Kozluk, R (on the application of) v Circuit Court In Poland

LORD JUSTICE JACKSON:

The appellant, in due course, came to live in England together with his wife. The appellant tells me that he settled in England in 2006. The appellant is now living in this country with his wife and two children. Apparently the children are now aged 4 and 11.

On 14 January 2008, some time after the appellant had come to this country, the District Court issued a decision for interim arrest. This was followed by a "wanted" notice.

Then, on 20 May 2008 the Judicial Authority in Poland issued a European Arrest Warrant requesting the arrest and surrender of the appellant to Poland to face trial. The European Arrest Warrant was certified by the Serious Organised Crime Agency on 9 February 2010.

On 30 June 2010 the appellant was arrested pursuant to the warrant. The appellant was brought before District Judge Tubbs in the Westminster Magistrates' Court. There was reference at the initial hearing in the Magistrates' Court to the appellant's desire to compromise the European Arrest Warrant. However, no compromise has ensued and I am unaware of any steps taken by the appellant to return to Poland voluntarily and stand trial.

On 31 August 2010 the appellant appeared before the Magistrates' Court again, and was represented. An adjournment was granted for legal aid to be obtained.

In due course the appellant appeared at the Magistrates' Court on 14 October represented by both solicitors and counsel. On that occasion the appellant had raised a number of arguments as to why he should not be extradited. However, in the event, the appellant having taken legal advice, decided not to contest the matter and therefore on 14 October 2010 at an uncontested hearing the District Judge made an order for extradition of the appellant to Poland to stand trial.

The appellant was aggrieved by the order for extradition and now appeals to this court. The appellant is unrepresented and appears in person today with the assistance of an interpreter. Fortunately, he also speaks quite good English, and was able to cope with much of today's proceedings using his own understanding of English, both listening to others and making submissions to this court.

There are three grounds of appeal put forward against the order for extradition. The first ground is that the appellant is settled in this country. He is supporting his family. His two children are at school. His wife does not work because she looks after the children and if he is extradited to Poland there will be no means of supporting his family. The appellant submits that this would give rise to a breach of his rights under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

It is unfortunately the case that when those accused of offences, whether in this country or overseas, are required to stand trial there is disruption of family life. In extradition cases inevitably the disruption is much greater. There is, however, nothing in the circumstances of this case to take the matter outside what one may call the general run of cases. Many young men with wives and children face extradition in order to stand trial overseas, and it cannot be a good reason to avoid extradition that the individual has a wife and family here. I accept that the appellant does indeed have a private and family life in this country, but carrying out the balancing exercise required by Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, I am quite satisfied that there is no infringement of the appellant's rights by requiring him to stand trial in Poland.

The appellant says that the charges against him in Poland are false. He says that the police officer, upon whose evidence the prosecution is based, sought to extract a bribe from him and is only giving adverse evidence because the appellant refused to pay a bribe. These are all matters for the Polish court. This court, in extradition proceedings, cannot evaluate whether the charges to be pursued in Poland are well-founded or ill-founded. This court cannot determine whether the police officer for the prosecution is giving honest and accurate evidence or dishonest and untrue evidence. These are all matters to be dealt with by the Polish court. It will be recalled that Poland is a member of the Council of Europe and subscribes to the Convention on Human Rights. Accordingly, the appellant will have the benefit of Article 6 of that Convention.

The second ground asserted by the appellant is that the delay between the offence and the present time is excessive. Accordingly, he relies upon section 14 of the Extradition Act 2003. This provides that there is a bar to extradition if, by reason of the passage of time, it would be unjust or oppressive to extradite the individual concerned. I do accept that there has been an unwelcome and unfortunate delay between December 2004, when the incident occurred which is alleged to constitute the offence, and the present time.

I do not, however, accept that it is impossible for the appellant to have a fair trial in Poland. The appellant's arguments about delay can all be deployed in the Polish court and it is for that court to determine the significance and weight of those arguments.

The third ground advanced by the appellant is that he has suffered an injury to his right index finger. The top of that finger was damaged in an industrial accident, and indeed has now been amputated. The appellant showed me his hand, and one can see that the top of the finger is missing. The appellant says that he is now making a claim against his employer for damages, no doubt for negligence or breach of statutory duty giving rise to the injury. Also, the appellant is undergoing rehabilitation for his injury. Accordingly, the appellant relies upon section 25 of the Extradition Act 2003. This provides:

I do not think that the injury which the appellant has suffered, unfortunate though it is, constitutes an injury of such severity as to trigger section 25 of the Extradition Act 2003. All member states of the European Union have an obligation, save in specified circumstances, to surrender those accused of offences in other member states to stand trial in the jurisdiction where the offence was allegedly committed. I do not think that there is anything in the circumstances of this case which constitutes an exception under any of the provisions of the Extradition Act 2003.

The appellant told me candidly that he was advised by his counsel at the hearing below that there were no proper grounds to resist extradition, and that is why he consented to the order being made against him. None of the matters raised by the appellant today would constitute a ground for resisting extradition. If any of those matters did constitute such a ground, then I would have to consider Miss Wilkes' argument on behalf of the respondent, to the effect that fresh evidence should not be received because the test set out by this court in Fenyvesi has not been surmounted. I do not go into that aspect of the case, because it seems to me that none of the arguments deployed today is a good ground for overturning the decision of the District Judge.

Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed.