Wandsworth London Borough Council, R (on the application of) v The Schools Adjudicator

The Claimant, as the admissions authority for Ernest Bevin College (“EBC), a boys’ community school (secondary school) in its area, seeks permission and an order to quash the decision of the Defendant in respect of a determination made by him on 8 August 2003. In his determination the Defendant was considering objections to the selective admissions policies operated by EBC and two other schools in the borough, Graveney School (“GS”), a mixed foundation school, the First Interested Party and Burntwood School (“BS”), a girls’ foundation school, the Second Interested Party. He upheld the objections in part and decided that each of the admissions authorities should reduce the percentage of pupils to be selected on the basis of academic ability at each school. In EBC’s case, he reduced the percentage from 33% to 30%.

For reasons which will become clear, I grant permission.

By section 100 of the School Standards and Framework Act 1998 (“the Act”),

“(1)

Where at the beginning of the 1997-98 school year the admission arrangements for a maintained school made provision for selection by ability…the admission arrangements for the school may continue to make such provision…”

By section 89(1) of the Act,

“The admission authority for a maintained school shall, before the beginning of each school year, determine…the admission arrangements which are to apply for that year.”

It is agreed the Claimant is the admission authority for EBC. “Admission arrangements” are defined in section 88(2) as,

“the arrangements for the admission of pupils to the school including the school’s admission policy.”

By section 90(2),

“Where-

(a)

admission arrangements have been determined by an admission authority…but

(b)

any parent…wishes to make an objection about those arrangements…

(c)

…that person may refer the objection to the adjudicator.

(3)

On a reference…the adjudicator shall either

(a)

decide whether, and if so, to what extent the objection should be upheld…

(6)

Where the adjudicator…decides that an objection referred to him…should be upheld to any extent, his decision on the objection may specify the modifications that are to be made to the admissions arrangements in question.

(7)…the adjudicator…shall publish his decision on the objection and the reasons for it.

(8)

The decision…on the objection shall…be binding…”

There is a Code of Practice concerning admissions. Paragraph 4.13 states,

“…the Adjudicator may determine that an Admission Authority seeking to continue to make provision for partial selection should cease to do so…Adjudicators may uphold, reject or partially uphold objections and may make modifications to admissions arrangements beyond those suggested by the objectors. ”

The Education (Objection to Admission Arrangements) Regulations 1999 are also relevant. Regulation 6 deals with the condition to be met before there can be consideration by the Adjudicator. By 6(2)

“…not less than 10 parents [must] have referred objections…which-

(a)

are about the same admission arrangements; and

(b)

raise the same or substantially the same issue.”

Regulation 9 limits the number of later objections in following school years. If an objection has been decided by an adjudicator, no subsequent objection may be referred about those arrangements, or the arrangements for that school for the next following school year.

A summary of the facts

Partial selection on the basis of ability was introduced for the Interested Parties in 1995. It was introduced for EBC in 1996. At GS the number of such pupils was 125, 50% of the intake: at BS 90, 32% of the intake and at EBC 90, 50% of the intake. There were objections from the governing body of a junior school to partial selection for all three schools in 1999. An adjudicator’s decision to reduce the proportion of selective places in each school was quashed by the Court. Objections from the same body were received in 2000. In respect of GS and EBC respectively an adjudicator reduced the number of selected pupils to 75 or 30% and 45 or 33%. BS was unchanged. In May 2002 objections were received in respect of GS from the parents who lived in the area. The adjudicator, who was the Defendant, did not uphold the objections.

Ability is determined by the results of the Wandsworth Year 6 Test. Although expressed slightly differently in each case, the balance of admissions (which in each case of course is the majority) is allocated in the following order: any applicant who has a sibling at the school and is not admitted as a result of selection, special medical or social grounds and finally, children who live nearest.

In May 2003 34 parents of children who lived in North Battersea objected to the admissions arrangements. Each objection was not in identical terms. One example is in the following terms.

“We, the undersigned parents of primary school-age children living within the relevant area…wish to object to the admission arrangements recently published in the local press by [GS], [BS] and [EBC]…for the year 2004/5.

