Lauryn Goodman v Kyle Walker

The parties are Ms Lauryn Goodman (the Applicant, to whom I shall refer as “the mother”) and Mr Kyle Walker (the Respondent, to whom I shall refer as “the father”). They are the parents of two children, namely Kairo Walker (a boy, d.o.b. 17^th April 2020, to whom I shall refer as “Kairo”, who is now aged 4) and Kinara Storm Walker (a girl, d.o.b. 28^th June 2023, to whom I shall refer as “Kinara”, who is now aged 1).

The hearing before me on 16^th and 17^th July 2024 largely related to the mother’s financial remedies application under Children Act 1989, Schedule 1 in relation to Kinara, although some of the points raised also relate to Kairo.

Both parties appeared before me by Counsel: Ms Nichola Gray KC (Counsel instructed by Dawson Cornwall, Solicitors) appeared on behalf of the mother and Ms Nikki Saxton KC (Counsel instructed by Malcolm C Foy & Co., Solicitors) appeared on behalf of the father. I am grateful to both Counsel, and indeed the wider legal teams, for the helpful and clear way they have respectively conducted their cases. Both parties have been represented before me at a first class level; but it has, of course, come at a cost. In the proceedings for which this was the final hearing, the mother has incurred a total of £259,298 in legal costs and the father a total of £171,440. All but a very small portion of the mother’s legal costs have been paid by the father, who has of course paid his own costs as well.

The court was presented with three electronic bundles (a ‘core bundle’ running to 367 pages, an ‘exhibits bundle’ running to 859 pages and a ‘supplemental bundle’ running to 71 pages) and a paper bundle running to 67 pages. I have considered all the documents presented to me, in particular I have considered:-

I have also heard oral evidence from the mother and the father, subjected to appropriate cross-examination. As a case management decision, I time limited the cross-examinations to 3.5 hours each in order to ensure that evidence and submissions were completed within the two-day time estimate. I am satisfied that this gave sufficient time for each party to put forward their own case and challenge that of the other and nobody has suggested otherwise.

I have also had the benefit of full submissions from each counsel in their respective opening notes and their closing submissions.

To put the current dispute in context I propose to set out a chronology of events, as follows:-

The decisions made in the 2022 ‘Kairo’ proceedings went through a number of iterations as a result of the various procedural stages described above and it is perhaps convenient to record the end result as the combined effect of the various orders made in 2022 (by Recorder Chandler on 25^th July 2022, Sir Jonathan Cohen on 11^th May 2022 and DDJ Burles on 18^th November 2022).

There are many details involved in these decisions, but the headlines for the mother’s provision from the father under Children Act 1989, Schedule 1 were as follows:-

It is common ground that the father has substantively complied with all the above provisions (with a few niggling exceptions described above). In fact, in relation to the purchase of a home for the mother, the father has, in the context described above, gone over and above the order by purchasing a home for a purchase price of £2,400,000.

The application under Children Act 1989, Schedule 1 issued on 30^th June 2023 by the mother in relation to Kinara (but in part reference to Kairo) seeks to build on and extend the above provisions.

In the course of or in the context of these proceedings, either wholly voluntarily or as a result of consent orders, the father has made the following payments to the mother, all of which are over and above the provision required by the 2022 orders:-

The parties have reached agreement on a number of matters and I am content to approve their agreement and will include the agreed matters in the order that I shall make. The agreed matters are as follows:-

On a large number of other matters, however, the parties do not agree what should happen and I will need to make a determination. They are:-

I need next to set out some statutory provisions and case law guidance relevant to my task in determining these matters.

