Royal Courts of Justice
The Strand
London
WC2A 2LL
B e f o r e:
MR JUSTICE GIBBS
B E T W E E N:
R W
(by his Litigation Friend Michael Ferguson)
Claimant
- v -
SHEFFIELD CITY COUNCIL
Respondent
Computer Aided Transcription by
Smith Bernal, 190 Fleet Street, London EC4
Telephone No: 020 7421 4040
(Official Shorthand Writers to the Court)
MISS KERRY BRETHERTON and MR ALASTAIR REDPATH-STEVENS (14.04.05) (instructed by Messrs Moss Beachley Mullem & Coleman, London W1H 1HA) appeared on behalf of THE CLAIMANT
BRYAN MAGUIRE (instructed by Legal & Administrative Services Sheffield City Council, appeared on behalf of THE DEFENDANT
J U D G M E N T
Thursday, 14 April 2005
MR JUSTICE GIBBS:
Introduction
At the outset, and as a preliminary to the judgment I am about to give, I make the following observations. First, I heard this morning that the hearing in the Central London County Court determining the appeal by the claimant against a review being conducted by the Westminster City Council will be heard on 28 April. In the light of a suggested solution to the problem facing the parties in this case, that date has a significance. Mr Maguire on behalf of Sheffield City Council was prepared to undertake to the court in the course of the hearing yesterday that the claimant would be accommodated at their expense in Westminster for a period of fourteen days, even if the judicial review claim were to be dismissed against the defendant. The effect of the hearing date being the 28th is that the claimant would remain accommodated until the hearing. I take that matter into consideration, even though it has only recently come to my notice.
The second matter is this. I propose to make an interim order today. I will set out the reasons for that in the course of my judgment. However, in the light of the various issues that were raised in the course of yesterday's hearing, I think it right to give a detailed judgment in this matter, albeit that the conclusions will be entirely provisional and not binding on any judge who might have to determine the matter finally.
Thirdly, for reasons which counsel will appreciate, I propose to order the transcript of my judgment to be expedited please, so as to be ready in good time for the hearing on the 28th of this month.
The claimant is a man aged approximately 51. He grew up in Warrington in a care home. He lived in Sheffield for three or four years between 2001 and 2004. He has recently spent time living in London and he intends to remain in London. He moved to Westminster on or about 13 August 2004. He has not spent the whole of the time since then in Westminster. He appears to have been housed in a neighbouring London Borough for a period of time. He has also been homeless during that period. However, he has lived in Westminster for at least a substantial period of that time. He is unable to read or write. He has serious mental health difficulties. He has a very low IQ and has the mental age of a child. He has found it very difficult in the past to accept help from support services. But currently, and for some time, he has been reacting positively and co-operating with an organisation known as The Passage.
The Passage is a day centre in Victoria within the City of Westminster. The housing advice worker dealing with the claimant there is Mr Michael Ferguson. I am not sure what qualifications Mr Ferguson has, but undoubtedly he has busied himself in an admirable and conscientious fashion in connection with the claimant's problems. In his witness statement Mr Ferguson says as follows:
.... I am a housing advice worker at The Passage day centre .... for homeless people. The Passage provides services such as housing and welfare benefits advice, employment, education and training advice, physical health care, mental health care and substance misuse workers, as well as hot food, showers and laundry.
My role as a housing adviser involves attempting to find accommodation for homeless persons.
During the early part of August 2004, [the claimant] started visiting The Passage.
On 26 August 2004, [the claimant] approached Westminster Homeless Persons' Unit ('Westminster HPU') and was placed in interim accommodation.
On 11 October, Westminster HPU notified [the claimant] by letter that they accepted that there was a permanent housing duty owed to [the claimant] under section 184 of the Housing Act 1996 ('the Act'). However a referral was made to Sheffield City Council under section 198 of the Act. By a letter dated 27 October 2004, [the claimant] was notified that Sheffield had accepted the referral.
From the information that I have gathered I believe that there are good reasons why a referral to Sheffield should not go ahead and why [the claimant] should be accommodated in Westminster. I set out these reasons in paragraphs 7 to 18 below."
