Bramall v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government & Anor

Pear Tree Cottage is situated to the west of Battenhurst Road, Stonegate in the County of East Sussex. It was built in about 1918 and, as its name suggests, it was built to be used as a dwelling house. Between about 1918 and 1955 the cottage was used for residential purposes. However, by about 1955 the cottage had become very run down. Indeed, it is common ground that it was then unfit for human habitation.

In the 1950s the owner of Pear Tree Cottage was Mr John Bramall. In 1955 he applied for a grant to carry out work to render the cottage fit for habitation. Unfortunately for him, however, the application was refused.

In November 1956 Mr Bramall applied for planning permission to change the use of the cottage to a poultry house. On 11 December 1956 the local planning authority granted permission for that change of use but specified that the permission should subsist only until 30 September 1961. Following the grant of this permission (and indeed perhaps before the grant), Mr Bramall began to use the cottage as a poultry house.

It is not clear when the use of the cottage as a poultry house ceased. It is common ground, however, that this use had ceased by 30 September 1961 when the planning permission granted on 11 December 1956 expired.

Since 1961 Pear Tree Cottage has remained unused. Over the years planning applications have been made in respect of the site but, to repeat, no use of any kind has been made of the cottage.

Some time in the 1990s the Claimant became the owner of Pear Tree Cottage. He is the son of Mr John Bramall. In May 2008 the Claimant made an application to the Second Defendant for a lawful development certificate for an existing use in respect of the cottage. In the application the description of the existing use was specified to be “existing dwelling”.

The Second Defendant refused the application in a decision communicated to the Claimant on 28 October 2008. The refusal notice was in the following terms:-

“The Rother District Council hereby give notice that the application for a certificate of lawful use or development in respect of the use described in the first Schedule hereto in respect of the land specified in the second Schedule hereto and edged red on the plan attached to this notice was not lawful within the meaning of section 191 of the Town & Country Planning Act 1990 (as amended) for the following reason:

The structure dates from pre-1948 and the local planning authority considers that any residential use which existed, has long since been abandoned. In particular, this conclusion has been reached in view of the considerable period of time that has passed since the structure was last occupied residentially (since before 1956), the extremely derelict state of the structure and the considerable period of time that has passed since it fell into a derelict state (since before 1963). Moreover, the view that the residential use has been abandoned has long since been established having been consistently held by the local planning authority from as early as 1963, and upheld in appeal decisions in 1965 (A/65/832) and 1997 (RR/96/2045/P). Consequently, it is considered that the structure does not have a lawful planning use as a dwelling.”

The Claimant appealed against that refusal to the First Defendant. An Inspector duly appointed by the First Defendant conducted a public local inquiry on 24 June 2010. In a decision letter dated 27 July 2010 the Inspector dismissed the appeal.

The Claimant now challenges the Inspector’s decision in an appeal under section 288 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 (“the 1990 Act”) . Mr Stinchcombe QC, on behalf of the Claimant, has identified 4 grounds upon which he submits that the Inspector fell into errors of law. He submits that each of those errors, or the errors cumulatively, vitiate the Inspector’s decision. He invites this court to quash the Inspector’s decision and remit the matter for re-determination.

Before dealing with the grounds advanced on behalf of the Claimant it is necessary to consider first the legal context and principles upon which this appeal proceeded before the Inspector.

The Claimant's application to the Second Defendant was for a lawful development certificate “for an existing use.” The Claimant invoked section 191 of the 1990 Act. The Second Defendant refused the application for the reason given in its notice of refusal (see paragraph 7 above). However, as the Inspector observed in paragraph 17 of his decision letter, there was no use of Pear Tree Cottage as a dwelling at the time the Claimant made his application for a certificate of lawful use. Essentially, the application, as formulated, was misconceived. Strictly, the Inspector would have been entitled to dismiss the appeal on the basis that no use of the cottage was established.

However, the Inspector did not take that course. Quite correctly, in the circumstances, he decided to proceed as if the Claimant had made an application for a certificate of lawfulness of a proposed use under section 192 of the 1990 Act. That section enables a person who wishes to ascertain whether any proposed use of a building would be lawful to apply to the local planning authority for a certificate of lawfulness of a proposed use.

