Wiltshire Police, R (on the application of) v The Police Appeals Tribunal & Anor

On 31 March 2011 the Defendant announced its decision to allow an appeal by the Interested Party against the decision of a Misconduct Panel (“the Panel”) constituted under Regulation 25(4) of the Police (Conduct) Regulations 2008 (hereinafter referred to as the “Conduct Regulations”). The Panel had found proved 10 separate allegations made against the Interested Party which, cumulatively, it considered constituted gross misconduct; further, it had decided that the Interested Party should be dismissed without notice by reason of that misconduct. The Defendant decided that the Panel ought not to have found proved two of the allegations which had been made against the Interested Party (the only two allegations which he contested). It also decided that the Panel should not have imposed the sanction of dismissal without notice; rather it should have issued a final written warning in respect of seven of the allegations which he had admitted and a written warning in respect of the eighth. As a consequence of its decisions the Defendant ordered the Interested Party’s reinstatement as a police constable, the Panel’s decision having taken effect following its pronouncement. As I have said the Defendant announced its decision on 31 March 2011; on 6 May 2011 it provided detailed written reasons for the decision which it had made. In the remainder of this judgment the written reasons are referred to as the decision letter.

In these proceedings the Claimant seeks to impugn each of the decisions made by the Defendant and contained within the decision letter. In particular he argues that the Defendant acted unlawfully when it concluded that the Panel should not have imposed the sanction of dismissal upon the Interested Party.

Mr Robert Meade and the Interested Party are old friends. On 23 May 2009 Mr Meade was arrested on suspicion of having committed sexual offences against a 14 year old girl. After further investigation Mr Meade was charged with abducting the girl and engaging in sexual activity with her.

On 16 October 2009, at the Swindon Crown Court, Mr Meade pleaded guilty to the offence of engaging in sexual activity with the girl. He was sentenced to a period of 12 months’ imprisonment. The prosecution did not pursue the charge of abduction.

During the course of the investigation of Mr Meade his two mobile phones were seized and examined. It became clear that Mr Meade had been using one of the phones to text and speak to the Interested Party on various occasions between 17 March 2008 and 23 May 2009. In due course, text messages passing between Mr Meade and the Interested Party were retrieved which gave rise to concerns on the part of the investigating officers that the Interested Party had been behaving inappropriately.

On 10 September 2009 DI Stirton made a written report to his superior, DCI Capstick, in which he drew attention to a number of text messages which had passed between the Interested Party and Mr Meade in the period 12 May 2009 to 18 May 2009. He further reported that the Interested Party had disclosed to him that he had “accessed the Niche Occurrence to ascertain what his friend was accused of” although DI Stirton also reported that the Interested Party had explained his conduct by saying that he had been unable to contact Mr Meade, that he was concerned for him and that he had done nothing to interfere with the course of the investigation.

In October 2009 DI Stirton’s report was received by the Professional Standards Department of the Wiltshire Police Force. An investigation of the Interested Party ensued. On 7 December 2009 the Interested Party was served with a notice pursuant to Regulation 15 of the Conduct Regulations which alleged that he had been in breach of the “Standards of Professional Behaviour” – a reference to a document so entitled which is an annexe to the Conduct Regulations and which sets out standards to be expected of serving police officers. The following day the matter was referred to the Independent Police Complaints Commission. The Commission determined that there should be a managed investigation of the allegations made against the Interested Party undertaken by the Wiltshire Police Force.

In due course, TCI Harvey was appointed to carry out the investigation. On 28 January 2010 the Interested Party was served with a notice detailing 11 specific allegations of breach of professional standards. As was his right the Interested Party served a detailed response. Thereafter he was interviewed under caution.

On 14 May 2010 TCI Harvey published the report of her investigation. She concluded that there was “a case to answer” in respect of 10 of the allegations she had investigated. She also concluded that should the allegations be proved they would amount to gross misconduct. Accordingly, she recommended that the allegations should be considered by a panel at a misconduct hearing.

