Nursing & Midwifery Council v McMorine

In this matter the Nursing and Midwifery Council seeks an extension to an interim suspension order imposed on Toni McMorine, imposed on her registration by the Investigating Committee of the Council. The respondent's registration was first suspended on 14 March 2006. This followed a complaint about her competence and conduct by her former employer who had dismissed her.

It is unnecessary to go into the details of the allegations against Miss McMorine, except to say that on a number of occasions committees of the Council have regarded them as very serious allegations. They include allegations of poor drug administration, failures in relation to patient care and causing patients undue duress and stress. They were coupled with allegations of an inability and unwillingness to follow instructions and plans which resulted in causing patients harm.

I have seen the evidence of Mr Gary Coates, a case manager for the hearings in the Fitness to Practise Directorate of the Nursing and Midwifery Council. I share the views of the Committee to which I have just referred. The nature of the allegations is indeed serious. The merit of the complaints is not a matter with which I have to be concerned. They are serious allegations and I can well understand why they led to the respondent's registration being suspended on 14 March 2006.

The suspension was continued from time to time, first by the Investigating Committee and then by the Conduct and Competence Committee. The most recent extension was on 25 July 2007 by the Conduct and Competence Committee of the Council. That Committee has a discretion as to whether or not a hearing is necessary to investigate the complaint against the respondent. In April 2007 the Committee decided that such a hearing was indeed necessary. I am told this morning by Miss Strickland that the date of 18 and 19 October has been proposed for that hearing. The Council is content with that date. It has been put to the respondent for her comments. So far there has been no response from her. If there were to be no response in the next few days, then the Council would need to give formal notice of that hearing, in order to allow the 28 days which its rules prescribe as the minimum period of notice. If the respondent does make representations as to the suitability of that date, the Committee will no doubt take those into account and it may be necessary for it to be re-fixed. Having regard to the length of time which has already elapsed since the first suspension, I would imagine that the Committee would wish to fix an alternative date as soon as possible after the date that has been proposed.

The Committees of the Council may extend suspension from time to time, but only for a maximum of 18 months. Thereafter, the Council may apply, as it does, to the court for a further extension of the suspension for a period of up to 12 months (see Article 31, paragraph 8 of the Nursing and Midwifery Order 2001).

The criteria which the Committees must apply in deciding whether suspension is necessary, and which I infer the court should also apply when deciding whether some further extension is necessary, is whether the Committee (or, as may be, the court) is satisfied that it is necessary for the protection of members of the public or is otherwise in the public interest or is in the interests of the person concerned for the registration of that person to be suspended or to be made subject to conditions. That is prescribed by Article 31, paragraph 2 of the Nursing and Midwifery Order 2001. In this case it is said that suspension is necessary for the protection of members of the public or otherwise in the public interest.

Having looked carefully at the witness statement of Mr Coates, I am clearly of the view that that test is satisfied in the present case. I have also been directed to the considerations which the Court of Appeal thought were appropriate in the analogous regime for doctors in the case of General Medical Council v Dr Stephen Chi Chung Hiew [2007] EWCA Civ 369. In my judgment the applicant makes out its case. I agree that a further period of suspension should be ordered.

The claimant sought a period of six months' suspension. I was concerned that that appeared to lead to a situation where the respondent may have been suspended for two years before this matter was finally resolved. Having heard the proposed date for the substantive hearing by the Conduct and Competence Committee, and after hearing submissions from Miss Strickland on behalf of the claimant, in my judgment the right order would be to provide for a further period of suspension of four months. That will allow a degree of margin in case the hearing dates of 18 and 19 October have to be moved following representations from the respondent and for any hearing that may need to go part-heard, but at the same time there has also to be an acknowledgement that this matter needs to come to a conclusion relatively quickly.