The point is and was of more than academic importance. It involved the Inspector inquiring into and reaching a conclusion about the legal basis upon which the Claimant might be entitled to use Pear Tree Cottage as a dwelling house in 2008 when it was agreed that it had not been used for that purpose since 1955.

In order to justify the conclusion that the Claimant was lawfully entitled to use Pear Tree Cottage as a dwelling without first obtaining planning permission reliance was placed upon section 18(5) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1948 and its successor sections (now section 57(2)) of the 1990 Act).

Section 18 of the 1948 Act was not included in the Authorities Bundle. However, it is common ground that the subsection 18(5) was in the same terms as section 57(2) of the 1990 Act. That sub-section is as follows:-

“57(2). Where planning permission to develop land has been granted for a limited period, planning permission is not required for the resumption, at the end of that period, of its use for the purpose for which it was normally used before the permission was granted.”

Mr Stinchcombe QC submitted to the Inspector at the public inquiry and submits before me that this statutory provision is applicable in the instant case. The argument he advances is as follows. The normal use of Pear Tree Cottage prior to the grant of planning permission in 1956 was as a dwelling house. Upon the expiry of the planning permission granted in 1956, namely on 30 September 1961, the landowner had the right to resume the use of Pear Tree Cottage without the need for planning permission. Mr Stinchcombe QC submits that this was still the position at the time the Claimant applied for a certificate of lawfulness notwithstanding that 47 years, or thereabouts, had elapsed between the expiry of the planning permission and the application for a certificate in 2008. He submits that the Claimant or his predecessor in title would have been entitled to resume the dwelling house use of Pear Tree Cottage at any time after 30 September 1961 unless, on proper analysis, either the Claimant or his predecessor in title abandoned that right.

That is how the debate developed before the Inspector. Further, it is clear that the Inspector proceeded to determine the appeal by considering whether or not it was proper to conclude that the Claimant (or his predecessor in title) had abandoned the right to resume the use of Pear Tree Cottage as a dwelling house.

However, the Inspector proceeded in this way after some hesitation. At paragraph 19 of his decision letter the Inspector said this:-

“Section 18(5) [of the 1948 Act] contains the phrase ‘for the resumption, at the expiration of that period….’. Although it would be too onerous an interpretation to take the view that the right ceases to exist if not immediately exercised at the expiration of the period, the words of the Act do imply a relationship in time between one use ending and another commencing. It therefore follows that the longer the time after the ‘expiration of that period’ the greater the likelihood that the right could be lost through inaction. I am not aware of any case law that sheds light on whether a right to resume, as opposed to an existing use, has withered and died. However, I regard the approach taken by both parties during the course of this appeal, being application of the four pillars of use abandonment as identified in Castell-y-Mynach and Hughes, as a sound means of assessing this. I will therefore consider the matter with reference to these same criteria.”

The decision of Woolf J (as he then was), in Smith v Secretary of State for the Environment and Bristol City Council [1983] JPL 462 was not cited to the Inspector. It did feature in the argument before me. Woolf J was concerned with section 23(5) of the Town & Country Planning Act 1962. This subsection was the successor section to section 18(5) of the 1948 Act and one of the predecessor sections of section 57(2) of the 1990 Act. Having set out the section and made various observations about it in the context of the case before him Woolf J continued:-

“However, if the limited permission was implemented, and pursuant to the limited permission a use was made of the land authorised by that permission, then when that use ceased, the normal use could be resumed as long the resumption took place at the end of the period that the land was used for the purpose permitted by the limited permission, irrespective of whether the limited use ceased before or after the permission required permitted use to cease. It might be possible for the right to resume to be lost. However, on the facts of this case, although a long period lapsed after the date the permission expired, this could be explained by the negotiations which were taking place between the Appellant and the planning authority. He did not therefore regard the Appellant as having lost any rights which he might have had by lapse of time.”

This passage of the judgment must be read in the context of the argument presented to Woolf J by Counsel for the Minister which was to the effect that a landowner who wished to take advantage of the right to resume a previous normal use must begin that use immediately after the expiry of the period during which a different use had been authorised by planning permission. As is clear from the extract of the judgment of Woolf J set out above the Learned Judge did not accept that interpretation of the sub-section.

Although Woolf J clearly contemplated that the right to resume a previous normal use might be exercised at some point in time which was significantly after a time limited planning permission had expired he also recognised that the right to resume the previous normal use might be lost. Indeed, on one view of the passage quoted above Woolf J seems to have taken the view that a lapse of time without more, certainly if not explained by cogent reasons, might result in the loss of the right to resume the previous normal use.

It is also to be observed that the Appellant in Smith sought to argue his case on the basis that his right to resume the previous normal use would subsist indefinitely following the expiry of the time limited planning permission unless that right was abandoned. Woolf J seems to have rejected that proposition. The following passages from the report in the Journal of Planning Law are apposite:-

“In support of the contention that he had existing rights, the Appellant submitted that those rights could only be lost if they had been abandoned and that clearly those rights had not been abandoned in this case because the planning permissions which were implemented were all for a limited period and the implementation of a planning permission for a limited period does not give rise to an implication of abandonment, though this would be the implication which could be drawn from the implementation of a planning permission which was not for a limited period.

It was his (Woolf J’s) view that the submissions of the Appellant were misconceived in so far as he sought to deal with the matter on the basis of abandonment. Abandonment only has relevance where he wanted to revert to an existing use from a nil use. If, however, you change from an existing use to a new use in the normal way planning permission will be required both for the new use and also for the return to the former use, subject to the express statutory provisions to which he had referred. In this respect he adopted the reasoning of Forbes J in Young v Secretary of State for the Environment & London Borough of Bexley [1982] JPL 635 [see now the Court of Appeal’s decision at page 465 of this issue of the Journal, upholding Forbes J’s decision].

If, therefore, there was any right to revert in the present case, it could only be found in section 23(5).”

I have laboured the point about section 57(2) of the 1990 Act for this reason. I am not convinced that the right to resume a previous lawful normal use under section 57(2) of 1990 Act (or its predecessors) subsists indefinitely if that right can be said to be abandoned in the way the concept of abandonment is explained below. I agree with the Inspector that the words of the subsection do imply a relationship in time between one use ending and another commencing. I can well understand that the resumed use need not commence immediately upon the expiry of the time during which a different use has been authorised. However, if there is any significant length of time between the expiry of the time during which the alternative use was authorised and the resumption of the previous normal use it may well be that unless the lapse of time is explained by factors such as those which prevailed in Smith (negotiations between the landowner and the local planning authority) the right to resume may be lost. Further, in my judgment, there must necessarily come a point in time when, as a matter of interpretation, it simply cannot be said that the resumed use occurred at the end of the period during which an alternative use was authorised.

As I have said, however, the appeal before the Inspector proceeded on the basis that the Claimant had the right to resume the use of Pear Tree Cottage as a dwelling house as at the time he made his application for a certificate of lawfulness unless either he or his predecessor in title had abandoned that right. My task is to decide whether the Inspector fell into error in concluding that the right had indeed been abandoned. If the Inspector made no error of law in relation to abandonment, on any view the Claimant’s right to resume residential use of Pear Tree Cottage has been lost.

It is common ground that a particular use of land which is lawful can, nonetheless, be abandoned. That proposition was established, authoritatively, in Hartley v Minister of Housing and Local Government & Another [1970] 1QB 413. Since Hartley there have been a number of decisions in which the criteria necessary to establish abandonment have been discussed and elucidated. The most recent statement of law on the test of abandonment is to be found in Hughes v Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport & Regions [2000] ATP & CR 397. In his skeleton argument, Mr Stinchcombe QC, distils the test for abandonment to be found in Hughes as being “the view objectively to be taken by a reasonable man with knowledge of all the relevant circumstances.” In seeking to ascertain the view of the reasonable man Mr Stinchcombe QC acknowledges that there are 4 factors which would normally fall for consideration when assessing whether a use has been abandoned; he also accepts that the Inspector in this case addressed each of those factors in his decision letter. They were

Both in his skeleton argument and in his oral submissions Mr Stinchcombe QC elaborates upon the significance to be attached to the owners’ intentions in relation to the use in question in any given case. First, he concedes that Hughes establishes that a use may be abandoned following cessation of use even when the owner has never ceased to hold the intention to resume the use in question. He acknowledges that this is the consequence of importing the view of the reasonable man into the test for abandonment. In my judgment this concession must be right.

