Konuksever v The Government of Turkey

The Appellant Tahir Konuksever is a Turkish citizen. His extradition has been requested by the Government of Turkey. Turkey is a Category 2 territory within the meaning of Section 69 of the Extradition Act 2013 [“The Act”]. Mr Konuksever [“the Appellant”] appeals pursuant to Section 103 of the Act against a decision of District Judge Nicholas Evans given following written and oral evidence and argument presented on 1 September 2011, in a written judgment delivered on 15 September 2011. The Secretary of State on 14 November 2011 ordered the Appellant’s extradition.

The Appellant was born in 1972 and is of Kurdish ethnicity. According to the Proof of Evidence from the Appellant placed before the District Judge, the Appellant’s grandfather moved the family from Eastern Turkey to Aksaray where both the Appellant and his father were born. As confirmed by Professor Bowring, this is a region of Turkey where Kurds are very much in the minority. The Appellant states the family has “suffered from persistent discrimination” due to their origins.

The Appellant married in 1989 and had a baby daughter. On his account his daughter died in March 1992 because she was “murdered by some locals shooting at our house”. This account is in complete conflict with the judgment of the local Criminal Court of First Instance dated 12 March 1992 concerning the death of the child. According to the court record there was a finding based on the confession of the accused persons, including the Appellant, to the effect that the Appellant’s young daughter died because her sibling “Safiye”, took the Appellant’s hunting rifle:

These events do not bear directly on the extradition, however they form the beginning of wide ranging conflict between the account given by the Appellant and the court record disclosed from Turkey.

On the afternoon of 22 February 2000, local police recorded a telephone call from an anonymous informant suggesting that this Appellant and his father Dursun Ali Konuksever “dealt with firearm trafficking and kept a long barrelled rifle and pistol at their house”. At about 4.00pm that afternoon police attended at the house where the Appellant lived with his wife, his mother and father and his children. The police found a Kalashnikov rifle and a 7.65 mm calibre CSM pistol concealed in the Appellant’s bedroom. Both the Appellant and his father were arrested.

According to the record, the Appellant gave an account which he formally confirmed in a preliminary court hearing on the following day. He claimed that the rifle and pistol were his and his father had no knowledge of the weapons. He claimed he had obtained the weapons in 1997 and that they were bought for his own protection and that of his family. He denied dealing in guns. According to the record, when he signed this account on the afternoon of 23 February he was already represented by a defence lawyer.

On the following day 24 February 2000 the Appellant attended at the Public Prosecutors office again represented by a lawyer. He gave an account consistent with that given the previous day, the account being reduced to writing. His lawyer is recorded as saying:

By 7 March 2000, the Appellant was still in custody, by now at the Aksaray Penal Institution. He made formal appointment of a different defence attorney on that date. On 8 March, the file was delivered with an indictment to the Criminal Court of First Instance and on 10 March the Appellant was arraigned. At this stage the charge he faced was trafficking in firearms. He indicated his intention to defend that charge.

On 30 March, the Appellant was still in custody and was produced again before the court. The Appellant accepted the charges of possession of the weapons and his advocate confirmed that “he confessed his offence before the courts sincerely”. However, he emphasised that the charge of trafficking was rejected. The advocate requested the release of the Appellant pending trial, the court ordered that the Appellant’s wife should be deposed on the facts and remanded him in custody, whilst also ordering an expert report on the weapons.

The weapons were tested on 5 April and the results recorded in an expert report of 10 April. Both weapons were in good working order and both were successfully test fired, using ammunition which had been seized from the Appellant’s house at the same time.

On the following day 11 April the Appellant again appeared before the court. His advocate indicated there was no challenge to the examination and the expert witness report. The Appellant’s wife then gave evidence to the court. She confirmed that the Kalashnikov rifle and the pistol belonged to her husband. She confirmed that the weapons were always in the separate room used by her and her husband and there was no connection between them and the Appellant’s father. She went on to confirm that the weapons had remained in the home and that her husband neither took them out nor did he buy or sell weapons at all. The Appellant’s advocate submitted to the court there was no evidence to sustain the trafficking charge, and the court agreed. This more serious charge was dismissed. The uncontested charges of possession stood and the court went on to decree that:

On the same day the Appellant’s advocate entered Notice of Appeal, the grounds being given in a document of 28 April. The appeal appears to have been directed to penalty, on the basis that the “penalisation” was in accordance with the wrong article of the code.

