Taheri, R (on the application of) v City of Westminster

MR JUSTICE OWEN: The claimant, Mariam Taheri, is a married woman, aged 37. She and her husband are refugees from Iraq. They have no children. They have been in the United Kingdom for approximately five years, but the claimant speaks no English and her husband's English is apparently limited. The claimant has been diagnosed as suffering from mild to moderate depression, and also from some degree of physical infirmity. The claimant and her husband applied to the defendant authority for accommodation, being homeless. They were provided with interim accommodation, pending a decision on their application.

The defendant gave its decision under section 184 of the Housing Act 1996, in a letter dated 2nd July 2003. The decision was to the effect that the claimant was not in priority need, and accordingly no duty was owed her. The letter also stated that the provision of interim accommodation would be ended on 9th July.

In a letter dated 8th July, solicitors for the claimant requested a review of that decision and requested the provision of accommodation pending the outcome of that review. In that same letter, the claimant's solicitors informed the defendant that as the decision letter was posted on 2nd July, it was not received until 3rd July. Mr Gannon today informs me that it was not, in fact, received on that date, although there was a communication to the premises in which the claimants have been living that the claimant saw on 3rd July. The important point is that that only allowed her three working days in which to find alternative accommodation as the notice period to 9th July naturally included a weekend.

On 9th July the defendant declined the request for accommodation pending the review. The claimant seeks permission to challenge both the decision of 2nd July as to the length of the notice that she was given, and the decision of 9th July, refusing interim accommodation pending review of the decision.

As to the second, I am not persuaded that there is any basis for judicial review. The Council were entitled to come to the conclusion that accommodation should not be provided pending the review of their earlier decision. But in my judgment, there is unquestionably substance to the application for a review of the decision of 2nd July, affording seven days' notice to vacate the temporary accommodation, which, as I have explained, in reality gave only three working days in which to find alternative accommodation. It is submitted, on behalf of the authority, that that was reasonable in all the circumstances. I do not agree. In my judgment, the notice given was plainly Wednesbury unreasonable, taking account of the considerable disabilities and difficulties under which the claimant and her husband labour, in particular her inability to speak English. I have no doubt that an authority acting reasonably would have afforded her and her husband a longer period of notice. For that reason, I give permission to apply for judicial review of the decision of 2nd July.

I also propose to treat this hearing as the hearing of that application, as it is a very short point on which no further evidence is necessary. I have come to the conclusion that it would be appropriate in the circumstances for the claimant to be allowed a further 14 days before she leaves the temporary accommodation that she currently occupies. Accordingly, there will be an order that the defendant continue to provide temporary accommodation for the claimant for a period of 14 days from today's date. I recognise that she will face considerable difficulties in finding alternative accommodation, but, in my judgment, a period of a further 14 days represents a reasonable period of notice within which she can at least attempt to make alternative arrangements, given her particular disabilities.

Yes, Mr Gannon?

MR GANNON: My Lord, just to clarify, is your Lordship allowing therefore the application for judicial review?

MR JUSTICE OWEN: Yes.

MR GANNON: I am publicly funded, and although I do not press the matter, I think I am obliged to seek my costs of the application.

MR JUSTICE OWEN: Yes. Mr Peacock, what do you say as to the costs?

MR PEACOCK: I think I simply say that both parties should bear their own costs. It is a very narrow point, and it has been helpful to receive the court's guidance.

MR JUSTICE OWEN: Yes. I am not going to make an order as to costs, but you may have your assessment of your publicly funded costs, Mr Gannon.

MR GANNON: Can that be subject to a certificate being filed? Because of the emergency nature, we do not have one.

MR JUSTICE OWEN: Of course. Thank you both for your assistance.