On 7 July 2010 a notice was served upon the Interested Party pursuant to Regulation 21 of the Conduct Regulations. The notice alleged that the Interested Party’s conduct had breached the Standards of Professional Behaviour in 10 specific respects. The notice also informed the Interested Party that his behaviour was alleged to constitute gross misconduct and that a misconduct hearing would be convened to consider the allegations. The allegations set out in the notice were as follows:-

By letter dated 9 July 2010 the Interested Party's solicitor responded to these allegations. He indicated that the Interested Party accepted allegations 1, 2, 3, 4, 8, 9 and 10 and that the conduct alleged amounted to conduct which fell below the standards specified in the Standards of Professional Behaviour. In relation to allegations 5, 6 and 7 the Interested Party's solicitor wrote:-

On 21 July 2010 the Panel convened pursuant to Regulation 25(4) of the Conduct Regulations and heard the case against the Interested Party. He was represented by counsel and solicitors. He admitted allegations 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 9 and 10. The Panel found proved allegations 6 and 7. In relation to allegation 7 the Panel concluded that the Interested Party had not contravened the policy of the Wiltshire Police Force by maintaining contact with Mr Meade but found that his contact with Mr Meade between 25 May 2009 and 16 October 2009 was a pattern of behaviour that should be considered as “discreditable” for a serving police officer. It found allegation 7 proved on this basis.

During the course of her submissions to the Panel, Counsel for the Interested Party accepted that his conduct “could amount to gross misconduct” (see Trial Bundle 2 C/326 and C/331). That concession was made in relation to the 8 allegations which the Interested Party admitted. Perhaps not surprisingly in those circumstances, the conclusion of the Panel was that the Interested Party's conduct was “sufficiently serious to constitute gross misconduct.” In relation to allegations 1, 2, 4, 9 and 10 the Panel recorded the fact that the Interested Party admitted each allegation but did not specify, in any detail, the Panel’s view as to the important underlying facts or the seriousness of the misconduct in question. In relation to allegation 3 the Panel said this:-

The Panel concluded that the appropriate sanction was dismissal from the Police Service with immediate effect and without notice. It did so having heard the submissions of counsel and evidence from the Interested Party and having considered written material including substantial references. It justified its conclusion on sanction as follows:-

An appeal from the Panel to the Police Appeals Tribunal is governed by the above rules (hereinafter referred to as the “Appeal Rules”). The material parts of Appeal Rules provide as follows:-

The substance of the Defendant's decision is set out at paragraph 1 above. This section of my judgment identifies the important parts of the decision letter dated 6 May 2011.

Section 1 identified the basis of the appeal brought by the Interested Party. It also set outs the only grounds of appeal which were available to the Interested Party under Rule 4(4) of the Appeal Rules. Section 2 of the decision letter contained a detailed account of the facts relevant to the allegations found proved and admitted together with some of the facts which the Defendant thought relevant to mitigation. Section 3 dealt with the findings made by the Panel in relation to allegations 6 and 7. Sections 4 to 9 analysed each of the allegations which the Appellant admitted. Section 10 contained the Defendant’s “conclusions upon the appeals against the punishments”. It is necessary to consider sections 3 to 10 in some detail.

In section 3 the Defendant first concluded that allegation 7 was not proved because at the material time there was no relevant adopted force policy of which the Interested Party could have been in breach. The Panel had reached the same conclusion; however it had gone on to conclude that the Interested Party’s contact with Mr Meade had been “part of a pattern of behaviour which may be considered as discreditable conduct”.

The Defendant’s view was that the Panel had not been entitled to consider allegation 7 on this alternative basis. Additionally, however, the Defendant concluded that even if the Panel had been entitled to consider the allegation in the manner that they did there was no proper basis for the conclusion that the contact which occurred between the Interested Party and Mr Meade was discreditable conduct.

In the remaining part of section 3 the Defendant considered allegation 6. The Panel’s reasoning in relation to allegation 6 had been as follows:-

The Defendant’s conclusion was that it was unsafe to make a finding of guilt on this allegation. In so finding the Defendant was clearly influenced by two factors. First, the fact that PC Kenzie had not been offended by the Interested Party’s conduct; second, that in the view of the Defendant the Panel had been wrong to doubt the credibility of the Interested Party’s account of events surrounding the allegation.

In reaching the conclusion that the Panel had been wrong to doubt the credibility of the account of the Interested Party, the Defendant laid emphasis upon what it described as an error of approach on the part of the Panel. During the course of her submissions about allegations 6 and 7 Counsel for the Interested Party had invited the Panel to read the impressive character references adduced on his behalf before reaching conclusions about whether allegations 6 and 7 had been proved. The Panel declined to do so maintaining that the references were relevant only to the issue of sanction. The Defendant’s view was that this was an error and that the character references were plainly relevant to the issue of the Interested Party’s credibility.