We believe that the current rules of partial selection by ability in [the above] schools work against the interests of most parents and children in our local community in or near North Battersea for the following reasons:

1.

The current rules ensure that these schools recruit as least one third of top ability children, but not in equal proportions of average and below average ability children. This creates an unfair balance in the intake left available for other schools in Wandsworth, including the Battersea area, which cannot achieve a balanced intake.

2.

We believe that partial selection…is directly damaging our local secondary school, Battersea Technical College [“BTC”], which has become the last choice for parents in the borough, even for those who live nearby. Because of budgetary constraints, BTC is then forced to take a greater proportion of hard to teach children than any other school in the borough.

3.

For many of us, for whom the choice is even more restricted because we cannot afford the transport to alternative schools, sending our children somewhere else is not an option. We object to selection by ability in other schools in the borough because it exacerbates the difficulties that our local secondary school [BTC] already faces in a deprived area, where more than 55% of pupils qualify for free school meals.

4.

The current rules of admission have, over time, created a hierarchy of schools and [BTC] is perceived to be at the bottom…We believe this situation will not change unless the current rules for admission for [GS, BS and EBC] are changed.

5.

We request that the current selection rules, which concern themselves only with high-achieving pupils, should be replaced by a fair banding system which takes account of all children in the area.”

Not all the objections referred to fair banding. A fair banding system is one by which pupils are admitted in a range of ability bands which reflects the range of applicants to that school (see section 101 of the Act). It applies to some (although not all) of the non-selective schools in Wandsworth. If there are too many applications for places at such a school, applicants within a band are chosen in the order first of those who have siblings in the school and second, by the proximity of the school to their home. Fair banding does not apply to BTC.

Another example of the objections is in the following terms:

Whatever gloss is put on the objections, it is clear they concern the area of North Battersea and the position of BTC. It is agreed that BTC has significant problems. It has surplus places when other schools (selective or not) in Wandsworth are “significantly oversubscribed”: see page 13 of the Determination. It has recently been placed in special measures by Ofsted.

Each of the schools put in a response for the Defendant. That of the Claimant in respect of EBC contained an analysis of the intake at the school. It revealed, among other things, that the free school meal intake was “considerably higher” than the Borough average, as was its proportion of bilingual pupils. The assessments for its intake revealed it was slightly below the Borough average and “notably below” three other schools not operating a policy of partial selection. It suggested,

“On this analysis it is apparent that any policy of partial selection has not resulted in an unduly “advantaged” intake cohort…

The above evidence shows that neither in terms of social mix…nor achievement of its intake has a policy of partial selection acted to create a particularly advantaged situation for the school or had any distorting effect on the intake locally. Indeed in aggregate there is no marked variation in social composition and achievement levels at [EBC] when compared to other schools operating in similar settings but without partial selection…highlighting that [EBC’s] intake has been and remains wholly representative of the community within which it is set.”

The Defendant stated that

“It is to the cumulative impact of the three schools’ admission arrangements that the parents make objection, with all objectors citing all three schools. However natural justice would dictate that each school is deserving of detailed consideration of their own individual circumstances…”

He summarised the objections in the following terms.

“The objectors contend that by operating a policy of partial selection by ability [the schools] work against the interests of parents and children in the local community in or near North Battersea. They cite their reasons for objection as:

•

That as a consequence (my emphasis) of the…schools admitting disproportionately large numbers of high ability children, other local schools in Wandsworth and Battersea in particular are unable to achieve a balanced intake.

•

That this process has, over time, created a hierarchy of schools in the eyes of parents seeking a secondary school for their child.

•

That this has been particularly damaging to [BTC], which is located in an area of high social deprivation (55%…qualify for free school meals) and become last choice for the Borough, even those who live nearby. The result being budgetary shortfalls and a greater proportion of hard to teach children than other schools in the Borough

•

This is unfair for those parents and children living in the area who face an unnecessarily complex and distressing secondary admissions process, and particularly discriminates against those who are unable to provide transport to alternative schools.

