Royal Courts of Justice
Strand
London WC2
B E F O R E:
MR JUSTICE LEVESON
THE QUEEN ON THE APPLICATION OF GENERAL MEDICAL COUNCIL
(CLAIMANT)
-v-
NAMMALWAR
(DEFENDANT)
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MR I HARE (instructed by General Medical Council) appeared on behalf of the CLAIMANT
The DEFENDANT did not attend and was not represented
J U D G M E N T
MR JUSTICE LEVESON: This is an application by the General Medical Council pursuant to section 41A(7) of the Medical Act 1983, as amended, to extend for 12 months an order made by the Interim Orders Panel dated 17th March 2005 suspending the defendant, Dr Venkataswamy Nammalwar.
The circumstances can be summarised briefly. A complaint as to this doctor's conduct was received by the GMC on 23rd September 2003. He had been arrested in connection with allegations of serious misconduct and, in particular, indecent assault. Furthermore, by a letter dated 1st October 2003 other concerns were also raised about the doctor's conduct, in particular relating to his clinical competence and other aspects of his behaviour. It is not necessary or appropriate to include details of these allegations within this judgment; suffice it to say that on 11th November 2003, prior to the determination of the criminal charges, on the other allegations, the Interim Orders Panel met and determined to place an interim order of conditions upon the doctor's registration for a period of 18 months. That order expires on 10th May 2005. Meanwhile, the prosecution was proceeding and on 4th November 2004 the GMC were informed that the doctor had been convicted of indecent assault and sentenced to a term of three months' imprisonment.
On 5th January 2005 the doctor's legal advisors wrote to inform the GMC that he wished to have his name removed from the medical register on a voluntary basis. Having regard to the conviction, and in accordance with the rules, that application was referred to the Fitness to Practice Panel.
On 17th March 2005, the Interim Orders Panel met to review the doctor's case. The Panel then determined to replace the interim order of conditions with an interim order of suspension. Given the conviction and the sentence of imprisonment, that is not at all surprising. Because the interim order would in any event lapse in May, they determined to apply under Section 41A to extend the term.
Meanwhile, on 29th March, two case examiners considered the application of voluntary erasure against the background of the conviction for serious assault and other matters of serious significance. It was determined that it should be refused on the basis of public interest and that a very serious conduct issue warranted a public enquiry. It is against that background that this application is made.
Having been made, the application was served both upon the doctor and his solicitors. The solicitors, who had previously written to the effect that the doctor had retired from practice since the time of the allegations and had no intention of undertaking any clinical practice in the future, did not receive any instructions on the issue of this application. Nevertheless, the doctor did not consent to the extension of the order and I have to determine it.
The power in the statute acts as a legitimate restraint upon continued delay in dealing with disciplinary issues. Having said that, however, in the context of this case it is quite clear that the GMC have proceeded properly, imposing conditions in the light of the allegations when originally made, and only seeking to suspend after conviction. Given that he has no intention of resuming clinical practice, he is not adversely affected by the continuation of the extension. In the circumstances, I am prepared to exercise my discretion to extend, for the maximum period of 12 months, the interim order of suspension from 11th May 2005 to 10th May 2006.
MR HARE: I am grateful, my Lord. My Lord, the GMC does apply for its costs and does say that this is an appropriate case for it to be done on summary assessment. I made the point earlier that the defendant and his legal advisors were invited to consent to the order which would have removed the need for my attendance and that of my instructing solicitor today. Of course, the GMC would have been obliged to come to court in the sense of submitting the bundle because of the expiry of the 18-month period since 11th November 2003, but the expense at this stage of me appearing and my instructing solicitor appearing could have been avoided. On that basis we say it is an appropriate case for summary assessment and an appropriate case where the GMC should be entitled to its costs of today. I do have a schedule which I can hand up.
MR JUSTICE LEVESON: Has it been served?
MR HARE: It has, my Lord.
MR JUSTICE LEVESON: These would have been incurred anyway, would they not?
MR HARE: Yes, my Lord. We do not seek costs in relation to the preparation of any documents. The only matters in relation to which costs are sought deal with the drawing up of the draft documents for today's hearing in particular, and the attendance of my instructing solicitors and my own fee which is over the page.
MR JUSTICE LEVESON: How much is that?
MR HARE: Forgive me, my Lord. It comes out at around £950, I am instructed.
MR JUSTICE LEVESON: For two hours work on documents for today?
MR HARE: There was further correspondence, and we have produced a draft order on the matter which your Lordship may wish to have before him.
MR JUSTICE LEVESON: Yes. (Handed). Thank you. I will order that costs be paid by the defendant in the sum of £900. I have added that into the order.
MR HARE: Thank you, my Lord.
MR JUSTICE LEVESON: I also make the order in relation to non-disclosure to non-parties and any subsequent application to be on notice.
MR HARE: I am obliged, my Lord.