Section 4 of the decision letter began with the following paragraph:-

Section 5 of the report dealt with allegations 1, 8 and 9. These allegations are those relating to the accessing of Niche intelligence records. The Defendant recorded in terms that “unauthorised access is serious misconduct”. Having made that point, however, it then concluded that the misconduct proved in relation to allegation 1 was “of a low order” and that allegations 8 and 9 “share an important mitigating feature” namely that the Interested Party did not publish the information which he obtained to anyone outside the police service. The Defendant's consideration of allegations 8 and 9 concluded with the following:-

In section 6 the Defendant considered the 3 charges of “exchanging inappropriate e-mails and texts”; these were allegations 2, 3 and 5. The Defendant began its appraisal of these charges by noting:-

In the light of the factors in mitigation summarised above and notwithstanding the fact that the Defendant categorised the misconduct in these three allegations as serious it concluded that dismissal without notice was an unreasonably harsh sanction.

Sections 7 and 9 dealt with the individual allegations numbered 4 and 9. It suffices to say that the view of the Defendant was that neither offence justified dismissal without notice. Indeed in respect of each allegation the Defendant's view was that the punishment imposed was out of proportion to the facts proved.

Section 8 of the decision letter considered that part of allegation 8 which was critical of the Interested Party for emailing confidential information about Mr Meade to a fellow officer. The Panel’s view of allegation 8 as a whole is set out at paragraph 13 above.

The Defendant concluded that allegation 8 constituted a breach of confidentiality. It expressed itself as unclear how it could constitute discreditable conduct. In order to understand the Defendant's reasoning process it is necessary to set out what it had to say about this aspect of the case.

That leaves section 10. In this section the Defendant drew together its reasons for allowing the appeal against the sanction imposed by the Panel. It expressed itself as follows:-

The Defendant did not conduct an oral hearing. It reached it conclusions upon the documents with which it was provided although I make it clear that the documents included a transcript of the proceedings before the Panel. The documentation also included detailed grounds of appeal which suggested, in summary, that the Panel’s findings in relation to allegation 6 and 7 were unreasonable, that aspects of its factual conclusions in relation to the allegations admitted were also unreasonable and that the sanction imposed was unreasonable.

There have been a number of recent decisions in which this court has grappled with what is meant by the word “unreasonable” in Rule 4(4)(a) of the Appeal Rules 2008. I refer to R (Montgomery) v Police Appeals Tribunal[2012] EWHC 936 (Admin) (Collins J); R (Chief Constable of Hampshire) v Police Appeals Tribunal[2012] EWHC 746 (Admin) (Mitting J); R (Chief Constable of the Derbyshire Constabulary) v Police Appeals Tribunal[2012] EWHC 2280 (Admin) (Beatson J) and R (The Chief Constable of Durham) v Police Appeals Tribunal[2012] EWHC 2733 (Admin) (a Divisional Court consisting of Moses LJ and Hickinbottom J). In his decision in the Derbyshire case Beatson J expressed the view that the issue of whether a finding or sanction was unreasonable should be determined by asking the question whether the panel in question had made a finding or imposed a sanction which was within the range of reasonable findings or sanctions upon the material before it. The learned judge clearly considered that his view was consistent with the views expressed in the earlier decisions in the Montgomery and Hampshire cases.

The approach of Beatson J is echoed in the approach adopted in the Durham case by Moses LJ (with whom Hickinbottom J agreed). During the course of his judgment Moses LJ considered whether or not the use of the word “unreasonable” within Rule 4(4)(a) mandated the tribunal to apply what is familiarly known as the Wednesbury test when determining whether or not a finding or sanction is to be categorised as unreasonable. His conclusion was as follows:-

I propose to follow the same approach to the word “unreasonable” as that which was adopted by Beatson J in the Derbyshire case and Moses LJ and Hickinbottom J in the Durham case.

At each level in the disciplinary process, the decision-maker is expert in nature. It knows and understands how the Police Service works. It knows and understands the importance of maintaining integrity amongst police officers. It knows and understands the impact that serious misconduct can have on the Force concerned and the Police Service in general. Parliament has provided that the Defendant is the appellate body for these purposes. There is no further appeal to the High Court. The Defendant is subject to the supervisory jurisdiction of this court. Absent an error of law on the part of the Defendant its decisions cannot be impugned. In the skeleton argument on behalf of the Claimant the authors accept that a decision of the Defendant upon sanction can be interfered with only on classic Wednesbury grounds.

