George & Ors, Re

This is the final determination of an application for a child arrangements order issued by the father as long ago as 21^st June 2019. At that time, there was only one child of the parties, George, born in 2018. Since then, and during the pendency of the current proceedings, there have been three further children born to the parties, Hilary in 2020, Jude in 2021 and Kim in 2022. The scope of the application has been widened to include all four children in the application for a child arrangements order.

As well as the father’s application for a child arrangements order, the father on 18^th June 2023 issued an application for enforcement against the mother of earlier contact orders. For reasons which I gave on 18^th August 2023, the first day of the hearing of this matter, I decided that it was neither in the children’s interest nor proportionate to adjudicate on that application for enforcement and consider a punitive outcome for the mother as expressly sought by the father.

The mother issued an application on 19^th June 2023 seeking an order under section 91(14) of the Children Act 1989 preventing the father from making any application in respect of the children without the permission of the Court.

The mother (supported in this instance by the father) also seeks a family assistance order under section 16 of the 1989 Act against the local authority. The local authority appeared by Mr Clarke of counsel to oppose the application.

Further, the mother, by her counsel, at the hearing invited the Court of its own motion to make a non-molestation order in the light of the father’s behaviour in the course of the hearing.

Subsequently in an email of 4^th October 2023, the father sought retrospective permission of the Court to present a complaint to Social Work England about David Phillips, who made two reports as an independent social worker.

There was a fact-finding hearing before District Judge Jabbitt on 16^th and 17^th August 2021. He delivered a long and careful draft judgment on 6^th September 2021 which was put into final form on 16^th September 2021. At that time only three of the children had been born.

The parties have never lived together. The children have always lived with the mother. The father seeks arrangements for joint care of the children. There have been difficulties with contact, but at present he has in principle supervised contact with the children at the maternal grandparents’ home for two hours every fortnight.

At the heart of the issues in this case is the personality of the father, in particular his rigid belief system, and the unusual relationship which exists between him and the mother. As District Judge Jabbitt said:

These finding were made at a fact-finding hearing, but the issues for determination at the hearing were a number of concrete issues, which did not include reaching a view of the father’s personality. It is thus probably the case that the Judge’s comments on the father’s personality are not binding on the parties and this Court. Nonetheless, from my own observations of the father, I can with only some minor differences of emphasis independently agree with District Judge Jabbitt’s observations above and his conclusions which I set out below.

The father represented himself before me. He was clearly an intelligent man. He works as a professional. Before me, he did not emphasise (as he appears to have done before District Judge Jabbitt) any abhorrent views of women and instead made a more modest submission that men and women had different strengths and weaknesses. On occasions, he showed that he was capable of some charm.

However, these positive aspects of his presentation were wholly outweighed by his other behaviour. The mother gave her evidence behind a screen. In consequence of her allegations of abuse on his part, the father was prohibited from cross-examining her. Due to the age of the case, the Court could not appoint a Qualified Legal Representative to cross-examine the mother. Instead, the father provided a long list of questions which he wished should be put to the mother.

When the mother came to give her evidence in chief whilst sitting behind the screen, the father repeatedly interrupted her, yelling abuse at her from the other side of the courtroom and alleging that she was a liar. He refused to obey my directions that he should be silent and ignored my warning that, if he did not behave, he would be removed from the courtroom. Only after I had security summoned and security arrived, did his behaviour moderate. Mr Shaw says that even after security had arrived the father continued to threaten to fight him as counsel and the security guard, but this was not something I witnessed and formal evidence of this has not been put in evidence. In fairness to the father, I should record that in his submissions to me on the final day of the hearing he did apologise to the Court.

What I found surprising was the mother’s response to this abuse. In effect she shrugged it off. It appeared to be behaviour she had seen before. No one would like this behaviour, but she appeared able to ignore it. This is particularly surprising, because the mother is a vulnerable woman. She was severely injured in a motor car accident in early adulthood and sustained brain injuries which resulted in epilepsy. The epilepsy is fortunately now under control. She presented as a slightly shy and nervous woman.

This interaction between the father and the mother mirrors what occurred before District Judge Jabbitt. That hearing was held remotely during Covid, so there was no need for the judge to summon security. The father’s behaviour before me was more extreme, because it was at an in-person hearing.

Judge Jabbitt’s conclusion as to the relationship between the mother and the father was:

Mr Phillips, who gave evidence to me as a social worker, reached a different conclusion. The mother had filled out a questionnaire prepared by the local authority to help identify cases of domestic abuse. On the basis of her responses to the questionnaire, he considered that there was domestic abuse and that the mother had been coerced into sexual relations with the father. The questionnaire was not put in evidence, so I have not been able to assess it. I can readily see how a bald account by the mother of, say, the abusive text messages sent by the father and his general behaviour might lead to a conclusion that this was a coercive relationship. Mr Phillips did interview the mother. However, he had little opportunity to see the father and the mother interacting: his focus was on two sessions of contact between the father and his children. I can thus put less weight on his view of the relationship between the father and the mother.

I agree independently with District Judge Jabbitt’s conclusion. I asked the father how it came about that after George’s birth and the commencement of the current proceedings, he had a further three children with the mother (including one born after the hearing before the district judge). He explained that what would happen was that the mother “got affectionate” with him and that things had gone on from there. That had the ring of truth and was not substantially challenged on the mother’s behalf. Like the district judge, I find that the sexual relations which resulted in the births of the four children were consensual.

I consider below what effect this finding has on the views expressed by Mr Phillips.

An issue arose as to the father’s behaviour when he and the mother went to the Registry Office on 3^rd August 2023 to change the children’s names. The father said they sat together amicably, whereas the mother said he was abusive. On balance of probabilities, I find that the father used abusive language, but that (as occurred in Court before me) the mother was not particularly disturbed by this.

I turn to a separate point. George has been diagnosed with severe autism. This has resulted in significant speech delay. George attends a special school for autistic children. (The other three children are in good health and are meeting their developmental milestones.)

The father does not consider it appropriate that George attend the special school. In the father’s view, George is very intelligent. He is likely to come on best in an ordinary school where he will be competing with other children, whereas at the special school he will only be interacting with other autistic children. He will lack the intellectual challenge he would face at a normal school.

This is not the assessment of the professionals. George’s Education Health and Care Plan, dated shortly after his fourth birthday says:

The father claims to have particular insights into George’ behaviour, because he says that he himself is autistic. As District Judge Jabbitt noted at para 107 of his judgment, no evidence of this beyond the father’s ipse dixit has been adduced. Moreover, there is evidence before me, which was not available to Judge Jabbitt, which casts doubt on the diagnosis. The father was brought up and still speaks bilingually, which tells against his suffering speech impairment. His mother told Mr Phillips that “her son… had not had any difficulties with social communication as a child and had been fluent in both [languages] at his nursery before attending mainstream school. She described having been shocked to learn about his recent Autism diagnosis.” Given the weight which the father seeks to put on what he describes as his special insights into his son’s autism, it is (at least with the benefit of hindsight) unfortunate that the father has not adduced any evidence from the professionals who diagnosed him with the condition, or any evidence about how the particular autism from which he suffers manifests itself. However, (as was the case before the district judge) there was no requirement for him to do. Like the district judge, therefore, I feel obliged to accept that the father does suffer from autism.

This, however, in my judgment only helps the father’s case as regards his son to a limited extent. I do not accept that it gives him any special ability to determine what the best developmental programme for George might be. The fact that the father thrived in a competitive environment does not mean that his son, whose autism is much more severe, will also thrive in such an environment. As I shall discuss below, the father’s rigid belief system means that he does not accept that George is exposed to risks which are potentially dangerous. In my judgment, minimising these dangers is a key factor when considering the welfare checklist.

Mr Phillips gave evidence to me as an independent social worker. He had recently retired. Prior to his retirement he had managed a large team of social workers. He has great experience of social work, albeit largely in the context of public family law.

