Royal Courts of Justice
Strand
London WC2
Friday, 17TH October 2003
B E F O R E:
MR JUSTICE SILBER
THE QUEEN ON THE APPLICATION OF SHARON MARIE TAYLOR
(CLAIMANT)
-v-
MAIDSTONE CROWN COURT
(DEFENDANT)
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MR G LEE (instructed by Derek J Hayward & Co) appeared on behalf of the CLAIMANT
The DEFENDANT was not represented
J U D G M E N T
MR JUSTICE SILBER: Sharon Marie Taylor applies, with leave of Goldring J, to quash a decision of a Recorder and Justices sitting at Maidstone Crown Court made on 14th February 2003, by which they dismissed the appeal of the claimant against a conviction of committing a course of conduct contrary to section 2 of the Protection from Harassment Act.
The claimant had been found guilty, originally, of this and another offence, in her absence, by the Sittingborne Justices. She appealed those convictions to the Maidstone Crown Court where His Honour Judge Simpson ordered that the two matters should be severed as there was no connection between them.
The first appeal related to the harassment conviction and it is the decision on that appeal, which is the subject of this decision for review. During the appeal, to which this application for review relates, the complainant, Mrs Jenny Bishop, admitted that, on a previous occasion, she had made a false allegation to the police about the claimant, Mrs Taylor. The claimant's case was that this is a powerful factor in favour of the defence as it seriously undermined the complainant's credibility as a witness. No other witnesses of fact were called by the Crown and Mrs Taylor gave evidence denying the allegation.
It seems that the only evidence on which it was possible to convict the claimant was that of Mrs Bishop. Therefore, it is submitted that, in all the circumstances, Mrs Taylor was entitled to be informed of the reasons as to first why Mrs Bishop's evidence had been accepted, notwithstanding the fact that she admitted that she had made a previously malicious, false allegation, and second why the claimant's own evidence had been rejected.
The Recorder, when giving his reasons at the end of the hearing, said:
"Mrs Taylor, having carefully considered the submissions made by Mr Lee on your behalf, and having considered the evidence by Mrs Bishop, and the evidence which you gave, it is the view of all three of us that we do accept the evidence given by Mrs Bishop. We are satisfied on that so that we are sure, and accordingly, this appeal will be dismissed."
As I will explain later, the Recorder gave a further explanation of the decision which was sent by the Crown Court when they acknowledged service. It was submitted on behalf of the claimant that, as this claim challenged the adequacy of the reasoning given by the Crown Court, this constituted a breach of natural justice. Therefore the appropriate remedy for the claimant is one of judicial review, rather than appeal by way of case stated.
The Maidstone Crown Court, as the defendants, indicated on its acknowledgment of service that it did not intend to make any submissions and it has not done so. The Crown Prosecution Service has joined as an interested party but it has neither appeared nor made any representations.
The basic contention made on behalf of the claimant is that there was an obligation to give reasons, in the particular circumstances of this case, and that the Crown Court did not comply with that duty. Mr Lee says that there are a number of important principles of law that can be drawn from the decision of this court in R v Harrow Crown Court ex p Dave, 99 Cr.App.R 114 DC in which Pill J gave the judgment of the court, which consisted of himself and Kennedy LJ. The principles which Mr Lee says are relevant are threefold of which the first is that:
" . . . the Crown Court judge giving the decision of the court upon appeal must say enough to demonstrate that the court has identified the main contentious issues in the case and how it resolved them."
Second, the reasoning required of the Crown Court Judge would depend on the circumstances as:
"In some cases, the bald statement that evidence of a particular witness is accepted may be sufficient."
Third, Pill LJ explained that:
"The appellant is entitled to know the basis upon which the prosecution case had been accepted by the court if, like the present case, that involved knowing the process by which the apparently powerful points in favour of the defence had been rejected."
It is submitted by Mr Lee that the reasons given in the Crown Court in Dave are similar in nature to those in the present case. Indeed, there were powerful arguments in favour of the defence in this case; namely that the only prosecution witness had made a previously false allegation to the police about the claimant. In addition, there had been a failure to call any other supposed witnesses which the claimant gave evidence denying the allegations.
To my mind, each of those factors, collectively or individually, indicate that there was a clear obligation in the particular circumstances of this case for the Crown Court to give some more detailed explanation than merely the short statement that had been given by the Recorder. Where, as in this case, there was what would appear to be a compelling point in favour of the defence, the Crown Court ought to have dealt with it and I do not consider that they did so.
