, the designated authority, for the purposes of certification under section 2(7). On one interpretation of what happened here (given the date of the certificate and its contents expressly acknowledging the fact of the annotation) is that SOCA originally received the warrant in its defective state, recognised such defect, drew the defect to the attention of the issuing authority who immediately remedied the defect by the annotation and then reissued the certificate and sent the same back to the designated authority in this country who duly received it in this annotated form and issued the certificate.

If this is what happened (and the inference that this is so, is a compelling one) this would be entirely in accordance with the process envisaged as a lawful one by Scott Baker LJ in Robert Thompson v Public Prosecutor of Boulogne Sur Mer [2008] EWHC 2787 at paragraph 23:

“The European Arrest Warrant procedure is designed to provide a summary and speedy process for securing the extradition of accused and convicted persons between Member States… Whilst I appreciate that warrants are often directed to more than one Member State, and it may not be easy to provide a form of words that meets the requirements of each recipient state’s national legislation, it should surely be possible, on receipt of the warrant in the United Kingdom, for it to be carefully checked to ensure that it complies with the requirements of the Extradition Act 2003. Then any defect can be remedied before time is wasted on what are likely to be costly and abortive proceedings”

In any event the critical time in my judgment when the warrant must contain the requisite statement and information so as to qualify as a valid Part 1 warrant under section 2(2) for the purpose of validating the executing procedures provided for under Part 1 of the Act, is when those procedures commence following the receipt of the warrant in this country by the designated authority (see again section 2(1) of the Act). Those procedures begin with the certification of the warrant under section 2(7), the existence of which is a precondition to the execution of the warrant by the arrest of the person to which it relates, or any further process under Part 1 if the person is arrested under the provisional arrest provisions of section 5. If at that time the warrant contains the statement and information required under section 2(2), then in my judgment it complies with the section in these regards.

I agree with the District Judge that there is nothing wrong in principle in the issuing authority remedying defects in a EAW before it is certified by the designated authority under section 2(7), even if the warrant cannot be said to have been “reissued” by the issuing authority as distinct from being “amended” by the authority post issue, so long as such amendment is apparent upon the face of the warrant as having been made by the issuing authority.

In this case as at the time this warrant was certified by SOCA on the 13^th of June (see again the careful wording of that certificate with its reference to the annotation of the 13^th of June) it did contain the information required by section 2(4)(b)… The handwritten annotation signed and dated by the issuing authority was apparent on the face of the warrant. There was nothing ‘extraneous’ about this information, giving ‘extraneous’ its ordinary meaning as in the Oxford English Dictionary, as connoting something “of external origin separate from the object to which it is attached”. If this is to be treated as a case of an amendment made to the warrant, I agree with the District Judge’s analysis that:

“the amendment occurred prior to certification and is integral to the certificated EAW and the information contained in it is therefore information included in the EAW”

In rejecting this ground of appeal, I agree with the overall analysis contended for in Mr Stansfeld’s skeleton argument:

“The information in the EAW was included prior to certification, prior to any arrest and prior to the commencement of any procedures under the Act. This information has not been introduced from outside nor has it been introduced to supplement the warrant already under consideration by the Courts. It is and has always been a part of the warrant under which the Appellant has been arrested and has had his extradition ordered”

The issue is whether the particulars given in the warrant are adequate to satisfy the requirement that the warrant contain the information set out in section 2(4)(c) of the Act. The essential complaint made by the appellant is that it does not set out adequately and unambiguously, particulars of the conduct alleged to constitute the offence which he is alleged to have committed.

The information required by subsection (4)(c) is in these terms:

“(c)

particulars of the circumstances in which the person is alleged to have committed the offence, including the conduct alleged to constitute the offence, the time and place at which he is alleged to have committed the offence and any provision of the law of the category 1 territory under which the conduct is alleged to constitute an offence”

The article of the Framework Decision which this particular provision of the Act, was seeking to implement, although not in identical terms, is that of Article 8 headed “Content and Form of the European Arrest Warrant”. This provides under Article 8(1) that such a warrant shall contain information including:

“ (d) the nature and legal classification of the offence

(e)

a description of the circumstances in which the offence was committed, including the time, place and degree of participation in the offence by the requested person”

Mr Farrell when inviting the court to interpret the expression “conduct alleged to constitute the offence” appearing in subsection (4)(c) in the light of this Article, emphasises the use of the expression “the… degree of participation in the offence by the requested person”.

We were referred to a number of decisions of this court in which this particular subsection has come under scrutiny in the light of the objects of the Framework Decision and Article 8.

It is well established that the subsection does not demand the specificity of a count on an indictment or of an allegation in a civil pleading (see Auld LJ in Fofana and Belise v The Deputy Prosecutor Thubin Tribunal de Grande Instance de Meaux [2006] EWHC 744 at paragraph 39). The court must be alive to the purpose of the legislation namely that of simplifying extradition procedures so as not to put too onerous a burden on the requesting judicial authorities. The court must have regard to the object that the conduct be expressed concisely and simply. There is no requirement that it be described in legal language.