Mr Stinchcombe QC also submits that the relevant circumstances which must be assumed to be within the knowledge of the reasonable man when applying the test for abandonment must include the reasons which explain why, in any given case, the owner has not resumed the use after cessation. In my judgment that submission, too, is well-founded. That said, however, the reasons may or may not convince the reasonable man that it is appropriate to conclude that no abandonment has taken place. The reasons cannot elevate the owner’s subjective intention to a status which it does not enjoy.

One further point is worth stressing. Although the four factors set out above will always be factors to be considered by a local planning authority or Inspector on appeal when making a decision about whether a use has been abandoned the weight to be attached to these factors will be for the decision maker to determine – see Nolan J in The Trustees of the Castell-y-Mynach Estates v Secretary of State for Wales and another [1985] JPL 40.

All of the principles in relation to abandonment set out above were formulated in cases in which the issue was whether an actual use of land had been abandoned. However, both Stinchcombe QC and Mr Whale proceed on the basis that these principles are equally apposite to determining whether the Claimant and/or his predecessor in title had lost the right to resume the use of Pear Tree Cottage as a dwelling. Although, as I have said I have some reservations about whether this is correct, it is on this legal basis that I consider each ground of challenge.

In 1969 a Mr Wakeford was interested in purchasing Pear Tree Cottage from the Claimant's father. On 9 September 1969 solicitors acting for Mr Wakeford wrote to the local planning authority to inform the authority that he was contemplating restoring Pear Tree Cottage so that it could become a habitable residence once again. The solicitors sought confirmation from the authority that in the event that restoration occurred planning permission would be unnecessary if the cottage was used for residential purposes.

On 23 September 1969 an assistant solicitor then employed by the local planning authority wrote what is described as a “note to the file” in which he considered whether or not planning permission would be required a) for the restoration of Pear Tree Cottage to a satisfactory condition so as to enable it to be used as a dwelling house and b) for dwelling house use. In relation to the second issue the solicitor wrote:-

“These premises were last occupied as a dwelling in 1955 and…..there is evidence in the premises that they have been used for poultry since that date…. In such a case, is it possible to say that the dwelling use of the premises has been abandoned? I am aware that section 13(5) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1962 provides that where planning permission to develop land has been granted for a limited period, planning permission is not required for the resumption at the end of that period of a use of the land for the purpose for which it was normally used before permission was granted. In 1956, a time limited permission was granted for the use of these premises for a poultry-house, and this time limit expired in 1961. I think it is clear that in 1961, or within a reasonable time thereafter, the premises could have reverted to a dwelling use…..without the need for planning permission, but the sub-section does provide that planning permission is not required for the resumption at the end of the relevant period of the previous use of the land. The time limit expired in 1961, and the premises have not been used as living accommodation since then; thus 8 years has elapsed. The land was the subject of a planning appeal in 1965, which was the last of several attempts on the part of the owners to secure redevelopment of the area surrounding the dwelling and the site of the dwelling itself. The appeal was unsuccessful, the Minister saying that on the information available, it is considered that it would be wrong to permit the replacement of a semi-derelict building by a new bungalow. I think in the circumstances there is a good case for saying that the use of the premises as a dwelling have been abandoned and that enforcement action should be taken in respect of a material change of use of the land if an attempt is made to bring the property back to residential use.”

