Gopalakrishnan, R (on the application of) v Immigration Adjudicator & Anor

The claimant is a woman asylum seeker from Sri Lanka who arrived in the United Kingdom in September 1999 and claimed asylum some 5 months later. Her claim was refused by the Secretary of State, who certified it under paragraph 9 of schedule 4 to the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999. An adjudicator dismissed the asylum appeal and agreed with the certification. The consequence of certification is to preclude any further avenue of appeal to the Immigration Appeal Tribunal. The present challenge, brought with permission, is to the adjudicator’s decision in respect of certification.

Paragraph 9 of schedule 4 to the 1999 Act provides in material part:

“(1)

This paragraph applies to an appeal under Part IV of this Act by a person who claims that it would be contrary to the Convention for him to be removed from, or to be required to leave, the United Kingdom, if the Secretary of State has certified that, in his opinion, that claim is one to which -

(a)

sub-paragraph (3), (4), (5) or (6) applies; and

(b)

sub-paragraph (7) does not apply.

(2)

If, on an appeal to which this paragraph applies, the adjudicator agrees with the opinion expressed in the Secretary of State's certificate, paragraph 22 does not confer on the appellant any right of appeal to the Immigration Appeal Tribunal.

….

(4)

This sub-paragraph applies to a claim under the Refugee Convention if -

(a)

it does not show a fear of persecution by reason of the appellant's race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion; or

(b)

it shows a fear of such persecution, but the fear is manifestly unfounded or the circumstances which gave rise to the fear no longer subsist.

….

(7)

This sub-paragraph applies to a claim if the evidence adduced in its support establishes a reasonable likelihood that the appellant has been tortured in the country to which he is to be sent.”

The Secretary of State's refusal letter dated 22 June 2001 set out the nature of the claimant's asylum claim as follows (para 2):

“You claim that as a Tamil living in Sri Lanka you were persecuted by the Sri Lankan authorities. You state that you have had to move several times because of the expanding of the civil war. In 1998 you claim that you moved to Colombo however, due to the number of visitors you used to receive the authorities were alerted. You claim that between May 1999 and September 1999 you were arrested 3 times by the police and interrogated for between 3-4 hours on each occasion. You claim that this was because you were a Tamil. In September 1999 you came to the United Kingdom to see your family members for 6 months. However, in January 2000 you claim that your husband contacted you to inform you that a Tamil Politician had been killed near where you lived and that the Security Forces had arrested many Tamils. Your son was detained and released and enquiries made as to the whereabouts of the rest of your family. You claim that your husband has been ordered to tell the Security Forces upon your return to Sri Lanka. Your husband told you not to return to Sri Lanka so you decided to claim asylum.”

The letter went on to set out at some length the reasons why the Secretary of State did not consider the claimant to have a well founded fear of persecution if returned to Sri Lanka. It referred to the general conditions in Sri Lanka and the general position of Tamils in that country. In relation to the claimant's alleged detentions, it expressed the view that round-ups of Tamils by the security forces did not amount to persecution and that the authorities would not have released the claimant if they had any reason to believe she was of continuing interest to them. In relation to her claim of ill-treatment while held by the authorities, it stated that the Secretary of State was aware of reports of continuing abuses of human rights by members of the security forces but was satisfied that the Government had taken genuine steps to address the human rights situation and that it continued to respond positively to international concerns. The fact that the claimant was able to leave Sri Lanka freely indicated that the authorities had no adverse interest in her. The letter made a number of comments on the reasons put forward by the claimant for claiming asylum when she did and on her delay in applying for asylum after her husband was said to have contacted her in January 2000. The letter stated that the delay "damages the credibility of your claim" and that the Secretary of State was of the opinion that, when considered with the other aspects of the claim, "you applied for asylum merely to extend your stay in the United Kingdom."

The letter concluded (para 17):

“In the light of all the evidence available to him, the Secretary of State has concluded that you have not established a well-founded fear of persecution and that you do not qualify for asylum. Your application is therefore refused under paragraph 336 of HC 395 (as amended) and has been recorded as determined on 22/6/01. In addition, the Secretary of State certifies that your claim is one to which paragraph 9(4)(b) of Schedule 4 to the 1999 Act applies because your fear of persecution is manifestly unfounded; and that your claim is one to which paragraph 9(7) does not apply because you have adduced no evidence relating to torture. This means that if you exercise your right of appeal it will be subject to the accelerated appeals procedure.”

At the hearing of the appeal the adjudicator deferred a decision on the certificate until after hearing evidence and submissions. In his determination he dealt first with the evidence. In evidence in chief the claimant adopted her statements and interview notes. Among the matters covered in cross-examination was this, as set out in para 12 of the determination:

“She has suffered at the hands of the Sri Lankan authorities since 1992. She could not leave Sri Lanka at that time as her children were quite young and it would have been difficult to uproot herself. She was arrested on three occasions between May and September 1999. On the third occasion members of the police attempted to rape her at her home but her husband arrived just in time. She was then taken to the police station. She did not mention this earlier as she was embarrassed to talk about it. She did however mention that there was a threat of rape on the previous occasions but that these threats were verbal whereas on the third occasion there was an actual physical attempt.”

The adjudicator’s conclusions were expressed as follows:

“27.

The appellant's credibility has been challenged and it is essential that I reach a conclusion as to her credibility. In reaching this conclusion I have taken into account the totality of the evidence before me (including the background documents).

28.

I regret to say that I did not find the appellant to be a credible witness at all. The appellant came to this country as a visitor on 20 September 1999 in order to visit her brother who was ill. She claimed that it was not her intention to claim asylum when she arrived here. She intended to stay here for only two to three months. I regret to say that I do not believe her. It seems to me that she used the pretext of visiting her brother in order to come to this country and, having arrived here, concocted a story of ill-treatment in Sri Lanka. There are a number of discrepancies in her evidence which lead me to believe that she is not telling me the truth. She claimed to have been ill-treated by the authorities since 1992. I accept of course that the appellant and her family like many Tamils in the north of Sri Lanka have been affected by the conflict in Sri Lanka. The appellant and her family seem to have moved around in the northern part of Sri Lanka before finally moving to Colombo in June 1998. She had travelled to Thailand in January 1999. She has in my view made up a story of arrest and detention between May and September 1999. She had tried to embellish her account by making allegations of rape. She made no mention of any physical threat to her when she was last arrested in any of her previous statements or interview. I find that the appellant's credibility is damaged to such an extent that I cannot place any reliance on her evidence. I also find that her credibility is damaged by the late application for asylum. She told me that she had not intended to claim asylum when she arrived and only changed her mind following a letter from her husband in November 1999 and telephone calls from him in January 2000. As I have stated I do not believe her. I believe that the application was made in order to prolong her stay in this country and that her application for asylum does not have anything to do with the Convention.

26.

I have given careful consideration to the totality of the evidence before me (including that which I have not specifically mentioned). I find that there is nothing in the evidence to show that the appellant is entitled to the protection of the 1951 United Nations Convention on the Status of Refugees. The appeal is wholly without any merit whatsoever. The appellant has failed to demonstrate that she has a well-founded fear of persecution if she is returned to Sri Lanka. There is no evidence before me to establish persecution in the past or the likelihood of threat of persecution in the future.

30.

I agree that the respondent was right to certify this appeal because the claim under the Convention is manifestly unfounded. I also find that the evidence has not established a reasonable likelihood that the appellant has been tortured in Sri Lanka.”

Miss Peterson submits that the Secretary of State wrongly certified the claim and that the certification was invalid and could not or should not have been upheld by the adjudicator. The challenge to certification relates to both limbs, i.e. that the claim was one to which para 9(4)(b) did apply and that it was one to which para 9(7) did not apply.

The submissions concentrated first on the certification under para 9(7). In the refusal letter the Secretary of State stated that "you have adduced no evidence relating to torture". In fact, however, the claimant had adduced evidence relating to torture. In her asylum interview she had said:

“They threatened me and bullied me, asking me to tell them the truth whether my family supported the LTTE.

They beat me there at the police station but the beatings were not so severe as to cause any open injuries. I had some pains and aches after that for which I took some home remedies.”

Although she had said nothing in terms about this in her statement, there was a veiled reference to it, in that she had referred to the three occasions when she was arrested and taken to the police station and had stated "I was kept and interrogated between 3-4 hours on each occasion" and, later in her statement, "I know how I was treated during the three times of my inquiry at the Police station and I am very scared to go through the same process again".

Miss Peterson submitted that the ill-treatment described by the claimant in interview fell within the definition of torture as applied for the purposes of certification. The IND's Asylum Policy Instructions state in chapter 5, section 2 that: "The definition of torture for the purposes of certification follows the dictionary definition: 'the infliction of severe physical or mental pain as a punishment or means of coercion'." They also refer across to guidance given in chapter 3, section 2, where it is stated inter alia that caseworkers should consider the following key factors in making an assessment of whether an applicant has suffered torture: severity, intention, purpose (interrogation, punishment, intimidation and discrimination) and official involvement. That section likewise stresses that for the purposes of certification the wider dictionary definition of torture should be followed (though it gives a slightly different definition). It further states: "If allegations of torture made in the asylum claim are not considered reasonably likely to have taken place, the refusal letter must say so (for example, if the claimed instances of torture are not considered credible, the refusal letter must say why credibility is in doubt). Failing that, a claim including allegations of torture may not be certified."

Thus the policy requires that, if certification under para 9(7) is based on an adverse credibility finding in respect of a claim of torture, the refusal letter should say so. In this case the refusal letter said nothing to the effect that the claimant's allegation of beatings was not considered credible. The letter proceeded simply on the basis that there was no evidence at all relating to torture. That was simply wrong, and the consequence was that the certification was invalid.

The present case is said to be on all fours with R (Prabaharen) v. Special Adjudicator [2001] EWHC Admin 764, a decision by Collins J. Although that was a permission application, Miss Peterson sought leave to cite it on the basis that it was a relatively extended judgment and the judge had expressed the view that it should be reported and had directed a transcript. In his judgment Collins J stated at para 11 that "[t]he adjudicator's approach to the certification should be, first, to look at the Secretary of State's letter and decide whether, on its face, the certification was proper. If it was not, the adjudicator ought immediately to decide not to uphold the certificate." The judge referred to the refusal letter, which used the same language as in this case, namely "you have adduced no evidence relating to torture". That was wrong, since the applicant had stated in interview that he had been tortured, and the Secretary of State had mentioned the allegations of ill-treatment earlier in the refusal letter. The judge concluded (para 15):

“Accordingly, the adjudicator should have appreciated that the letter was wrong, that evidence had been adduced and that, therefore, the certification was invalid. That being so, as it seems to me, even though he was persuaded that he did not believe the appellant and that this evidence adduced by the appellant did not establish that he had been tortured, nonetheless, he should not have upheld the certificate because he should have appreciated that there was nothing to uphold. The certification was bad. As I say it should not, in those circumstances, have subsisted to be upheld by the adjudicator ….”

As to the second limb of certification, under para 9(4)(b), Miss Peterson's essential submission was that the unchallenged facts before the Secretary of State at the time of certification demonstrated a claim under the Convention and that the claimant's fear of persecution could not be said to have been "manifestly unfounded". The facts were that she had been detained by the Sri Lankan authorities and had been ill-treated because of her Tamil ethnicity and imputed political opinion, and that she feared further persecution because of the adverse attention of the authorities towards her family after she departed from Sri Lanka. The credibility of those facts was not challenged by the Secretary of State. Moreover the objective evidence showed that the sort of ill-treatment described by the claimant was endemic in Sri Lanka.

Miss Peterson's skeleton argument referred to some of the earlier authorities on the test to be applied in deciding whether a claim is "manifestly unfounded", but she did not dispute that the correct approach is now as laid down by the House of Lords in R (Thangarasa) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] 4 All ER 800, albeit the context in that case was a human rights claim. On the basis of Lord Bingham's observation at para 14 of the judgment that "the Home Secretary is entitled to certify if … he is reasonably and conscientiously satisfied that the allegation must clearly fail", she submitted that the Secretary of State was not in a position so to certify in this case. She also cited a passage in the judgment of Stanley Burnton J in R (Gavira) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2001] EWHC Admin 250, where he observed: "It is impossible to see how a claim can show a fear of persecution, in the sense of being factually well-founded, and yet be manifestly unfounded".

For the Secretary of State, Miss Anderson relied heavily on the judgment of Keith J in R (Farkondeh) v. Special Adjudicator [2002] EWHC 384 (Admin). Although the case went to the Court of Appeal, it did not do so on points relevant to the present case. The refusal letter in Farkondeh was made under para 9(6)(c) (which applies where a claim is "frivolous or vexatious") and para 9(7) of schedule 4. The Secretary of State certified that the claim was one to which para 9(6)(c) applied but failed to specify any reasons for that conclusion. In relation to para 9(7) he said that the provision did not apply "because you have adduced no evidence relating to torture …".