There then followed the reasons:
[The claimant] has an adult learning disability. Although this has never been formally assessed Jude Francis (who was the Community Learning Disability Nurse who had responsibility to facilitate [the claimant's] health needs in Sheffield) indicated that a professional estimate of his IQ is in the range of 52-62. (I understand that the lowest measurable adult IQ is 45). Ms Francis also confirms that [the claimant] exhibits symptoms that are on the autistic disorder spectrum. In the circumstances, it is simply not acceptable to state that his refusal to go to Sheffield is a personal choice.
[The claimant] grew up in Warrington, partly in a care home. Although I have been unable to fully establish the facts, I gather that [the claimant] was in Sheffield for around three years, between 2001 and 2004. This is not a long period in the life of a man aged 51.
Ms Francis has stated to me that [the claimant] either did not engage in the first place or gradually disengaged from support services in Sheffield. For example, I understand that, although [the claimant] was nominally under the care of a consultant psychiatrist in Sheffield, [the claimant] missed most of his appointments. As far as involvement with Social Services was concerned, [the claimant's] social worker in Sheffield was Barry Baldwin. I understand that Mr Baldwin did see [the claimant] on a few occasions but this contact ended prior to [the claimant's] departure from Sheffield after [the claimant] attacked Mr Baldwin.
Jude Francis says that she was the person involved in [the claimant's] care with whom he maintained the most contact whilst in Sheffield. However, before he was evicted, she says that he had also stopped engaging with her. As a result she would not support his being accommodated in Sheffield again.
I therefore believe that it is not true that [the claimant] has a support network to which he could return to in Sheffield.
[The claimant] is a very difficult person to obtain factual detail from. However, although the details are not clear to me, I am aware that he has stayed in London for several years. He certainly knows the Victoria area of Westminster very well.
Through The Passage, [the claimant] has been assisted in making links with appropriate medical, mental health and support services in London. He uses the mental health team and support services at The Passage day centre on a daily basis. It has been arranged that Westminster Adult Learning Disability Partnership team will see [the claimant] and perform an assessment of his disability and learning needs on Monday 29 November 2004. The assessment is to take place at 4 Frampton Street, London NW8 8LW with Jenny Manville. As far as we are aware, this will be the first opportunity in his adult life to perform a formal assessment due to his non-engagement or disengagement with services in the past. His adult learning disability was never assessed during his time in Sheffield. Jude Francis described this engagement as a great opportunity.
[The claimant] has developed supportive relationships with members of The Passage staff that we consider would be damaging to break off. The Passage staff intends to continue to use their best endeavours to make sure that [the claimant] receives support, including the involvement of Social Services. [The claimant] has involved himself in social activities organised by The Passage, such as attending the 'Over 50s' group and the 'Streetwise Opera' group. We believe that this is perhaps the first time in [the claimant's] adult life that he appears to be settling somewhere.
I consider it important, given [the claimant's] history of disengagement and the support that he is being offered by The Passage, that he himself is expressing a very strong desire to remain in London. As stated, he has previously spent some years living in London and is now conveying a desire to live here permanently.
[The claimant] did not go to Sheffield. He remains in Westminster where he has been since the end of July/early August 2004. He is psychologically averse to moving back to Sheffield because of his memories of being there. He flies into a rage at any mention of the word 'Sheffield' and has left us in no doubt that he will not return there under any circumstances. Since the termination of interim duty, [the claimant] has been rough sleeping or in a night centre.
Investigations show that [the claimant] has a long history of threats of suicide and suicide attempts. In the recent past, he has drunk detergent/shampoo, horded very large amounts of prescribed major tranquilliser and attempted to cut his throat with broken glass. He has had many stays in psychiatric units both under Mental Health Act sections and as a voluntary patient, after threatening suicide. These threats clearly need to be taken seriously as does the genuine emotional distress displayed by [the claimant] at the thought of going back to Sheffield. Between 2 August 2004 and 26 August 2004 he was held under a Mental Health Act section at the Cygnet hospital, Blackheath. Between 8 November 2004 and 17 November 2004 he was a patient in the psychiatric ward at North Lambeth Hospital, again after threatening suicide. In the view of The Passage's mental health team, it would seem apparent that street homelessness/a forced return to Sheffield (were this possible) will increase his suicidal ideation.
In my view, [the claimant] is a person with very complex needs who, because of his disability, does present challenging behaviour and finds it difficult to engage with support services. Such people frequently 'fall through the net' and end up destitute, and unsupported. In [the claimant's] case there is also the clear added risk of self-harm. This must not be allowed to happen in this case. If [the claimant] remains here he will continue to have the support of services that he has engaged with."
The information that Mr Ferguson sets out in that statement is in part based on enquiries that he made in Sheffield. This is further confirmed by a telephone attendance note dated 2 November 2004. Mr Ferguson, who was in attendance yesterday during the hearing, confirmed to the claimant's counsel that the claimant continues to co-operate with The Passage organisation and exhibits signs of distress at the possible outcome of the hearing. I make allowance for the fact that Mr Ferguson is unashamedly an advocate on behalf of the claimant, and for the fact that there is a body of evidence from those previously responsible for the claimant. None of that is inconsistent with Mr Ferguson's evidence, but it shows a degree of ability to manipulate on the part of the claimant. However, taking Mr Ferguson's evidence as a whole and viewing the history, it is entirely credible.
The Procedural History
Westminster City Council, which is an interested party in this claim for judicial review, reached a decision about its duty under section 184 of the Housing Act 1996. It found that the claimant was eligible for housing, was homeless, was not intentionally homeless and was in priority need. However, it found that the claimant had no local connection with Westminster. It considered that the claimant had a local connection with Sheffield and referred the application to Sheffield.
On 21 October 2004, on the claimant's behalf The Passage wrote to Westminster requesting a review of that decision. On 27 October 2004, the defendant, Sheffield City Council, confirmed that they accepted the referral. Westminster wrote to the claimant saying that his accommodation booking would be cancelled from 4 November 2004 and enclosed a travel warrant for his travel. On 29 October, The Passage wrote to Westminster stating that, given that the review was concerned with the referral to Sheffield, the decision not to continue to accommodate in Westminster pending the review was irrational. There followed further exchanges between The Passage and Westminster. On 2 November 2004, Westminster wrote acknowledging the request for review and confirmed that they would not provide interim accommodation pending review.
I pause there for a moment to consider a legal issue which arose between the parties as to whether at that point it would have been open to the claimant to take proceedings against Westminster on the basis that interim accommodation should have been provided. I heard submissions from both counsel about that. Without making a concluded decision, I preferred Mr Maguire's submissions on the issue. It would have been open to the claimant to make an application based on that refusal, but since I am proposing to make an interim order I make no concluded decision on that.
On 4 November 2004, The Passage wrote to Westminster pointing out that the claimant was street homeless and they asked Westminster to undertake its duty under section 47 of the National Health Service and Community Care Act 1990.
On 30 November 2004, the claimant's solicitors wrote to Westminster asking the council to provide interim accommodation, in default of which they would issue proceedings for judicial review. There was a follow-up letter emphasising the urgency of the matter.
On 7 December 2004, the claimant's solicitors wrote to Sheffield asking that they give urgent consideration to providing the claimant with suitable accommodation within Westminster given that he was street homeless. On 8 December they wrote a follow-up letter. In the course of a telephone conversation on 8 December the claimant's solicitors were informed that Sheffield had closed the file and that the claimant would need to attend Sheffield for an assessment. It is fair to say that that position was modified not long afterwards. The claimant's solicitors wrote again to Sheffield on 9 December asking that they re-open the application. Sheffield were informed that the claimant had threatened suicide if he was forced to return to Sheffield and had finally engaged with support services within Westminster. Sheffield's response on 9 December was to reiterate the stance that they believed that the question of the provision of accommodation in Westminster was for the Westminster Council.