On the other hand it is equally established that the use of the introductory word “particulars” in the subsection means that “a broad omnibus description of the alleged criminal conduct”, such as “obtaining property by deception” will not suffice (see Dyson LJ as he then was in Peter Von Der Pahlen v Government of Austria [2006] EWHC 1672 (Admin) at paragraph 21). Although the question “how far does the warrant have to go?” admits of no prescriptive answer (see again Dyson LJ at paragraph 20 in Von Der Pahlen), the particulars required must at the very least in my judgment enable the person sought by the warrant to know what offence he is said to have committed under the law of the requesting state and to have “an idea” of “the nature and extent of the allegations against him in relation to that offence” (to use the language of Cranston J in Ektor v National Prosecutor of Holland [2007] EWHC 3106 (Admin ) at paragraph 7). The amount of detail required may turn on the nature of the offence.

I would not go as far as the observations of Hickinbottom J in Sandi v The Croatia Court, Romania [2009] EWHC 3079 (Admin) at para 28 that “a significant level of particularisation is required to enable the person sought to be extradited to identify exactly what he might face at trial” if by the expression which I have emphasised is meant that the information provided must deign to every last detail of the case against the person. Further, of course, there is no requirement to set out the evidence against the person by which the particularised conduct is to be established at trial.

Mr Stansfeld on behalf of the Respondent referred the court to the decision of this court in Hewitt and Woodward v First Instance and Magistrates Court Number One of Denia, Spain [2009] EWHC 2158 (Admin) to support his proposition that the purpose of the particulars under s.2(4)(c) is to enable the requested court to determine whether the conduct alleged amounts to an extradition offence, and to alert the Requested Person to possible statutory bars to extradition such as the passage of time and speciality (see section 11 of the Act). So long as the particulars are adequate for these purposes they meet the requirements of particularity. Hewitt concerned an allegation of anal rape and this court held that it was not necessary in the particulars to give the precise date in the month when the conduct had taken place when the month and year had been given, nor was it necessary to go beyond the description of the victim as a minor male and to give his name, or to particularise “his domicile” in the city which was however identified as being where the offence was committed. Roderick Evans J. said this at para 11:

“For my part, I do not see any ambiguity in the reference to the place where the incident is said to have occurred, but in any event the importance of the need to give particulars of a place is to enable the court to determine whether the conduct referred to amounts to an extradition offence; see the speech of Lord Hope in Office of the King’s Prosecutor, Brussels v Cando Armas… at paragraph 30. The particulars here make clear that the Appellants are to face an allegation of raping a male minor in Calpe Alicante, Spain in March 2008. There has been no attempt to identify how the Appellants are in any way disadvantaged by the particulars provided or by the absence of particulars not provided. Adequate information is given to enable the Appellants to consider whether there is any statutory bar to their extradition. In my judgment the particulars contained in the warrant are adequate and comply with the requirements of section 2(4)(c)”

I myself would not seek to confine the application of section 2(4)(c) in the precise way contended for by the respondent. As was also said in Van der Pahlen, the language of the subsection is not obscure and should be given its plain and ordinary meaning albeit in the context of the objects of the Framework Decision.

What Hewitt does highlight however, is the need when determining the adequacy of the particulars in a given case, and the significance of any lack of particulars complained of, to have regard to any potential prejudice to the Requested Person in the extradition process both in the requested state and upon his surrender to the requesting state. Clearly the particulars must be sufficient to enable him to consider whether any statutory bars may apply. Equally the particulars of the conduct alleged must be sufficiently clear and unambiguous to enable the Person to invoke the principle of speciality if on his surrender, he, for example, finds himself facing allegations in the requested state as regards his degree of participation in the alleged offence (for example being that of having the master role in a conspiracy) which go materially beyond that which was alleged in the EAW. I agree again with Cranston J (see Ektor at paragraph 7) that where dual criminality is involved the detail must also be sufficient to enable the transposition exercise to take place.

It was the degree of vagueness and ambiguity of the particulars given in Van Der Pahlen which was fatal to he validity of the warrant on the first charge in that case (“Is it alleged that the Appellant pretended to sell single family houses when he was in fact offering something else? Or is it that he pretended to sell single family houses when he was not offering anything else for sale?” per Dyson LJ at para 22) and on the remaining charges which were also held to be too obscure (see again at para 23 – “…In answering the charge of obscurity Ms Ezekial submits that the whole of this charge must be read together, and that it remains only one allegation not two… It seems to me that this is by no means clear, but what is clear is that the allegation is put on the basis that that there was an obtaining of unjustified monies, dishonestly, or alternatively that the appellant “had intended to take it”. How these two alternatives are to be understood without amplification is totally unclear. No amplification or explanation is provided in the text of the charge”).