There can be no doubt that it is open to this court to quash a decision of the Defendant if the Claimant has established that the decision was unreasonable or irrational. In the light of the decision in the Durham case it may be that the potential grounds of challenge are not so confined. I will return to this issue later in this judgment.

Did the Defendant consider whether the panel’s findings in respect of allegations 6 and 7 were unreasonable? I pose that question since there is no explicit finding in section 3 of the Defendant's report that the Panel’s conclusions in relation to allegations 6 and 7 should be so categorised.

Notwithstanding the Defendant's failure to specify, expressly, that the Panel’s findings in relation to allegations 6 and 7 were unreasonable I have little doubt that this was the conclusion which it reached when its decision on each of these allegations is read in context.

In relation to allegation 6 the Defendant concluded that the Panel had been wrong to disbelieve the Interested Party’s account of the circumstances in which he came to take a photograph of his colleague. Two reasons were advanced by the Defendant for reaching this conclusion. First, the Panel had not heard evidence from PC Kenzie. According to the Defendant, the Panel should not have relied upon the difference between her account of how the photograph came to be taken (as contained in her witness statement) and the account given by the Interested Party as a reason for disbelieving him. Second, the Panel was wrong to refuse to take account of the evidence of the Interested Party’s good character when considering the credibility of his account in relation to allegation 6. Counsel for the Interested Party had wished to adduce this evidence before the Panel reached its conclusions about whether allegations 6 and 7 had been proved but the Panel refused to admit the evidence at that stage of the proceedings holding, in effect, that the evidence of good character was relevant only to the issue of sanction.

In my judgment, the Panel fell into error in its approach to the issue of evidence of good character. Such evidence was relevant not just to the issue of sanction but also to the issue of the Interested Party's credibility. The Interested Party’s credibility was an important factor in determining whether allegation 6 was proved (and, for that matter, in determining the seriousness of the allegation). In my judgment the Defendant was entitled to conclude that the adverse credibility finding inherent in the conclusion that allegation 6 had been proved was unreasonable given that the evidence of good character had been excluded, wrongly, from consideration.

I do not share the view of the Defendant that it was unreasonable of the Panel to reach an adverse credibility finding against the Interested Party based upon the difference between the witness statement of PC Kenzie and the evidence given by the Interested Party to the Panel. The Interested Party was represented by experienced lawyers; there was no request that PC Kenzie should give oral evidence before the Panel. The Panel was reasonably entitled to compare the evidence contained in her witness statement with the evidence given by the Interested Party and reach a conclusion about which evidence it preferred. However, it is by no means certain that the Panel would have reached the same conclusion had it taken account of the evidence of good character upon which the Interested Party sought to rely.

I am satisfied that the Defendant was correct to conclude that the Panel’s finding that allegation 6 was proved was unreasonable. If the evidence of the Interested Party’s good character had been taken into account prior to the determination in relation to allegation 6 there is a realistic possibility that a different view of the Interested Party’s credibility would have been taken. At the very least there is a realistic possibility that if the good character evidence had been taken into account the Panel might have viewed the seriousness of the allegation in a different light even if it was appropriate to find the allegation proved.

The credibility of the Interested Party was also important to allegation 7. The failure to take account of the good character evidence before determining whether allegation 7 was proved was also an error which undermines the reasonableness of the Panel’s conclusion on this allegation. The Defendant was correct so to find. In my judgment the Defendant was correct, too, in its conclusion that there was an additional reason why the Panel’s finding in relation to allegation 7 was unreasonable. Allegation 7, as framed, was a complaint of a failure to comply with an adopted policy of the police force. No such policy existed at the material time and the draft policy which was in existence was not known to the Interested Party. Notwithstanding that the Panel accepted all that, it concluded that the Interested Party had been guilty of behaviour which was discreditable. It is by no means clear that it was open to the Panel to reformulate allegation 7 in the way that it did. Assuming it had the power to do so, however, it is clear from the transcript of the proceedings that it did not afford the Interested Party any opportunity to make representations about whether it had such power and, if so, whether it was fair to exercise it. To repeat, in my judgment, the finding that allegation 7 was proved in its amended form was unreasonable.

This is the issue which is at the heart of this challenge. Was it open to the Defendant to conclude that the sanction of dismissal without notice was unreasonable in the light of the 8 allegations which the Interested Party had admitted?