In deciding what I should order I need to take into account the matters set out in Children Act 1989, Schedule 1, paragraph 4, which reads as follows:-

The Dictionary of Financial Remedies (2024 edition) gives a helpful summary of how the case law has guided the use of these powers in relation to capital:-

In relation to income, some of the above principles, including the broad approach, also apply; but the following matters are worthy of particular comment:-

I have been specifically addressed on the issue of whether I should feel in any way bound in my determinations by the 2022 decisions. Ms Gray has gone as far as suggesting that any reliance on the previous decisions would amount to an impermissible adoption of the res judicata principle and has cited the Court of Appeal decision in Re J [2023] 2 FLR 1206 in support of this argument. Ms Saxton has said that I should pay attention to the earlier determinations in the context of my own decisions, not because I am bound by them in any formal res judicata context, but rather because they are part of the developing story here and any fresh application of discretion should take them into account – she points out also that I may also be inclined to agree with them because they are sensible and correct applications of the law to this case. On this disagreement of the legal approach to take, I consider that Ms Saxton’s approach is the correct one.

I shall start by considering “the income, earning capacity, property and other financial resources” which each of the parties “has or is likely to have in the foreseeable future”. I make the following comments.

It is common ground that the father is a wealthy man in terms of capital and currently also in terms of income.

His capital position does not need to be set out in minute detail, but broadly it is represented by the table below:-

His current income position can also be set out broadly. His income as a professional footballer (including basic pay, image rights, performance bonuses and success fees and international fees) is in the region of £7,000,000 to £10,000,000 per annum gross or approximately £3,500,000 to £5,000,000 per annum net. As an elite Sportsman, earning at this level is time-limited by age and, at age 34, he has a limited number of years at the height of his powers (he is currently contracted by Manchester City until 2026). At some stage not very many years in the future he will cease to be a player and it is not yet clear what he will then do – although plainly some players continue earning significant amounts by moving to coaching/management or media work, not all can do this – and it is reasonable to suppose that his income will in due course be significantly lower than it is now and will, to a greater or lesser extent, have to live off the capital he has accrued and the income derived from that capital.

On any view, however, the father is in a position, now and in the foreseeable future, to meet and afford reasonable financial claims made against him by the mother. It is common ground that affordability is not an issue here.

It is equally common ground that the mother is, apart from what she receives from the father, really quite impecunious in terms of income and capital.

Her capital position, likewise, does not need to be set out in minute detail, but broadly it is represented by the table below:-

Her income position (apart from receiving maintenance from the father) is a little opaque; but she seems to receive a modest amount of money from her work as an ‘influencer’ and has received ad hoc payments, also of a relatively modest nature, from media projects such as Channel 4’s ‘Celebs Go Dating’ and ITV’s putative “Wannabee WAG” reality show, which appears in the end not to have been commissioned. She does not appear to plan to move to any employed work but would wish to develop her life as ‘a celebrity’. Whether this proves to be a remunerative plan in the future is not entirely clear, but it would be wrong, I think, for me to assume that she currently has a significant earning capacity which should make a real difference to the outcome of this case and this has not formed a part of the father’s case before me.

In addressing the issue of “the financial needs, obligations and responsibilities which” each of the parties “has or is likely to have in the foreseeable future”, I propose mainly to deal with this in the context of the particular disputes which I have outlined above as requiring to be resolved.

I propose, however, to make a number of general comments.

I note Recorder Chandler’s assessment of the parties’ reliability as witnesses, when he said, in March 2022:-

I am entirely free to make a different assessment of the parties to that of Recorder Chandler and I am in no sense bound by what he said; but the assessment quoted above entirely accords with my own overall assessment of the parties. In my view the father’s presentation before me was sensible, honest and reliable. Where he felt that the mother may have a point, he readily conceded it with some grace, generosity and kindness. Plainly, he was embarrassed and remorseful as to the difficult situation in which he has placed a number of people, including all of his children, and regretted his decision-making in trying to keep his paternity of Kinara a secret; but he has in my view acted with dignity and generosity (and, once the secret was out, honesty) in facing up to the financial and personal consequences of what happened. In contrast, my assessment of the mother is that she was not reliable, often said what she thought would help her case rather than what was true, failed to make a calm and measured assessment of what she needed and often exaggerated her need to spend money (I think the father was correct to observe that the mother was in many ways treating him as an open-ended cheque book). She was unable to give any credit to the father for the reliable and generous financial support he has in fact given her and was happy to take every point against him. She made few concessions where concessions might have been appropriate, for example in relation to the appropriateness of her threats to move to Cheshire near the father’s home. She went out of her way to blame the father for all the newspaper coverage that has been received when I am entirely satisfied that she was overwhelmingly responsible for it, save for the one mea culpa interview he gave in late January 2024, which is perhaps more to his credit than otherwise.

