Daie, R (on the application of) v London Borough of Camden

MR JUSTICE WILKIE: This is the hearing of an application by Dr Daie for judicial review of a decision of the London Borough of Camden which was made on 6 October 2004. Dr Daie, who acts for himself, launched these proceedings against the decision which was a decision to cancel his then temporary accommodation and to reject his application for rehousing; an application which he had made on 10 September 2004.

The particular point which he focused on was that the decision of 6 October had been notified by a letter which did not amount to a decision as required by section 184 of the Housing Act 1996. As events have transpired, by the time of today's hearing the London Borough of Camden has not only agreed to consider an application by Dr Daie on the grounds of homelessness, but I have been shown a letter of yesterday's date which, on the face of it, constitutes a decision by Camden, having considered his application, to accept the full housing duty under section 193 of the Housing Act. That letter identifies the temporary accommodation presently occupied by Dr Daie as being the premises available for his current accommodation and identified the process by which the full housing duty will be discharged.

Dr Daie, perhaps understandably, is cautious about taking this letter at face value as constituting a decision very much in his favour and has urged on me that I should not deal with the matter finally today but should adjourn the case for 24-hours or so in order to enable him to seek advice from the CAB as to his best course pursuant to that letter.

Miss Godfrey for Camden says that I should not accede to that request. She says that the proceedings with which I am concerned, which focus on the decision of 6 October 2004, have, on any view, become academic and if, after taking advice, Dr Daie has any problem with the letter of 20 February then his course is not to resurrect or keep going the present proceedings, but to seek a review by Camden of the decision contained in that letter as he has done in the past. In the event that he was dissatisfied with that review then, there is the appeal process through the county court which he has also engaged in the past. In my judgment, Miss Godfrey's contention is correct and realistic and, accordingly, I will proceed to deal with Dr Daie's application for judicial review today.

There is some history to the application and it is summarised very helpfully in the defendant's chronology. In 2002, Dr Daie had, as his accommodation, flat 5a 13 Adamson Road London NW3. On 29 November 2002, he applied to the defendant for assistance under part 7 of the Housing Act 1996, stating that his accommodation was in a state of disrepair and he could no longer live there. That application resulted in a decision by the defendant of 14 April 2003 under section 184 of the 1996 Act that the claimant was not homeless as he had accommodation available to him at Adamson Road which was reasonable for him to continue to occupy.

Dr Daie was dissatisfied with this decision and, on 29 April 2003, requested a review under section 202 of the Act. On 12 May 2003, the defendant decided on the review to uphold their original section 184 decision. Dr Daie was not satisfied with that outcome and, as he was entitled to do, on 2 June 2003 issued an appeal to the county court under section 204 of the 1996 Act.

There was a hearing of that appeal before HHJ Green QC on 27 August 2003, but that was adjourned generally with liberty to restore. Nothing further happened in relation to that application because Dr Daie began to be represented by the Mary Ward Legal Centre and, on 10 September 2004, the Mary Ward Legal Centre, apparently acting on behalf of Dr Daie, not on behalf of the official solicitor whose involvement had arisen, requested the defendant to consider a further application under part 7 of the 1996 Act. In that letter, it was said that the application was made "on different grounds" but enclosed an earlier letter dated 24 October 2002.

It was the response to that letter, a letter dated 6 October 2004, which is the subject of this application. The defendant stated it would not accept a fresh application from Dr Daie as there had not been a material change in his circumstances. In that letter, the defendant also wrote to him that his temporary accommodation would be cancelled with effect from 31 October.

On 1 November 2004, Dr Daie applied for permission to seek judicial review of the decisions contained in that letter and for interim relief. On 1 November, Sullivan J dismissed the application for interim relief and abridged time for the acknowledgment of service. On 3 November, at an oral hearing, Sullivan J granted interim relief but on 8 December he refused permission to apply for judicial review on the papers and discharged the order granting interim relief.

Dr Daie then renewed his application for permission and that came on for an oral hearing before Hodge J on 7 March 2005. Hodge J refused permission. On 31 March 2005, Dr Daie had an oral hearing before the Court of Appeal seeking permission, at that level, to seek judicial review. By that stage, there had been a decision of the Court of Appeal in the case of London Borough Tower Hamlets v Rikha Begum [2005] EWCA Civ 340. The Court of Appeal thought that, by reason of that decision, Dr Daie's principal argument that the defendant's letter of 6 October 2004 was not a sufficient response to his application became arguable and consequently the Court of Appeal gave him permission to seek judicial review but ordered expedition.

From that time, matters began to change. There was an order for possession of flat 5a 13 Adamson Road made by the Central London County Court, on a date of which I have not been made aware. Pursuant to that on 26 October 2005, the bailiffs had an appointment to enforce that order for possession in respect of Adamson Road. On 7 November 2005, Dr Daie informed the defendant's legal services department that he had been evicted from Adamson Road.

From there on, the defendant's legal services department acted on the basis that Dr Daie now could make an application for a finding of homelessness and the full housing duty. From that point, there was a quantity of correspondence between the parties with a view to persuading Dr Daie to make such an application. He did so and on 16 February 2006, an appointment was arranged for him to attend the Homeless Persons Unit to renew that application and for that application to be considered.

It was pursuant to that application that on 20 February, the defendant wrote to Dr Daie accepting the full housing duty under section 193 of the Housing Act. In the meantime, Dr Daie has been in temporary accommodation at Royal Park Hotel London N4, initially pursuant to the decision of the Court of Appeal of 31 March 2005, but, from 20 February, that accommodation has been and is to be provided by the defendant as the first stage of the discharge of the full housing duty which they have decided they owe to the claimant.

In my judgment, it follows that the claim of Dr Daie arising from the decision letter of 6 October 2004 has become wholly academic. He has continued to be in that temporary accommodation more or less continuously and he now has the decisions of the defendant, not only to consider his application for homelessness but also he has a positive decision on that application that they accept the full housing duty.

In those circumstances, I can see no point in further public money being expended either by Camden or by the court in considering the matter further. It is right to say that Dr Daie, in the material which he researched and produced in support of his judicial review application, does touch on much wider and much more deep seated issues which in his view afflict the way in which Camden discharges its housing functions. In my judgment, they form no part of this judicial review application and certainly do not comprise the basis upon which the Court of Appeal on very narrow grounds, gave him permission to pursue this matter on 31 March 2005.

Accordingly, in my judgment, the only proper order for me to make, given that Dr Daie does not wish to withdraw his claim for judicial review, is to dismiss his claim for judicial review, and I do so although I do so not on the basis that he was inevitably going to fail but on the basis that, as events have developed, the judicial review which he sought has become overtaken by events and is now wholly academic.

Thank you Dr Daie, thank you Miss Godfrey.

MISS GODFREY: My Lord, in terms of the order I think I will invite you, for the avoidance of any doubt, to discharge the interim injunction that was granted by the Court of Appeal which was paragraph 4 of the order of 31 March.

MR JUSTICE WILKIE: That automatically falls. Of course, it is of overtaken by the decision letter of 20 February. Can the court retain this copy?

MISS GODFREY: My Lord, yes.