A request was then made to Westminster Council asking whether they would co-operate if Sheffield requested assistance in rehousing the claimant within Westminster. Westminster's response was to refuse co-operation and say that they would not be willing to do so. That stance, which was wholly regrettable, was it is fair to say altered subsequently.
Again on 10 December 2004, the claimant's solicitors wrote to Sheffield explaining that they remained under a section 193 duty, notwithstanding the claimant's failure to attend Sheffield for assessment, and asked for the claimant's file to be re-opened. It is that alleged section 193 duty and its proper discharge which effectively forms the subject of this claim for judicial review. It was stressed to Sheffield; that there was no question of the claimant returning to Sheffield; and further, that he was receiving support, which he would not receive in Sheffield.
On 14 December 2004, draft proceedings were sent to both Sheffield and Westminster. The basis of the claim against Westminster was that their decision to refuse to co-operate with Sheffield if requested to do so was irrational and illegal. Sheffield maintained its stance that any request for accommodation should be made to Westminster. On 16 December 2004, Westminster modified their earlier stance and confirmed that they would consider any request for assistance if it were forthcoming from Sheffield as regards housing in Westminster, albeit no such request was expected. Because of that chance of stance, the claimant took the view that it was inappropriate to proceed further against Westminster.
On 16 December 2004, Sheffield wrote to the claimant's solicitors submitting that the proposal to proceed against Sheffield was fundamentally flawed. It confirmed that the section 193 duty had been accepted by Sheffield, but submitted that the obligation was restricted to securing accommodation in its own area pursuant to section 208. They were and have remained unwilling to provide or to pay for accommodation in Westminster, save on an interim basis and/or unless ordered by the court.
On 22 December 2004, proceedings having been issued with Sheffield as the defendant and Westminster as the interested party, Westminster wrote to the Administrative Court objecting to being made an interested party. I find that curious since they clearly were an interested party.
On 23 December 2004, Beatson J made an interim order that the defendant Sheffield provide suitable temporary accommodation within Westminster. Sheffield made a request to Westminster to accommodate the claimant. Since then he has been accommodated within the City of Westminster, at Sheffield's expense.
On 7 January 2005, Westminster made their decision on the review of their original decision to refer the case to Sheffield. That decision resulted in no change of stance and was unfavourable to the claimant. Meanwhile, the claimant continued to resist any steps preparatory to any move to Sheffield. The defendant continued to maintain its stance that its duty would be discharged by offering accommodation in Sheffield.
On 20 January 2004, Bennett J granted permission for the claimant to proceed by way of an application for judicial review against Sheffield and ordered it to provide suitable temporary accommodation in Westminster pending review. That order remains in force and the claimant is currently accommodated under it.
On 27 January 2005, the claimant lodged an appeal against the decision of the Westminster City Council. That appeal was against the review decision to which I have referred. The appeal, as I have been told this morning, is listed on 28 April 2005 -- in a fortnight's time.
On 17 March 2005, Westminster wrote:
"I dispute your claim that [the claimant] has developed a local connection in this borough and that there has been a material change in his circumstances since he approached as homeless in August 2004 when his application was referred to Sheffield."
That statement was in response to a submission to Westminster which had been made on the claimant's behalf to the effect that he now undoubtedly had developed a local connection with Westminster.
On 17 March 2005, the defendant made an offer of accommodation at 151 Derby Street in Sheffield. It is a standard form offer which includes the statement:
"No further offers of accommodation will be made. If you refuse this offer your priority award will be cancelled and if you are in interim accommodation you will be contacted to notify you when you have to leave the interim accommodation address."
The letter notified the claimant that he had a right to seek a review of the offer of accommodation.
The claimant responded to that letter by screwing it up and telephoning a representative of the defendant to shout that he was never going back there. His solicitors responded on his behalf in rather more measured terms in a letter dated 23 March 2005.
Upon the evidence currently before this court, and having regard to the history outlined, I am compelled to a number of preliminary conclusions. I say "preliminary" because I have not had the advantage of any contribution from Westminster Council as interested party. Undoubtedly they are an interested party whatever the merits of their stance. It would have helped if they had attended, but they were not required to do so and therefore cannot be criticised on that count.