In the judicial review proceedings Keith held in relation to para 9(6)(c) that, by contrast with SSHD v. Salah Ziar [1997] INLR 221, the Secretary of State had identified the ground on which the certificate was being issued and it was unnecessary for him to state whether he was certifying the claim as frivolous or whether he was certifying it as vexatious. Nor was it necessary for him to state why he thought that the claim was frivolous or vexatious.

In relation to para 9(7) Keith J held as follows (para 19):

“Nor was there any need for the Secretary of State to explain why in his view paragraph 9(7) did not apply to the claimant's claim. It would have been sufficient for him to state that the claim was one to which paragraph 9(7) did not apply. It is true that the additional words 'because you have adduced no evidence relating to torture in Iran' did not track the language of paragraph 9(7). That might have suggested that the Secretary of State thought that the issue was whether torture occurred in Iran, rather than whether it was reasonably likely that the claimant had been subjected to torture there. Indeed, if the words used by the Secretary of State in the refusal letter showed that the Secretary of State failed to 'address his mind to the critical factors' found in paragraph 9(7), which was the language of the headnote in Salah Ziar, the certificate under paragraph 9(7) could then be set aside. But I do not think for one moment that the additional words which the Secretary of State added show that he did not apply his mind to the critical question posed by paragraph 9(7). In my opinion, the additional words were a form of shorthand designed to inform the claimant - unnecessarily, because the claimant or her advisers could have checked paragraph 9(7) for themselves - of the topics to which paragraph 9(7) related. It would, I think, have been better for the Secretary of State, either to reproduce the statutory language, or not to add any additional words at all, but it is not possible sensibly to argue that the words which the Secretary of State chose to use betrayed a misunderstanding of what paragraph 9(7) was all about.”

Miss Anderson submitted that that approach was right and should be followed. Prabaharen, by contrast, should not be followed: it was a decision on the grant of permission, did not have the benefit of full argument and did not provide the same detailed analysis as Farkondeh.

Thus she submitted that the reason given in the refusal letter for the certification under para 9(7), i.e. that "you have adduced no evidence relating to torture", may not be well expressed but is to be read as a shorthand for the statutory test that the evidence does not establish a reasonable likelihood that the claimant had been tortured. In any event it was not necessary for the Secretary of State to state his reasons. It was sufficient that he had applied his mind to the statutory question and had certified the claim.

If it was appropriate to review the Secretary of State's decision, then Miss Anderson submitted that he was entitled to conclude that para 9(7) did not apply. Although there is no hard and fast definition of torture, it must have a quality of significant severity taking it beyond just ill-treatment. Looking at the facts as a whole the Secretary of State could reasonably conclude that the requisite threshold was not reached, especially bearing in mind circumstances such as the failure to mention the ill-treatment in the original statement, the absence of wounds and the lack of supporting medical evidence. Moreover there was no acceptance of the claimant's credibility: the refusal letter referred to matters as damaging her credibility and a further letter of 11 September 2001 giving supplementary reasons in respect of the human rights claim made clear that her credibility was not accepted.

In any event, Miss Anderson submitted that the adjudicator's function was not to review the Secretary of State's decision but to decide on the evidence before him whether he agreed with that opinion. The adjudicator was entitled to consider the claimant's credibility whether or not the refusal letter took issue expressly with it. The adjudicator's conclusions on credibility were reasonably open to him and in the circumstances he was plainly entitled to agree with the Secretary of State's opinion that para 9(7) did not apply.

As to para 9(4)(b), the Secretary of State was entitled to conclude that the claim was clearly bound to fail and therefore to certify it as manifestly unfounded. He had concluded that the claimant was of no interest to the authorities when she left and that later events did not support the view that she had been singled out by the authorities: she had nothing to fear by returning to Sri Lanka. In any event, here again the function of the adjudicator was not to review the Secretary of State's decision but to reach his own opinion on the evidence before him. In the light of his conclusions on credibility it was plainly open to him to find that the claim was manifestly unfounded. There was nothing unlawful or irrational about that conclusion.

Finally, Miss Anderson submitted that this was a case in which relief should anyway be refused. The challenge had been confined to the certification and nothing had been put forward that was capable of establishing a risk of persecution if the claimant were returned to Sri Lanka. Since the purpose of quashing certification would be to open up an avenue of appeal to the Immigration Appeal Tribunal, relief should be granted only if there was material to suggest that an appeal to the Immigration Appeal Tribunal would or might have a real prospect of success. That was not so in this case.

