Loader v Law Society

LORD JUSTICE DYSON: Mr Loader is a solicitor who was admitted in 1977. He appeals against a decision of the Solicitors' Disciplinary Tribunal ("the Tribunal") of 17th October 2002, whereby he was ordered to be suspended from practice as a solicitor for six months.

The facts in outline are as follows. In January 1993, he became a salaried partner in the firm of Martin Cray and Co. Martin Cray is the sole equity partner of the firm. On 1st April 1994, a legal aid franchise was awarded to the firm. Two of the solicitors employed by the firm were Diana Keane and Rachel Spring. Ms Keane joined the firm as a newly qualified solicitor in September 1993. Ms Spring joined the firm in May 1995, immediately after obtaining her practising certificate. They both worked at the Brighton office. According to the account that they were subsequently to give, within a short time of their joining the firm, they were being instructed, they said by Mr Cray, in relation to legal aid files to create missing documents and backdate them. They were to say that, reluctantly, they agreed to comply with these instructions. But eventually, they reported the matter to the legal aid authorities. They were interviewed by Legal Aid Board personnel on 26th February 1997 and gave witness statements on 3rd April of that year. Mr Loader approached the legal aid authorities with Mr Marsh, who was an assistant solicitor in the firm. Mr Loader was interviewed on 10th April and a witness statement taken on 22nd April. This latter witness statement has assumed some significance in the appeal to this court.

On 1st July, the firm's legal aid franchise was suspended. On 22nd March 1999, the Legal Aid Board lodged a complaint to the Office for the Supervision of Solicitors ("OSS") that seven solicitors in the firm, including Mr Loader, had been guilty of misconduct in that they had created and backdated client care letters and file review checklists. On 7th April 2000, the OSS resolved to refer the complaints to the Tribunal. On 24th May, the OSS also resolved to refer the cases of Ms Keane and Ms Spring to the Tribunal. On 9th August 2000, an appeal against a decision to refer their cases to the Tribunal was allowed. They subsequently received reprimands from the Law Society.

The allegations made on behalf of the OSS which came before the Tribunal were that five members of the firm had been guilty of conduct unbefitting of a solicitor and/or had acted in breach of the relevant practice rules. The allegations against Mr Loader were that:

(i) He had acted in breach of rule 1(a)(c), (d) and (e) of the Solicitors' Practice Rules 1990 in that he had failed to comply with the mandatory requirements set out in paragraphs 3.50, 3.70 and 3.71 of the Legal Aid Franchising Specification and/or the requirements set out in the Law Society's Practice Management Standards;

(ii) He instructed, or, in the alternative, caused employees to create false documentation so as to create the impression of compliance with paragraphs 3.50, 3.70 and 3.71 of the Franchise Specification and, in so doing, acted in a manner which was fraudulent or deceitful or otherwise contrary to his position as a solicitor; and

(iii) He created and backdated correspondence and/or documentation.

I shall refer to these three allegations as the first, second and third allegations, respectively.

So far as relevant, the Legal Aid Franchising Specification provides:

The documented procedures had been formulated by Mr Cray following practice management standards drafted by the Law Society. These required that client care letters be sent to clients at specified intervals and also required the creation of monthly file review checklists.

The other respondents to the proceedings instituted on behalf of the OSS were Mr Cray, Mr Mitten, Mr Marsh and Mr Harris.

In advance of the hearing before the Tribunal, and, as a result of discussions between Mr Loader's former advisers and Mr Goodwin, who was the solicitor acting for the Law Society, an agreed basis of plea was formulated in respect of Mr Loader. By a letter dated 3rd October 2002, Mr Loader's solicitors wrote to Mr Goodwin in these terms:

The hearing commenced before the Tribunal on 7th October 2002. At the outset, there was discussion about the admissions that were to be made by Mr Loader (and, indeed, Messrs Marsh and Harris). In the course of this discussion, Mr Loader's counsel, Mr Tim Owen QC, made clear the basis on which the first and third allegations were being admitted, and why the second allegation was not admitted. Mr Goodwin indicated that he accepted the basis for plea that was being advanced on behalf of Mr Loader and that he was content to proceed against Mr Loader on the first and third allegations alone on the basis that these constituted an admission to the charge of unbefitting conduct.

