Stanford v First Secretary of State & Anor

This an application under section 288 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990, by which the claimant, Mr Stanford, seeks to quash a decision dated 8 December 2003 of an inspector appointed by the First Secretary of State.

Mr Stanford had made an application for outline planning permission in relation to a site known as the Graftonbury Garden Hotel, Grafton Lane, Hereford. The proposed development was described as the provision of specialist over 55s accommodation in connection with a hotel diversification project.

The local planning authority, the Herefordshire Council, failed to determine the application within the time provided. The claimant appealed. There was a public inquiry in November 2003. At that inquiry the authority contended that the development was contrary to policy in that it proposed new housing development in the countryside and was not justified. The claimant disputed that the site was in the open countryside or that it should not be regarded as an exception. He contended that the location was sustainable; that there was a need for the development; and that the appeal proposal was the most sensible and reasonable use of the current infrastructure.

In his decision letter the Inspector dismissed the appeal. As part of the background the decision letter referred to the fact that there had been three previous appeals relating to proposals for residential developments on nearby sites, all of which had been dismissed. In the most recent of those appeals the Inspector had concluded that Cedar Folly, a house adjoining the Graftonbury Garden Hotel, was in the open countryside. The Inspector referred to that as the “previous appeal”. He mentioned that an illustrative lay-out had been submitted with, though not forming part of, the application, and that that showed three blocks of apartments in the landscaped grounds of the hotel. Each would have three floors and they would provide a total of 42 units. A further block, described as a proposed future phase, was shown in part of the grounds of Cedar Folly. Proposed parking spaces on the site were also shown. He mentioned that the site itself had a complex planning history, but that little purpose would be served by rehearsing it in detail, although there had been some recent grant of planning permission for change of use of staff accommodation to offices and for the construction of a new vehicular access.

The Inspector identified the main issues to be, first, whether the appeal site was in the open countryside and, if so, what effect the proposed development would have on the character and appearance of the area; secondly, whether the appeal site was in a sustainable location for residential development; and thirdly, whether there was a need for residential accommodation of the type proposed. He summarised the relevant planning policy framework. It is unnecessary to give detailed references to the policies of the development plan. It suffices to note that in paragraph 9 the Inspector said that an important theme running through the plans was the encouragement of sustainable forms of development that reduced reliance on the private car; in paragraph 10 that another theme common to all the plans was that residential development in the open countryside away from established settlements should be strictly controlled; and in paragraph 11 that the plans dealt with the importance of taking account of the landscape setting of any development and retaining the stock of trees. He stated that there were similar themes in the relevant parts of national guidance.

The Inspector then turned to give his reasons. I will come back to certain detailed passages. To summarise the position he considered, first, “Issue 1 -- First Aspect”, namely open countryside or small settlement, and concluded that the site lay in the open countryside and was subject to a generally restrictive approach towards development. On “Issue 1 -- Second Aspect”, character and appearance, he found that the proposed development would in principle have an unacceptable effect upon the character and appearance of the area and conflict with the aims of relevant policies, all of which sought strictly to control development in the open countryside away from established settlements. On Issue 2, Sustainability, he concluded that the appeal site was not in a sustainable location and that its development in the manner proposed would undermine the aims of relevant policies. On Issue 3, Need, he noted the authority's acceptance of a need for accommodation for older people in Hereford City, but did not regard the site as being adjacent to the city from which, he said, it was separated by a broad swathe of countryside. He noted that there was an exception to policy in respect of affordable housing, but indicated that the claimant was not in a position to confirm the extent of affordable housing, if any, that the scheme would provide. In those circumstances he concluded that the claimant had not established a need for the proposed dwellings that was sufficient to outweigh the policy objections that he had identified. The Inspector then dealt with a variety of other matters before expressing the conclusion that, for the reasons given, the appeal should be dismissed.

Mr Stanford has indicated that he has strong objections to the decision that was reached. He had hoped to cross-examine the Inspector so as to probe the rationale of the decision and certain omissions in it. He indicated that this was to have been an important aspect of his case, but the limited role of this court and the general inappropriateness of cross-examination in such proceedings had been explained to him before the hearing. He therefore did not pursue his intention of seeking cross-examination.

