Royal Courts of Justice
Strand
London WC2
B E F O R E:
MR JUSTICE SILBER
THE QUEEN ON THE APPLICATION OF JEREMY MARTIN KEYS
(CLAIMANT)
-v-
DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS
(DEFENDANT)
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MR R GREY (instructed by Morris, Scott & Co) appeared on behalf of the CLAIMANT
The DEFENDANT was not represented
J U D G M E N T
1. MR JUSTICE SILBER: Jeremy Martin Keys appeals, by way of the case stated, against a conviction recorded against him on 24th January 2003 at the Bournemouth Magistrates' Court that between the 15th August 2002 and 20th August 2002 he, without reasonable cause, entered the Somerfield Stores car park at 309 Lymington Road, Highcliffe and the store itself which he was prohibited from doing by a restraining order imposed upon him by the East Dorset Magistrates' Court on 2nd July 2002.
2. The Magistrates found that the appellant had been subject to a restraining order which had been made against him on 2nd July 2002, pursuant to section 5(1) and its terms were, in so far as is relevant to this application:
"The court hereby prohibits the defendant from:
"...(ii) going to the premises of Somerfield supermarket at 309 Lymington Road, Highcliffe, including the car park."
I should add that it was agreed between the parties that the car park was actually not part of Somerfield supermarket premises but was a council car park and therefore if there was to be a breach of the order, it would have been by the claimant "going to the premises of Somerfield supermarket".
3. The facts that were found by the Magistrates were that on 15th August 2002, Miss Olroyd was working at Somerfield supermarket and she saw the claimant approximately 20 metres away from the store. Secondly, that on 16th August the appellant was in close proximity to the store in that he was approximately two metres away from the store, within the car park adjacent to the store. Third, that on 17th August the appellant was outside the store on the public footpath. The Magistrates also found that the appellant did not enter the Somerfield supermarket on any of these occasions.
4. The question that was raised for this court was:
" . . . whether our decision that the offender was guilty of breaching the terms of a restraining order prohibiting him from "going to" premises by virtue of his being in close proximity to these premises was the decision to which no reasonable Magistrates could come."
The respondent to this application, the Crown Prosecution Service, has indicated to the Administrative Court Office that it would not oppose the appeal of the applicant. Nevertheless, I still have to consider the matter. The issue that is raised is really whether it was open to the Magistrates to find that the appellant was guilty of "going to the premises of Somerfield supermarket" when first, on 15th August 2003, he was 20 metres away from the store; when second, on 16th August 2003, he was approximately two metres away from the store; and when third, on 17th August 2003, he was outside the store on the path.
5. In my opinion, the words "going to the premises of Somerfield supermarket" means entering them. The Magistrates, in my view, were not entitled to take the view that "going go to the premises of Somerfield supermarket" meant going near to those premises. If it had been the wish of the magistrates, to prohibit the claimant from going near the premises, that could have been stated in the restraining order but it was not said.
6. In disposing this matter I have to express my gratitude to counsel for his clear written and oral submissions and also to the Magistrates for their admirably succinct case statement. However, the answer to the question raised by the Magistrates must be in the negative because the decision that the defendant was guilty of breaching the terms of the restraining order, prohibiting him from "going to" Somerfield premises, by virtue of his being in close proximity of those premises, was not a decision to which a reasonable bench of the Magistrates could come. Thus, this appeal is allowed.
7. MR GREY: My Lord, I am most grateful. We appear under terms of a representation order. As I understand it, it is necessary for me to ask you for an order that the appellant's costs be assessed.
8. MR JUSTICE SILBER: Yes. Thank you very much for the clear way you dealt with this.
9. MR GREY: The conviction is therefore quashed, my Lord?
10. MR JUSTICE SILBER: Yes, the conviction should therefore be quashed. I think a direction should be given to the Magistrates to quash it. Thank you very much.