The starting point must be that Counsel for the Interested Party expressly acknowledged that it was properly open to the Panel to conclude that the 8 allegations, viewed cumulatively, could amount to gross misconduct – see paragraph 13 above. The Defendant acknowledged, expressly, that it had to proceed on the basis that the Interested Party had admitted that each of the admitted allegations amounted to gross misconduct – see paragraph 29 above.

The Defendant concluded that no individual allegation merited dismissal. It also concluded that the allegations viewed cumulatively did not merit such a sanction. At one point it doubted, expressly, whether some of the allegations admitted amounted to gross misconduct, although in section 10 of the decision letter it stated expressly that it should proceed on the basis that the Interested Party had admitted 8 allegations of gross misconduct. The Panel expressed no conclusion about whether any individual allegation looked at in isolation justified dismissal. Its view was that the allegations taken together amounted to a course of conduct which justified dismissal. It reached that conclusion on the basis that there were 10 admitted or proved allegations but there is no realistic possibility that it would have reached a different conclusion had it found that allegations 6 and 7 had not been proved. Accordingly, the issue for the Defendant was whether the sanction of dismissal for a course of conduct which encompassed 8 admitted allegations of gross misconduct spanning a number of years was unreasonable. Was the sanction within the range of reasonable responses open to the Panel given the material before it?

In my judgment, the Panel was plainly entitled to reach the conclusion that the course of gross misconduct admitted by the Interested Party justified dismissal. Their reasons for so concluding are set out in paragraph 14 above and although those reasons relate to 10 allegations I am quite satisfied that the Panel’s reasoning would have been the same had it been dealing with the 8 allegations which were admitted. The Defendant did not suggest in its decision letter, and given its own reasoning could not suggest, that it was allegations 6 and 7 which tipped the balance in favour of the sanction of dismissal.

No useful purpose would be served by repeating or emphasising parts of the Panel’s reasoning. It is necessary to read the reasoning as a whole since, in my judgment, it constitutes compelling justification for the stance which the Panel adopted.

The Defendant reached the conclusion that

First, in relation to many of the allegations which the Interested Party admitted the Defendant substituted its own view of the relevant facts for that of the Panel rather than making an assessment about whether the findings of the Panel in relation to the allegations were ones which were reasonable. Section 6 of the Defendant's decision letter (which deals with the email/text allegations) provides a good example of what I mean. The Defendant acknowledges that “any police force would be disappointed to realise that one of its mature officers had been engaging in electronic conversation with a member of the public using…..disgusting language.” The decision letter continues “the language is disparaging, derogatory and sexist in its attitude to women.” However, the Defendant then explains that the conduct is less serious than would otherwise be the case since the Interested Party’s words did not reach the public domain and identifies other factors which in its view mitigate the seriousness of the allegations (see paragraph 25 above).

With respect to the Defendant, I consider Mr Beggs QC is correct when he submits that it was reasonable for the Panel to focus upon the nature of the words used rather than whether or not the words actually reached the public domain. The plain fact is that if many of the Interested Party's texts or e-mail messages had reached the public domain there would likely have been very significant adverse comment about his conduct. The “rape” message (described by the Defendant as “simply appalling”) would, in my judgment, have led to very significant adverse comment upon the Interested Party's behaviour and, undoubtedly, would have brought discredit upon his force. In my judgment there was nothing unreasonable about the Panel’s assessment of the email/text allegations (see paragraph 13 above).

The Defendant's treatment of the other allegations admitted by the Interested Party is open to the same criticism. In respect of each allegation the Defendant appears to have placed the admitted conduct in its most favourable light – as opposed to asking itself whether the Panel’s assessment of the allegation was reasonable. In my judgment the Defendant's approach to sanction has been conditioned by its own view of the seriousness of the allegations. To repeat, the task for the Defendant was to determine whether the Panel’s view of the allegations was a reasonable one and, in light of that view, whether the Panel’s sanction constituted a reasonable response. The Defendant’s approach was much more akin to an assessment by way of re-hearing rather than an objective assessment of the reasonableness of the conclusions reached by the Panel.