Because Mr Stanford appears in person, I also emphasised to him at the outset of the hearing that the role of the court is to determine whether there was any error of law in the Inspector's decision. This is not an appeal on the merits. It is not for the court to substitute its judgment for that of the Inspector on planning matters. As Mr Coppel for the First Secretary of State put it in his submissions: “It is not for the court to stand in the shoes of the Inspector”. I think that Mr Stanford understood this, at least in principle, but much of what he has put before the court seems to me to be directed more to persuading me that the Inspector was wrong in his assessment of the merits than that the Inspector was wrong in law. Mr Stanford also contended that the Inspector's decision was not correct and that another inspector would have reached a different conclusion. That does not go far enough. If one is challenging the correctness of a view expressed by an inspector or a decision reached by an inspector, it must be done either by identifying a specific legal error or by showing that the Inspector went so wrong as to have reached an irrational or perverse decision, that is to say not simply that another inspector would have reached a different decision, but that the decision reached by this Inspector was one that no reasonable inspector could have reached.

In the course of his written submissions and witness statements, and in the course of his oral submissions today, which were drawn in large part from a further written document that he helpfully placed before the court, Mr Stanford has traversed a lot of ground, but in terms that make it quite difficult for the court to separate out specific points that are alleged or might be said to be legal issues of a kind that the court can properly entertain.

I propose to deal with the matter by looking at the more detailed reasons given under each of the issues identified by the Inspector and by referring to what seem to me to be the main specific criticisms that are advanced by Mr Stanford in relation to them. I will then come back to some more general observations about the case as it is put by him.

Under Issue 1, First Aspect, in paragraphs 13-15 of the decision, the Inspector referred, first, to Mr Stanford's argument that the appeal site was within the small settlement of Grafton -- a view that was based on the fact that there were fifty houses and other buildings, including three car showrooms, along the length of Grafton Lane where the site was situated. The Inspector said:

“13.

.... to my mind, neither this, nor the fact that planning permission has previously been granted for development on this lane by the Council and its predecessor authority is sufficient to confer the status of a small settlement on this loose knit group of buildings.

14.

In order to establish the status of Grafton in planning terms it is necessary to look to the Local Plan as this lists all small settlements in the area. Grafton is not on that list. The appellant does not dispute this nor does he seek to rely on any contrary advice in the Local Plan to support his view that Grafton should be treated as a settlement. Indeed the appellant stated at the Inquiry that the Local Plan provides no flexibility with regard to the definition of small settlements. I consider, therefore, that the appeal site does not form part of the small settlement. It follows from this that it is in the open countryside and is subject to a generally restrictive approach towards development.

15.

In coming to this view I note that I am taking essentially the same approach as the Inspector at the previous appeal. I also note that the Local Plan uses both the term countryside and the term open countryside. In the context of the policies relevant to the appeal scheme I do not consider there to be a significant distinction between the two.”

Among Mr Stanford's objections to that process of reasoning are these points. He contends that the Inspector fell into error in holding that Grafton was not a small settlement or should not be treated as a small settlement. He submits that it has the characteristics of a small settlement, and that the Council seem to have accepted it to be such by allowing substantial development in the area. He suggests that the Inspector ignored that other development within the area in reaching his conclusion. He contrasts that with the account taken by the Inspector of the recent appeal decision in respect of the immediately adjoining property, Cedar Folly. Even if Grafton was not to be treated as a small settlement, it is submitted that the Inspector was wrong to treat the site as falling in the open countryside rather than treating it as adjoining a countryside area. At one point of his submissions he said that previously developed land (which this was accepted to be) could not be in the open countryside. A further point made was that the Inspector was wrong not to draw a distinction between open countryside and countryside, but to hold that there was no significant distinction between the two.

The answer to those points, as given by Mr Coppel, and as I accept to be correct, is, first, that the question whether Grafton is a small settlement is determined by the Local Plan. The Local Plan does not list it. That is decisive of the point. Mr Stanford has not taken me to the Local Plan or advanced any argument by reference to the terms of it to suggest that the Inspector erred in expressing the view that he did on that point.

As to whether the site was to be regarded as in the open countryside, that was a matter for the planning judgment of the Inspector. It involves an essentially qualitative assessment. There was no error of approach by the Inspector. Land can be in the open countryside, even if it is previously developed land. There is no reason of principle why that should not be the case. There was nothing illogical or irrational in treating the site as falling in the open countryside. No argument has been addressed by reference to the terms of the Local Plan to show that the Inspector was wrong in treating open countryside and countryside as being materially indistinguishable for the purposes of the Local Plan. Nor indeed has it been shown that if there was any distinction the Inspector's treatment of them as indistinguishable led to a material error.