On 2 October 1969 the solicitor wrote a second file note to much the same effect. This file note included a description of the property which was said to be in a very poor state and described in more detail in the following terms:-

“…it is constructed of timber frame, which has been attacked by beetle or other pest, with weather-boarding exterior (many missing boards) and asbestos lining, which is also defective in parts. The roof appears to be quite good, although with the present dry weather it is difficult to tell whether there have been any leaks, but at least all the tiles appear to be there. The interior has been completely stripped and there seemed to be no fittings inside of any kind at all. The garden is very overgrown, a water supply was available for connection, the same with the regard to electricity. There is, of course, no main drainage in that area and owing to the brambles and weeds in the garden. It was not possible to see what form of drainage there was to the property, but it was probably by means of cess pool and/or soak away.”

At the conclusion of the note the solicitor wrote that he had invited an application under section 43 of the 1962 Act from Mr Wakeford. Section 43 is the predecessor section to section 191 or 192 of the 1990 Act.

Mr Wakeford made an application. It was considered by the planning committee of the local planning authority on 21 October 1969. The committee resolved as follows:-

“The Applicant be informed that carrying out of proposed constitutes development for which planning permission is required for reason that land has been put to other use since interruption of former use as dwelling; and former use as dwelling was not resumed at end of limited period for which planning permission was granted in respect of the intervening use.”

Mr Wakeford was informed of the decision of the committee but, apparently, the Claimant's father was unaware of the decision at the time it was made. He became aware of the decision in early 1973 at a time when he was seeking to implement Building Regulations approval for the carrying out of works to Pear Tree Cottage which would have facilitated its return to residential development. By letter dated 5 February 1973 an employee of the local authority notified the Claimant's father that he might consider it to be prudent not to proceed with any further building work until the planning position had been clarified.

In the light of this communication the Claimant's father stopped carrying out work to Pear Tree Cottage. He wrote letters to the local planning authority. He took no step, however, either to use Pear Tree Cottage as a dwelling or to test the assertion that he needed planning permission before reverting to using the cottage as a dwelling.

Before the Inspector Mr Stinchcombe QC submitted that the local planning authority had erred in law in taking the view that planning permission was necessary before use of Pear Tree Cottage as a dwelling house could be resumed. He invited the Inspector so to conclude and to accept that this erroneous decision of the Council was a major factor in explaining what had transpired subsequently and in particular in explaining why a residential use of Pear Tree Cottage had never resumed.

The Inspector declined to make a determination about whether or not the decision of the local planning authority in response to Mr Wakeford’s application was correct or erroneous. He took that stance because he considered that he did have all the material before him which would allow him to make a definitive judgment (see paragraph 24 of the decision letter). Nonetheless, the Inspector did consider the consequences of the determination made in 1969.

I deal with this latter point first. Upon the basis of the evidence adduced before him, the Inspector concluded that the Claimant's father had not abandoned the right to resume the use of Pear Tree Cottage as a dwelling house at any time before early 1973 (see paragraph 31 of the decision letter). The Inspector also accepted that the decision made in 1969 and the communication of that decision to the Claimant's father in early 1973 were likely to have acted as a deterrent to pursuing a resumption of use of the cottage as a dwelling house – see paragraph 32. However, save to this extent, the Inspector did not consider the determination of 1969 to have much significance to his decision (see paragraph 34 of the decision letter).

In the context of this case the only possible relevance of the determination of 1969 is the effect it had upon the subjective intention of the landowner. As the inspector found it deterred the landowner from seeking to resume residential use of Pear Tree Cottage and, additionally, it provided a possible explanation for the landowner’s inactivity in the years following 1973.

It must be emphasised, however, that the Inspector’s task was to consider the issue of the effect of the 1969 decision in the context of the test for abandonment elucidated above. Further, having determined that abandonment had not occurred prior to 1973 (about which Mr Stinchcombe QC does not complain) the task for the Inspector was to consider whether abandonment had occurred some time after that year. It is common ground that the information available to the Inspector about events after 1973 was as follows.

Having received the letter of 5 November 1973, the Claimant’s father entered into correspondence with the local authority immediately. In his first letter, dated 7 February 1973, the Claimant's father wrote in unequivocal terms that he wished to restore Pear Tree Cottage so that it could be occupied as a dwelling. In a subsequent letter dated 22 February 1973 he asserted that he had “gone to considerable expense and trouble” in relation to the restoration of Pear Tree Cottage. This correspondence ended, however, with a letter from the local authority dated 23 February 1973.