To be set alongside the court records are three medical certificates from February 2000, dated 22, 23 and 24 February successively. In each case doctors signed to say that there were “no marks of battery and coercion” on the Appellant’s body on physical examination. The earliest of these from 22 February bears the appearance of being typewritten. Those of 23 and 24 February bear the appearance of being generated by word processor a point made the subject of adverse comment by the Appellant. In similar fashion, there is in the papers a certificate from the Director of the “closed prison of Ankara CPA” indicating in relation to the Appellant that he was a detainee at the prison from 24 February to 11 April 2000 and “no report indicating that the detainee was subjected to any battery or maltreatment was found”.

In the Appellant’s Proof of Evidence placed before the District Judge, he gives an account inconsistent with the court records. The relevant passages are as follows:

The Respondent Government, amongst other things, contest the Appellant’s account of a clandestine departure from Turkey. A record has been produced of a computer passenger enquiry against the Appellant’s name and date of birth and this revealed:

On 6 December 2001 the Court of Cassation on the Eighth Criminal Circuit dismissed the Appellant’s appeal and confirmed the judgment and sentence.

In part of the note created by the Aksaray Chief Prosecutor’s Office in June 2011 in preparation for the hearing, the Turkish Public Prosecutor records that “an Apprehension Warrant” for the Appellant was issued on 10 January 2002 and sent to the local police for his arrest. He had of course already left. The Public Prosecutor goes on to say that:

It is normal practice on the part of the Home Office to keep entirely separate from extradition proceedings any immigration and asylum proceedings relating to an individual whose extradition is sought. This is in order to avoid the possibility that any allegation of mistreatment made in an asylum application is used as an objection to extradition, where it might be said that the mere allegations could lead to a risk of mistreatment or worse if the individual were returned. In this case, the Government of Turkey requested disclosure of the material arising in the asylum claim made by the Appellant. This was refused by the Appellant. As Mr Cooper frankly explained, this was really on the basis of reciprocity in the face of the established Home Office practice. As he also frankly acknowledged, there was little logic to it in this case, since his client was making the most explicit allegations of torture against state actors in Turkey. In other words, the damage was already done. However, in the result, neither before the District Judge nor before us was there any full disclosure of the material from the Appellant’s asylum claim.

However, what was disclosed to the District Judge was the report of the Appellant’s case in the Court of Appeal: R (on the application of K) –v- Secretary of State for the Home Department [2009] EWCA Civ 660.

The history recited in the course of that judgment confirms the Appellant arrived in the United Kingdom in November 2001, a finding consistent with the exit stamp from Ankara Airport. He apparently applied unsuccessfully for asylum and his appeal on asylum and human rights ground was dismissed by an adjudicator in April 2003. The Appellant’s case was based on fear of a vendetta against him and his family by three families in the village in which he lived. They had accused him and his family of being PKK sympathisers, which he had said he was not. The 2001 complaint against him was said to come from these families. The judgment goes on to recite:

The judgment goes on to recite as follows:

The Court of Appeal summarised the findings of the Adjudicator. The Adjudicator did not find that the fear of persecution from three families was credible, but even if it was, internal relocation was available to him and there was a sufficiency of protection. The sentence passed on him for possession of a weapon was not unduly severe. The Adjudicator observed that the Appellant had been placed on reporting restrictions and that “there was some evidence of ill-treatment but none required hospitalisation”. The Adjudicator went on to conclude the Appellant would not face any harm or ill-treatment based on association with the PKK and that it was also clear the Appellant’s past arrest had not led to the authorities viewing him as a suspected terrorist. There was no evidence that he would be seen as a political activist.

The Court of Appeal went on to recite that in March 2006 the solicitors then acting for the Appellant sought to make a fresh asylum claim. The rejection by the Secretary of State of that attempt had led to the judicial review proceedings subject to appeal. The matter related to a letter of further representation submitting a medical report by Dr M G Wright in September 2006, and the subsequent refusal by the Secretary of State to accept the evidence of Dr Wright as giving rise to a fresh human rights claim.