In his report of 16^th April 2023, Mr Phillips explained the background as follows:

There is no evidence adduced before me that the first social worker had a sexual relationship with the mother or behaved in any way improperly. I find that there is no basis for this allegation on the father’s part.

As regards the father’s alcohol consumption, the hair strand testing shows that there is no chronic or excessive use. Although there seems to have been some inappropriate drinking by the father, such as having what the father described as a “small beer” during a Sunday morning contact visit, alcohol is not a key issue in this case. As the father says, drinking a moderate quantity of wine at lunch is customary in the country where he was brought up. As the father submits, the Court has to have some regard to cultural diversity.

As regards the courses and mediation which the first social worker recommended, Mr Phillips commented:

This failure to change was evidenced in the mother’s evidence. She and the father had gone to mediation three times, but she said it had not helped because he kept bringing up the same issues. The whole purpose of mediation is to move the parties forward. That did not happen. Instead, she said the two-hour sessions just made both of them angry.

Among examples of how the father had failed to change, Mr Phillips quoted a sample of some of the 80 text messages sent by the father to the mother between 5.42am and 3.33pm on George’s birthday in 2022, after various of the interventions had occurred designed to make the father’s behaviour more acceptable. The texts and their grossness speak for themselves (the reference to “Valentino” is to another non-existent lover of the mother):

It is apparent that the various courses which the father has attended have made no difference to his behaviour. In my judgment this is unlikely to change in the future.

Mr Phillips’ report recited strengths and weaknesses in the father’s parenting skills. He said:

Mr Phillips commented further on the issues with food for George. He noted that the father had not fed George with the foods (which he liked) provided by the mother for consumption during the contact visit. Instead the father insisted that George eat the lamb, which George had never eaten previously and which he spat out in part.

The mother raised additional concerns from the lack of supervision when the father took the children to the park. This would potentially allow George to run into the road. I accept that evidence, which is entirely in keeping with the father’s belief that his son should be encouraged to be independent.

Contact was in fact changed to two hours once a fortnight at the maternal grandparents’ home pursuant to an order of District Judge Saunders. The mother is not present at these contact sessions. A different social worker to Mr Phillips observed a contact session in July 2023. It went well.

Mr Phillips gave evidence before me. Although I do not accept his view on the relationship between the father and the mother, I found him in general an impressive and balanced witness. He found the father a polite individual. He was disappointed that the father was wholly unable to change. He explained that the father’s impaired personality was not his fault, but that it was very deep rooted.

Mr Phillips’ conclusion in his April report was:

Since then it became apparent that five hours fortnightly placed too great a burden on the grandparents. As noted, the contact sessions were reduced to two hours each. By the time of the hearing before me, Mr Phillips concluded that fortnightly sessions were too much. There had been an incident (the facts of which I have not been asked to determine) in which the father is alleged to have assaulted the grandfather. Although the grandparents have continued to support contact, this incident has put a strain on the arrangements. Mr Phillips’ final recommendation made orally to me was that there should be contact once a month of up to three hours.

I accept Mr Phillips’ recommendation. The father’s wish for 50-50 joint care of the children is in my judgment wholly unrealistic. I sympathise with his desire to have a normal family life with the mother and the children, but the mother does not wish to live with him. In my judgment the care she is giving the children and in particular her handling of George is excellent.

By contract there are very significant risks in giving care to the father. He does not recognise how best to support George’ special needs. He has an inadequate appreciation of the risks to which George and the other children are potentially exposed. There is no prospect of his changing his beliefs in child-rearing, notwithstanding the risks to which his children and particularly George will be exposed if left in his unsupervised care.

I turn to the welfare checklist (section 1(3) of the Children Act 1989). As to the children’s wishes and feelings, all four enjoy contact with their father. However, they are not of an age to be able to consider the type of contact which would best protect and develop themselves. As to their physical and emotional needs, these are being met fully as a result of the care given them by their mother.

As regards education, the special school matches George’s needs. I reject the father’s submission that George would do better in an ordinary school. That submission is contrary to the views of the professionals who have considered how George can best be educated. The other children are thriving in normal education. Any change to the children’s current arrangements is likely to be deleterious. These considerations encompass the children’s characteristics.

Of great important is the risk of harm. For the reasons I have outlined, the father is in my judgment unable adequately to ensure the safety of the children when they are in his unsupervised care.

In my judgment, Mr Phillips’ proposal for supervised contact at the maternal grandparents’ for up to three hours once a month is realistic. The current fortnightly arrangement puts too much of a burden on the grandparents. I so order. I dismiss the father’s application for joint care.

The mother applies for an order under section 91(14) of the Children Act 1989 to prevent the father from issuing further applications in these proceedings without the permission of the Court. The traditional approach of the Court to making such orders has been very restrictive, usually requiring the parent against whom the order is sought to have issued repeated applications with little or no prospect of success.

The Domestic Abuse Act 2021 has by section 67 inserted a new section 91A to the 1989 Act. The effect was considered by Hayden J in M v F [2023] EWFC 5:

In the current case, there are strong indications that the father may bring further proceedings unless steps are taken to control him. I have already mentioned the application for enforcement steps to be taken against the mother. I deal below with complaints which the father has made. He has reported Mr Phillips to Social Work England with a view to that regulator taking disciplinary proceedings against him. He has complained to the chambers of Mr Shaw, the mother’s counsel, about counsel’s alleged behaviour. He has said, both orally and at item 4 of his response to the mother’s submissions for 28^th September 2023, that he intends to appeal. This was even before I delivered any judgment or made any decision. It is of course his right to seek permission to appeal and I do not hold that against him, but wanting to appeal even before a decision has been reached indicates a state of mind in which he will not let the dust settle on what on any view has been gruelling litigation.

The father is in my judgment perfectly capable, even before he has exhausted his appeal routes, of issuing fresh proceedings, seeking a variation of the contact and care arrangements. This is because he strongly believes that the mother is giving the children poor care and will not accept the Court’s determination that he is in error on this. He will continue to believe that he can provide the children with better care than she can and will continue to litigate to try and impose his view on the mother and children. My conclusion on this is reinforced by the father’s suggested amendments to this judgment when I had it circulated in draft. He wanted an alternation to this paragraph reflecting his view that it “is unbelievable that the Court thinks that the mother can provide adequate care for her… children” due to the size of her flat.

In my judgment, this is a case where it is in the best interests of the children that the mother and the children should have some protection against a continuation of this litigation. The mother originally proposed a five-year order, but in the concluding submissions on her behalf it was submitted that seven years was more appropriate, given the children’s ages. In my judgment, the five-year order is more appropriate. Section 91(14) orders are not punitive. It would in my judgment require stronger evidence than here to show that a period of longer than five years was needed. If meritless applications are made after the expiry of the order, the Court can always make a fresh order. Accordingly, I will make an order under section 91(14) against the father for a period of five years.

The father submits in post-judgment submissions that the making of such an order “will severely limit contact between father and children for five years as there is no way of increasing contact from 3 hours per month.” This is not correct. Firstly, the parties can agree between themselves to increase contact. Secondly, the father can apply to the Court for permission to bring fresh proceedings for a variation of the contact arrangements. I strongly discourage the father from doing this until the current arrangements have bedded in or there is a major change in circumstances, but the order merely provides a filter for the making of such an application; it does not debar the father from seeking a variation.

Section 16 of the Children Act 1989, so far as material, provides:

Mr Shaw, on the mother’s behalf, submits:

Mr Clarke on behalf of the local authority opposes the making of an order. He submits that the leading case on the making of a family assistance order is Re E (Family Assistance Order) [1999] 2 FLR 512, where the judge made an order in what he described as “a highly unusual and a highly exceptional situation.”

The father supported the making of an order on the basis that he “is keen to evidence to the local authority that he is capable of looking after his children on his own in particular on days out to places such as the Science Museum, Legoland and the Aquarium if he is not granted unsupervised contact.”