More than 10 years then went by. The Claimant’s father next wrote to the local planning authority on 27 October 1983 in the following terms:-

“Please could you advise me on the likelihood of granting of planning permission for the building of a house…site on the enclosed land.

I wrote inquiring about this a few years ago when your advice was permission was unlikely to be granted…and as we have not used the building for a long time I thought I would inquire…the local planning authority replied to the effect that planning permission was unlikely to be granted.”

In 1986 an application was made for planning permission to demolish Pear Tree Cottage and erect a new dwelling with garage/parking space upon the cleared site. This application was refused. In 1996 an application for outline planning permission was made for the replacement of Pear Tree Cottage with a “typical Sussex cottage”. That application was refused by the local planning authority and an appeal against the refusal was dismissed.

At that appeal the position taken by the Appellant was that planning permission ought to be granted because the provision of a replacement dwelling was compliant with the development plan (Policy S21). That argument was rejected The Inspector conducting the appeal concluded that he had no reason to reject the determination which had been made by the local planning authority in 1969. That being so Pear Tree Cottage could not be considered to be an existing dwelling to which Policy S21 might apply.

Just before the application for a certificate under section 191 of the 1990 Act was made in 2008 another application was made for permission to demolish Pear Tree Cottage and replace it with another dwelling house.

In his decision letter the Inspector described this history as indicative of “an intermittent intention on the part of the [Claimant] or his father to re-use the appeal site for residential purposes.” He went on to conclude that the applications for planning permission could not be considered as being an assertion of a perceived use right. Applying the test in Hughes the Inspector concluded that the right to resume the use of Pear Tree Cottage as a dwelling had been abandoned some time after 1973.

I can find no basis for concluding that the Inspector's conclusion about the effect of the 1969 decision is erroneous in any way. His view, essentially, is summarised in paragraphs 34 to 36 of his decision. In my judgment these paragraphs contain compelling reasons why the Inspector was entitled to conclude that the right to resume residential use of the Cottage had been abandoned and that weighed against all other relevant and competing factors the determination of 1969 and its deterrent effect should carry little weight. The plain fact is that approximately 35 years elapsed after the Claimant’s father became aware of the 1969 determination. In that period of time a building which was already uninhabitable was allowed to deteriorate even further. As the Inspector made clear he attached very considerable significance to those facts and given the test for abandonment which he was applying that is hardly surprising.

In any event I have reached the conclusion that the Inspector did not err in law when concluding that he was not in a position to judge, definitively, the legality of the 1969 decision. As Mr Whale pointed out the Inspector did not have at least two (and possibly more) important documents before him. He did not have the application which was submitted under section 43 of the 1962 Act. He did not have the minutes of the meeting of the committee of the local planning authority. It may very well be that although the Inspector had file notes of the solicitor to the planning authority he did not have the formal report which was submitted to the committee although I accept that the document which appears at Tab 5 page 34 might be the report given that it is dated one day before the meeting of the committee. On any view, however, the application under section 43 and any supporting material submitted with it would be highly material to the issue of whether the determination was right or wrong. As I have said, I am not persuaded that the Inspector's decision to decline to make a definitive ruling upon the legality of the 1969 decision constitutes an error of law on his part.

This ground is, with respect to Mr Stinchcombe QC, an alternative way of addressing the issue raised in ground 1. Essentially, Mr Stinchcombe QC asserts that the Inspector can be demonstrated to have fallen in error because at paragraph 24 of his decision letter he expresses himself as follows:-

“I make no finding on the accuracy or otherwise of the 1969 determination, as I cannot be sure that I have all the material before me that might have informed that decision. Having said this, I will consider its consequences when addressing the question of intention. Nonetheless, the fact remains that the dwelling house use has not been active for an extraordinary length of time. I conclude that this in itself must weigh heavily against the Appellant's case for resumption, irrespective of any underlying reasons. It remains to be seen whether there are other considerations that might outweigh this factor.”