The report from Dr Wright, considered by His Honour Judge Inglis and in the Court of Appeal, is still relied on by the Appellant in the extradition proceedings. At that stage, of course, it stood unsupported by the other expert material. The Court of Appeal dealt with this evidence as follows:

The Secretary of State’s decision letter on the fresh claim dismissed Dr Wright’s report, on the basis that the account of ill-treatment given by the Appellant to the doctor was inconsistent with that given by him in his original witness statement, where he had made no mention of injury to his penis as a result of the ill-treatment he suffered. The Secretary of State also relied on objective information as to the improvement in Turkey strengthening provisions against torture and ill-treatment. He further relied on passages from the Adjudicator’s decision showing the absence of any connection between the Appellant and the PKK and on other passages relevant to the absence of risk on return.

The Court of Appeal then focused on the reasoning of His Honour Judge Inglis quoted in paragraph 18 of the judgment. It is not necessary for me to repeat all of that. The Judge’s conclusion was in essence that it was not unreasonable on behalf of the Secretary of State to conclude that the evidence of Dr Wright did not alter the future risk to the Appellant. The Adjudicator had come to the conclusion that there was “no real threat of ill-treatment to a relevant degree in the Claimant’s case”. The introduction of the medical evidence from Dr Wright did not give rise to a reasonable prospect of success before the immigration judge, which would itself turn on the rationality of the Secretary of State’s view of future risk. As Richards LJ put it in paragraph 22 of the Court of Appeal decision:

So far as any later immigration or asylum claim was concerned, there is no suggestion that it adds anything to the extradition case.

A warrant was first issued in Turkey for the Appellant’s arrest on 30 June 2009. The Court was told that until that point the Government of Turkey was unaware of the Appellant’s whereabouts. On 15 September 2009, Turkey requested the Appellant’s extradition. A certificate was issued on 4 November and on 24 November 2009 DJ Purdy issued a warrant for the arrest of the Appellant.

On 16 February 2010 the Appellant was arrested at home and extradition proceedings were commenced, with the initial hearing listed on 17 February 2010. The court adjourned the proceedings to allow time for the preparation of expert reports to assist the Appellant. It became apparent that the Secretary of State had agreed to reconsider her previous refusal of asylum and to consider any evidence advanced that the Appellant had been tortured. The court allowed the adjournment of proceedings to ensure that the Secretary of State was able to reach a decision first. According to the judgment of DJ Evans, the matter was then repeatedly adjourned, so that the final and effective hearing on 1 September 2011 was the 15^th court hearing.

When the matter came before DJ Evans on 1 September 2011 he was asked once again to adjourn the matter on the basis that the Secretary of State had not yet reached a fresh decision on the asylum claim. This application was based on the procedure recommended in R (Chichvarkin & Another) –v- SSHD [2011] EWHC Civ 91. DJ Evans accepted that the fact of active consideration by the SSHD of an asylum/human rights claim was a “strong factor” in favour of adjournment, but he nevertheless declined to adjourn the case further. His reasons are set out in paragraph 4 of his judgment. Since there is no challenge to that part of his decision, there is no need to rehearse them here.

Following that refusal to adjourn, the application was renewed on a different basis. On 19 July 2011 the Government of Turkey identified the relevant limitation period for the enforcement of the Appellant’s imprisonment as expiring on 6 December 2011, a date which it was then said could not be extended. At that stage it was said that if the extradition proceedings, whether by appeal or otherwise, were extended beyond the deadline, then the Appellant would be entitled to ask for his discharge in any event. The evidence before the Magistrates’ Court stated, inter alia, as follows:

The District Judge declined to adjourn on this basis also. He proceeded to hear the case, rejected the Appellant’s appeal and decided to send the case to the Secretary of State as already indicated. I will address his reasoning below. However, it is helpful to complete the procedural history before doing so.

The District Judge handed down his decision on 20 September 2011, and the Appellant appealed. No step had been achieved in the appeal before 6 December came and went. On 20 December the Turkish Chief Prosecutor applied to the Criminal Court of First Instance to revoke the Appellant’s sentence on the ground that the limitation period had expired. This was done.

On 18 January 2012, the Government of Turkey applied to adjourn the appeal proceedings. The court was told that the Crown Prosecution Service acting on behalf of Turkey wanted additional time so as to get explicit instructions whether or not to seek to proceed with the extradition. It appears to be common ground that the view on all sides was this was a formality. Both the Appellant and those representing the Government of Turkey were of the view that the extradition could not proceed because of the expired limitation period. In that context, the Appellant agreed to the adjournment and the appeal fixed for 2 February 2012 was removed from the list.