Both counsel agreed that in deciding whether to make a family assistance order the Court needed to apply the usual test of the paramount interests of the children. In my judgment the reference in Re E to the situation there being “highly unusual” and “highly exceptional” is not intended to be a threshold requirement. However, I consider that it will be rare that an order is made where there are not special circumstances. The involvement of the State in the private lives of parents is inevitably intrusive. As a result, in public law proceedings there is a significant hurdle for a local authority to jump before it can interfere with the parents’ family life. Absent the crossing of the hurdle, it is not generally in the best interests of the children that an emanation of the State continue to interfere in the private lives of a family.

In my judgment there is little advantage to the children in having further local authority involvement. It is suggested on the mother’s behalf that if contact breaks down it would be useful to have a social worker allocated who could advise on alternatives. There is in my judgment no need for a family assistance order for such a limited purpose. Likewise, the father is not, at any rate in the near future, going to be allowed to take his children to the Science Museum and elsewhere unsupervised, so the basis for his support for such an order falls away.

Accordingly, I refuse to make a family assistance order.

At the hearing before me, Mr Shaw invited the Court to make a non-molestation order against the father of its own motion. There appears to be no jurisdictional problem with the Court making such an order of its own motion: Family Law Act 1996 section 42(2)(b). As the abuse recited in this judgment shows, the father pursues a course of harassment of the mother. It is true that the mother is fairly resilient to the abuse, however, she should not have to put up with the father’s molestation of her. In these circumstances, I am satisfied that the Court should grant a non-molestation order, initially for one year.

In his post-judgment submissions seeking to argue against the making of such an order, the father said: “Father will continue to say things that mother does not like to hear which father considers absolutely essential in pointing out to protect the children in this case.” I am afraid this reinforces my decision that a non-molestation order should be granted.

On 22^nd September 2023, between the first day of the hearing before me and the second day, the father made a complaint to Social Work England about Mr Phillips. He alleged that “even though David Phillips put in considerable effort into preparing his report he did not pursue good practice in his field resulting in poor quality outcomes.” He proceeded to say (I cite largely just the headings) “1) Reports did not pursue good practice. (a) Failure to take a holistic approach… (b) Triangulation… (c)… lack of objectivity or evidence-based approach to work… (d) ‘Cherry picking’… (e) Lack of evidence-based conclusions… 2) Misrepresentation… his social work experience revolved around public cases rather than private cases… 3) Unconscious bias… 4) Naivety… 5) Fixed mind…” Attached to the complaint as Annex 2 was Mr Phillips’ very full report to the Court.

In my judgment, making the complaint in this way without the permission of the Court was a serious breach of confidentiality. Section 12(1)(b) of the Administration of Justice Act 1960 preserves liability for contempt of court in respect of publication of information relating to proceedings held in private under the Children Act 1989. Section 97(2) of the Children Act 1989 prevents identification of children involved in Children Act proceedings to the public or a section of the public.

The father argues that he did not require the Court’s permission to make the complaint and publish Mr Phillips’ report to Social Work England, because it was permitted by Practice Direction 12G, which, he says, allows publication to “A person or body assessing quality assurance systems.” Even supposing Social Work England is a quality assurance assessor (which I doubt), the Practice Direction makes it clear (a) that only a legal representative or a professional legal advisor can make the reference and (b) that the purpose of the disclosure must be to “enable the legal representative or professional legal adviser to obtain a quality assurance assessment.” Neither of these requirements are satisfied.

At the hearing I discussed with the father whether this was a case which I should refer to the Attorney-General. The effect of making the complaint was to intimidate a witness whilst the proceedings were still live. The father was keen to have the matter referred to the Attorney. Since the purpose of the reference would be for the Attorney-General to consider taking proceedings in the King’s Bench Divisional Court for criminal contempt, the father’s position was difficult to understand.

After further discussions, it seemed to me that the better course was simply to grant an injunction so as to require the father to withdraw the complaint to Social Work England. This also had the desirable effect of being faster and providing quicker protection for Mr Phillips.