Having identified the basis for plea, the case against Mr Loader was adjourned by the Tribunal until 8th October, when it was agreed that mitigation would be heard on his behalf. The cases of Messrs Marsh and Harris were adjourned for mitigation to take place later. In the meantime, the case against the two solicitors who denied the charges, Messrs Cray and Mitten, proceeded before the Tribunal between 7th and 17th October.

It will be necessary to consider the Tribunal's findings in some detail. At this stage, it is sufficient to say that the Tribunal announced its decision on penalties on 17th October and gave written reasons for its findings on 4th December.

On behalf of Mr Loader, Mr Owen submits that the Tribunal acted with procedural impropriety and/or imposed a grossly disproportionate penalty because:

(a) It must have sentenced him on the factual basis that his April 1997 statement to the Legal Aid Board was dishonest, and, in so doing, the Tribunal departed from the agreed basis of plea without giving Mr Owen an opportunity to deal with the point on behalf of Mr Loader;

(b) It was disproportionate to subject Mr Loader to a six month suspension when Ms Spring and Ms Keane had been dealt with by means of a reprimand;

(c) The decision to impose a six months suspension on a 56 year old solicitor "of great competence and professionalism who was held in the highest esteem by all of those who came into contact with him", in relation to the misconduct which took place more than seven years earlier, shows that the Tribunal did not attach sufficient importance to the impact of delay in the context of this case.

Ground 1: procedural impropriety in departing from the agreed bases of plea

In order to understand the nature of this complaint, it is necessary to set the scene. It was common ground between Mr Owen and Mr Goodwin before the Tribunal that Mr Loader fell to be dealt with on the basis of the letter of 3rd October 2002, and this was made clear to the Tribunal by both advocates. The potential significance of Mr Loader's witness statement of 22nd April 1997 was apparent on 7th and 8th October. In that witness statement, Mr Loader had said that Mr Cray was fully aware of the arrangements for the creation and backdating of documents, and indeed had instigated them. It was understood by the beginning of the hearing before the Tribunal that these allegations, which were in large measure supported by the witness statements of Ms Keane and Ms Spring, were denied by Mr Cray. It was Mr Cray's case, ultimately upheld by the Tribunal, that he was kept in the dark and was wholly unaware of these arrangements.

The following exchanges took place early on during the hearing before the Tribunal. On 8th October the following exchange took place:

The Chairman: Very well; I understand".

Mr Owen submits that the Tribunal departed from the agreed basis of plea in that:

(1) It failed to take account of the fact that the deception which Mr Loader admitted did not mean that files had not been reviewed or that client care letters had not been sent to clients; and

(2) It allowed its conclusions about Mr Loader's witness statement of 22nd April 1997, which were very adverse to Mr Loader, to affect its assessment of the gravity of Mr Loader's misconduct.

Before I deal with these submissions, I need to refer to the relevant parts of the Tribunal's findings.

At paragraph 9 of its written findings, the Tribunal wrote this:

At paragraphs 203 to 223, the Tribunal summarised the submissions made by Mr Owen in the course of his mitigating remarks.

Then there is a section headed "The facts found by the Tribunal". That is between paragraphs 258 and 266. Paragraph 260 is of some importance. It starts as follows:

There follows a list of factors in subparagraphs (a) to (y). These include the following that relate to Mr Loader's witness statement of 22nd April 1997:

At paragraph 265, the Tribunal said:

The final section of the Tribunal's document is entitled "The findings of the Tribunal". It is necessary to refer to some paragraphs from this section of the document:

I can now return to Mr Owen's two submissions. As regards his first submission, it is true that paragraph 9 does not record the important part of the letter of 3rd October 2002, which states that client care letters were sent out and review checklists were made. But, in my judgement, it is clear that the Tribunal had this point well in mind. At paragraph 212, the Tribunal records the submission made on behalf of Mr Loader that:

Again, at paragraph 258, the Tribunal say:

The words "would have been sent or ... reviewed" indicate that letters were sent and files were reviewed. Finally, there is paragraph 280, to which I have just referred.