My preliminary conclusions are:
The claimant is genuinely and seriously vulnerable by reason of his learning disability and/or his deep-seated mental health problems. He may also be manipulative and prone to change his mind, as well as having a history of non-co-operation with a number of professional staff and agencies. It is well know, however, to those who have any experience in the field, that such characteristics are far from uncommon with somebody suffering from the claimant's undoubted problems.
The claimant plainly does have a local connection with Westminster. On the evidence before this court there is no doubt about it. He is resident here by his own choice: see section 199 of the Housing Act 1996. His sole or principal effective source of support is here. On the evidence before me -- without, I stress, any input from Westminster -- any denial by Westminster of the local connection without good explanation would be irrational and perverse.
There is credible, strong and uncontroverted evidence that the sole effective support services currently available to the claimant are within the City of Westminster. Associated with this is credible evidence that the claimant has no intention of returning the Sheffield and that even the prospect of doing so is liable to put his mental condition at risk. It might be said that there is an element of manipulation involved. I have already made my observations on that topic, but the point on the evidence remains a very strong one. Mr Ferguson confirms that even at the time of the hearing the claimant exhibits distress about the prospect of the return to Sheffield.
It follows that, whatever the court's decision, it is highly improbable that this vulnerable claimant will ever return to Sheffield -- certainly not in the foreseeable future. Thus the defendant's recent offer of accommodation there is in reality an empty formality.
The reasons given by Westminster for transferring responsibility to Sheffield make it quite clear that, but for the view that referral of the case is justified, they accept that the claimant is in priority need of accommodation. This can only be because they accept his learning disability and the mental problems which constitute his vulnerability.
If these conclusions are all correct, it must follow that one or other of the two councils has or had a duty to provide suitable accommodation. It also follows that accommodation in Sheffield in reality cannot be suitable, subject to one argument raised and skilfully put forward to Mr Maguire to which I shall turn.
The inference from these provisional conclusions is that the two local authorities involved are engaged in a struggle to avoid being fixed with responsibility for this awkward case. That is a lamentable state of affairs where it concerns a person such as this claimant. There is a need in cases of those who are difficult and vulnerable for co-operation to meet a claimant's needs. That is the purpose of the statute to which I have referred.
Having reached these provisional conclusions, it is imperative for the stalemate which has developed be resolved in the promptest and most effective fashion so that the claimant's legitimate needs can be met by the body responsible under statute for doing so. It is also important that it be met without undue legal expense. To their credit, both counsel recognise the force of the matters to which I have just referred. But to find a solution is easier said than done.
Mr Maguire makes some telling submissions based on the procedural inappropriateness of the present claim. He says that there are other remedies that the claimant should have sought in order to safeguard his position. He says that the existence of those other remedies justifies in itself the dismissal of the present claim. He submits that the claimant should seek an injunction from the Central London County Court against Westminster, to which the statutory appeal is being made under section 204 of the 1996 Act, such an injunction now being possible under section 204(a). (That submission has perhaps been overtaken by the listing date of the case.) The submission remains that such an injunction should have been sought. In any case, he says on the substance of the claim, that, given Westminster's still current and undisturbed decision that the claimant has no local connection with Westminster, the decision by Sheffield not to secure housing for him in Westminster is fully justified and certainly lawful. Mr Maguire also points to material in the evidence about the claimant's history which might support the lawfulness of a decision by Sheffield to house the claimant in Sheffield on the basis that he may be being manipulative in his approach.
One of the reasons I am making an interim order in this case, as opposed to a final order, is that the issues which might possibly arise under that last argument have not been fully explored so that justice can be done to them. If they were fully explored I suppose it is possible that the provisional view that I have expressed about the case might not be as fully supported as I now think it to be.
Further, as I pointed out yesterday, there is the possible alternative remedy against Sheffield, namely a request for a review of its decision followed if necessary by an appeal to the County Court against an adverse decision on review. It follows for reasons already given that it would be possible for an injunction to have been applied for to the County Court in those proceedings. There is authority for the proposition that, save in unusual cases, the claimant should use the County Court appeal procedure rather than judicial review since the purpose of creating the County Court procedure is that housing matters should be determined in the County Court.