I shall now resolve the disputed areas against the above legal principles, case law guidance and facts.

The mother would like the provision in the 2022 orders for a ‘protected housing budget’ of £1,350,000 (upgraded proportionately) in the event of the mother moving outside the 100-mile rule to be completely removed. The father wishes it to stay in place.

I should remind myself that this provision, although perhaps unusual, was imposed by the DDJ Burles order by consent as part of a ‘deal’, the other side of which was that the housing budget was increased from £1,350,000 to £1,850,000. In fact, the father went further and made £2,400,000 available as a housing budget, not because he accepted that this was needed, but because the mother asked him for this and he acceded. I also remind myself that there was a specific reason for its inclusion, that the mother was threatening to move her home close to the father’s family home in Cheshire. Having heard the evidence, this reason and this justification still very much exists. I also remind myself that, in his evidence, that the father readily conceded that the 60-mile rule could be extended to 100 miles. There is no reason for thinking that the mother faces any injustice because of this clause. There is no reason why she should move out of her current home and/or anywhere within 100 miles of her current home and there is no evidence before me to suggest that the figure of £1,350,000 (proportionately upgraded) would not adequately house her in a suitable home outside the 100-mile limit.

I certainly have the jurisdiction to remove this clause, but in my view it would be inappropriate and unfair for me to do and I shall not accede to this demand by the mother.

The mother would like the cohabitation trigger clause included in the Recorder Chandler order to be completely removed. The father wishes it to stay in place.

The clause (which is reproduced from the Standard Family Order) says:-

The mother argued against this clause before Recorder Chandler in July 2022 and lost and did not appeal on this point. The clause was not removed by the DDJ Burles order and the Sussex property was purchased in August 2023 in the context of an express agreement that this would continue to apply. It is not an uncommon clause to see in these orders and any risk to the mother is ameliorated by the caveat which requires the court’s leave before any sale can occur. If the mother cohabited with another wealthy man she would probably not still require the current property, but if she cohabited with an impecunious man she almost certainly would still require the current property (and an order for sale would probably not be permitted by the court) so it is difficult to see any significant injustice arising from the inclusion of this clause.

I certainly have the jurisdiction to remove this clause, but in my view it would be inappropriate and unfair for me to do and I shall not accede to this demand by the mother.

The father has agreed to ensure that he will keep a management agent of the mother’s Sussex property in place and in funds to the extent of £10,000 at any one time in order to minimise the delay between discovering some item of repair (or equivalent) and the repair being executed. The mother seeks a provision that she should have the absolute right to direct any spending on this fund up to £3,000 on any one item without reference to the father, but the father does not wish her to have that right.

My conclusion on the evidence I have heard suggests that the father is reliable and conscientious in the way which he has dealt with property management issues. In contrast, my impression is that the mother is often difficult, unreasonable and demanding. These conclusions are partly informed by the oral and written evidence before me and are corroborated by a convincing email dated 1^st July 2024 from the property manager Tracey Lewis (albeit that she is paid by the father) who said: “I would add that at all times, both John Bower and Kyle Walker have been swift to come back to me on instructing the works required, although I have mainly communicated with John, funds to cover the works have been sent within 24 working hours as and when required….All communications with Lauryn are generally through Business Whatsapp, multiple messages can be sent to me within a few minutes at times, my requests to call Lauryn to discuss over the phone are generally not permitted, Whatsapp is a brief message system and it is difficult to sometimes find out all information needed to effectively get to the point of what actually needs addressing.”

I have reached the clear conclusion that it would not be appropriate to give the mother the access to these funds which she seeks. I have a real fear that this access would be abused by her and there is nothing in the evidence that I have seen to suggest that the father (via his agent) is not dealing with matters which arise on a perfectly reasonable basis.