Overall I would adopt the approach of Lloyd Jones J. in Owens v Court of First Instance Marbella, Spain [2009] EWHC 1243(Admin) para 17:

“…a balance must be struck between the requirement of particularity and the requirement that the conduct be stated concisely and simply. In determining the degree of particularity required in the description of the offence in the warrant, it is necessary to balance these competing considerations while at all times being mindful of the need to avoid unfair prejudice to the person whose extradition is sought”

With these considerations in mind, I turn to consider the adequacy under s.2(4)(c) of the particulars given in the present warrant.

The particulars are given in section (c) under the heading “offences” as follows:

The warrant relates to in total… 1… offence.

One of these individuals is Sanjay DHAR (DOB 24/08/1964 in Delhi) who operates within the United Kingdom. The Dutch investigation has identified that Singh has provided loans to DHAR via his wife’s UK Bank account. DHAR has been identified as using a variety of mobile telephones and is regularly in contact with Singh.

Furthermore indications from the Dutch investigation are that Sanjay DHAR received funds within the United Kingdom that were paid to suspected drug traffickers in the Netherlands by Singh. On the 5^th of May 2011 Singh and DHAR were identified as being in a telephone conversation discussing a sum of money of 40,000 Euros.

Surveillance by the Dutch National Crime Squad on the 16 May 2011 identified that DHAR was meeting with another of Singh’s associates, previously arrested with 112,400 Euros. DHAR was identified in telephone contact with Singh shortly after his arrest, during which the cash and seizure were discussed. In addition DHAR made reference to having viewed paperwork from the seizure. The nature of the conversation concerns the rectifying the loss of cash by splitting the amount into smaller amounts. The Dutch investigation believes that DHAR is a key figure in Singh’s illegal money laundering activities and is suspected of being part of the money laundering conspiracy within the Netherlands.

There then follows under the heading “Nature and classification of the offence(s) and applicable statutory provision/code”, the particulars of the provisions of the applicable Article 420b of the Dutch Criminal Code, followed by particulars of the maximum available sentence. These particulars tell us that under Dutch law a person is considered guilty of the offence of “money laundering” if he, amongst other things, (a) hides or conceals the real nature of …an object, while knowing that this object directly or indirectly originates from an offence or (b) acquires possesses transfers or turns over or uses an object, while knowing that this object directly or indirectly originates from an offence.

The District Judge held that these particulars complied with the requirements of section 2(4)(c). She gave the following reasons (the emphasis is my emphasis):

“The EAW seeks the Defendant’s extradition for the purpose of prosecuting him for an offence of money laundering …I do not accept the defence submission that the EAW is alleging a number of different offences inadequately particularised. The conduct said to constitute the offence of money laundering is particularised. It is alleged that the Defendant was involved with and handled money from Bakshish Singh who himself is linked to drug trafficking. In particular on one occasion the Defendant is alleged to have discussed with Bakshish Singh the seizure of money by the police and the splitting of the money into smaller amounts. There is no allegation against the Defendant himself of conduct amounting to drug trafficking or involvement in a type of banking which is illegal in the Netherlands. The locations of the money laundering allegations are particularised as being in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. Dates of two alleged instances are given as 5 May 2011 and 16 May 2011. The relevant provisions of law in the Netherlands are provided in Box E.

I find reading the EAW as a whole and applying Sandi, it is clear that the offence for which extradition is sought is that of money laundering and the particulars in the EAW comply with the requirements of s.2(4)(c) of the Act”

Mr Farrell submits that these particulars are not sufficient to enable the appellant to understand the nature and extent of what he is alleged to have done in order to have committed the specified offence. They do not enable him to understand the nature and extent of his alleged participation and conduct in relation to the offence of money laundering. He raises issues both of lack of particularity and lack of clarity. The warrant he says suffers from obscurity and vagueness.

In his attack on this ground Mr Farrell concentrated upon what he submitted was the ambiguity and lack of clarity of the critical allegation in the particulars that the appellant “received funds within the United Kingdom that were paid to suspected drug traffickers in the Netherlands by SINGH” (the emphasis is my emphasis). He points out that this is the only place in the particulars where express mention is made of drug trafficking in connection with monies handled by the appellant (or indeed in connection with Singh or his organised crime group) yet it is unclear whether what is being alleged is that the funds received by the appellant within the United Kingdom were funds which had been in the past used by Singh to pay drug traffickers in the Netherlands (in which case they would arguably be monies already originating from an offence, to use the expression in the applicable Dutch Code, or arguably already imprinted with the quality of what in English law would be described as criminal property) or whether they were funds which after his receipt were subsequently paid by Singh to the dug traffickers (in which case on the basis of this allegation alone they would lack this quality). Although this may be thought to be a point more relevant to the further ground of appeal based on dual criminality, Mr Farrell submits that his client is still entitled to know what is being alleged against him and how the case is being factually put against him in this regard.