On 3 February, the Turkish Chief Prosecutor applied to the Turkish Court for a reversal of the decision on the revocation of sentence. The basis appears to have been, in effect, that the English extradition proceedings could properly be deployed as a “stopping of the clock” in Turkey. It is not clear why this argument had not been deployed earlier. Nor is there any evidence to explain why such categorical statements as to the irrevocable nature of the December limitation date were made whilst this argument was apparently available to the Chief Prosecutor. Whatever the answers to those questions, the Turkish court reversed the revocation of sentence on 6 February 2012 and on 14 February that decision was communicated to the Appellant in England. Amongst other grounds of appeal, the Appellant argues that this sequence of events amounts to an abuse of process which should be sufficient, at least in the context of this case, to prevent extradition.

I return to the substantive hearing on 1 September. The Appellant was not called to give evidence before the District Judge although his statement was received. The District Judge had the decision of the Court of Appeal and, as indicated, had evidence in the extradition proceedings from a broader range of expert opinion than was available to the Court of Appeal. The District Judge also had the detailed documents from Turkey as analysed above.

The District Judge was perfectly properly influenced by the decision not to call the Appellant. In paragraph 13 of his written judgment he observed:

The District Judge clearly had well in mind the judgment of the Court of Appeal in the asylum proceedings. Amongst the findings of fact recited by Richards LJ in the Court of Appeal, the most striking was to the effect that the Appellant’s account of ill-treatment was supported by the evidence of Dr Wright. The evidence:

Richards LJ went on to say:

It follows that the thrust of the decision of the Court of Appeal was as follows. It was a rational conclusion on the evidence before the court that there had been ill-treatment, which might well properly be regarded as torture, but it was reasonable to conclude there was no risk of future ill-treatment. The Turkish authorities had concluded the Appellant was not a PKK terrorist and accordingly there was no real risk of future repetition. That was the context into which the additional evidence was introduced before the District Judge.

In the course of the hearing before him, the District Judge received a quantity of written evidence which included the series of detailed documents from Turkey with translations. He also received a number of expert reports. In date order they began with the report from Dr M G Wright a Consultant Rheumatologist dated 24 August 2006 focusing on scarring. There was a report from Dr John Joyce of the Medical Foundation for the Victims of Torture dated 14 September 2010. Dr Joyce has both surgical and medical qualifications and training and is a specialist in torture and its effects. There was a report from Dr Jan Falkowski, Consultant Psychiatrist, dated 25 November 2010 focused on the Appellant’s mental condition. There was a report from Professor Derrick Pounder, dated 22 April 2011, a Professor of Forensic Medicine who has a special interest and expertise in torture and on events in Turkey. The court also received a report from Professor William Bowring, Professor of Law at Birkbeck College London University dated 11 May 2011. Professor Bowring has a special interest and knowledge in the human rights situation in Turkey. Other written material was placed before the court by the Appellant dealing with the overall position in Turkey.

DJ Evans made no record in his judgment of the oral evidence he had received. We were informed by counsel that Professor Bowring gave oral evidence. It was not clear to us what further oral evidence had been given in the course of the hearing.

The report of Dr Wright is directly supportive of the account of torture to the Appellant’s genitals. Dr Wright considers that the umbilical hernia is consistent with trauma to the abdomen. He also observed the scars to the left foot and right knee which were either suggestive of gunshot injury or compatible with that caused, consistent with the Appellant’s account to Dr Wright of shotgun discharge. This was the medical evidence available in the asylum claim which was reviewed by the Court of Appeal.

The report of Dr John Joyce (14 September 2010) interprets the scars and hyper-pigmentation on the Appellant’s genitals and leg as corroborating his account of electric shock torture to the genitals. Dr Joyce also considers that the para-umbilical hernia is consistent with the Appellant’s account of beating. Although Dr Joyce is not a psychiatrist, he considered at the time with his examination of the Appellant that he was depressed and suffering from PTSD as a result of his experiences.