So far as concerns other development in the area, it is clear that the Inspector had regard to such other development. Paragraph 13 of the decision referring to the argument advanced by the claimant based on such other development makes that clear. So do other references in the decision letter, for example a reference at paragraph 26 to the grant of planning permission for a Travel Lodge at the Grafton Inn, located nearby on the A49. There was, therefore, no failure to take that matter into account and the suggested contrast between the failure to look at other development on the one hand and the specific reference to the refusal of planning permission on the immediately adjoining site was illusory.

As regards the second aspect of the First Issue, character and appearance, the Inspector's reasoning proceeded along these lines. First, he stated in paragraph 16 that the trees on the site were prominent both in short distance views from the south and in middle distance views from the east. There was a survey by an arboricultural consultant, which was accepted to provide accurate information about the location, size and condition of the trees on site, which included a number of fine, exotic trees. It was agreed between the Council and the claimant's arboricultural consultant that the illustrative lay-out had not been informed by the results of the tree survey, as it should have been. Insofar as Mr Stanford takes issue with that, I cannot go behind the express evidence of the Inspector himself on the point.

In paragraph 17 the Inspector acknowledged that it would be possible to design a scheme that had a less destructive impact on the trees on site than that illustrated in the illustrative lay-out. He accepted that the site was well screened from the road by existing walls, buildings and trees. He went on:

“However, I consider that even if all these trees and other features were retained, any development on the site would be apparent from Grafton Lane and clearly visible from the footpath to the south. Additional planting could be provided but this would take time to establish.

18.

It was agreed at the Inquiry that the appeal site, being within the curtilage of existing buildings, is previously developed land as defined in PPG3. However, as that PPG makes clear, in considering schemes for development on such land policies relating to development in the countryside should be taken into account. This I have done. To my mind any development beyond the built footprint of the hotel would compromise its woodland setting. I consider the trees on the site are of critical importance in blending the existing buildings with the surrounding landscape. The proposed development would unacceptably alter the balance between the buildings and trees on the site and the harm that this would cause to the character and appearance of the countryside would outweigh any benefits derived from using previously developed land.

19.

I find, therefore, that the proposed development would, in principle, have an unacceptable effect on the character and appearance of the area ....”

Mr Stanford makes a number of criticisms about what is said on the subject of trees and, more generally, the effect on the character and appearance of the area. He says that the Inspector omitted to mention that the site was subject to a tree preservation order. As to that, it seems to me that the point is of no materiality because the Inspector clearly had it in mind, as appears from the last part of paragraph 17, that it might be possible to retain all the trees by a revised scheme.

To my mind it was entirely fair for the Inspector to observe that the illustrative lay-out suffered from the drawback that it had not been informed by the results of the tree survey, but plainly he did not regard that as determinative in itself of the outcome in a way unfavourable to the claimant.

The most substantial concern expressed by Mr Stanford about this part of the Inspector's reasoning, and about the case as a whole, is that, according to him, what is said by the Inspector to the effect that any development beyond the built footprint of the hotel would compromise its woodland setting and would be unacceptable has a dramatic effect on any future applications in respect of this site. It effectively determines that, notwithstanding this is previously developed land, no development going beyond the existing footprint of the hotel would be acceptable. Mr Stanford says that this has been seized on by the authority in discussions about any alternative development proposal. The submission made is that the Inspector went beyond his remit in expressing the view that he did.

A further point made is that there is an illogicality between what is said in that passage, which is premised on the critical importance of the trees on site, and his acceptance at the end of paragraph 17 that it might be possible to have a scheme which did retain the trees on site.

As to those matters, and again accepting submissions made on this point by Mr Coppel, it seems to me that the first point to make is that the Inspector was concerned with separate issues in paragraphs 17 and 18. In paragraph 17 he was looking at the importance of the trees and whether they could be retained. He contemplated the possibility that they might be retained, but stressed that any development on the site would still be clearly visible. In paragraph 18 he was not proceeding on the premise that one would necessarily lose any of the tees on site, but he was expressing a judgment on the balance between the trees on site and the bulk of development on site. In his view the proposed development would alter that balance unacceptably, which is why he had reached his conclusion in relation to the harm that it would cause to the character and appearance of the countryside.