Mr Farrell complains further of the vagueness and obscurity of this particular allegation on either hypothesis. It is he submits totally unclear from whom the funds were received by the appellant and by what means; from where (in particular from within or from outside the United Kingdom) the funds were received; how they were transferred either to him in the UK or by him to the Netherlands (if this is the allegation), and to whom he made any such transfer. His links with or knowledge of the suspected drug traffickers is not stated nor is his knowledge that the funds had been or were to be paid to the drug traffickers (if knowledge, on either basis, be the allegation). When the funds were received or paid is not stated. The overall point is made that the alleged role of the appellant in the whole enterprise is unclear, in particular – on the second hypothesis - once he had received the funds. On the particular allegation that Singh provided the appellant with “ loans via his wife’s UK’s bank account” it is not clear whether that is intended to refer to Singh’s wife or the appellant’s wife and it is unclear how these “ loans “ fit into the alleged offence .

Mr Stansfeld on behalf of the respondent submits that the appellant is being far too pernickety. He submits that the District Judge was correct to read the particulars contained in the warrant as a whole, on which basis there is no lack of clarity as to the appellant’s role in the specified offence of money laundering or any lack of particularity as to the conduct alleged to constitute the offence. The particulars make clear, he submits, that the appellant is sought for prosecution for his involvement in a money launderingconspiracy (the emphasis is my emphasis)based in the Netherlands, with the appellant acting from the United Kingdom. The conspiracy involved illegal Hawalla banking controlled by Singh and related to drug trafficking .The appellant’s role was that of facilitating cash exchanges on behalf of Singh. In particular he received funds that were paid to suspected drug traffickers by Singh. On a specified date in 2011 he had met a man linked to Singh who had previously been arrested in possession of 112,400 Euros and shortly after whose arrest the appellant had been in telephone conversation with Singh in which had been discussed both the arrest and the rectifying of the loss by the splitting up of money into smaller amounts.

Mr Stansfeld submits that it matters not to the appellant’s understanding of the role he is alleged to have played in the conspiracy whether his receipt of funds was before or after they were paid to drug traffickers. His role was to facilitate cash exchanges, receive funds and assist in dealing with the money. His role was to facilitate the transfer of such funds whether by receiving funds or paying them out.

For my part, I have not found the resolution of this ground of appeal an easy one. The court at this stage of the appeal is not concerned with whether the conduct alleged amounts to the specified offence in Dutch law but simply with whether sufficient particulars have been given for the appellant to understand the nature and extent of his alleged offence role and participation in the alleged which go beyond the omnibus description set out in the final sentence of the particulars (“key role in Singh’s money laundering activities… being part of the money laundering conspiracy within the Netherlands”). I have had in these circumstances considerable sympathy with the submissions made by Mr Stansfeld, in particular given the need to avoid requiring such particularity as would satisfy a civil pleading and to have in mind the objects of conciseness and simplicity. Ultimately however I have been persuaded by Mr Farrell’s submissions on the issue of clarity and ambiguity.

The Appellant is entitled in my judgment to sufficient particulars to enable him to understand how the case is being put against him on critical allegations without that understanding being obscured by the fog of vagueness or ambiguity. The respondent has chosen in the EAW to make what in my judgment, looking at the particulars as a whole, is a critical allegation in the conduct alleged to amount to the offence of money laundering, namely the appellant “received funds within the United Kingdom that were paid to suspected drug traffickers in the Netherlands by Singh”. The appellant’s understanding of that allegation must be wholly disabled in my judgment by the ambiguity to which Mr Farrell referred and which is discussed above, and the lack of clarity of what it is the appellant is supposed to have done in this regard. Whether the funds were received by the appellant before or after they were paid to the suspected drug traffickers, how he is said to have received them and from whom, and the role if any which the appellant is supposed to have played in facilitating that payment, must be of considerable importance to any understanding of the role the appellant is supposed to have played in the alleged conspiracy.

The EAW makes reference to the conspiracy involving Hawalla banking. As I understand such term it refers to a private banking system which does not necessarily involve money transfers between different countries as distinct from cross credits. The allegation might for example be that the Appellant received funds within the United Kingdom from a wholly innocent source which however he then utilised to enable Singh to pay drug traffickers by cross credits. Alternatively the allegation may be that the appellant received funds from Singh or one of his associates which were already tainted with having been paid out to such traffickers, which is a very different allegation to have to meet. The District Judge regarded the particulars as informing the reader that “the Appellant was involved with and handled money from Singh who was himself linked to drug trafficking”. The only sentence in the particulars which could begin to justify this analysis is the one sentence referred to (coupled perhaps with the somewhat obscure allegation that Singh provided “loans” to the appellant) but as already explained the meaning of that sentence is wholly ambiguous, and it may or may not carry the meaning that the appellant “handled money from Singh”.

The sentence as it stands is moreover wholly lacking in the particularity one would need in order to understand how this particular piece of conduct is said to constitute the specified offence. I accept Mr Farrell’s submissions on this aspect summarised above at paragraph 78. It may be in that in a different case where conspiracy is alleged, it may not matter that one particular piece of conduct relied upon in support of the allegation that the Requested Person played a certain role in that conspiracy, is obscure and ambiguous, when the overall clarity of the allegation made against the appellant as to the nature and extent of his role is made good by particulars of other pieces of conduct relied on. But this is not the case here in my judgment. I agree with Mr Farrell that this particular sentence and this particular piece of conduct relied upon, is critical to the case alleged against the appellant in the EAW.