Further, the mother has (quite recently) produced a ‘snagging list’ of 59 items which she would like carried out in her Sussex home. Tracey Lewis has produced a helpful initial response to some of these items, but many of these come into the category of ‘an inspection will be needed to establish the nature of the complaint’. Some of the responses suggest that the repair work has already been done – others point to the mother’s obligation under the Recorder Chandler order to deal with “internal routine maintenance and routine upkeep”. Other responses, for example the provision of stair safety gates, suggest (in my view perfectly sensibly) that these should be the responsibility of the mother.

Ms Gray accepted that it would not be appropriate for me to deal with this snagging list on a line-by-line basis, like a building dispute. Even if I was minded to do this, I would need a Scott schedule, photographs, perhaps an independent expert’s report to do this and I have none of these.

In view of my conclusions about the responsible attitude of the father and his agent on these matters, I have no reason to believe that the father will not deal with any meritorious aspects of the snagging list and I do not propose to make any order in relation to it and would encourage the parties to compromise any of these disputes without recourse to the court.

The mother seeks a lump sum to fund the installation of air conditioning in her Sussex home at a cost of £33,000. The father does not agree to this. The mother’s justification for this spending is that her Sussex home is South facing, has a substantial amount of glazing and that at times of fine weather it would be too hot to occupy comfortably without air conditioning. A picture of a thermometer at 31 Degrees has been produced in support of this proposition together with two supportive letters from an estate agent and an air condition installer (who said “the heat will be unbearable in the summer, you will especially struggle to sleep at night”).

I was not persuaded that this demand by the mother was either necessary or reasonable. As the father said, on the fairly small number of days in England when it is very hot, any discomfort can usually be dealt with by closing blinds/curtains and deploying a modestly-priced electric fan. That is what happens in his home, he said, and although he conceded that it may be generally a little colder in Cheshire than in Sussex, he thought (and I agree with him) that air conditioning is rarely needed in an English home. In all the circumstances I was not persuaded by the mother’s demand here.

The mother seeks a lump sum to fund the installation of an astroturf football playing area in the garden of her Sussex home at a cost of £31,200. The father does not agree to this. I remind myself that Kinara has just turned one year old and is not yet walking. I remind myself that the Sussex home was the mother’s choice and that it has an extensive garden which includes paved areas and grassed areas, both of which may be suitable for ball games. The mother surprisingly justified her demand for astroturf by saying that Kinara, by kicking a ball with her left foot from a crawling position, has shown a talent which may suggest a future career as a professional footballer qualified to become a ‘Lioness’. I fear that is an unjustified evidential leap. The father accepted that he does have an astroturf playing area at his home, albeit one which was there when he moved in, and I note that some of the children by his wife are older. In all the circumstances I was not persuaded by the mother’s demand here. I was not persuaded that this demand by the mother was either necessary or reasonable in the context of all the circumstances.

The mother seeks a lump sum to fund some “internal re-modelling” at her Sussex home. The suggested figure for this was £4,000. The father does not agree to this. The evidence I heard suggested that the mother has actually already done what she wanted to do here and, in any event, I was not persuaded that this work was really necessary. In all the circumstances I was not persuaded by the mother’s demand here.

The mother wishes to have a further furnishing fund of £20,000. The father is prepared to offer £2,500 for this purpose, but no more.

It is appropriate to consider this item in the context of the fact that the mother received £75,000 as a furnishing fund in the Kairo proceedings (which she has spent, generally without any great concentration on economy – even if it did not include anything specifically for Kinara, she will undoubtedly benefit from some of the items) and the father also has already made capital payments for Kinara’s ‘capital needs’ as a baby of £30,000. I also note that on 10^th February 2024 the father made an offer of £15,000 for this item. The mother has produced a detailed list of things she would like to buy for Kinara which total nearly £30,000, although much of this list seems to me to be exaggerated and a ‘wish-list’.

The father’s view is that the mother is trying to make the house into a show-home and that the mother already has, or should have, everything she needs by reason of his earlier payments.