As a final point, some of the objectors make an additional request that the schools should be required to replace…partial selection by one of a fair banding system…”

Under the heading “Consideration of Factors” he again refers to the nature of the objections.

“I note the objectors raise three separate but related issues. The first relates to the impact of partial selection by the…schools…upon other schools, particularly [BTC]. The second relates to the impact upon parents living in parts of Battersea (all objectors live in SW11), for some of whom obtaining a place at any of their preferred schools would appear difficult. Finally, for those parents whose children attend BTC the quality of provision suffers unnecessarily from the creaming off of more able pupils.

In considering these issues it is important first to determine if schools in Wandsworth do have unbalanced intakes and if this is a particular problem for BTC. Secondly, what is the availability of places for children from the Battersea area? Finally, a review of the structure of pupil intakes for each of the three partially selective schools’ permits (sic) an assessment to be made of the likely impact of any changes upon the general pattern admissions (sic). In coming to my conclusions I have also considered a number of other factors, among which have been the broader implications for parental choice and the possible impact upon academic standards. ”

Miss Laing submits that the substance of the objections is clear and is reflected in the Defendant’s summary of them. He rightly understood the fundamental objection to be the consequences, particularly on BTC, of the unbalanced intake into the selective schools. She goes on to submit, that if the Defendant, in respect of EBC concluded there was no such lack of balance in intake, then the substance of the objection, at least insofar as EBC is concerned, cannot as a matter of logic, succeed. Miss Grey on behalf of the Defendant submits that in fact the substance of the objections was wider. The parents’ objections quoted in paragraph 4 suggest that. It was effectively to selection by the three schools on ability. The question of balance of intake was but one part of that. Some of the other comments of the Defendant indicate he understood them in that way.

It seems to me the substance of the objection was correctly set out by the Defendant in the quotation set out in paragraph 18 above. That was whichever type of parents’ objections are relied upon. At the heart of what the parents are saying is this. BTC loses out because the three schools together disproportionately recruit top ability children. That disproportionate intake of top ability children means there are fewer such children available for other schools in Wandsworth, particularly BTC. BTC cannot achieve a balanced intake. A more balanced intake into the schools will result in a more balanced intake for BTC. Its standards will therefore improve.

The Defendant summarised the schools’ responses. He referred to EBC’s contention that its intake was wholly representative of the community in which it was set (see paragraph 16 above). He referred too to an acceptance that BTC’s performance was poor, and a contention that there was

“…no correlation between its GCSE results and changing patterns of behaviour in other local schools…this is because the location of BTC means that its natural catchment area draws upon primary schools in several neighbouring LEAs…More generally they suggest that should the three schools subject to the current objection be forced to replace the number of pupils they currently admit by selection using other criteria, primarily geographic proximity, the result would be a change from selection by ability to selection on socio-economic grounds, namely the ability to afford local housing…a less desirable outcome.

The LEA provides evidence to suggest the success of its policy…as part of a policy to offer plurality of choice to parents and children…it highlights the change from the availability of surplus places…in the early 1990s, to current high levels of popularity and over subscription

[And] states that only 10.7% of admissions are made on the basis of selection by ability across the LEA…and that only a small number of such pupils are admitted to [GS], [BS] and [EBC] from the area local to BTC.”

The Defendant accepted that,

“The evidence [submitted to him] tends to confirm concerns expressed by the objectors regarding an unequal spread of the more able and less able pupils across the borough’s schools.”

He considered the “implications for parents and children living in SW11.” He observed that given there is a surplus of places at BTC and local parents are failing to gain entry to their preferred school, BTC cannot be high on their list.

“…whilst schools may have an issue relating to the academic mix of their intakes, other than for BTC it does not seem to have constrained their popularity. The resulting problem for parents [in SW11] in securing a preferred school place for their child therefore relates to a general deficit of places at popular schools and a lack of willingness to consider BTC.”

In other words, other non-selective schools are popular and oversubscribed. The problem is with BTC.

He went on to consider the “effect of a policy of partial selection upon local parents and children, and other schools.” He commented upon the wide range of available local schools. He observed that a pattern of admission on the basis of living locally will be distorted by selection on ability, although selection offered parents “plurality of choice.” In dealing with the percentage of selected pupils at BS, he mistakenly referred to 30% instead of 32%. He wrongly recorded the percentage had been reduced when it had not.