For all these reasons in my judgment this ground of appeal succeeds. The District Judge ought to have decided the question raised with regard to the compliance of the EAW with the requirements of section 2(4)(c) of the Act differently. She ought to have found that the EAW was invalid in that it did not contain the information required by that subsection.

I have had much less difficulty in resolving this final ground of appeal. The argument before us has again centred around the ambiguity and lack of clarity in the particulars of the conduct alleged against the appellant already identified.

In my judgment it is this self same ambiguity and lack of clarity which means that this ground must succeed.

The critical question if the condition in s.64(3)(b) is to be satisfied in this case, is whether the conduct alleged in the EAW, if it occurred in England, would constitute an offence in England. I accept (see Norris v United States of America [2008] 1 AC 920) that the court is not to be concerned with whether the elements of the offence in the requesting state correspond to an offence in the United Kingdom. Further it is to nothing that the offence to which the conduct would give rise in the United Kingdom does not correspond to the offence specified in the warrant, for example in the context of this case a conspiracy to possess a controlled drug as distinct from a money laundering conspiracy, or as a further example, a conspiracy to commit a criminal offence as distinct from the completed substantive offence. Further, I accept that as regards any mens rea required for the English offence, it is not fatal if the particulars of conduct in the EAW do not identify or specify that mens rea in terms. It is sufficient if it can be inferred by the court from the conduct which is spelled out and any further information from the appropriate authority in the requesting state (see Zak v, Regional Court of Bydgoscz, Poland [2008] EWHC 470 (Admin), per Richards LJ at paragraph 16).

It was thus the particulars of the conduct upon which the District Judge had to concentrate in answering this question. Her answer was that the conduct so particularised revealed two substantive offences, if it had occurred in England, contrary to the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (POCA), namely that under section 327 (concealing or transferring criminal property) and that under section 328 (assisting in the retention and control of criminal property).

The difficulty with this analysis is that for an offence to be committed under either section the property in question has to be “criminal property” within the meaning of the 2002 Act at the time the accused person does the acts said to amount to concealing or transferring etc. within section 327, or enters into or becomes concerned in an arrangement to facilitate the acquisition, retention, use or control of the property within section 328. And for property to be “criminal property” for these purposes the effect of the definition section (s.340(3)) is that it has already to constitute a person’s benefit from criminal conduct or to represent such benefit, and further the alleged offender must know or suspect it constitutes or represents such benefit. See R v. Amir and Akhtar [2011] EWCA Crim 146 where the Court of Appeal held that there was no warrant for construing the language of section 328 so that the offence could be committed where the applicable property was not “criminal property” at the time of the arrangement but where it had been intended that it should be. The court accepted the submission of Mr Farrell that the whole premise of the money laundering sections in the 2002 Act, criminalising those who deal in various ways with criminal property, is that there has been an earlier offence committed, the benefit from which is or is represented by the property in question. The court followed an earlier decision of the Court of Appeal in R v Geary [2010] EWCA Crim 1925, in which my lord, Lord Justice Moore-Bick, in giving the judgment of the court said (at paragraph 19) that to say that section 328 extended to property which was originally legitimate but became criminal only as a result of carrying out the arrangement, was to stretch the language of the section beyond its proper limits.

The District Judge purported to find that these offences were made out by the conduct alleged in the EAW by reasoning as follows:

“the allegation is that this Defendant is a key figure in Singh’s illegal money laundering activities and is part of the money laundering conspiracy in the Netherlands the money being benefit from criminal conduct, drug trafficking in the Netherlands…

If the conduct occurred in this jurisdiction it would constitute an offence of concealing or transferring criminal property s.327 Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 or assisting in the retention and control of criminal property under s.328 POCA 2002. Criminal property is defined in section 340 POCA 2002 as constituting a person’s benefit from criminal conduct and the alleged offender knows or suspects it constitutes or represents such a benefit. The particulars state that the money from Singh derived from criminal conduct and provides particulars from which the necessary ‘mens rea’ of the Defendant can be inferred (see Zak…) (again the emphasis is my emphasis).”

The reasoning of the District Judge would suggest that the particulars allege that the appellant received funds from Singh which were already derived from criminal conduct, namelydrug trafficking (and hence criminal property for the purposes of the offences) and which by inference the appellant knew or suspected to be so derived. However, as already explained, the only conduct identified in the particulars which can begin to support this analysis (‘furthermore indications from the Dutch investigation are that Sanjay DHAR received funds within the United Kingdom that were paid to suspected drug traffickers in the Netherlands by SINGH’) is wholly ambiguous and unclear on the critical question whether the funds received by the appellant had already been paid to drug traffickers and so were arguably criminal property when they came into his hands, or were originally not so tainted but subsequently paid on to the drug traffickers. This is quite apart from the question of the lack of clarity as to the source from whom the appellant is supposed to have received the funds within the United Kingdom or the basis upon which it could be inferred that the appellant knew or suspected that they were so tainted.