Dr Jan Falkowski (25 November 2010) examined the Appellant on 22 November 2010, accompanied by his wife and an interpreter. Dr Falkowski had a number of previous reports available to him including those of Dr Wright and Dr Joyce. Dr Falkowski observed that the Appellant was very anxious and distressed in the course of the interview. His answers were long and rambling. He appeared objectively to be anxious and depressed and subjectively described his moods being low. The Appellant described intrusive thoughts, flashbacks and dreams about the torture. Dr Falkowski diagnosed as suffering from Post Traumatic Stress Disorder and from “a major depressive disorder”. His conclusions continue as follows:

Dr Falkowski was also of the view that a return to Turkey would very likely mean that the Appellant’s depressive disorder would become worse and that his suicidal ideation would increase. He concluded that there was a significant risk the Appellant may attempt suicide if he is returned to Turkey. That risk would be “more likely to happen if he is imprisoned there”.

Professor Derrick Pounder declined to make a medical examination of the Appellant. Having read the contents of the papers provided to him, he formed the view that an interview of the type he would normally carry out, necessitating a detailed exploration of the events said to constitute torture, would have a significant risk of damaging the Appellant’s mental health. His views were therefore based on the documents provided to him. Essentially his report bears on the credibility of Mr Konuksever’s account and the credibility of the various documents used on behalf of the Government of Turkey designed to counter the allegations of torture. Professor Pounder has expertise in the history of ill-treatment in Turkey and of official and medical responses. His conclusion is that:

Professor Bowring, from a legal and historical point of view, focused on the history of discrimination and ill-treatment of Kurdish people in Turkey. His opinion was that it was “highly likely that the Defendant would if returned continue to suffer discrimination as a Kurd, especially a Kurd in whose home weapons were found in 2000, even if he was not charged with terrorist offences.” In his report the Professor was asked:

Professor Bowring indicated that his experience and knowledge of the recent history within Turkey not only gave support to the Claimant’s account of his historic torture but underpinned a risk that he would in the future be mistreated in prison. He went on to say:

There was no expert evidence adduced before the District Judge on behalf of the Government of Turkey, and therefore no opinion evidence to contradict that given on behalf of the Appellant.

The District Judge addressed the expert evidence in support of torture. He concluded that the unexplained injuries to the Appellant’s penis:

The District Judge reminded himself of paragraph 339K of the Immigration Rules, which provides that evidence that the individual has already been the subject of “persecution or serious harm, or ………direct threats of such harm” should be regarded as a serious indication of future risk unless there are good reasons to consider that such persecution or serious harm will not be repeated. The District Judge accepted that much the same approach was required by him in the extradition court. However he concluded that even though the anti-terrorist police in Turkey had “wickedly and wrongly” resorted to torture:

In paragraphs 26 and 27 of his judgment the District Judge expanded his conclusions, including comment on Professor Bowring’s report, evidence of course which was available to him but not available to the Adjudicator, the Judge or the Court of Appeal in the asylum proceedings. The District Judge relied on the evidence of Professor Bowring in support of the key conclusion that the Appellant’s injuries had been caused by torture, but rejected Professor Bowring’s evidence in relation to future risk. The District Judge accepted that there might have been political motivation in the acts of torture but concluded there was nothing to suggest that there was any political motivation in the extradition. He concluded there was no evidence to show that the Appellant was likely to suffer any discrimination to such a degree as to give rise to a bar to extradition, noting that 20% of the Turkish population is Kurdish. He added this:

In dealing with the Professor’s evidence that the Appellant would be at risk of violence from fellow prisoners the District Judge said:

It follows that the District Judge found the Appellant was unreliable and lacking in credibility. However he did find that he had been tortured. This latter conclusion was based on the medical evidence and, explicitly, on the evidence of Professor Bowring. It follows from this conclusion that at best some of the official documents from Turkey – medical certificates and/or the prison governor’s certificate were fake and designed to conceal torture. Yet the District Judge rejected Professor Bowring’s evidence on future risk.

Regrettably, the Appellant’s position has not always been succinctly presented in this case. To my mind, there are really two points to be considered, both of them arising as “extraneous considerations” within the meaning of section 81 of the Extradition Act 2003. Both are potential breaches of the Appellant’s ECHR rights, under Article 3 and Article 6 respectively, and so section 87 is brought into play.

The first point, is whether the District Judge’s decision in respect of future risk was a reasonable one. In my view he was justified in concluding that the Appellant lacks credibility as a witness, given the contradictions and conflicts arising in the accounts he has given. He was justified in finding that torture by state actors was proved. It is worth noting that it follows the Claimant is correct in that stark fact, even though the conclusion was based on objective evidence rather than on his account.