He set out two questions.

“Against this background I have considered the intake data for each of the three schools in order to resolve two questions. Firstly, is the result of [the schools’] current admissions policy an intake that is significantly imbalanced in favour of high ability children? Secondly, where are children of higher ability travelling from to attend the school?”

He analysed the intake of EBC for September 2002. In terms of English, Maths and Science it was below the borough average. The Abstract Reasoning Standardised Score was “significantly below the borough average.” Its social deprivation was “well above” the borough average although its number of pupils with a statement of educational needs was “somewhat lower than average.”

“These intake measures were not significantly out of line with those at Wandsworth schools operating fair banding systems for admissions. The school’s intake also includes a much greater proportion of pupils from ethnic minorities than most other Wandsworth schools, including BTC.”

In short therefore, the Defendant did not in respect of EBC find a significant imbalance in favour of high ability children. Fair banding would not make any significant difference. His findings confirmed what the Claimant was saying in its response to the objections.

He then considered his second question: where the children of higher ability came from.

Of the 60 higher ability entrants to EBC in September 2003, 16 attended a primary school for which BTC

“could be considered a realistic alternative on grounds of geographic proximity, including 7 living in SW11 postcodes. Adding the number of non-selective admissions…from these same…schools, presumably…mainly…siblings of current [high ability] pupils…we might estimate that approximately 25 pupils per year attend [EBC] who otherwise might consider BTC or other local schools as an alternative, of which a minimum of two-thirds [the 16 on ability] would score highly in the Wandsworth “test”.”

He went on to consider the same two questions as far GS and BS are concerned. Their intake comprised the most able in the borough with below average social deprivation. Only 10 pupils in each case lived in SW11: 30 to 40 originated from primary schools “at least equidistant to BTC.”

He considered the effect of an end to partial selection and compared it with selection by proximity to the three schools, taking into account the siblings of those selected on ability. He said that such kinds of calculations “are fraught with difficulties.” He concluded that it “is not unreasonable to assume” that there were 90 to 100 pupils enrolled annually at the three schools from whom other schools located reasonably close to Battersea, primarily BTC, “would be a realistic alternative in terms of proximity to their home…probably at least half would be likely to score highly in the Wandsworth admission test.

The Defendant then advanced the “ripple effect.”

“The high levels of over-subscription at many Wandsworth schools would then help create a “ripple” effect, whereby [GS], [BS] and [EBC] would enrol a greater number of local children and those displaced would apply in turn to their own nearest school. As they would generally enter one of the higher bands, they would displace other able pupils [because of admission by fair banding]. The cumulative effect would be to “push” the able pupils outwards from South Wandsworth, including in the direction of BTC and other less popular schools.

However, this also assumes that a parent of an able child thus denied access to one of the [three] schools would then place their child at a non-selective school, including BTC. This has not been the case in the past. The difficulties of BTC existed prior to the introduction of partial selection. High levels of cross-border transfers and participation in private education also have a long history.”

He set out the “likely actual result” of an end to partial selection.

“Firstly, many out of area children, whose parents clearly feel they benefit from attending one of the [three] schools would no longer be eligible for admission unless they [moved]…Secondly, it is unlikely that any child living in the north of the borough would obtain a place at one of the [three]…schools [which are in the south east]. Thirdly, it is possible that as a result of a greater proportion of local children gaining a place at one of the three schools, places [taken by local children] would become available at other schools, including those in the northern part of [Lewisham]…”

He goes on to say that that some of the more able pupils and their siblings currently attending schools in the North would seek a place at their most popular local school. While this may benefit schools well placed to absorb more able children

“Any assumption that the enforced injection of a small number of able children will, in some way of itself, [act] as a catalyst to promote greater performance in a school with a history of weakness and low pupil attainment offers a rather naïve view of those factors contributing to successful schools.”

In short, the Defendant is saying that it is naïve to believe that the injection of some 90 to 100 more able children (as a result of the ripple effect) will on its own improve BTC’s performance, given its history.