The second reason which leads me to the view that the Defendant fell into error is that it seems to have ignored the principle, now well established, that one of the primary purposes of professional misconduct proceedings is to ensure the preservation of public confidence in the profession in question. There can be no doubt that this principle is applicable to disciplinary proceedings involving police officers. In R (Green) v Police Complaints Authority[2004] UKHL 6 Lord Carswell said:-

The Panel’s decision made specific reference to the need to respond to the Interested Party's misconduct in a manner which would maintain public confidence in the police service. There is no such reference to be found in the decision of the Defendant. While it is not necessary for the Defendant to articulate this principle expressly in its written decision as a means of demonstrating that it has taken it into account there is nothing in the Defendant’s decision which suggests that it did and the clear tenor of the decision suggests that it did not.

The Claimant's challenge to the Defendant's decision is based squarely on the proposition that the Defendant reached a decision which was unreasonable or irrational in the Wednesbury sense. Reluctantly, given the status of the Defendant, I would agree if needs be. It may be, however, that in light of the analysis of the Divisional Court in the Durham case it is not necessary, strictly, to establish that the Defendant's decision was unreasonable or irrational. In that part of his judgment which is set out at paragraph 33 above Moses LJ emphasises that the Defendant is entitled to substitute its own approach for that of a panel only if it has already found that the decision made by the panel was unreasonable. As I have endeavoured to show I do not consider that the Defendant adopted that approach in this case. In my judgment the Defendant adopted a view of the relevant allegations which it considered was justified by the evidence without first making a judgment about whether the Panel’s view of the allegations was reasonable. It compounded this error of approach by failing to take account of a highly material factor – the maintenance of public confidence in the police service - when determining the appropriateness of the sanction imposed by the Panel. In my judgment it is open to this court to intervene given those errors on the part of the Defendant.

During the course of his oral submissions, in particular, Mr Davies, on behalf of the Interested Party, sought to persuade me that the sanction of dismissal was not reasonable if, notwithstanding the conduct about which complaint was made, the police officer in question was still “operational.” Mr Davies used the word “operational” to mean that it would still be reasonably possible to deploy the officer in question in his normal duties notwithstanding his proved or admitted misconduct.

I have considered this submission in the context of the authorities put before me. I am unable to discern from the authorities any statement of principle to the effect that dismissal should not be regarded as a reasonable sanction if, despite the misconduct in question, the officer remains “operational”. No doubt if the misconduct in question has had the effect of rendering the officer non – operational it may follow, almost inevitably, that dismissal will be regarded as a reasonable sanction. It does not follow, however, that the misconduct in question must have that effect for the sanction of dismissal to be regarded as reasonable. To repeat, I can find no statement of principle in the authorities which supports Mr Davies’ submission. In any event in this case the Panel’s conclusion was that it was “impossible to reconcile your behaviour with that of a professional police officer” and that “the various breaches of the Standards of Professional Behaviour have been a flagrant disregard of those Standards which in turn has made his position as a police officer untenable.” In the context of the whole of the passage in which those expressions of view appear (see paragraph 14 above) that seems to me to be tantamount to a finding by the Panel that the Interested Party was no longer operational as a consequence of his misconduct.

Finally, I should refer briefly to an aspect of the Defendant's decision which troubled me to some extent. The Defendant was at pains to say that it was part of its function to ensure a consistency of approach to the sanctions imposed upon police officers for misconduct. I do not consider that aim to be objectionable in itself but there is a need for caution. There may be many instances where it will be easy, comparatively, to establish a consistent approach; one example is cases involving dishonesty on the part of a police officer. I doubt, however, whether Misconduct panels or the Defendant are often faced with the sort of misconduct alleged in the instant case. Indeed, I would be surprised if there were many instances of cases such as the present in which an officer has engaged in quite different forms of unprofessional and discreditable behaviour. While the Defendant claimed that it was seeking to apply an approach which was consistent with other decisions made in comparable cases it provided no details or reasoning to justify that assertion. This issue has not been raised directly as a discrete ground of challenge and, accordingly, I do not take account of it in reaching my decision in this case. I mention it only so that the Police Appeals Tribunals are aware of the possibility that more detail may be necessary if consistency is to found a justification for allowing an appeal against the findings of a Misconduct panel especially when, as here, consistency was not a ground of appeal and it had formed no part of the police officer’s case before the panel.

I have reached the conclusion that the decision of the Defendant should be quashed. I presume that a quashing of the decision means, inevitably, that the decision of the Panel will be restored (a presumption confirmed by the draft order agreed by the parties consequent upon my judgment). The issue of costs will be determined in accordance with the terms of my order and the timetable attached thereto.