That judgment was within his remit. It was a judgment relating to the proposed development, albeit expressed in terms that referred more generally to any development going beyond the built footprint of the hotel. It was a judgment reasonably open to him. Perhaps most importantly from Mr Stanford's point of view, Mr Coppel submits, and I accept, that what is said by the Inspector in that passage does not preclude any future development going beyond the built footprint of the hotel. The general position in planning applications is that each application is considered on its merits. A decision by a Planning Inspector does not have the status of a binding precedent. It is something that may be taken into account by an Inspector considering a future application in respect of the same site. Indeed it is something that may have to be taken into account by him. But it is one thing to be required to take into account a previous decision and the reasons expressed in support of that decision, it is another thing to say that a future inspector would have his own discretion or judgment curtailed or fettered by the earlier decision. A future inspector would have to form his own judgment in respect of whatever proposals were before him. If he took a different view he would have to explain why he took a different view about the effect on character and appearance of a development going beyond the existing built footprint of the hotel. I have referred to an inspector taking a decision, but the same point should apply equally to the local planning authority forming a view at that stage of the decision making process. In other words, whilst I understand the concerns expressed by Mr Stanford on this point, I think that he has formed an exaggerated understanding of the significance of what is said by the Inspector. Nonetheless, so far as concerns its implications for the specific development proposal that was before him, what was said was, in my judgment, perfectly lawful and provided a proper basis for the conclusion reached by the Inspector.

Under Issue 2, sustainability, the Inspector observed in paragraph 20 that the site was not well served by public transport, and he gave certain details of distances to bus routes and bus stops. He said that there was no footway on either side of Grafton Lane, which was narrow in places, and that it was not disputed that the road was heavily used by traffic during peak hours. He considered that such a long and potentially hazardous walk would offer little encouragement to the residents of any dwellings on the appeal site to make regular or frequent use of public transport. As regards shops he noted that any residents would need to travel off site, and he expressed himself satisfied that in order to do so they would be heavily dependent on the private car. In all the circumstances he considered that the appeal site was not in a sustainable location for the purposes of the policies.

Mr Stanford challenges some of the factual conclusions of the Inspector as well as his overall conclusion on sustainability. Mr Stanford observed that this is a metalled road, and that there are services already there, that the Highways Authority had no objection to the proposed development. He submits that the Inspector was simply wrong in the views he expressed about the unsuitability of the lane for walking and the distance and times involved.

In my view, these are all very much matters of judgment which it was for the Inspector to make. There is nothing in the decision itself or in the material that I have been shown that could lead me to the view that the conclusion of the Inspector was an unreasonable conclusion.

In relation to Issue 3, need, the main point raised by Mr Stanford concerns the Inspector's conclusion that certain policies did not apply because the development was going to be not in or adjacent to or on the outskirts of the City of Hereford but separated from it because (as he put it in paragraph 22) the site was “separated by a broad swathe of countryside”. Mr Stanford says it is only 250 metres away from the City of Hereford. The Inspector says in his witness statement that in the course of the inquiry the claimant's advocate submitted on several occasions that the distance amounted to 500 metres. Be that as it may, the Inspector was in the best position to judge, on the basis of his overall knowledge of the case, including his site visit, whether the area between the appeal site and the City of Hereford could properly be referred to as a “broad swathe of countryside” and whether the site should properly be regarded as benefiting from policies relating to the city itself. Again I see no basis upon which the court could conclude that the judgment made on this issue was unreasonable.

That leads me to a couple of more general points relating to the way the case is put by Mr Stanford. It is clear from much of what he says that he contends that the Inspector misunderstood and even misrepresented the physical features of the area. For example, complaint is made about what the Inspector said about how visible the site is and how visible the proposed development would be from different locations. The question as to whether it was in the open countryside or adjoining the open countryside and whether the City of Hereford was separated by a broad swathe of countryside could be regarded as other aspects of the same general point.

In my judgment, in seeking to persuade the court that the Inspector has misunderstood or misrepresented these points, Mr Stanford has embarked upon a hopeless task. Although the court has before it a number of plans and photographs, to which Mr Stanford has referred me, the court is in nowhere near the same position as an inspector in having a proper understanding of the area. In particular, the value of a site visit is incalculable. For those reasons it is generally recognised to be an extraordinarily difficult hurdle to overcome to seek to make good the kind of case that Mr Stanford has put forward. I am satisfied that he has got nowhere near overcoming that hurdle.