As to parental choice, he states that some parents living in Battersea are likely to gain greater choice in that their local school may benefit from improved standards and be more attractive to children. Parents local to the three schools would have greater choice. A wider range of parents would loose choice because of the disappearance of selection. That would probably end any possibility of children in SW11 going to a school with currently the highest level of pupil attainment.

The Defendant considered the “likely impact on academic standards.” Among other things, he states that

“There is some evidence that BTC has suffered by comparison with other local schools for many years and has actually improved its performance and reduced surplus capacity since the introduction of partial selection elsewhere in the LEA.”

There is some controversy about the next part.

“All three of the…schools consistently out perform BTC and other non-selective schools in the league tables. At two of the…schools, [BS] and [EBC], recent OFSTED have stated that selection is not the main driver of academic standards, and therefore one might question if partial selection is a necessary component of their admissions arrangements. Indeed academic performance at [EBC] is not as strong as the other two schools and the same claims for importance of selection…is not being made…An examination of intake data…suggests that even with its current level of partial selection, the school is not recruiting a profile of pupils, either academically or in terms of social deprivation, significantly different from [BTC] and in all respects well below average for the borough. It could be argued that the removal of its partial selection policy would impact negatively on its ability to maintain even this level of performance.”

In other words, the Defendant is saying that in terms of intake EBC and BTC are not significantly different. To deprive EBC of those selected on ability would arguably have a negative impact on its performance.

The Defendant considers the other two schools. Finally he sets out his conclusion.

“…I am persuaded on a number of points made by the objectors, namely

•

That [BTC] does suffer from a significantly unbalanced intake in terms of academic ability and social deprivation.

•

That parents and children living in Battersea…have a much lower likelihood of gaining a place for their child at those schools with the highest levels of pupil attainment.

•

That [GS] and [BS] recruit pupils more academically able than the average for schools in the borough, and that [EBC] recruits a more academically able profile of pupils via partial selection than would otherwise be the case.

•

Finally I am persuaded that in the absence of partial selection [the three schools] would each admit a lower number of more able pupils, which would potentially make an increased number of such pupils available for recruitment by other local schools. As one Wandsworth school with surplus places [BTC] should be in a position to benefit.

I sympathise with the view of the objectors that there is a significant difference between the partially selective schools, [GS] and [BS] in particular and the non-selective schools, [BTC] in particular in terms of the measures of academic ability and social deprivation within their intakes. Whilst there will always be some schools that remain more popular than others, they should be able to operate on as level a playing field as it is possible to create.

Legislation permits schools to admit a proportion of their intake on the basis of ability and I am not persuaded that the existence of partial selection per se at the three schools is sufficient (sic) and primary cause of any unfairness that might result to parents and children in the SW11 area. Indeed there are strong reasons to believe that the complete elimination of partial selection at these schools would act to reduce some elements of parental choice in SW11…However, whilst I am not in a position to estimate the precise number of more able pupils that might eventually be admitted into currently less popular schools, I am in no doubt that some reduction in the proportion of pupils selected by ability at [GS] and [BS] in particular would create a more conducive environment within which schools such as BTC might operate. Their ability to benefit from it will be a product of their own abilities and support form the LEA.”

He makes the observation that fair banding might not affect the intake of pupils at schools such as GS and BS. For their popularity might result in as high a proportion of able pupils as selection.

He then states,

“Therefore I conclude that [GS], [BS] and [EBC] should be allowed to retain their arrangements for partial selection by ability. However, a broader group of parents and children would gain from a reduction in the proportions currently admitted on this basis, and I am persuaded therefore to uphold the objection in so much that I reduce the proportion of children selected by ability to each school. I have concluded that a figure of 25% would be the optimum balance of interests for [GS] and [BS]. I am persuaded that such a reduction for [EBC] would lead to a more problematic situation for the school in maintaining its overall profile in terms both of intakes and attainment. Therefore I propose to require [EBC] to reduce its proportion of selective places to 30%.”

The consequence for EBC was a reduction of selective places for 6 pupils.