Doing the best I can to strike an appropriate balance here in all the circumstances I have reached the conclusion that it would be reasonable for the mother to have a further lump sum of £5,000 as a furniture fund specifically targeted at Kinara’s needs, and in particular her bedroom, but I have not been persuaded above that figure.

The mother would like to improve the car replacement mechanism from the earlier order so that the figure of £45,000 is replaced by the figure of £70,000. The father does not agree to this increase, save that he is content to CPI inflation proof the car provision back to April 2022 – this would have the effect of increasing the car replacement budget in March 2025 to approximately £51,000.

I remind myself that this figure was set in 2022 by Recorder Chandler and was not appealed or improved upon by the DDJ Burles order. I have the jurisdiction to interfere and change the level established by Recorder Chandler, but I struggle to see any compelling reason to do so.

I am not persuaded that the sort of motor car which the mother has now, or that which she could purchase in March 2025 for £51,000, is other than entirely adequate for transporting around two young children. The addition of a second child really makes very little difference to this.

The mother’s complaint is that she only really wants a Mercedes GLE and that nothing else will do and that they cannot be purchased for £51,000. I do not find this a persuasive argument. My attention has been drawn to the fact that the father owns yet more expensive motor cars; but the law does not in my view require the father exactly to reproduce his car budget for the mother. It suffices if her provision is suitable, adequate and reasonably commensurate with his and I am satisfied that the current arrangements, with the CPI uplift incorporated, more than adequately meet the mother’s needs.

In all the circumstances I was not persuaded by the mother’s demands here.

The mother seeks an additional fund of £7,500 plus VAT for the purpose of perfecting and implementing the order I make. The father is prepared for a figure of £2,500 plus VAT to be used for these purposes.

It is difficult to tell how much lawyers’ time will be needed to draft and implement my order. It will depend on how many arguments there are and, whilst I am attempting to produce clarity, the history of this case suggests that the lawyers will find something to argue about and it is in everbody’s interest that the order is settled and implemented as quickly as possible.

On this I am minded to split the difference between the two sides and award £5,000 plus VAT for these purposes. If it is not used, then it should be returned to the father.

The mother would like the father to create a capital fund now for the payment of nursery school fees plus all school fees for Kinara and Kairo. The father opposes this suggestion, saying he will pay for these items as they go along (as per the 2022 orders).

It is correct that the court has the power to deal with these fees in the way demanded by the mother and, if it had been established that the father was unreliable, or a flight risk, then I may have been tempted to do this; but this is absolutely not my impression of the father. I accept his evidence that, even if he engaged in an end-of-career period with an overseas club (for example in Saudi Arabia) his home would still be England. I accept his evidence that he will always be reliable and available to pay these fees.

Further, I have little confidence in the mother’s ability to deal with such a trust fund in a reliable and sensible way and I understand the father’s anxiety about having to operate a joint account with the mother or otherwise running a joint trust fund. I note that Sir Jonathan Cohen reached a similar conclusion about the dangers of having a capitalised nanny fund in his May 2022 judgment.

My conclusion is that there is no need for the capitalisation of the school and nursery fees and that it would make the arrangement more difficult rather than easier. I go one step further and shall, despite the mother’s rather irrational objections, direct that that the father, via an agent if he wishes, have direct contact with the bursar of any school or nursery attended by Kairo or Kinara so that the appropriate fees can be paid by the father without the mother having to be involved. I would hope and expect that this will deal with some of the administration problems which have occurred in this area.

The mother seeks to impose a global figure for child periodical payments for Kairo and Kinara at a rate of £14,750 pcm (plus future CPI inflation). The father suggests the figure should be £12,500 pcm (plus future CPI inflation). In each case they agree the structure of the order (including a 35% reduction when one child drops out) so the matter for me to resolve is quantum.

The father’s offer would produce for the mother some £150,000 per annum in tax-free income. An individual would have to earn about £300,000 per annum gross to receive this net income. In addition, the mother will have all her housing and motor car costs met. It is, on any view, a very significant income. If it is not at the level of a premiership footballer, it might be difficult to argue that it is not broadly commensurate with it or that it is out of kilter with it or that it is out of kilter with what the father spends from his income (preferring to a significant extent to accrue capital).