There is a further general submission that he has made and to which he has returned at various points, that the report of the Inspector is thoroughly unbalanced and unduly dismissive of Mr Stanford's case and unduly accepting of the case for the Council. I cannot identify such imbalance. It seems to me that the report is a perfectly fair report. It does not have any indications of bias or pre-determination, both of which expressions were referred to in the course of Mr Stanford's submission. Accordingly, that broad point is another one that I would reject.

I have not covered all the different points that are mentioned in Mr Stanford's various written documents, or indeed in his oral submissions. In consequence I have not dealt with everything that is put against those points in Mr Coppel's very thorough skeleton argument. I have, however, dealt with what I consider to be sufficient to indicate why it is that, in my judgment, the Inspector's decision did not suffer from any error or law or irrationality or any other legal defect of the kind suggested by Mr Stanford. In my judgment the challenge to the decision must fail and the claim must be dismissed.

MR COPPEL: My Lord, I am grateful. In the circumstances I would ask that the claimant do pay the Secretary of State's costs, and for those costs to be summarily assessed. My Lord, unfortunately the summary assessment of costs has only just been handed to me, so that Mr Stanford will not have had an adequate opportunity of seeing it. I can inform the court that the total amount sought is the sum of £5,711 and, as I say, I would ask that those costs be assessed in that sum.

MR JUSTICE RICHARDS: Can I see the schedule? Have you a copy for Mr Stanford?

MR COPPEL: Certainly.

MR JUSTICE RICHARDS: The major individual items are -- well there are twelve hours -- this is on the second page -- twelve hours on the documents.

MR COPPEL: I think it is more likely to be 22 hours. It has been divided up by fee earner, A, B, C, D, E, 20 hours. My Lord, by way of explanation, the reason for that is this. Conventionally in a challenge under section 288 the Secretary of State and his solicitors will have had no earlier involvement in the matter so that when the claim is made they, unlike the local planning authority, come to it with no prior knowledge. It is conventional in those circumstances for the Treasury Solicitor to look through the papers to see whether the challenge merits defending. That is what is done and that, my Lord, explains the time spent on the documents. Further, my Lord, in this case a witness statement was put in by the Inspector with the help and assistance of the Treasury Solicitor. So between them, my Lord, that goes to explain the 22-odd hours spent on documents.

MR JUSTICE RICHARDS: Yes. Of course, it is a short witness statement; on the other hand, it does append a lot of documents.

MR COPPEL: They had to be found, my Lord.

MR JUSTICE RICHARDS: Yet again, we have not actually needed to refer to any of those documents.

MR COPPEL: My Lord, that is correct, although it is fair to say that Mr Stanford's challenge traversed the breadth of possible grounds that could be levelled at a decision letter of an inspector and in those circumstances, particularly because a perversity challenge was levelled at the Inspector -- particularly because of that -- it is necessary to see what the totality of the material is. It sometimes happens, as is the case here, that that material is not in fact referred to during the course of submissions, although, my Lord, I did refer to parts of it in my skeleton argument to this court.

MR JUSTICE RICHARDS: Yes. I see the force of that point. What about the need for the highest fee earner to attend the hearing?

MR COPPEL: My Lord, the reason for that is the fact that this was prepared over the luncheon break. The fee earner who was to have attended would have been a little bit less. That was to be Miss McAstwie(?), but owing to certain matters this morning she ceased to be available, and the only other person in the planning section, as I understand it, was Mr Turner. My Lord, in the circumstances it is a comparatively small matter.

MR JUSTICE RICHARDS: Yes, but one needs to protect Mr Stanford's interests. He is not as familiar as the rest of us with these documents. That seems on the face of it to be one item that is too high. But, apart from that, I do not think that I have any questions. Let me discuss with Mr Stanford how we deal with this. (To the claimant) Mr Stanford, first of all, putting aside the document that you have just got in front of you, there is the question of principle to be addressed as to whether I should order you to pay the costs of this challenge. Now, I am sure you understand the normal rule is that in a case of this kind the loser pays the winning party's costs. It is not an absolute rule and the court will look to see if there are any special circumstances why it should not be applied. At the moment I know of no reason why it should not apply. It always hits the litigant in person on the face of it even harder than it does a public authority or a large company. But the fact is that if one causes other parties to incur very substantial costs themselves, and it turns out at the end of the day that it was not justified in the sense that you have lost the case and they have those costs that they should not have incurred, why should they not be able to recover them from you? Is there any special reason that you want to put before the court why I should not apply the ordinary rule?