In view of the way in which this case has been argued for the claimant, I think it important to spell out what I consider to be the correct approach by an adjudicator when dealing with certification. (I am not concerned with whether the adjudicator should announce the decision at the start of the hearing or reserve it until after hearing evidence and submission.)

The first question for the adjudicator is whether there has been any certification by the Secretary of State that falls within the terms of para 9 of schedule 4 at all. If the Secretary of State has failed to identify the provisions of para 9(3)-(6) that in his opinion apply to the claim, or to state that in his opinion para 9(7) does not apply, then (subject to the possibility of amendment) the certification is defective and there is nothing for the adjudicator to agree or disagree with: Salah Ziar. If, however, the Secretary of State has sufficiently identified the provisions that in his opinion do or do not apply, so as bring the certificate within the terms of para 9, the adjudicator can and should proceed to consider whether he agrees or disagrees with the opinion expressed in it.

I agree with Keith J in Farkondeh that the validity of certification by the Secretary of State does not depend on his giving reasons why the relevant provisions do or do not apply. Reasons will often be helpful and may be called for by policy instructions. They are likely, however, to be a very brief summary rather than a detailed restatement of the relevant parts of the reasoning that led to the refusal of the asylum claim. And the validity of the certificate depends on the Secretary of State having certified that in his opinion the relevant provisions do or do not apply, not on the reasons given in support of that opinion. Thus, where reasons are given by the Secretary of State, the adjudicator is not required to review those reasons to see whether they are adequate or whether the evidence before the Secretary of State supported them, though he may choose to examine them as part of the process of forming his own independent judgment on whether the relevant provisions of para 9 do or do not apply.

Underlying all this is the wider point that the adjudicator is not engaged in a judicial review of the Secretary of State's certification. The adjudicator is not concerned, for example, with whether the opinion reached by the Secretary of State was reasonably open on the evidence that was before the Secretary of State. The adjudicator has the distinct statutory function, pursuant to the clear terms of para 9(2), of deciding whether he "agrees with the opinion expressed in the Secretary of State's certificate" (emphasis added). That provision is premised on the existence of something that can properly be regarded as a certificate of the Secretary of State under para 9. Subject to that, however, it contemplates a fresh exercise of judgment by the adjudicator. He must form his own independent assessment of whether the relevant provisions of para 9 do or do not apply. Such an assessment must, as a matter of general principle, be based on all the evidence now before him, rather than being limited to the evidence that was before the Secretary of State at the time of the original certification.

Reference is often made to the adjudicator "upholding" the Secretary of State's certificate. As a shorthand that is perfectly acceptable, but it should not be allowed to obscure the essential point that the adjudicator is concerned primarily with whether he "agrees with" the opinion in that certificate. If he does agree with it, then by virtue of para 9(2) there is no right of further appeal to the Immigration Appeal Tribunal. Otherwise the normal avenue of appeal remains open.

All of this follows through to the position on judicial review of the adjudicator's decision. The court is then concerned with the adjudicator's decision on appeal, not with the Secretary of State's decision from which the appeal was brought: the existence and exercise of the statutory right of appeal make it plainly inappropriate to engage in judicial review of the original decision. On judicial review of the adjudicator's decision, a threshold issue may be whether the adjudicator had before him a certificate falling within the terms of para 9; but, as explained above, that is a very narrow issue and does not involve, for example, examination of the rationality of the opinion formed by the Secretary of State in relation to certification. Subject to that, if the adjudicator has agreed with the Secretary of State's opinion, the court's focus is not on the Secretary of State's certificate but on the lawfulness of the adjudicator's conclusion, including in particular the question whether the conclusion was reasonably open to the adjudicator on the evidence before him.

The approach I have indicated accords with that of Keith J in Farkondeh but differs from that of Collins J in Prabaharen. Despite the respect to be accorded to a decision of Collins J, with his extensive experience in this field, I accept Miss Anderson's submission that Prabaharen should not be followed. It was only a permission application and the judge did not have the benefit of full argument as in Farkondeh and in the present case.

Turning to the particular circumstances of the present case, it is clear in my judgment that the adjudicator was reasonably entitled to reach the conclusion he did on certification, having regard to the evidence before him and his findings in relation to that evidence.