On the claimant's behalf Miss Bretherton made the point that, by virtue of section 200 of the Act, Westminster's duty to house the claimant (as opposed to its power to do so) has ceased, whether their decision was perverse or not. Accordingly, she submits that the unequivocal section 193 duty rests solely on the defendant. She contends that suitable accommodation has as one of its aspects suitability of location. She submits that Sheffield is manifestly unsuitable and that the appropriate location is Westminster. The fact that Westminster has made an irrational decision abdicating their responsibility does not, so she submits, have the effect of limiting the considerations which Sheffield must properly take into account in assessing suitability. Accordingly, unless and until the Westminster decision is reversed, Sheffield's refusal to provide accommodation in Westminster is irrational.
Recognising the reality of the situation, namely the claimant's principal contention that Westminster's decision is wrong, Miss Bretherton invites me not to make a permanent or open-ended order against the defendant, but to make an interim order effective until the outcome of the appeal against the Westminster decision is known.
There is some force in the submissions made by both counsel. On balance, were I to decide the matter today I would be more inclined to accept Miss Bretherton's submissions. I am not currently persuaded that an apparently perverse decision by Westminster should influence this court in its decision as to the suitability of accommodation for the claimant and the rationality or lawfulness of Sheffield's decision about that.
As to the alternative remedy, this is in my (provisional) view, an exceptional case in terms of the obstacles which have been placed in the claimant's way. The history that I have deliberately outlined in some detail shows that the claimant's solicitors have been assiduous in attempting to obtain the appropriate relief against what I regard as at times unnecessary hurdles placed in their way and thus in the claimant's way. But, the claimant having been caught between two stools and faced with an exceptional situation, I consider that it is appropriate, notwithstanding the existence of alternative remedies, to entertain judicial review proceedings.
The question is whether or not to make any concluded findings in this judicial review hearing or whether simply to consider the weight of the arguments and my provisional views about them and make an interim order. For several reasons I believe that the justice of the case requires that I make an interim rather than a final order and that I make no concluded rulings. I consider that the justice of the case requires it for reasons connected both with the claimant and with the defendant. The claimant's case, as put by Miss Bretherton, is that the reason why the defendant has (at any rate for the time being) the section 193 duty to house the claimant in Westminster is because of the unreasonableness of the decision-making made hitherto by Westminster. That is what impels her not to ask this court to make a permanent or open-ended order against Sheffield. That is one reason. The other reason is that it might be thought unjust to make any concluded findings against Sheffield. Mr Maguire concurs with Miss Bretherton on the merits if not the legal consequences of the current situation.
I have considered the Civil Procedure Rules. The Rules have the overriding objective of enabling the court to deal with cases justly in order to ensure so far as practicable that the parties are on an equal footing with a view to saving expense and with a view to ensuring that a case is dealt with expeditiously and fairly. The court's case management powers, which include the power to adjourn, to stay proceedings and to make interim orders, are to be exercised with the overriding objective in mind. I consider that in making an interim order at this stage, until the disposal of the County Court proceedings or further order, I am conforming with the aspects of the overriding objective to which I have just referred. In particular, I am seeking to avoid a multiplicity of proceedings, to ensure that the claimant's case is dealt with on an equal footing to those of the defendant and the interested party, and to do my best to see that the matter is finally disposed of expeditiously and fairly.
It follows that the order I make is:
that this claim be adjourned;
that the defendant continue to provide to the claimant accommodation in Westminster until the disposal of the County Court appeal or further order; and
that there be liberty to apply.
My anticipation is that if the appeal before the County Court succeeds (which will be a matter for the County Court Judge), this judicial review claim will come to an end.
I will hear the parties on it but it may be that in anticipation of that I should make a direction regarding the resolution of the costs issue (if there is an issue) that they be dealt with by written submissions.
MR REDPATH-STEVENS: My Lord, the only thing that occurs is in relation to the continuation of accommodation pending the determination of the appeal in the County Court, is it your Lordship's intention that that is the determination of the appeal or any further appeal? It just springs to mind that the hearing in the County Court may not be the end if it is necessary to take the matter further.