In an appropriate case, such a finding will be highly important for the question of extradition, not least because of the approach set out in paragraph 339K of the Immigration Rules which I have summarised above. However, proof of torture will not always found a successful asylum claim or prevent extradition. It was unwise to present this case as if it would, since the Court of Appeal had upheld the refusal of this Appellant’s asylum claim on exactly that basis. However, the finding in this case in my view gives rise to considerable caution before proceeding with extradition. At the very least it demands a detailed and careful consideration as to future risk.

Although it is not central to the challenge to the District Judge’s decision, his conclusion in paragraph 26(b) that: “there is no acceptable evidence to support the contention that K has suffered any discrimination in Turkey because he is Kurdish” seems very difficult to uphold, given the District Judge’s own findings. The sensible inference from the facts as found is that the Turkish anti-terrorist police tortured the Appellant precisely because he was Kurdish and had been denounced by non-Kurdish neighbours in Turkey as a PKK sympathiser. The denunciation and its consequences seem to me powerful evidence of discrimination on the grounds of ethnicity. On the other hand, it seems to be entirely justifiable for the District Judge to conclude that the extradition is not now being sought on any discriminatory basis.

The real problem lies with future risk of harm in breach of Article 3. The District Judge accepted as important support for his conclusions the evidence of Professor Bowring. Given that future risk must be the central consideration which preoccupied him, it is hard to see from his reasons why, having accepted part of Professor Bowring’s evidence, he rejected the thrust of his evidence about future risk. In my view it requires little imagination to see how the risk perceived by Professor Bowring might come about. Assuming the Appellant would be imprisoned in his own home area he will be a Kurd within a Turkish prison in a region where there are few other Kurds. Relocation will not be open to him.

Even if there is no basis for fearing violence from state actors, because the official conclusion is the Appellant is not a PKK member or sympathiser, it seems to me that one would need a reasonably firm basis for excluding the risk of inter-prisoner violence, in such a context. One misplaced piece of gossip about the earlier suspicion of PKK involvement, or even one sighting of the Appellant’s scarring, showing that he, as a Kurd, had been tortured by the anti-terrorist police, and the risk might be thought to arise. Given the accepted history here, and despite the Appellant’s lack of credibility, it seems to me that this was a serious matter which required careful reasoning by the District Judge. With great respect to him, it does not appear to me that he analysed this fully. On this aspect, it seems to me that his conclusion was wrong.

Turning to the question of the procedural history, I would also hold that extradition here might well breach the Appellant’s rights under Article 6 of the ECHR. I should make it clear, for the avoidance of doubt, that I exonerate those who have represented the Government of Turkey in England from any suggestion of anything improper. It is clear from the careful way the Respondent’s case has been presented by Miss Wilkes throughout that nothing of that kind arises. Nevertheless, the procedural history is troubling.

It is beyond doubt that there was misinformation given to the Magistrates Court in England as to the finality of the 10 year limitation date in Turkey. I am not in a position to conclude whether that was deliberate or negligent. It was clearly given to the Court in order to put pressure on the court so that matters would be brought to a conclusion before the period expired. Once the date had passed, the Turkish proceedings were dismissed. A subsequent adjournment in England was achieved only because all parties regarded the eventual outcome as a formality. Had the true position been explained to the legal representatives of the Appellant, it is inconceivable they would have agreed to any further adjournment on 18 January 2012. They did so as a formality. With complete inconsistency, and with no prior notice to the Appellant, the authorities in Turkey then achieved a reversal of the decision. It appears to me that, properly understood, this way of proceeding is capable of being viewed as an abuse of process and as a breach of Article 6. Despite my real concern I express matters carefully. I do not reach the conclusion that there was in fact an abuse of process but merely conclude that there may have been. Since these events post-date the decision of the District Judge, the events said to found an abuse of process could be raised de novo before us.

For those reasons relating to Article 3, it was in my view wrong to dismiss the Appellant’s objections to extradition. His extradition would not be compatible with his convention rights and would therefore be in breach of S.87 (1) of the Extradition Act 2003. I would therefore allow the appeal from the District Judge and order that the Appellant should not be extradited to Turkey.