THE CLAIMANT: Well, I certainly would like to think of one, my Lord, but --

MR JUSTICE RICHARDS: I am sure you would.

THE CLAIMANT: -- but I am not sure how these are made up. So I can't really comment as to whether they are justified or not, and you can.

MR JUSTICE RICHARDS: To give you an illustration, there can be cases where a claimant it perfectly justified in starting a claim because it only turns out when you get all the evidence in that the point being made is a bad point. On the face of it perhaps it was a good point and perhaps the Inspector's evidence disposes of it and in those circumstances you might get your costs up to that point but not subsequently. But this case so far as I can see has got no features of that kind or that might otherwise be regarded as exceptional. I give you the opportunity to say something, but I have to say that I cannot see what might be put forward on your behalf in opposing the order that you pay costs. That leaves entirely on one side the amount that you pay.

THE CLAIMANT: Is there any mitigation in whether the case had any merit to be brought, rather like tribunals where they tend to -- I know it is not the same category, but in tribunals they tend to say that as long as the case has some merit they normally do not award costs. I know that it's different in this court. As I appear to have lost today, I would expect to pay some. As I say, I don't know what mitigating circumstances there can be and from what you say, you do not think there are any?

MR JUSTICE RICHARDS: There we are. There is not any rule of the sort to which you refer. I am going to make an order that you pay the Secretary of State's costs, but now I have to decide whether I am going to assess them summarily -- decide what they are today -- or order that they be made subject to a detailed assessment at a later stage if they cannot be agreed. If I assess them summarily, I have to decide the sum in which I assess them. Now, in the ordinary course for a hearing of this length I would assess them summarily -- that is to say I choose a figure today that is the fair sum for you to pay. The only reason why I would not do so, if you wished me not to do so, is that you have only just had this sprung upon you. They were late producing the schedule. You have not had a chance to consider it and it is something on which you might want to take separate advice. The level of figures that are here, I can tell you, is modest by the standards of this court, as it normally tends to be when you are dealing with the Treasury Solicitor and the Secretary of State claiming costs. So these are not figures in any way out of the ordinary or clearly being too high. But I am not here to advise you. If you want to go off and take advice, then I will make an order for detailed assessment at a later date, but that may end up costing you more because you have to go through that process of detailed assessment.

THE CLAIMANT: What is the figure?

MR JUSTICE RICHARDS: It is £5,711 being sought.

THE CLAIMANT: And is that what you would award?

MR JUSTICE RICHARDS: If I do make a summary assessment -- and subject to anything else you want to draw to my attention in these figures -- I am going to make a small adjustment downwards to reflect the fact that it does not require the highest fee earner to be present at the hearing.

THE CLAIMANT: I would like to accept your judgment, my Lord.

MR JUSTICE RICHARDS: In that case I will summarily assess the costs. I am not going to have a fine mathematical calculation. I am going to assess them at £5,400 which, in my judgment, is an entirely fair and reasonable sum for litigation of this kind. Is there anything else you want to raise?

THE CLAIMANT: No, my Lord.

MR JUSTICE RICHARDS: Mr Stanford, since you are here as a litigant in person I should raise the question of rights of appeal. You do have an opportunity to appeal against this judgment, but in order to appeal you will have to obtain my permission to appeal or permission from the Court of Appeal. If you want my permission you will have to ask for it. It will not be too much of a surprise for you to learn from the terms of my judgment that if you were to ask for it I would refuse it. But you must have the opportunity to ask for it because if you want to try and pursue this in a higher court the first step is to try and --

THE CLAIMANT: I think in the circumstances I am not going to ask.

MR JUSTICE RICHARDS: I think you are very wise. Thank you very much indeed. Thank you for the very balanced way in which you presented your case. I appreciate how difficult it is when you are appearing in person, especially if you are not used to courts, and even the strongest advocates sometimes blanch at being in the Lord Chief Justice's Court, which we happen to have found ourselves in today. You can regard this as the experience of a lifetime. Thank you very much.