As to the threshold issue, there was nothing defective about the Secretary of State's certification under para 9. The refusal letter stated in terms that the claim was certified as one to which para 9(4)(b) applied and para 9(7) did not apply. The adjudicator's task was therefore to go on to decide whether he agreed with the Secretary of State's opinion.

As to the finding under para 9(4)(b) that the fear of persecution shown by the claim was "manifestly unfounded", I think it right to apply the same legal test as was articulated by the House of Lords in Thangarasa. The certificate in that case was given under section 72(2)(a) of the 1999 Act and precluded an in-country appeal in respect of the refusal of a human rights claim. It is arguable that the effect of a certificate in that context is somewhat more serious for the claimant than in the present context, where the claimant remains entitled to an in-country appeal to an adjudicator in respect of his asylum claim and the effect of a certificate is limited to precluding a further appeal to the Immigration Appeal Tribunal. The differences are in my view not such, however, as to justify the application of a different test in determining whether a claim is "manifestly unfounded". In Thangarasa there are various formulations of the test, but their general thrust is the same. The essential point is that expressed by Lord Bingham at para 14, namely that "the Home Secretary is entitled to certify if, after reviewing [the material before him], he is reasonably and conscientiously satisfied that the allegation must clearly fail".

The adjudicator in this case, having regard to his conclusions on the substance of the asylum claim, was fully entitled to form the opinion that the claimed fear of persecution was manifestly unfounded. The strong adverse credibility findings were reasonably open to him, and the contrary has not been argued before me. They supported the conclusion that the appeal was "wholly without any merit whatsoever" and that there was "no evidence … to establish persecution in the past or the likelihood of threat of persecution in the future". In the light of those matters, it was plain that the allegation must clearly fail. The adjudicator's opinion that the claim was manifestly unfounded was not only reasonable but inevitable.

The same considerations apply to para 9(7). The adjudicator simply disbelieved the account of ill-treatment in custody, and he was reasonably entitled to do so. His opinion that the evidence had not established a reasonable likelihood that the claimant had been tortured in Sri Lanka was again not only reasonable but inevitable.

It follows that the challenge to the adjudicator's decision on certification must fail.

In the circumstances I do not think it appropriate for me to engage in the exercise to which many of Miss Peterson's submissions seemed to me to be directed, namely to analyse the Secretary of State's certification as if it were itself subject to judicial review. I should, however, make clear that I would not have been inclined to strike down the certification even if such an exercise of review had been appropriate. Very briefly, the position is in my judgment as follows. In relation to para 9(4)(b), the Secretary of State was reasonably entitled to conclude on the evidence before him, and having regard to the detailed reasons given for refusal of the asylum claim, that the claim was manifestly unfounded; and he was entitled to do that without an express rejection of credibility. In relation to para 9(7), it may be that the words "you have adduced no evidence relating to torture" are to be read as a shorthand reference to the statutory test, as Keith J held in Farkondeh. But even if they are to be read as referring to the actual evidence in the case, I am far from satisfied that the letter was wrong. The ill-treatment described by the claimant could reasonably be regarded as not amounting to torture even on the basis of the definitions set out in the IND's policy instructions, so that the view could properly be taken that her evidence of such ill-treatment was not "evidence relating to torture". If this was the process of reasoning, it would have been desirable to spell it out more clearly; but, as already indicated, it was not necessary as a matter of law to give reasons and I do not consider that the lack of fuller reasoning would vitiate the certificate even if it were the direct subject of review.

I should deal finally with Miss Anderson's submissions about the refusal of relief even if there were a problem about the adjudicator's decision on certification. It is striking that the claim to this court puts forward no grounds for challenging the adjudicator's substantive decision. Although it is asserted that grounds for challenging the decision do exist, that the Immigration Appeal Tribunal is not so circumscribed on an appeal as the court is on judicial review, and that there is the possibility of fresh evidence being adduced on appeal, it is still important in my judgment for a claimant seeking the discretionary remedy of a quashing order to satisfy the court that such an order would serve a useful purpose. No useful purpose would be served by quashing a decision on certification if there were no real prospect of a successful appeal to the Immigration Appeal Tribunal. It would serve only to cause delay in the ultimate disposal of the asylum claim. In this case there is nothing whatsoever before the court to establish any such prospect of success on an appeal. In those circumstances I would have refused relief even if I had been persuaded that the adjudicator had erred in relation to certification.

For all those reasons the claim is dismissed.