This ambiguity is fatal in my judgment to the argument that the particulars make out a completed offence of laundering criminal property under either section of POCA on the basis put forward by the District Judge.

Mr Stansfeld did raise the argument that the funds received by the appellant from Singh (assuming that the ‘loans’ referred to, or the’ funds received’ referred to, qualify for this purpose) could be inferred from the particulars as having been derived from criminal conduct by virtue of the reference to the criminal group, of which Singh was the controller, being involved in Hawalla banking which is illegal under Dutch law if unlicensed. The difficulty with this submission is that the use of Hawalla banking to facilitate money exchanges is not of itself unlawful if carried out in this country (see R v Khanani (Abbas Hussein) [2009] EWCA Crim 276).

Mr Stansfeld sought to circumvent this difficulty by relying on the principle, exemplified in Norris, that in assessing whether the conduct would have been criminal if it had occurred here, “a level of transposition is required”. Hence in Norris the court held that the offence was not one of obstructing a criminal investigation by a Pennsylvania Grand Jury into price fixing but was an offence of obstructing an equivalent investigation by the appropriate investigatory body in this jurisdiction.

This may be so, but in my judgment the principle of transposition does not extend on the facts of these particulars, to the court being entitled to transpose involvement in Hawalla banking, which would not be criminal activity in this country, into involvement in an “unlicensed and unregulated financial activity”. Given Hawalla banking (unlike an investigation by a Pennsylvania Jury) is capable of being carried out in this country and indeed on one analysis of the particulars the allegation is that the appellant did involve himself in this country with such a system by facilitating cash exchanges, this is in my judgment to take the principle of transposition too far. No more should be transposed than is necessary to give effect to the essence of the conduct alleged against the requested person where that conduct is linked in a particular way to the requesting state ( see the analysis in Norris at paragraphs 92 – 101 ) .

The essence of the acts alleged against the appellant in these particulars is not that he involved himself in unlicensed financial activity as such (as indeed the District Judge acknowledged) or laundered money which was derived from such conduct.

Mr Stansfeld then attempted to circumvent the difficulty that there were insufficient particulars of a completed offence under POCA by submitting that the particulars of conduct allege participation by the Appellant in a criminal conspiracy which, in order to be an offence, does not require that a completed substantive offence be committed, only that the appellant be party to an agreement to carry out such an offence. He submitted that the particulars of conduct were adequate to make out as against the appellant his being party to an agreement, and hence a conspiracy contrary to section 1 of the Criminal Law Act 1977, either to launder the proceeds of crime, namely the proceeds of drug trafficking, or to drug traffic itself.

The difficulty with this submission however in my judgment lies again in the ambiguity and lack of clarity in the particulars relied on for this purpose. There is no express allegation that the appellant entered into an agreement to launder the proceeds of drug trafficking. I accept that the court is entitled to look to the alleged conduct of the appellant to see whether such an agreement can be inferred (see Islam v Paphos District Court of Cyprus [2009] EWHC 2786 (Admin) at paragraph 11). If indeed there were an allegation that the appellant had received funds from Singh which were already the proceeds of drug trafficking, then I would agree that this might be a basis upon which his being a party to such a conspiracy could be inferred but for the reasons already explained it is wholly unclear whether such an allegation is being made.

Equally for like reasons, it is wholly unclear whether an allegation is being made that the appellant received funds which were thereafter used by Singh to pay drug traffickers but even if it were, that would not in itself be sufficient to infer an agreement on the part of the appellant to traffic in controlled drugs or even a conspiracy simply to possess controlled drugs absent any sort of particulars alleging that following receipt, the appellant transferred monies to Singh which he then used to purchase drugs.

Further, for reasons I have already given, I do not consider it is open to the Respondent to say by virtue of the principle of transposition, that the conduct alleged would constitute the appellant being part of a conspiracy to launder the proceeds of crime, being the proceeds of unlawful banking activity.

At their highest, the particulars of conduct allege against the appellant, apart from a general allegation of being part of a money laundering conspiracy, that the appellant was facilitating cash exchanges on behalf of Singh through Hawalla banking; that he received loans from Singh; that he received money which may or may not have been received from Singh, and which may or may not have already been paid to suspected drug traffickers or which may or may not have subsequently used by Singh to pay such traffickers to purchase drugs; that he often spoke to Singh using a variety of mobile phones inferentially to avoid detection; that he was in contact with an associate of Singh from whom monies had been seized and he had been discussing with Singh the seizure and how the loss might be rectified.

None of this, for the reasons I have given, is sufficient in my judgment to satisfy the requirement of dual criminality for the purposes of section 64(3)(b) of the Act. It must follow that the District Judge was wrong to have found that the offence specified in the warrant was an extradition offence for the purposes of section 10 and should have ruled that it was not.