Subsequently by email of 4^th October 2023, the father sought retrospective permission to make the complaint to Social Work England. As will be clear from the judgment above, although I do not agree with Mr Phillips’ view as to the nature of the relationship between the father and the mother, there is nothing in the substance of the allegations against Mr Phillips. The Court has a duty to protect witnesses who give evidence to it. Only in an egregious case would it be appropriate to grant permission to a party to make a complaint to a professional body. This is far from such a case. Accordingly, I refuse the father’s application for retrospective permission to make the complaint.

I gave Mr Clarke carriage of the order. In general costs are not awarded in the Family Court, but the father was guilty of serious misconduct in making the complaint. In these circumstances it is in my judgment right that the local authority should have its costs of this issue.

Nothing daunted by the Court’s reaction to his complaint against Mr Phillips, on 1^st October 2023, the father complained to Mr Shaw’s chambers about Mr Shaw’s behaviour. A flavour of the complaint can be seen from this:

Again the father has shown no regard for the confidentiality of the proceedings. Further the allegations have again no substance to them. Whatever was said between Mr Shaw and his client is covered by legal professional privilege. Mr Shaw was instructed by solicitors, who would have been well able to assess whether Mr Shaw was acting properly or not. Any issues in the hearings before me could have been aired by the father then and there, rather than being raised as the subject of a complaint to counsel’s chambers.

In my judgment, the injunction I have granted in respect of Mr Phillips should be extended to be a general injunction against the father making any complaints without the permission of the Court. Since the father may be considering whether to bring complaints against me and the other judges who have heard his case, the order should provide that any application by the father for permission to use confidential materials should be placed before the designated family judge. Although I am making order forbidding the father from making a complaint about judicial office holders without the permission of the designated family judge, I am not extending this injunction so as to protect myself, since I cannot be a judge in my own cause.

Following the hearing on 18^th August 2023, I gave directions limiting the parties to the provision of skeleton arguments of a maximum of ten pages. The father had previously objected to this, saying:

Unfortunately, the father deliberately ignored the direction that he serve a skeleton argument. Instead he served a ten-page “closing submission statement”. Because the document is in pdf format, I cannot tell the precise font size. It is, however, very small. I could not read the font save by using the zoom function on my computer. From other documents which he has served in word format, it is likely to be in 7.5 point size. This coupled with single spacing and narrow margins, meant that the document contained 16,469 words. This is the equivalent of 2.7 per cent of the length of War and Peace.

I summarised the law in relation to excessive length of submissions in WWRT Ltd v Carosan Trading Ltd [2021] ECSCJ No 784, https://eccourts.org/judgment/wwrt-ltd-v-carosan-trading-ltd-et-al which pointed to the numerous breaches of the Overriding Objective caused by immoderately long written submissions. It means that the other parties to the case have to read the submissions and an inordinate amount of the Court’s limited resources have to be given to the party submitting the excessive submissions.

Accordingly, I directed that the father pay the costs incurred by the other parties resulting from the excessive length of the father’s closing submissions.

The mother’s solicitors have served a schedule of the costs claimed in accordance with my judgment above. It amounts to £579.00 plus VAT. The VAT was originally wrongly calculated, but the correct figure of £115.80 has been substituted. The total is £694.80. The partner’s hourly rate is billed at £280; the paralegal at £150. The father makes no complaint, and could make no complaint, as to the hourly rate. The overall sum claimed is in my judgment proportionate.

The father has served eight pages of objection with a further twelve pages of annexes. Much of these submissions sought to challenge the decision as to costs which I made above, which I do not propose to reconsider. As to the submissions as to the amount of the costs, which are the relevant issues on the assessment of costs, the father’s main objection is as to the length of time taken to read documents. In my judgment, the time spent is wholly reasonable and indeed longer might have been justified.

The father criticises the solicitor for forwarding various of his emails to the mother about the complaint he had made about Mr Shaw. Again, the solicitor is obliged to keep his client informed about relevant steps in the proceedings and to advise her about the significance of this attack made against her counsel. There is no difficulty in my judgment with a solicitor charging one unit for reading a substantive email from the father and then charging another unit for forwarding the email with his comments to the mother. A twelve-minute phone call with the client on this subject is wholly reasonable.