In my view, there is no basis for concluding that the Tribunal departed from the agreed basis of plea by leaving out of account the fact that care letter were in fact sent and that cases were in fact reviewed, albeit on the wrong dates.

I turn to the second submission. Mr Owen accepts -- rightly, in my view -- that the Tribunal was entitled to make findings as to the truthfulness of the contents of Mr Loader's witness statement of 22nd April 1997 when considering the case against Mr Cray. The case against Mr Cray, that he knew of the backdating arrangements, was substantially based on the allegations contained in the witness statements of Ms Keane, Ms Spring and Mr Loader. The contents of these statements were put to Mr Cray in cross-examination.

In my view, the Tribunal could not simply ignore these statements. They had to reach a view about them. But I agree with Mr Owen that the Tribunal could not properly and fairly take into account its conclusions about Mr Loader's witness statement against him without giving him an opportunity to deal with the suggestion that its contents were untruthful and that he had made the statement in order to deflect blame from himself on to Mr Cray. The question, therefore, is whether the Tribunal did in fact take into account its conclusions about the witness statement when considering and arriving at a decision as to the gravity of Mr Loader's misconduct.

Mr Owen submits that the Tribunal did take them into account because:

(a) The phrase "in all of the circumstances" in paragraph 285 is unqualified and must include the conclusions reached at paragraph 260 (n) to (r) about the witness statement; and

(b) There is no other reasonable explanation for the severity of the penalty imposed and the fact that Mr Loader was treated so much more severely than Ms Keane and Ms Spring. Alternatively, Mr Owen submits that there must be a doubt as to whether the Tribunal ignored the witness statement when dealing with Mr Loader's case and that that is a sufficient reason to allow the appeal.

I do not consider that the phrase "in all of the circumstances", in its context, suggests that the Tribunal had regard to its findings about the witness statement when deciding what penalty to impose on Mr Loader. Paragraph 285 is the last paragraph of the section which discusses the position of Mr Loader, that is paragraphs 279 to 285. There is no reference in this section to the witness statement at all. There is no reason to doubt that the circumstances to which the Tribunal is referring at paragraph 285 are those mentioned in this section, which in turn are a fair summary of the essential elements of Mr Owen's mitigating submissions.

As regards the severity of the sentence, it is important to have in mind paragraphs 270 and 271 of the findings, which I have already quoted.

Mr Owen has a separate criticism of paragraph 270. He submits that this paragraph shows that the Tribunal did not heed his plea that it should not adopt what he called a "monochrome" view of deception, and that it should regard Mr Loader's deception as being at the bottom end of the scale of gravity.

But what is clear from paragraphs 270 and 271 is that:

(a) The Tribunal considered all cases of "conscious impropriety" as requiring treatment with the utmost severity; and

(b) What made Mr Loader's case worse than that of Messrs Marsh and Harris was his seniority and experience.

In my judgment, it is very significant that the only factor identified by the Tribunal as justifying treating Mr Loader more seriously than Messrs Marsh and Harris, who were both suspended for three months, was his seniority and experience. There was no criticism by the Tribunal of Mr Marsh or Mr Harris for making false statements with a view to implicating others and exonerating themselves. If the Tribunal had been of the view that Mr Loader's witness statement was an aggravating factor in his case, one would have expected that point to be made as an additional feature justifying the disparity of treatment between Mr Loader on the one hand and Messrs Marsh and Harris on the other.

In my view, this point is not mentioned here, or indeed anywhere else in the findings, because it was not taken into account by the Tribunal as against Mr Loader. Nor should this be a matter of surprise. The Tribunal would no doubt have had in find the following exchange that took place between Mr Owen and the Chairman before Mr Owen started his plea in mitigation on 8th October:

I do not accept Mr Owen's second submission that the severity of the sentence is consistent only with the Tribunal having taken the witness statement into account. When my Lord suggested during argument that if the Tribunal had found Mr Loader guilty of making false statements in order to implicate Mr Cray, he would surely have been struck off the roll of solicitors, Mr Owen was inclined to agree.