So how does Ms Gray on behalf of the the mother seek to persuade me that the figure should be yet higher, i.e. £177,000 per annum?

She does this by putting forward a budget which has as its bottom line a figure of £17,931 pcm. Ms Saxton has produced a line-by-line comparative budget (see p.816 of the exhibits bundle) which has as its bottom line a figure of £10,374 pcm.

I propose to apply a broad brush to this exercise, and do not propose to give an assessment on each and every line, but I am satisfied that the fair and correct figure is much closer to the bottom of this comparison table and I have not been persuaded that there is a case for going above the figure offered by the father of £12,500 pcm. I am persuaded that what the father has offered is fair and reasonable, some would say it is generous, and I have not been persuaded that I should go any higher.

The issue of child-care costs has been dealt with in 2022 by Sir Jonathan Cohen. I have set out above what he said. Since this is a fresh application, I am not formally bound to adopt what he said, and in any event there are now two children, but I have found it difficult to disagree with either the sentiment or the detail of his judgment. Ms Gray suggested that it would not be correct to say that it is never appropriate to allow child-care to allow a mother to redevelop her career, and she suggested that Sir Jonathan Cohen was not correct to say this (if he did), but (whatever the merits of this argument generally) I am entirely satisfied that it was the correct answer for the present case. I agree with Sir Jonathan Cohen that it is reasonable here to make some provision for child-care in the nature of respite care. Sir Jonathan felt that, when there was one child, fair provision would be additional child periodical payments in respect of child-care costs in the sum of £1,386 pcm until August 2025 (the start of Kairo’s primary school) and then at the rate of £1,040 pcm until September 2031 (the start of Kairo’s secondary school).

My task should, in my view, be to recast the spirit of Sir Jonathan Cohen’s order into a situation where there are two children of Kairo and Kinara’s ages.

The mother seeks 30 hours per week at £30 per hour, i.e. £3,900 pcm, until September 2027 (when Kinara is likely to commence primary school) and 20 hours per week at £30 per hour, i.e. £2,600 pcm, until September 2033 (when Kinara is likely to commence secondary school). The father offers to pay for 24 hours per week at £20 per hour, i.e. £2,080 pcm, until September 2027 and 12 hours per week at £20 per hour, i.e. £1,040 pcm, until September 2033. Whatever the figures, the mother would like this capitalised and paid in one lump sum; but the father offers to pay it as it goes along.

My view is that, again, the father’s offer is fair and reasonable both in terms of the number of hours per week and the quantum per hour. That is the outcome I propose to adopt.

The only difference that I would impose is that the £20 per hour should be CPI inflation proofed with effect from May 2022 (the date of Sir Jonathan Cohen’s judgment). I do not propose to backdate the figures in the context of awarding arrears, but the upgraded figure will start from now, i.e. from 1^st August 2024 and be applied in May each year in the future.

I have not been persuaded that there should be anything extra arising out of the apparent need to give the existing nanny three months’ notice (the mother should have sorted this out before).

I do think it may be appropriate, however, for the nanny to have access to a run-around car so that the children can be transported around while the mother is enjoying her respite; but I think that £30,000 is far too high and I propose to award the figure of £12,000 for this on the basis that a reasonably suitable nanny car can be purchased for this sum, but this sum should be conditional on the mother presenting evidence to the father that she has employed a nanny with a current full driving licence. It should not be necessary to replace this any time soon and I therefore do not propose to include a recurring figure for the nanny’s car.

There are also disagreements over whether there are arrears of the interim child periodical payments order I made on 10^th January 2024 and the Kairo order made by Recorder Chandler in 2022.

Having heard the arguments on this, and looked carefully at the arguments advanced by each Counsel, I have reached the following conclusions.

I think it was an error by the father to make the deductions from the Kinara interim child periodical payments over in the five months between February and June 2024. It has caused distress and mistrust, even if there was some mathematical justification for some deduction. Indeed, the father told me he rather regretted this decision.