Mr Stinchcombe QC submits that the use of the phrase “irrespective of any underlying reasons” demonstrates that the Inspector fell into error. They demonstrate that the Inspector took no account of the reasons advanced by the Claimant for the failure to resume the residential use of Pear Tree Cottage. I do not agree. When the decision letter is read as a whole it becomes clear that the Inspector attached comparatively little weight to the underlying reasons. He did not ignore them. The underlying reasons, of course, were identified as being the subjective belief of the Claimant and his father that they could do nothing to resume the use of Pear Tree Cottage as a dwelling by reason of the determination of 1969. As I have sought to explain in assessing whether or not abandonment of the right to use Pear Tree Cottage as a residence after 1973 had taken place the Inspector was lawfully entitled to attach little weight to the underlying reasons and the determination of 1969.

In so far as the formulation of this ground raises a different issue from those encompassed by Grounds 1 and 2 it seems to me that it relates to the point made by Mr Stinchcombe QC that the Inspector misdirected himself and gave wholly inadequate reasons for deciding that the events after 1973 did not constitute an assertion of a perceived use right. As I have indicated the Inspector's conclusion was that those events were indicative of an intermittent intention on the part of the Claimant or his father to re-use the appeal site for residential purposes.

In my judgment that interpretation was open to the Inspector on the facts before him. In 1983 the Claimant's father enquired about whether planning permission might be granted for a replacement dwelling. In 1986 and 1997 planning applications were made for replacement dwellings. In 2008 another application was made for a replacement dwelling. While, obviously, each application was presented to the local planning authority on the basis that planning permission should be granted because the planning application was compliant with planning policy in the development plan (S21 or its predecessor policy) it did not necessarily follow that the Claimant or his father had an unambiguous intention to resume the use of Pear Tree Cottage as a dwelling. That was a possible conclusion – it was no more than that. It seems to me that the Inspector, having heard the evidence, was ideally placed to conclude whether, as a matter of fact, the intention of the Claimant and his father before him was to resume the use of Pear Tree Cottage as a dwelling or, as he found, to obtain planning permission for a replacement if the planning authority could be persuaded to grant it. In my judgment the Inspector correctly identified that his task when considering the issue of the owners’ intentions was to discern whether or not the owners held the intention to resume the active residential use of Pear Tree Cottage itself. On the material before him he was entitled to conclude that there came a time when they did not.

This ground suggests that the Inspector failed to take account of evidence to the effect that the Claimant's father had incurred considerable expenditure in relation to Pear Tree Cottage.

It is true that the Inspector does not mention this feature expressly in his decision letter; certainly it forms no part of his reasoning. That is not surprising. So far as I can discern the only evidence of expenditure on Pear Tree Cottage related to a period before early 1973. The Claimant's father asserted in correspondence in February 1973 that he had incurred expenditure on the cottage but, as far as I am aware, that is the extent of the evidence on this topic.

Expenditure on the property prior to 1973 was no more than peripheral to the issue of whether or not the right to resume residential use of the cottage had been abandoned some time after 1973.

It is now well accepted that a decision letter does not have to deal with every single point taken by an Appellant or Respondent at a public inquiry. The decision must convey the main reasons why the decision to allow or dismiss an appeal (as the case may be) has been taken. In my judgment the issue of expenditure prior to 1973 was utterly peripheral to the Inspector's reasoning and conclusions about abandonment after 1972/73 and there is no basis, in my judgment, for concluding that he failed to take account of a material consideration as is alleged in this ground.

In my judgment this appeal fails. I can discern no error of law on the part of the Inspector which would justify the relief which the Claimant seeks. I propose to make an order dismissing the appeal and directing that the Claimant should pay the First Defendant’s costs. If the Claimant wishes to dispute any aspect of the First Defendant’s costs and/or apply for permission to appeal he must serve and file written submissions in support by 4pm 20 June 2011. The submissions must be filed at the Administrative Court and sent electronically to the Clerk to Wyn Williams J.