In my judgment, he was right to do so. Mr Owen's riposte was that Mr Loader had not been not charged with that offence. That is true, but I am in no doubt that the Tribunal could have made such a finding as against Mr Loader in the context of the proceedings as they stood, and, had it done so, could, and almost certainly would, have struck Mr Loader off the roll of solicitors. The only reason why such a course was not open to the Tribunal was because Mr Loader was not given the opportunity to deal with the allegation.

In my view, the fact that a suspension of six months was imposed, far from supporting Mr Owen's submission, suggests that the Tribunal was astute not to take its conclusions about the witness statement into account when deciding what penalty to impose on Mr Loader. I would therefore reject Mr Owen's first ground of appeal.

I should add that, in his skeleton argument, Mr Owen also submitted that the Tribunal departed from the agreed basis of plea in that it stated (see paragraph 9) that Mr Loader had accepted that his conduct amounted to "conscious impropriety". That, he submitted, was incorrect. But it is clear that Mr Loader pleaded guilty on the basis that his actions necessarily involved a degree of deception in his dealings with the Legal Aid Board.

The Tribunal understood that this was not dishonesty of the gravest kind. I have already mentioned the fact that the Tribunal referred more than once to the fact that care letters were sent and case reviews carried out. Mr Owen makes the point that Mr Loader believed that the legal aid authorities would not have been interested in the breaches of the rules that were committed, and apparently evidence as to the attitude of the legal aid authorities was called before the Tribunal.

But that was not necessarily how the picture appeared at the time. In this regard, the following exchange is of some relevance:

In reaching the conclusion that the breaches were themselves sufficiently serious to justify a suspension of six months, I bear in mind what Sir Thomas Bingham, Master of the Rolls, said in Bolton v The Law Society [1994]1 WLR 512, 518 D:

Mr Owen submits that the present case falls into that narrow class of "very unusual and venial cases".

I do not agree. It seems to me that, for the reasons given by the Tribunal, this was a serious case and not one that fell into that very narrow band of special cases of misconduct involving deception where a penalty less serious than one of suspension ought to be imposed. In my judgment, therefore, subject to the second and third grounds of appeal, the decision of the Tribunal cannot be faulted.

Ground 2: disparity

During the course of his mitigating remarks, Mr Owen said this:

But, as the Chairman pointed out, although there was no difference between the nature of the acts committed by Mr Loader and those committed by Ms Keane and Ms Spring, Mr Loader admitted carrying out less creating and backdating of documents over a shorter period than the two women solicitors.

It is unfortunate that the Tribunal considered the relatively blameworthiness of Mr Loader, as compared with that of Messrs Harris and Marsh, but made no reference to the fact that the two women solicitors had merely been reprimanded by the Law Society. I do not, however, consider that there has been objectionable disparity in the treatment of Mr Loader as compared with that of the two women solicitors.

First, Ms Spring, and to a lesser extent Ms Keane, had the courage to bring the matter to the attention of the Law Society, thereby exposing the wrongdoing that had occurred. It is true that Mr Loader followed their lead within a few weeks, but no doubt he was already aware of the fact that the Law Society had been involved before he decided to do so.

Secondly, Ms Keane and Ms Spring were young and very inexperienced solicitors. On the other hand, Mr Loader was a very experienced solicitor, having been admitted as long ago as 1977. He was a salaried partner and there plainly was a highly material difference in terms of seniority and experience between him and the two women solicitors.

These two features, both of which were recognised by Mr Owen himself in his submissions, in my judgment justified a substantial difference in treatment between Mr Loader and the two women. I would reject the second ground of appeal.

Ground 3: delay

It is rightly accepted on behalf of the Law Society that the lapse of time between the misconduct alleged and the hearing before the Tribunal can properly be taken into account in fixing the appropriate penalty. The Tribunal said that it had taken into account the delay in this case. Thus, on 17th October, when the penalty was announced, the Chairman said this:

I have already quoted paragraph 284 of the findings, where the point is repeated. Delay was taken into account. I see no reason to interfere with the Tribunal's overall assessment of the appropriate penalty in this case.