I accept, however, the logic of Ms Saxton’s table and have been persuaded that her figure of net arrears of £16,176 is correct. This figure should be paid forthwith.

In relation to the arrears on the Kairo order the arrears position has been complicated by the fact that the mother’s Solicitors miscalculated the amount due and that the father made some voluntary extra payments. Taking a broad view, I have reached the conclusion that these arrears, if they exist, should be remitted and I therefore do not propose to make any order for payment.

In relation to the costs incurred in pursuing the arrears I propose to summarily assess the costs at the figure requested on the enforcement application for the arrears of interim maintenance, i.e. £2,020, and order that this sum should be paid. I do not propose to allow any costs for the other enforcement application, which I consider was unnecessarily incurred.

I do not propose to make any costs order in relation to the father’s late adjournment application. In my view the mother’s team could and should have been more flexible than they were and there was really no need to incur a large costs bill in dealing with this. The issue really did little more than generate a few emails in any event.

I now return to the transparency issues.

In this context I have heard from Ms McNeil-Walsh for Associated Newspapers (whose views were supported by Ms Saxton for the father) who has argued that I should reach the conclusion which permits the newspapers to publish (with a few targeted exceptions) information about these proceedings, including my judgment, without redaction or anonymisation.

I have also heard from Ms Gray for the mother who argued for the interim transparency order to be made final so that, in effect, there should be an almost complete prohibition of publication of information in relation to these proceedings. Any published judgment, she argued, should be redacted and/or anonymised so as to prevent the identification of the parties.

A starting point here is that, because these are Children Act 1989, Schedule 1, proceedings, Administration of Justice Act 1960, section 12(1) prevents the publication of any information relating to the proceedings. Further, Children Act 1989, section 97(2) prevents the publication of any material likely to identify a child involved in proceedings.

These provisions can, however, be dispensed with if a disclosure is authorised by the court. The task of the court here is explained in judgments such as Re Webster [2006] EWHC 2733, Re S (A Child) (Identification: Restrictions on Publication) [2004] UKHL 47 and Griffith v Tickle [2021] EWCA Civ 1882. Any decision by the court to dispense with these provisions and to authorise disclosure should be taken by an “intense focus on the comparative importance of the specific rights being claimed in the individual case”, i.e. a balancing of the Article 8 and 10 Convention Rights involved and the justifications for interfering with them, with a proportionality test applied to each. The best interests of the children are a primary, but not a paramount consideration. The question to be asked is: Are the best interests of the children involved weighty enough to justify maintaining the statutory fetter?

The court’s decision must be made against the background of the general guidance on transparency in the family courts (see Confidence and Confidentiality in the Family Courts, 28^th October 2021) and the specific guidance in relation to financial remedies proceedings (see The Transparency Reporting Pilot for Financial Remedy Proceedings: Guidance from the President, 15^th December 2023 – the pilot which has been running in the Central Family Court and some other courts since 29^th January 2024); but the decision of course must be made on the facts of a particular case.

It is common ground that the press should not publish the addresses of any of the individuals involved, save in a very broad sense identifying the county in which the homes are situated. It is common ground that the press should not publish the bank account details of the parties. It is common ground that the press should not publish photographs showing the children’s faces. My judgment has, with this in mind, deliberately steered clear of including anything in any of these categories.

The mother argues that I should go beyond that and prohibit the publication of the names of the parties and the children and that, if the judgment is to be published at all, it should be anonymised and redacted. The children’s privacy should be protected, she suggests, and that should dominate all other considerations. The father and Associated Press oppose this, in essence saying that the ‘cat is out of the bag’ already and, in this case, the interests of open justice and the right of the press to report on the work of the family courts and to scrutinise its operation and decisions should prevail.

It is quite rare for a judge in a financial remedies case, in particular in a Children Act 1989, Schedule 1 case, and it is certainly quite rare for me, to reach a clear conclusion that (subject to the few targeted matters above) the normal confidentiality restrictions should be dispensed with and that my judgment should be publicly reported without redaction or anonymisation, but that is the conclusion which I have reached here. In reaching this conclusion I have in mind all the authorities and legal principles referred to above. The dominant feature in my reaching this conclusion is that argued by Ms McNeil-Walsh when she wrote: “The parties are well-known celebrity figures and there has already been substantial reporting of the long-running dispute between them. Much of this reporting has been the result of one or both of the parties themselves putting information into the public domain. Given what is already in the public domain, it would be artificial to suggest that the parents could not be identified if there was reporting of these proceedings on an anonymised basis. The mother in particular has repeatedly placed in the public domain – both via the media and via her public social media profile – images, video and audio of the parties’ children, together with various statements about the father and his marriage to Ms Kilner. In those circumstances, any Article 8 rights are of limited weight in the Re S balancing exercise…In the particular circumstances of this case, there is no reason to suppose that the reporting of these financial remedy proceedings will cause further detriment to the welfare of the parties’ children”.

I agree with what Ms McNeil-Walsh has said. It would be a nonsense, opening the court to ridicule, to try to redact or anonymise this judgment to prevent identification of the parties. Further, a perusal of the many hundreds of newspaper articles published about these matters clearly illustrates that the mother has not just cooperated with, but actively instigated, press coverage placing in the public domain her own children, the circumstances of their conceptions and what she thinks about the father. It sits ill for a person to come to court arguing for privacy for her children when, just a very short while earlier, she took a payment from the press to visit the European football championship with her son dressed in an England football shirt with the name ‘Daddy’ on the back, and to be willingly photographed doing this to provide journalistic fodder which the newspapers were only too happy to use. If the children suffer any harm from the publicity of these matters, it has already happened, and it will largely be the result of the mother’s own decisions and actions. For me, on the facts of this case, the balancing exercise must come down against the mother’s argument. For me, the right of the press to scrutinise and comment upon the court’s procedures and decisions, and what the mother has requested of the father and how he has responded, are on this occasion a greater priority.

This conclusion applies also in relation to the press being permitted to name the children involved here. The names of the four children of the father’s marriage are very frequently cited in many of the press articles referred to above, as is the name of the parties’ older child Kairo. The name of the parties’ younger child Kinara does appear in some coverage, but certainly less than the others, although I have noticed that the mother sometimes appears in photographs with a necklace including the initials ‘KW’, although this could refer to either of her children (or indeed the father). I can see no benefit to the children or anybody else in the court trying to impose restrictions to prevent the reference to the names of the five children already widely publicised. How would they be helped if a newspaper article referred to un-named children whose names are already well known in the public domain? It would in my view also be quixotic and unhelpful to impose a restriction just on Kinara’s name when the other children were being named (and in any event it is very possible to find Kinara’s name on the internet with a small amount of searching). I also consider it very likely, having heard her evidence, that the mother will be tempted, one way or another and whatever any transparency order says, to seek defiantly to put in the public domain her views about the court’s findings and also further views she may have about the father. In these circumstances it is my view preferable that anybody interested in the topic should have the opportunity to read the full independent account contained in this judgment before reaching any conclusions about what has happened.

Accordingly, I propose to make a final transparency order which (save for the few targeted items referred to above, allows reporting of this judgment un-anonymised and un-redacted and I will place it on TNA in its current form) does not interfere with the wishes of the press to publish such material as they wish. For the avoidance of doubt, and lest either party seeks to make further submissions on this, or to seek to appeal with a stay in the meantime, the interim transparency order will remain in place for the time being.

This is my decision and I invite counsel to produce a draft order which matches these conclusions. Could I ask that I receive a draft order or a written explanation as to why this has not happened by 6^th August 2024.

I am sending the judgment out today, 23^rd July 2024, and the 21-day appeal period will run from this day (save if I extend it by an order). My hope is that the order can be agreed and approved without another court hearing, but if this proves optimistic I shall convene a hearing by a further order.

If there are costs submissions, then I will try dealing with them by emailed submissions unless I decide otherwise.