Dhanota, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department & Ors

The claimant is a prisoner serving a sentence of fifteen years imprisonment imposed on 11^th May 1998. He is also an enthusiastic litigant. There are five applications before me falling for consideration either for directions or for disposal. They do not represent the only litigation to which the claimant is presently a party and that is notwithstanding the judgment of Mr Justice Gibbs dated 27^th June 2002 when in respect of some eight appeals by the claimant, he dismissed each, statingin the course of his judgment:

“I am driven to conclude that the applicant’s conduct in these matters has the hallmarks of that of a vexatious litigant. The pattern of these applications indicates an attempt to use the Court process not for proper and legitimate reasons, but rather for the purpose of abuse of the process in order to pursue numerous and repetitive allegations and arguments most of which, if not all, are wholly lacking in any arguable merit.”

The common factor in the applications before the court is that the subject matter of each relates to his status as a prisoner. The legal basis for each is the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (the Convention).

Maurice Kay J ordered a directions hearing because one of the applications raised issues similar in nature to those being raised by other prisoners in a number of applications for judicial review.

Prior to the hearing the defendant gave notice of an intention to apply for the directions hearing to be treated as the oral hearing of the application for permission, at least in some of the cases. At the hearing the applicant objected to that course being taken. In particular he asserted that, had he known it was an oral hearing of his application(s), he would have brought a Mackenzie friend to assist.

Maurice Kay J did not adjourn the applications to an oral hearing. He could have done so. The applications were not before me as the single judge considering them on paper. The applicant is entitled to a decision from a single judge and to renew his application before another judge. I have concluded that it would not be right to deprive him of the procedural rights which Maurice Kay J mustbe taken to have envisaged he should enjoy. I shall confine myself to making such directions as I feel able.

The five applications are as follows:

At the date this application was issued the applicant had not been provided with IT equipment. A legal basis for the court to intervene is provided by Article 6 of the Convention, namely to secure the applicant’s right of access to the court. In August 2002 he was provided with IT equipment but he maintains, in new grounds of claim, that the equipment which has been provided is inadequate and not according to the specification he requested. Further, at the hearing, he elaborated upon a complaint in connection with an unspecified and vast number of CDs and discs he maintains he cannot access for the preparation of his legal cases because:

The defendant accepted at the hearing that the applicant was entitled to have clause 2 of his IT compact deleted. I take it that has now been done by the issue of a fresh or amended compact. Further, the defendant accepted that the applicant could have access to printing facilities at reasonable times and at a cost of 1p per page.

This application relates to the PIN telephone system which is available to the applicant at Long Lartin Prison. However, because of his objections, he has declined to use it. The applicant asserts:

The defendant submits that because of the applicant’s reliance upon the Convention it is convenient and in the interests of justice that the applicant’s claim, notwithstanding any differences, should be considered with the other cases. I agree. The applicant’s position will not be prejudiced either by delay or otherwise if it is considered with the other cases. The directions in the other cases are likely to be considered in the first part of next term and this application should be considered at the same time. It is obviously desirable that the interests of prisoners and the impact of the Convention on them should be considered together, if possible. If, after further consideration, the course is unacceptable, the court can act accordingly.

This claim relates to the handcuffing of the claimant at various court appearances he made in 2001.

Having reviewed the papers and heard the applicant the following appears to be relevant:

The papers contain material which suggests a blanket policy was adopted to the making of applications for handcuffing at court. The case of R v Mullen (Crim.L.R. 2000.893) confirms that the responsibility for the making of an order rest with the court, but nevertheless, an application should not be advanced unless proper grounds exist. Further, a blanket policy that all prisoners from a particular prison should be handcuffed is not a sufficient basis. Regard must be had to all the circumstances, including the security arrangements at the court in question.

The practice of maintaining a security file in connection with a prisoner is lawful. The record is likely to contain entries of doubtful evidential status which the authorities are entitled to record. It is the use to which the entries are put which calls for careful consideration.

The applicant’s complaints relate to 2001. He has complained in other proceedings, which have been dismissed, of the same facts (see judgment of Gibbs J, para 5(5), para 11, para 18, para 21; a transcript of the judgment is attached (to this judgment) for the benefit of the single judge should he have to consider this application).

In the light of the above observations as to the past practice, the applicant should consider whether he wishes to pursue this application, particularly having regard to the delay which has occurred and the past unsuccessful litigation of the issue. The history gives rise to a question as to whether the application constitutes an abuse of process.

In this application the applicant challenges the level of private cash which prisoners are allowed to have in their accounts. He claims that by limiting such amount he is denied access to the courts (Article 6) and that his right to family life is infringed (Article 8). The applicant has given no consideration to Article 8(2). In his Skeleton Argument for Hearing of 4 December 2002, paragraph 29, he itemises the alleged infringements. Having regard to the content of the defendant’s Acknowledgement of Service which identifies the security and administrative considerations to which regard must be had by the defendant, the applicant’s failure to consider Article 8(2) is critical. He should consider his position. The Prison Rules permit authorisation to be given for use of personal funds for legal purposes (the Article 6 claim). The applicant has made no application in that regard. In the light of the above he should consider whether he should withdraw his claim.

In this claim the applicant challenges the canteen system at HMP Long Lartin. He alleges that the system debits prisoners’ money unlawfully, that there is a take it or leave it system in connection with the ordering of food from the canteen, that there is profiteering taking place from prisoners and that the prices are artificially high. He has also challenged the legality of the contract entered into by the governor awarding the contract of supply to certain canteen services. The claim includes allegations of criminal conduct against individual public servants and allegations concerning public procurement impropriety. In this instance the complainant has invoked Articles 3, 8, 14 and 13 of the Convention. In the course of his lengthy argument he did not explain how any of those Articles could become engaged in relation to his complaints. His Skeleton Argument for the 4 December 2002 Hearing (para 30)summarises the position sufficiently for the single judge to consider the application.

In the Skeleton Argument of the 4 December 2002 (para 28) reference is made to: “PERS of 2000 have relevance here because they show risk assessment but these were confiscated in raid of my cell by DST on 29 Nov.” This incident was raised at the hearing. The PERS were in the custody of the prison staff accompanying the applicant. I examined the documents. The applicant contends the PERS came into possession because Gibbs J directed he should have them. I have no reason to doubt the position. As such the documents were in his possession for the purpose of the appeal he made which failed. Having regard to what I have stated above in connection with the handcuffing complaint it may be that the documents will have no relevance to any continuing litigation. If that is not the case the Governor should consider the question by reference to the right the applicant has to material which is relevant to his right of access to the court.

Since preparing this judgment I have been informed of a new claim CO/5569/2002. It relates to a Report by the Prisons and Probation Ombudsman dated 4 September 2002. It is clear the applicant should have divulged its existence earlier. In particular it deals with the complaint about CDs and discs which I have endeavoured to resolve. It should be considered by the single judge who deals with the applications the subject matter of the directions hearing.