Conclusion

For all these reasons, I would dismiss this appeal. This is indeed a very sad case. Mr Loader is 56 years of age. He has had a hitherto unblemished career as a solicitor, as the character evidence, which I have read, eloquently demonstrates. The creation and backdating of documents was carried out over a relatively short period, and in relation to a fairly small number of files.

Although there clearly are grades of seriousness of deception and dishonesty, the Tribunal was right to take the view that any deception by a solicitor was a grave matter. This may well have been towards the bottom end of the scale of seriousness, but it nevertheless was serious and the Tribunal was right to decide the matter as it did.

MR JUSTICE GIBBS: I respectfully agree with the conclusions reached by my Lord, Dyson LJ, and with his reasons for reaching those conclusions.

I add a few observations of my own, particularly in recognition of the serious effect of the events about which we have heard on this appellant, a hitherto well respected solicitor.

We have had the advantage of reading, and being addressed upon in detail, the record of the disciplinary proceedings challenged. The starting point for the consideration of the appellant's case, whatever the circumstances and outcome in relation to his former colleagues' cases, was his basis of plea. It is so described by analogy with the procedure adopted in criminal cases.

The basis of plea was set out in a letter from his then solicitors of 3rd October 2002. It contained an express admission that the appellant's conduct involved "a degree of deception in his dealings with the Legal Aid Board". That deception consisted of creating false documents.

Those documents were not false in the sense that their contents were dishonest. They were false in this sense: they consisted of letters of a type which were in fact from time to time sent to clients, known as "client care letters", but, on the occasions admitted by the appellant, they were backdated, that is, they were prepared so as to contain a false date in the past. Each such letter was then inserted into the client's file in order to pretend that it had been sent on that date, rather than any later date. Thus, it would tend to mislead anyone examining the file about the true facts and would tend to conceal any suggestion of deficiency in the appellant's handling of the case.

In my view, it cannot reasonably be argued that such conduct fell short of conscious impropriety.

Mr Tim Owen, QC, represented the appellant before the Tribunal, as he does before this court. It is clear from the record of the disciplinary proceedings that Mr Owen, with considerable thoroughness and skill, said everything on the appellant's behalf which could possibly have been said and there was a good deal of genuine mitigation.

However, that mitigation was, regrettably from the appellant's point of view, inevitably set against misconduct, which, however successfully it was minimised, was bound to be regarded, on the part of an experienced solicitor and salaried partner, as of some gravity.

Perhaps the appellant's most important submission is that the Tribunal was led, or led itself, into error in taking into account its adverse findings in relation to the formal statement made by him on 22nd April 1997 to the Legal Aid Board's investigator.

As to that statement, I agree with my Lord that it was necessary for the Tribunal to make its assessment of it, because it formed part of the case against Mr Cray, who was contesting the charges brought against him before the same Tribunal.

The real complaint, it seems to me, is that it was, or would have been, improper and/or unfair for the Tribunal to have allowed that adverse finding to influence its view of the seriousness of the appellant's misconduct; that the appellant did not himself give evidence; that he did not have a chance to respond to the suggestions being made against him; and that he should not have been dealt with on the basis that the statement contained self-serving fabrications by him designed to shift the blame to Mr Cray.

This submission depends, of course, on there being any, or any arguable, ground for finding that the Tribunal did proceed on such a basis.

In my judgment, on all the material to which we have been referred, there is no such ground. It is true that the Tribunal did not expressly state, in giving its reasons in relation to the appellant, that it was disregarding its findings about the statement. However, for my part, I can find no indication in the sections of the Tribunal's reasons, which related to the appellant and which have been cited extensively by my Lord, that it did take the statement into account.

It referred to the appellant's seniority as a solicitor as an aggravating factor, a proposition which cannot be criticised. But that was the only aggravating feature mentioned by the Tribunal.

It did, however, go on to refer in some detail to the mitigating factors, powerfully advanced by Mr Owen. There is no indication in its remarks that it approached the matter in any manner inconsistent with the basis of plea. It made no express reference to the 1997 statement in the context of the appellant's penalty at all.

After listening carefully to the submissions made on the appellant's behalf, I find myself unable to infer that the Tribunal relied upon, or was influenced by, the 1997 statement in determining the appropriate penalty.

I agree with my Lord that such an inference cannot reasonably be drawn in context from the use of the words "in all the circumstances" in paragraph 285 of its findings.

Finally, however, on this point, and perhaps most cogently, there is the penalty itself. It is difficult to conceive that a Tribunal, which was including in its considerations the falsity of a solemn statement such as that of April 1997, would have imposed any penalty short of removal from the roll. It was realistically conceded in argument that, in that situation, a significantly heavier penalty than six months' suspension would have been inevitable.

For those reasons, in addition to those set out by my Lord, I am not persuaded that the Tribunal either departed from the basis of plea or took any immaterial matter into consideration. Nor am I persuaded, viewing the proceedings as a whole, that the appellant's case was dealt with in anything other than a fair and careful way.

I would add that, on the face of it, the penalty imposed, whilst undoubtedly involving hardship, as well as sadness for the appellant, cannot be regarded as unduly severe for conduct involving admitted deception by an experienced solicitor. Indeed, the fact that the penalty was confined to six months' suspension was no doubt a reflection of the otherwise impeccable record and qualities of the appellant, supported by the force of Mr Owen's mitigation.

As to the matters of disparity of penalty and of delay, I agree entirely with my Lord's reasoning and do not wish to say anything further on those grounds of appeal.

Accordingly, I, too, would dismiss this appeal.

MR TREVERTON JONES: My Lords, I would therefore ask for an order that the appeal is dismissed and that Mr Loader pay the Law Society's costs of the appeal. My Lords, I have costs schedules for your Lordships.

LORD JUSTICE DYSON: Has Mr Owen seen them?

MR TREVERTON JONES: My Lord, yes.

MR OWEN: I saw them this morning. I do not accept the -- I always find this an undignified part of any proceedings -- but I do not accept that this is appropriate for summary assessment. I can go through the individual items and express views now. I can make the general comment that the total sum is more than twice Mr Loader's fees and costs.

LORD JUSTICE DYSON: I think I would like to see the schedule anyway, obviously before reaching a decision.

MR OWEN: Yes.

LORD JUSTICE DYSON: Let us just have a look at it.

MR TREVERTON JONES: My Lord, the schedule comes with an invoice. The invoice is for the cost of the transcript, which we would invite the court to order one third to be paid by Mr Loader, because there were two other appellants originally. They have both abandoned, as your Lordships know.

(Handed).

(Pause).

So, my Lords, I would ask your Lordships, if it has not been added on the schedule, mentally to add a further £1,300.

LORD JUSTICE DYSON: £1,300 has been written in on mine.

MR TREVERTON JONES: My Lord, I am grateful. So that would bring it up to about £17,370-odd.

LORD JUSTICE DYSON: Yes. Let us hear from Mr Owen.

There is no reason in principle why a summary assessment should not be made. This is a case less than a day in length, which was always estimated at less than a day in length. The courts encourage summary assessments of costs, as you know, because detailed assessments are very expensive and long and drawn out.

MR OWEN: Yes.

LORD JUSTICE DYSON: So, if you have specific points to make, I know it is undignified, and so on, and I can sure you that, at 4.30, after a long day, the last thing we want to do is to go through all this sort of thing.

MR OWEN: My Lord, I can make these submissions, looking at the first page. £750 for letters in relation to a matter which, once one has the transcript and the bundles, what on earth requires £750 worth of letters to be written, and to whom? We do not know to whom they are written.

Telephone falls of £1,000, virtually: again, it is difficult to see how that is justified.

Preparation/perusal: I assume it is Mr Goodwin, who was, after all, in the Tribunal below -- unspecified and undetailed at £3,000. It is difficult to see.

I have prepared this appeal without a junior and without an active solicitor, just on the basis of the documents, and I was there, as Mr Goodwin was there. So, frankly, it is impossible to see where that comes from.

Photocopying: I accept there has been a lot of photocopying, and no doubt that is fully justified.

Advocacy (estimate): I do not know whose advocacy that is.

MR TREVERTON JONES: My Lord, that is Mr Goodwin appearing as my junior, but, my Lord, he would have charged the same had he been sitting in front of me, rather than sitting behind me.