MR JUSTICE GIBBS: I think I said "or further order", did I not?
MR REDPATH-STEVENS: Your Lordship did.
MR JUSTICE GIBBS: Did I say "liberty to apply"? If I did not, I should have done.
MR REDPATH-STEVENS: Indeed your Lordship did.
MR JUSTICE GIBBS: I think that is probably a matter to be determined hereafter. I do not want this to be an open-ended matter. One cannot predict the future. The interim order will remain until the disposal by the County Court and if you like -- and I do not suppose this will be a great bone of contention -- I will say until seven days after the disposal. That is a matter which can probably be agreed between the parties.
MR REDPATH-STEVENS: Indeed, my Lord. The intention is just to avoid further costs.
MR JUSTICE GIBBS: I am grateful. Shall I say "until seven days after the disposal of the County Court proceedings"?
MR REDPATH-STEVENS: I am grateful.
MR MAGUIRE: My concern is a more fundamental one. That is that today and yesterday it looks as if Westminster, the party not here, are the main cause of the problem -- or a cause of the problem.
MR JUSTICE GIBBS: Yes.
MR MAGUIRE: And we have the mirror image, or the reverse situation in the County Court, with Sheffield not attending and Westminster saying, "Well, it is nothing to do with us".
MR JUSTICE GIBBS: I am conscious of that. I have directed an expedited transcript. I will further direct that the transcript be supplied to the judge who deals with the matter at the Central London County Court prior to that hearing. I was going to explore, Mr Maguire, the question of the consent procedure that we discussed yesterday.
MR MAGUIRE: Yes.
MR JUSTICE GIBBS: I did not feel able to pursue that. I think the parties were not far apart on it, but it may be that now that I have given this judgment it may be possible to arrange for the Sheffield issue to be before that same County Court by that consent procedure.
MR MAGUIRE: Yes. It may be -- Mr Redpath-Stevens is an experience housing lawyer -- it may be that if we speak for five or ten minutes a way forward can be incorporated in the order.
MR JUSTICE GIBBS: Absolutely. I anticipate that I shall be beavering away with written work connected with this court until at least some time this afternoon. So if you do produce such an order, would you like to send it through to me?
MR MAGUIRE: My Lord, yes.
MR JUSTICE GIBBS: Is there any other matter with which I need to deal before rising?
MR REDPATH-STEVENS: No, my Lord.
MR JUSTICE GIBBS: Thank you.
(Later)
MR JUSTICE GIBBS: I am only returning, Mr Maguire, because I have had an enquiry from the press as to whether, because I am adjourning the case, what I have said can be reported. I do not see any reason why not. There is of course the anonymity in relation to the claimant's name, but I do not see that there is anything else prevents it being reported, do you?
MR MAGUIRE: My Lord, I cannot see anything.
MR REDPATH-STEVENS: My Lord, the only point is the anonymity.
MR JUSTICE GIBBS: Yes. I would stress, however -- and it is not binding on the press -- that it will be appreciated that the judgment that I have given is not a final judgment. There are no findings made in it. There are a number of observations which are designed to assist, but particularly with regard to Westminster, about whom I have made certain observations, the trenchant observations are provisional and without the benefit of submissions from Westminster. Thank you.
Later, upon receipt of further written representations from counsel, the Judge made the following written observations:
"It has been suggested to me by the parties that a means by which the matter could come before the court on 28th April 2005 (subject to Central London County Court approval) is the following:
the letter at page 159-160 should stand as the decision letter;
the letter at page 161 should stand as a request for a review;
it should be deemed that 8 weeks have passed, so that the decision under appeal is that set out in paragraph 1 above;
the parties should waive any procedural points stopping a section 204 appeal against Sheffield being listed to be heard together with that appeal against Westminster presently listed to be heard on 28th April 2005, and to co-operate in preparing for the appeal;
This seems to me to be a sensible proposal which would have the advantage of having all disputes heard before the same judge in the same court."