As I have previously explained, when the acknowledgment of service was required the court gave further information which they had obtained from the Recorder, which he very helpfully provided for the assistance of this court. It stated that:
"In closing, Mr Lee (for Mrs Taylor) submitted that this was a case of allegations made by one person against another where, notwithstanding there were a number of potential independent witnesses available to the Crown, none had been called. He invited us to look with great care at Mrs Bishop's evidence, inter alia, because she had made a false allegation to the police concerning Mrs Taylor's driving with "bald tyres" (something Mrs Bishop had admitted when she was cross-examined). He addresses us carefully on the burden of proof, informing us that we must allow Mrs Taylor's appeals unless we were sure that we could accept the evidence given by Mrs Bishop concerning various incidents.
"After considering Mrs Bishop's evidence and Mrs Taylor's evidence, each one of us was sure that Mrs Bishop's account of the incidents was truthful and accurate. When we returned to court I gave the decision in the very brief form which appears on the transcript -- in so doing I had in mind paragraph 2-202 of Archbold. Given the thrust of Mr Lee's submissions to us, I thought that this was a case where a bald statement that Mrs Bishop's evidence was accepted was a sufficient statement of the reason(s) why Mrs Taylor's appeal was dismissed."
This was a helpful account of the reasons for the decision but I was concerned as to whether I could take that material into account in order to determine whether the Crown Court had satisfied its obligations.
A similar point arose in the case of Pullum v Crown Prosecution Service [2000] COD 206 in which the issue was whether or not reasons given by the Crown Court were adequate. In dismissing the appeal, the Recorder had simply said, "The appeal is dismissed. We find there was no assault." In the case stated, however, he elaborated on the court's reasons and the issue was whether the Divisional Court should take those factors into account.
The Divisional Court, consisting of Lord Bingham CJ and Kay J, stated that:
"Had the court announced its decision in approximately the terms of the case stated the appellant would have no possible grounds for complaint. As it was, and with some sympathy for the Recorder who had no doubt given judgment in terms which must have been followed in very many cases, the court concluded that the reasons given fell short of the minimum required." (Page 207)
I agree with Mr Lee that the decision in that case shows that, in order to determine whether adequate reasons have been given, it is necessary to consider the allegation that inadequate reasons were given in the terms of the words that were actually used when the decision was given rather than on the basis of reasons given later. That view is also supported by a comment in Archbold, paragraph 2-202 on page 209, where it is said:
"Where no reasons were given by a judge when dismissing an appeal, a note of the proceedings subsequently provided by him which was unsupported by affidavit, not signed by the justices sitting on the appeal, was of no real weight. Reasons should be given contemporaneously with the decision so that the losing party could be sure that there was no ex post facto rationalisation."
The authority given for that proposition is at R v Snaresbrook Crown Court ex p Input Management 163 JP 533 DC. Mr Lee has been unable to find that case at that reference but the clear position in this case was that there were matters which, in the form of the admission by the complainant of her previous dishonest statements, not only merited but also actually required the Recorder to explain why they had not been accepted at the time.
This was not a case where the reasons were obvious or the case was so simple that no further reasons were given, although I sympathise with the Recorder. To my mind, this application must succeed and it follows, therefore, that the decision of the Maidstone Crown Court has to be quashed.
MR LEE: My Lord, can I just raise a point. We would apply for the quashing order which your Lordship has granted but also a mandatory order as well because, if the decision is simply quashed, it is my understanding that the original decision of the Magistrates' Court would still subsist and the conviction would still be live. In the case of Dave, my Lord, the order was for a quashing order, quashing the decision, but also a mandatory order that the Crown Court re-hear the appeal.
MR JUSTICE SILBER: That was an application for judicial review as well. It proposed to quash the decision of the Crown Court and to direct them to re-hear this matter. Well, I think that is the order I consider that I have to make.
MR LEE: I am grateful, my Lord. My Lord, I appear under Civil Legal Aid representation order. I think I am duty bound to ask that costs be assessed.
MR JUSTICE SILBER: I think I will order a re-hearing by the Crown Court with a different constitution --
MR LEE: My Lord, I would be grateful.
MR JUSTICE SILBER: What do you ask for?
MR LEE: I appear under Civil Legal Aid representation order. I understand I have to ask for the costs to be set. I say that tentatively, my Lord.
MR JUSTICE SILBER: Who made the order?
MR LEE: It was granted from the Legal Aid, Legal Services Commission.
MR JUSTICE SILBER: There should be a certificate in the file but there is not one, I am told.
MR LEE: I understand from those instructing me that they admitted when permission was granted --
MR JUSTICE SILBER: What I suggest we say is that upon preparation or lodging of the certificate, there will be the appropriate taxation.
MR LEE: My Lord, I am grateful.
MR JUSTICE SILBER: Thank you very much for your help.