LORD JUSTICE DYSON: Yes. I think that you are quite fortunate, in a way, not having a junior member of the Bar.

MR OWEN: I was not quite clear what that related to. I see now what it does relate to and I do not object to that.

Travel: the Law Society can instruct whoever they like, but they happen to have instructed someone who is in Liverpool, when the Tribunal is in London and so is the appeal. I do not for a moment see why Mr Loader --

LORD JUSTICE DYSON: Sorry, who is in Liverpool?

MR OWEN: Mr Goodwin.

LORD JUSTICE DYSON: I see.

MR OWEN: I do not see really why Mr Loader should have to pay the travel costs. They can instruct who they like, but, in the circumstances, it seems rather unfair.

Those are really the only points that I am slightly mystified about.

LORD JUSTICE DYSON: Yes.

MR OWEN: In particular, with item 4, which is simply not broken down at all, it is quite difficult to see why that has to be --

LORD JUSTICE DYSON: Yes. So you are challenging 1, 2, 3, 4 and 8?

MR OWEN: Yes.

LORD JUSTICE DYSON: Yes.

MR OWEN: I accept that, in Mr Treverton Jones' case, he clearly was not in the Tribunal below, and he clearly had to --

LORD JUSTICE DYSON: There is a lot of preparation to get into a case like this from cold.

MR OWEN: My Lord, I agree. So I do not make any comparison with my fee or his, although mine was less than his, but he was not there below.

LORD JUSTICE DYSON: A third of the transcript fee?

MR OWEN: I cannot object to that.

LORD JUSTICE DYSON: I am going to ask you to comment on those in a moment, but I really do not think, and we will look at the detail of these points, but it really would not be sensible to send this off for a detailed assessment. So I think we have to do our pest.

I will hear from Mr Treverton Jones.

MR TREVERTON JONES: My Lord, dealing firstly with travel, it is a perfectly valid point: why should they have to pay for a Liverpool solicitor's travel?

The answer may be that they do gain in the fact that probably a Liverpool solicitor will be charging less per hour than a London solicitor, particularly a West End or City of London solicitor. So, yes, they have to pay for the travel, but they gain by the payment of a lower hourly rate. Your Lordship sees at the top of the page the hourly rate, which is sought for litigation of this sort -- it is by no means excessive.

LORD JUSTICE DYSON: No.

MR TREVERTON JONES: My Lord, as for the general points on paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 4, my Lord, perhaps paragraph 4 is the most significant because it is the biggest sum. My Lord, that is 161 units, which is 16 hours of preparation.

My Lord, Mr Goodwin had to read the transcript, as did I. He has recorded that as being his time. No doubt that was his time, and, if your Lordships consider that excessive, it will have to be trimmed. But it represents effectively two days of work, which, in a case of this sort, I submit is not excessive.

The other matters, my Lord, I cannot really respond. I do not have the letters here.

LORD JUSTICE DYSON: We just have to take a view of what is proportionate, and so on.

You do not want to say anything more, do you? No. We will retire for a moment.

LORD JUSTICE DYSON: We are satisfied that this is a case where we should make a summary assessment. It will save everybody further costs. We are persuaded that there is force in some of the points Mr Owen has made, and I am not going to give a detailed judgment on each of the items. We assess the costs at £14,000 and that includes a sum for the transcript fee. So we have taken the £17,379 and we have reduced that figure to £14,000.

MR TREVERTON JONES: My Lord, yes.

MR OWEN: My Lord, on the date when the order comes into force -- it has been stayed pending this appeal -- I have raised that obviously there are difficulties for Mr Loader in effectively ceasing his control of the firm, and it is by agreement we are asking that the court, subject to the court's view, would activate the suspension from 1st August, so that gives two weeks?

MR TREVERTON JONES: My Lord, it is not by agreement, but we do not oppose that application. In this case, the Law Society would be content with an order in those terms.

LORD JUSTICE DYSON: Suspension to take effect from 1st August?

MR OWEN: Yes.

LORD JUSTICE DYSON: Thank you both very much for your assistance.