I disallow nothing.

The father applies for permission to appeal. One difficulty he faces is that he has not requested a transcript of the various judgments and reasons I gave on 18^th August 2023 or any of the evidence adduced then. I raised this matter with him on 28^th September 2023. He said that he not requested and did not intend to request a transcript. The result is that I have not been able to peruse the transcript of evidence nor correct and approve the judgments I gave.

Another difficulty with his application for permission is presentational. He has not served grounds of appeal and skeleton argument separately. As a result it is sometimes difficult to identify the particular point which he says gives rise to an arguable ground of appeal.

The first ground of appeal is against my decision that it is neither in the children’s interest nor proportionate to adjudicate on the father’s application for enforcement and consider punitive outcome for the mother as expressly sought by the father. The father asserts that “the children will suffer greatly as a result of a lack of contact with their father as a result of no consequences on mother breaching contact orders even though she has been warned a number of times before.” With respect this does not in my judgment establish an arguable ground of appeal. Although there may be other ways of arguing an appeal on this issue, the most likely would be for the father to show that I had failed to take a relevant consideration into account or reached a conclusion which no reasonable judge would have reached. He makes neither assertion and in my judgment neither assertion would be upheld on appeal. Accordingly, this ground of appeal has no reasonable prospect of success. Nor are there any other grounds on which permission to appeal should be granted.

The second ground is that the “father adds a great deal of value to the children’s lives, [but that] this evidence has been disregarded.” I do not accept this. In para 34 above, I recite Mr Phillips’ evidence of the positive elements of the father’s contact with his children. This, however, has to be balanced against the risks which he identifies.

The third ground has two elements. It is submitted that my refusal to order shared parenting “breaches The Equality Act 2010 and the Human Rights Act as mechanisms should be put in place to facilitate shared parenting as this is in the best interests of the children. The Court cannot see this as it presided over an unfair trial where applicant father was not given sufficient opportunity to expose the weaknesses in the social worker report prepared by David Phillips that the Court heavily relied upon. A re-trial is required.” The duty to give primacy to the interests of the children under the Children Act 1989 is in full compliance with the duties of equality and respect for human rights. It is true that the father only asked Mr Phillips two questions. However, that is not because I forbad him from asking more. A transcript would show what transpired.

The fourth ground complains that I have not addressed the foreign passport issues in this judgment. That is because I gave an oral judgment on 18^th August 2023 explaining the order I was making in respect of the passports.

The fifth ground is that making a section 91(14) order is “not in the best interests of the children as circumstances change.” As I set out in para 52 above, a section 91(14) order merely creates a filter. It does not prevent the father applying for a variation of the contact arrangements if there is a change of circumstances; he merely requires permission.

The sixth ground is that the mother (he asserts) does not wish that a non-molestation order in her favour be made. Contrary to the father’s assertion, the mother’s solicitors have not sought to change the Court’s view that a non-molestation injunction is should be granted. It is through them that any representations to the Court should be made. This is particularly so given the father’s behaviour.

The seventh ground is that “[w]ithout local authority involvement the children will cease having contact with their father as a result of the success of the [section 91(14)] Application and Court deciding to refuse the C79 application for enforcement.” This misunderstands the purpose of having local authority involvement: they are not involved with enforcement of Court orders.

The eighth ground asserts:

The costs awarded are not intended to victimise the father. They represent costs incurred by the father’s unreasonable and improper behaviour as explained above. The father’s request for additional information as to the costs was unnecessary: a solicitor’s certification of a schedule of costs is sufficient to show the time spent and that the monies claimed are properly recoverable. Further, the additional work required of the solicitor to answer the father’s questions would incur disproportionate costs, in view of the size of the costs claimed.

Accordingly, grounds 2 to 8 of appeal have no reasonable prospect of success. Nor are there any other grounds on which permission to appeal should be granted.