Mr Stansfeld did invite the court before determining this ground of appeal on the section 10 question, to consider seeking further information from the appropriate authority in the requesting state in order to clarify that which the court considered to be unclear. He relied upon the guidance given by Lord Hope in Dabas at paragraph 49, that if a judge conducting an extradition hearing under section 10 found that the information presented to him is insufficient to enable him to decide whether or not the offence specified in the Part 1 warrant is an extradition offence within the meaning of section 64(2) or section 64(3), he would be at liberty to request further information from the appropriate authority and to adjourn the hearing to enable it to be so obtained. This was within the principle of judicial co-operation upon which the Framework Decision was based.

Clearly the District Judge in this case had the power to seek such further information but chose not to do so. Whether this court on an appeal has the power to do is not an easy question to answer given the court’s powers on appeal are circumscribed by section 27 of the Act which on one construction would confine this court to considering the correctness of the Judge’s decision on the section 10 question (like any other question raised on an appeal under section 26) by reference to the evidence which was before the judge or to evidence which although now available was not available at the extradition hearing. It is difficult to see how further information of the kind suggested by Mr Stansfeld can be said not to have been available for the purposes of the extradition hearing if the Judge had chosen to ask for it.

However, even if (without deciding the question) this court does have the suggested power, I, for my part, would not at this stage of the proceedings consider it appropriate to exercise it in the circumstances of this case. In any event, such information so obtained could not be used to rectify the non compliance of the particulars in the warrant which I have found to exist in relation to the requirements under s.2(4)(c) of the Act (see again, Lord Hope at paragraph 50 of Dabas) and which in itself means this appeal must be allowed and discharge ordered.

For all these reasons I would allow this appeal on the grounds that (i) the warrant was not a valid Part 1 warrant within section 2(2) of the Act in that it did not contain the information required by section 2(4)(c) and (ii) the offence specified in the warrant was not an extradition offence within the meaning of section 64(3) of the Act.

It follows in my judgment that under section 27(5) of the Act, this court should order the discharge of the appellant.

I agree that the appeal should be allowed for the reasons given by King J. However, because we are differing from the District Judge I propose to add a few comments of my own.

The warrant in this case was issued by Mr. Bos who described himself as a Public Prosecutor acting on behalf of the National Office of the Public Prosecution Service. Section 2(2) of the Extradition Act 2003 (“the Act”) requires a Part 1 warrant to be issued by a judicial authority, but the Act does not seek to define what is meant by that expression. Mr. Farrell Q.C. on behalf of the appellant submitted that Mr. Bos and the National Office of the Public Prosecution Service were not judicial authorities within the meaning of the Act because, as their descriptions indicated, their function was to prosecute, not to make judicial decisions. This argument was not raised before the District Judge, but I agree with King J. that the appellant is entitled to raise it before this court.

In Assange v Swedish Prosecution Authority [2011] EWHC 2849 (Admin), this question was fully considered by the court which had regard to the terms of the Framework Decision itself, the nature of the different constitutional arrangements in the various countries that are parties to it and earlier authorities. As the court recognized, the Act is to be construed so far as possible in a way which promotes the objective of the Framework Decision and accommodates the diversity of arrangements for the investigation and prosecution of crime to be found among the parties to it. The critical question is whether the person who issues the warrant is independent of the executive and responsible for exercising his own judgment in investigating the circumstances of the alleged offence and determining whether there are sufficient grounds for bringing proceedings.

In the present case there is no direct evidence of the nature of the Public Prosecutor’s Office; the appellant relies solely on its title and the fact that Mr. Bos is described as a Public Prosecutor. However, the decision in Assange, with which I respectfully agree, makes it clear that the mere fact that the warrant was issued by a person or body described as a “prosecutor” is not sufficient to show that it was not issued by a judicial authority. Indeed, in the light of Assange I would hold that such a description is not sufficient on its own to raise a triable issue. Quite apart from that, however, there is every reason to think that the National Office of the Public Prosecution Service occupies essentially the same position as the Swedish Prosecution Authority considered in that case or the District Public Prosecutor’s office in Leeuwarden, which was considered in Goatley v HM Advocate [2006] HCJAC 55, to which the court referred. In addition there is the certificate of the Serious Organized Crime Agency (“SOCA”) that the warrant was issued by a judicial authority, which, while not conclusive, tends to support the conclusion that the requirements of the Act are satisfied in this case. In the circumstances I have no doubt that the Public Prosecutor’s Office of the Netherlands is a judicial authority for the purposes of section 2(2) of the Act.

The next question is whether the warrant fails to comply with the requirements of section 2(4)(b) of the Act because it failed to contain information about the domestic warrant issued by Mr. Bos for the arrest of the appellant on 9^th June 2011. That information was added in manuscript on 13^th June, the inference being that someone at SOCA noticed the omission when the warrant was presented for certification and returned it to the Netherlands for completion.

I agree that there is no merit in this point. It was open to Mr. Bos to withdraw the warrant and issue a fresh warrant containing the missing information, but to insist on his doing so would be to take an unnecessarily technical approach inconsistent with the spirit of the legislation. In my view the argument fails for two separate reasons. In the first place it depends on the correctness of Mr. Farrell’s submission that the warrant was finally and irrevocably issued on 9^th June. I am unable to accept that. I agree with King J. that the critical point at which the formal validity of the warrant is to be judged is when the first steps in the procedure leading to its execution are taken, that is, when SOCA or any other designated authority issues a certificate under section 2(7) of the Act, that being a necessary condition of the execution of the warrant by arrest of the requested person, subject only to the provisions in section 5 allowing it to be executed on a provisional basis. Even in such cases, however, the validity of the warrant is to be determined as at the time when the certificate is issued. Until that point has been reached the warrant is inchoate and I see no reason why it should not be amended in order to ensure that it complies with the requirements of the Act. It follows that I also respectfully agree with the observations of Scott Baker L.J. in Robert Thompson v Public Prosecutor of Boulogne sur Mer [2008] EWHC 2787, to which King J. has referred. Quite apart from that, however, I do not think that the manuscript addition in this case can properly be equated with what Lord Hope in Dabas v High Court of Justice in Madrid, Spain [2007] UKHL 1672, [2007] 2 A.C. 31 described as “extraneous information”. What he had in mind was information derived from a source outside the warrant. For the reasons I have given I am of the opinion that the relevant information in this case was contained in and formed part of the warrant itself.

Compliance with section 2(4)(c) of the Act raises more difficult questions. It is clear from box (e) of the warrant that the appellant is accused of knowingly concealing, possessing or transferring property obtained by crime and, in broader terms, laundering the proceeds of crime. One would expect, therefore, the particulars of the offence to identify the property in question, to describe in general terms how it was obtained by crime, how the appellant became aware of that and what he did in relation to it. In the present case, however, the particulars do not really deal with these matters at all. The first paragraph describes the Dutch authorities’ investigations into an illegal Hawalla banking business run by Singh. (It should be noted that although Hawalla banking appears to be illegal in the Netherlands, the appellant is not accused of an offence relating to the operation of Hawalla banking as such.) The second paragraph states that the appellant assisted Singh in the operation of his business and that in that capacity Singh had provided loans to the appellant “via his wife’s bank account”. The appellant is said to have been in frequent telephone contact with Singh. None of this is suggestive of handling the proceeds of crime or money laundering.

The most pertinent particulars are to be found in the next paragraph. It is said that the appellant “received funds within the United Kingdom that were paid to suspected drugs traffickers in The Netherlands by Singh” and that the appellant and Singh had a telephone conversation in which they discussed a sum of €40,800. The appellant is then said to have met another of Singh’s associates who had previously been arrested in possession of €112,400 and shortly afterwards is said to have spoken to Singh to discuss the seizure of the money and the means by which the loss could be made good. Finally, it is said that the appellant is believed to be a key figure in Singh’s money laundering activities and that he is suspected of being a member of a money laundering conspiracy in the The Netherlands.

This information certainly leaves no doubt about the suspicions of the Dutch authorities, but it does not make it all clear what the appellant is said to have done by way of handling the proceeds of crime or engaging in money laundering. The allegation that he received loans from Singh is consistent with involvement with Hawalla banking, but does not indicate involvement in handling the proceeds of crime. The allegation that the appellant received funds in the United Kingdom that were paid to suspected drugs traffickers in the The Netherlands by Singh is ambiguous: it could mean that he received funds that Singh had paid to suspected drugs traffickers (which, if true, would render them proceeds of crime) or, as I think more likely, that he received funds in this country that were then transferred to Singh in the The Netherlands, who in turn paid them to suspected drugs traffickers. If the latter is intended, it does not follow that the funds the appellant received were themselves the proceeds of crime or, if they were, that he knew it.

Although I accept that the warrant need not contain highly detailed information of the kind that one might expect to find in a civil pleading, it must contain enough information to enable the requested person to understand with a reasonable degree of certainty the substance of the allegations against him, namely, what he is said to have done, when and where, and also, in a case where knowledge of particular matters is an essential ingredient of the offence, sufficient information to enable him to understand why it is said that he had the necessary knowledge. In the present case I do not think that the warrant satisfies these requirements because the information given in it fails to make it reasonably clear what the appellant is said to have done by way of handling property that was, and that he knew was, the proceeds of crime. In common with King J., therefore, I have reached the conclusion that the appeal must be allowed on this ground.

Mr. Farrell’s final submission, namely, that the dual criminality test is not satisfied in this case, is closely related to the issue just discussed. There is little, if anything, in the information to support the conclusion that the appellant was party to a conspiracy, whether to traffic in illegal drugs or to handle the proceeds of crime. I find it unnecessary to consider arguments based on the principle of transposition because the offences alleged against the appellant are almost identical in nature and content to the comparable offences under sections 327 and 328 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002.

For these reasons, as well as for the reasons given by King J, I would allow the appeal.