Royal Courts of Justice
Strand
London WC2
B E F O R E:
MR JUSTICE NEWMAN
THE QUEEN ON THE APPLICATION OF B
(CLAIMANT)
-v-
LONDON BOROUGH OF CAMDEN (1)
CAMDEN & ISLINGTON MENTAL HEALTH & SOCIAL CARE TRIBUNAL (2)
(DEFENDANTS)
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR HEALTH (1)
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT (2)
MENTAL HEALTH REVIEW TRIBUNAL (3)
(INTERESTED PARTIES)
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MS A BROWN appeared on behalf of the CLAIMANT
MR C LEWIS appeared on behalf of the DEFENDANTS
J U D G M E N T
MR JUSTICE NEWMAN: This is a renewed application for permission to apply for judicial review. Mitting J refused the application for permission on the papers on 24th June 2004.
The case concerns questions as to whether or not proper assessment was made of the services which should be provided to the applicant under the Mental Health Act at a time relevant to a decision of the Mental Health Review Tribunal. In fact, as is indisputable, and as Mitting J concluded, the claim is wholly academic because all the assessed services have been provided and were made available before the decision of the Mental Health Review Tribunal on 26th April 2004.
The response to that position is that maybe they could have been provided earlier, and therefore there are the makings of a claim for damages in this respect. As to that, Mr Lewis draws the attention of the court to the judgment of the Court of Appeal in the case of Anufrijeva v Southwark London Borough Council [2004] 2 WLR at page 603, in particular 635 at paragraph 81(iii), where the court draws attention to the need, before any permission to apply for judicial review is given, for those who do make complaints in this regard to make their complaints to the Parliamentary Commission and to the local government ombudsman. That has not been done.
The position, as it happens today, is that the court was notified that funding had been withdrawn for this renewal application. The applicant therefore was unrepresented until Ms Brown valiantly entered the fray, and accepted instructions to make an application for an adjournment which she has done, but she has not had a chance to look at the material. She is not asking for an opportunity to look at the material; she is merely asking that the matter should be adjourned.
In my judgment this case has gone on long enough. It has been under consideration since 7th April 2004 when Sullivan J considered it. It has been properly considered on the papers and resolved. The point on damages is manifestly one which should not enable this matter to stay alive. In all the circumstances there is only one course which can be properly taken, and that is that this application for judicial review should be dismissed. If there is a remedy it lies elsewhere.