The father then has a separate section giving no less than eleven grounds of appeal, with the numbering repeated. The first ground is that one day was insufficient for the hearing. This is a criticism of an earlier decision by District Judge Saunders to allocate one day to the hearing. It cannot be a ground of appeal against my orders. In any event, the matter was adjourned for a further half day hearing on 28^th September 2023, so the problem was alleviated.

The second ground is a long submission on the evidence of Mr Phillips. However, the submissions do not identify any appealable point against the determinations I made. The fact that the father disagrees strongly with my assessment of Mr Phillips’ evidence is not a valid ground of appeal.

The third ground contains a number of threads. It is submitted that I should have allowed the father to ask direct questions of the mother on 18^th August 2023. In the light of his behaviour that day, I regret to say I find this submission frivolous. It is said that I did not ask the mother all the questions he had put in writing. This is true, but I gave reasons at the time why I did not put certain questions to the mother. The father does not identify the questions where I am said to have erred in not putting them to the mother. Nor does he engage with my reasons for not putting particular questions to the mother. The father submits that I should have engaged more vigorously in asking follow-up questions of the mother. He does not particularise this submission, so it is not on its face a valid ground of appeal. Moreover, as a general proposition, it would be wrong for a judge to engage in a classic cross-examination of a witness whom a party is debarred from examining.

The fourth ground is that I determined that “David Phillips could not answer any questions on the S37 and CAFCASS reports including the safeguarding letter.” Without sight of the transcript, I have difficulty considering this ground of appeal. These were not, however, documents prepared by Mr Phillips. He could only give a limited response if parts of those reports had been put to him. The reports spoke for themselves. The father was able to comment on them and adduce evidence to contradict them.

The fifth ground is that District Judge Saunders refused the father representation (I presume by a qualified legal representative). This is not a complaint against my decision. Any appeal should be against District Judge Saunders’ determination. In any event, the father has not identified a power which the Court could have used to appoint a representative for him.

The sixth ground is that “mother’s representative submitted a Contact Chronology schedule the evening before the 18 August 2023 hearing which was not included in the Bundle.” This is true, but the chronology was used for a limited purpose only and the father was able to deal with the chronology satisfactorily in his submissions.

The seventh ground is that various documents containing submissions were limited to ten pages. This applied to all parties and, was for the reasons I have already given, a reasonable case management decision.

The eighth ground was that the mother’s “representatives have engaged in communication with the Court without involving Applicant father resulting in an unfair advantage to Respondent mother and therefore an unfair trial. In addition, before the hearing commenced on 18 August 2023, a meeting was held in person between Recorder Jack, David Phillips and Respondent mother’s representatives which breached Family Court Procedure Rules as Applicant father should have been present.” This relates to a short discussion held in Court as to how screens were to be set up to prevent the father seeing the mother. He does not identify any other communications said to have occurred between the solicitors and the Court.

Because the hearing was in one of the basement courts in the Royal Courts of Justice, the usual arrangement of putting a curtain around the witness box was not possible. Instead the mother had to be seated in (what I think would have been) the journalists’ box on the far side of the court from the father with the screen between them to separate her from the father. Only this —essentially administrative — matter was discussed. It was not practical to have both the father and the mother together in court while the arrangement of the screen was being discussed.

The ninth ground is that District Judge Saunders reduced the hours of contact the father had. This is not a matter determined by me. It cannot be a ground of any appeal against me.

The tenth ground is that the father had the right to make oral representations before counsel for the mother made his submissions. He cites no authority for this proposition. The hearing as I recall was quite fluid with both the father and Mr Shaw interacting with me. Without a transcript it is difficult to identify any way in which the father might have been prejudiced.

The eleventh and last ground is that I had not read the papers. This ground appears to be based on my not giving an immediate answer to the father’s questioning me as to particular documents which I had received. All the documents in this matter were in electronic form. Skeleton arguments, position statements etc came in piecemeal. It thus took a little time to check that a particular document had been received. Without a transcript, it is difficult to identify which documents he alleges I had not read.

In my judgment none of these grounds of appeal have a reasonable prospect of success. Nor are there any other substantial grounds for granting permission to appeal. Accordingly I refuse permission to appeal.

Accordingly, I: