W v H

For the final hearing the evidence in this case was limited to a statement each from the Parties and each party gave oral evidence. Consistent with the order made, at the ground rules hearing, each party was permitted to file and serve questions in advance. There was no limit placed on the Parties as to the number of questions which could be filed however each party was given notice that they would be limited to putting their questions and obtaining answers within the time allowed by the hearing template.

Upon my consideration of the draft questions, I disallowed a number of questions of each party. I made a case management order on the Friday before the hearing started on Monday in the following terms:

The Wife did not take issue with the order. The Husband made representations at the commencement of the hearing claiming that the case management order was potentially unfair by way of discrimination. I listened carefully to the Husband’s submissions and ruled that the questions had been disallowed fairly, appropriately, and proportionately for the reasons given. The hearing continued on the basis that the written questions were put to each party and then each party was permitted to expand upon their answers by way of re-examination in the usual way.

Whilst the Husband had been given permission to instruct Mr Ison as his advocate, he chose not to do so for the preliminary part of the hearing whilst the Wife answered the pre-prepared questions. The Husband agreed that it would be inappropriate for him to ask questions of the Wife, she having been denoted a vulnerable witness and asked me to ask the questions of the Wife on his behalf, which I did.

Regarding the Husband’s cross-examination the Court offered the opportunity to Mr Ison to put the questions to the Husband. The Husband politely explained that he would prefer the Court to put the questions. The Husband said that he was used to seeing my face on the screen and that having heard the manner in which the questions being put to the Wife it was his preferred choice that I put questions to him. I took the view that this was eminently sensible and was consistent with the Court endeavour to ensure procedural fairness. Following the Husband’s answers, but without direct consultation between Mr Ison and the Husband, Mr Ison asked one supplementary question which assisted the Husband to clarify a point he had made during cross examination.

At the conclusion of the evidence each party was invited to file and serve written submissions the timetable of which was agreed with Mr Thomas for the Wife and the Husband who rightly consulted upon this point with Mr Ison. The timetable for filing written submissions was therefore helpfully agreed by the Parties. The Court has received written submissions from Mr Thomas which were forwarded to the Husband for him to prepare his written submissions and file sequentially. Both Parties have filed their written submissions to assist the Court in its deliberations.

I pause at this point to express the Courts gratitude to both Parties Mr Thomas and Mr Ison who demonstrated a high degree of cooperation and respect for the Court process. The Court is also immeasurably grateful to the intermediary, Ms Pike, without whose professionalism I cannot see how this hearing would have been effective.

In Mr Thomas’ closing submissions, he highlights eight subheadings of behaviour which he relies upon on behalf of his client to demonstrate that the Husband has behaved in such a way that the Wife cannot reasonably be expected to live with him. In a further valid submission, the Court is asked to accept that there are a large number of allegations relating to the Husband’s behaviour and that the Court should not have to be satisfied that each and every allegation proved to conclude that overall, the test provided for in section 1(2)(b) is met.

I have considered the particulars in the Amended Petition, the Respondent’s answer and both Parties statements as supplemented by their respective oral evidence. I understand that I must take an holistic view of the evidence in relation to behaviour throughout the entire marriage. In addition to the behaviour during the marriage I am asked to have regard to some of the Husband’s behaviour prior to the marriage. The Wife says this behaviour is relevant when it happened without her knowledge and where she only became aware of it after the marriage (or even after the Parties separated).

The Husband says that some aspects of his pre-marital behaviour served as an indicator as to what the Wife could expect following the marriage and that where such simply continued into the marriage the Wife should not be able to say that he has behaved in such a way as she cannot reasonably be expected to live with him as she was forewarned as to how he might behave.

Each of these propositions has some merit and I will refer to them where necessary and give such weight as I deem appropriate.

I have decided to address the Wife’s allegations by following the subheadings set out in Mr Thomas’ submissions; the particulars in the Amended Petition are quite discursive and somewhat muddled. The particulars are not numbered, and neither are the paragraphs limited in their content to particular allegations. The language slips seamlessly from first to third person. Overall, it is not an impressively drafted document and would have benefitted from more professional or experienced input or oversight. Whilst the Husband has always represented himself, the Wife has always had the benefit of professional representation. I do not wish to cause any unnecessary professional embarrassment by my comments, but I do wonder whether the fee earner involved in this significantly important (and very costly) litigation has been effectively supervised.

I think the fairest way of approaching the allegations is to follow counsel’s lead. Mr Thomas has gone to lengths in his submissions to collate the allegations into a semblance of order which I find, for the purpose of my analysis to be useful and I am grateful to him for this. I will therefore use the same headings as those adopted by Mr Thomas.

I formed the view that the manner in which she described this example of behaviour in her statement was somewhat exaggerated as she was able easily to find a solution, albeit a temporary one. This was consistent with the Husband’s response in evidence whose response to this example was to say that he had questioned the efficacy of replacing beds prior to removal saying that he thought it not to be a good idea to buy packaged furniture which would then have to be taken apart on moving. He said that he was unable to understand this allegation until it was fully explained in cross examination and having listened to the Wife’s explanation, he recalled that whilst his Wife did see the bedding to be a problem, she nevertheless found a solution by using an alternative bed for the child.

Under the same heading and referring to paragraph 20 the Wife gave nine quotes of what she says the Husband has said to her. Each of the quotes is derogatory in its content and if said would be unpleasant to hear no matter what the context. Neither the statement nor the Wife’s oral evidence is specific as to when any of the phrases were used. Indeed, there is no corroborative evidence that any of the phrases were used during the time the Parties were living together, or whether the Parties had lived together for 6 months following any of the alleged phrases having been used. Whilst it would normally be reasonable to assume that allegations of the Husband’s behaviour contained within the Petition and the statement would be restricted to the period when the Parties were living together, when I consider the Wife’s evidence as a whole, and the Husband’s flat denial to use such statements are not find myself able to assume or indeed to find that these comments were made by the Husband, let alone during the course of cohabitation.

The Wife’s evidence in her statement on this matter is set out in paragraph 24. The Wife says, “The Respondent would never allow free access to our home for the children. They were only allowed in the back living room of the house. The Respondent put a safety gate across the area between the living room and the kitchen area and I therefore filled this room with toys to try to make it as entertaining for the boys as possible as they were only allowed in this area each day behind the safety gate.” In the Wife’s evidence she conceded that the two living areas in the house and the main living area was part of the kitchen. In his evidence the Husband explained that the house had an open plan living area, that there was a small living room at the front which was reserved as an adult room and at the back of the house was much bigger and have patio doors leading to the garden. The Husband explained that this was the room for the children, and they use it as a playroom/family room. The Husband confirmed that he had put a gate restricting the movement of the children into areas of the house where they could come into danger although consider this to be perfectly reasonable and explained that as he was out of work all day, when the Wife had exclusive control of the children, she was perfectly at liberty to let them wander wherever they chose. It was clear from Husband’s evidence that he was at an absolute loss as to how this behaviour could be described as giving rise to the Wife concluding that she could not reasonably be expected to live with him, and I agree with the Husband’s position.

The Wife accepts that she relied on the Husband extensively to assist her with her companies to be able to operate her Avon franchise. The Wife also accepts that during the evening the Parties conversed. Considering this allegation in the context of the marriage it seems to me that this is a further example of the Wife exaggerating. There may have been the odd occasion when the Husband has been busy working on his computer and focusing on a matter when he’s asked not to be interrupted. I do not accept that the Wife has sufficiently made out a case that this was even a frequent event or even that it was usual.

The Wife’s allegations under this heading relates to her taking on an agency or franchise for the sale of Avon products. The Parties evidence differs as to how the Wife became involved in Avon the material allegation is that the Wife maintains that the Husband effectively controlled the Wife’s engagement to the extent that he was dictating where she should canvas and when she should leave the home to distribute sales literature. It is the Wife’s stated case that she took on the agency for some independence, but the Husband’s controlling nature would not allow this. The Husband’s position as stated in his oral evidence was that the Wife informed him that she had signed up to Avon and told him, “You’re going to have to do all the computer stuff”. He says that far from interfering in the agency he was supportive and carried out the administrative function which the Wife was unable to undertake. During the Wife’s evidence I formed the view that she had overstated her position. I refer particularly to the allegation of the Wife that the Husband directed where she should canvas and where she must work when those directives came from the company itself. In my judgment, the Wife again exaggerated to the point where she presented a false picture in an attempt further to present the Husband as controlling.

Having regard to the personality traits of the Husband it is my finding that the Husband’s attempts to help the Wife in this venture were genuine, well intentioned and proportionate. It may be that the Wife regretted having committed herself to undertaking quite strenuous and demanding work while pregnant but there is no cogent evidence that the Husband’s approach was controlling or disproportionately intrusive. Any impression of this, the Wife had should have been regarded by her in the context of the Husband’s autism, as I explain later.

A specific allegation of financial control by the Husband was presented by way of an example of an incident which occurred prior to the Parties marrying. It involves the Parties signing mortgage guarantee documentation at the home of the Husband’s parents. The Wife presents a picture of the Husband and his parents conspiring to have the Wife sign documentation the results of which would give the Husband’s parents an interest in their future property. I am troubled by this having been given as an example of financial control within the marriage. Firstly, because whatever occurred, and it is impossible to establish exactly what did occur, it certainly did not occur during the marriage. This means that the Parties married after such behaviour occurred and that they remained living together for a far greater period than six months after the event.

Secondly, it seems to me that the Wife benefited from the financial arrangement as she was able to purchase with the Husband a property with the support of the Husband’s parents; a property which she would in all likelihood been unable to purchase without that support as she already owned her own property in her own name.

Thirdly, the Wife confirmed during her evidence that she did not ask to read the document at the time of signing and has not asked to read it since nevertheless, the Wife was able to explain that it was this document that meant that the Parties were able to buy a house for them both to live in following their proposed marriage.

Of potentially more relevance than the obtaining of the mortgage with the support of the Husband’s parents is the Wife’s allegation that the Husband controlled the finances throughout the marriage and deprived her of any form of independent means. The Wife’s statement bears quoting,

In her oral evidence the Wife undermined her allegations in this regard. The Wife confirmed that she had her own bank account which she had maintained since before the marriage and had access to the joint account.

An extract of the Wife’s cross examination exemplifies the problem the Court has in finding that the Wife’s allegations are sustainable:

She said that she had no idea if the bank accounts were funded or were empty; she confirmed she must have had some money in them because she was able to buy a caravan from her own money which cost (on the Wife’s evidence) £12,500. Significantly, she said, “I have financial independence until I had my first child because I had been working as a social worker.” The Wife went on to confirm that she could and can access the Halifax account online and that she had access to a joint account with the Nationwide she said that she had a debit card which she could use to buy goods and obtain cash and that she made purchases from that account. The Wife said, “He didn’t control the spending from that bank account.” The Wife went on to say, “He didn’t stop me buying anything for myself.”

The Wife was asked, “Do you agree that to buy items that you wanted to buy, gave you financial independence as you did this without speaking to [the Husband]? She answered:

“Yeah, I bought things without permission … I don’t have any examples of things that I wanted that I couldn’t get, to be honest.”

In Mr Thomas’s submissions he acknowledges that it has to be accepted that the Wife’s oral evidence was ambivalent. In my judgment the Wife’s evidence was not ambivalent, rather, it presented an accurate overall picture of the Wife’s financial status throughout this marriage and I find that the Wife was not financially controlled throughout the marriage; rather she unfortunately confused her position of financial dependency following the birth of the first child with being financially controlled.

An incident occurred on 9 March 2017 which the Wife claims was the final straw in the relationship between herself and the Husband and which prompted her to leave him. The Parties did separate, and they had not lived together since. The Wife’s account of the incident as set out in paragraph 29 of her statement presents a rather different picture to the way in which the incident is referred to by His Honour Judge Baker in a judgement handed down in the Parties’ Children Act proceedings, to which I have been referred. According to the Wife in her statement in these proceedings, whilst dropping Joseph at nursery she became convinced that she had brought Daniel with her and that he was not in her car. His Honour Judge Baker was rather more forthright in his description of what happened and describes the incident as a, “Bizarre set of circumstances caused by the Wife having forgotten that she didn’t have Daniel in her care and that he was in the safe hands of the father”. What followed was the Wife reporting to the police that Daniel was missing and the police visiting the family home. Whatever the Wife told the police resulted in the police accusing the Husband that he had abducted Daniel. This incident has to be set in the context of a father being at home looking after his child while the child’s mother took the other child to nursery and then suddenly being confronted by uniformed police officers making allegations of child abduction. An event of this type would be difficult enough for any father to comprehend let alone cope with but for this Respondent an autistic person, the police allegations must have been horrific. What followed is not contentious and was little short of a nightmare for the Husband who was arrested under the Mental Health Act and detained for assessment. Meanwhile his child was removed from his care and placed with social services. The Husband was subsequently (after several hours wait) assessed by a psychiatrist and fortunately immediately released. This incident has been (and remains) the subject of findings in other proceedings and I have no intention of attempting to make findings which may not be consistent with those already found as I understand they remain contentious. My finding on the information, which is uncontentious, is that the Husband’s behaviour in this overall context is not such as would meet the relevant test.

At first blush this may seem, as Mr Thomas has suggested, an event peripheral to the main issue as the allegation relates to something alleged to have been said at the Parties’ wedding by the Husband and is only reported to the Wife, after the Parties have separated. The law is clear, though, that the behaviour referred to need not have caused the breakdown and need not have even taken place during the Parties’ marriage. As stated above, provided the behaviour did not come to the knowledge of the Petitioner more than 6 months prior to the date of separation, it does not matter that the behaviour may have occurred prior to or even on the day of the Parties’ marriage.

My reason for discounting this allegation is not because I consider it to be peripheral, it is because it is hearsay, upon which I am unwilling to give any or sufficient weight for it to be considered cogent or reliable evidence. Such evidence is potentially admissible, but the length of time that has passed and the vague nature of its content lead me to give no evidential weight to this allegation at all.

This is the aspect of the Husband’s behaviour that has the potential to give me the most concern. In his closing submissions Mr Thomas says that it is open to the Court to consider this aspect of the Husband’s behaviour and its relevance for the purpose of applying the test under s1(2)(b) MCA 1973. I do not agree entirely with that submission. To take this approach would be to approach the behaviour in a purely objective manner when the duty of the Court is to approach the issue both objectively and subjectively.

The Wife was not cross examined on her reaction to this aspect of the Husband’s behaviour, so the Court has the evidence contained in her statement which was not challenged by any one of the 185 written questions the Husband originally wished to put to the Wife.

In her statement, the Wife says, while commenting on her wedding ceremony:

The above statement of the Wife is the only evidence the Court has as to the impact the Husband’s mis-placed denial of the validity of the Parties’ marriage had on the Wife. Whatever the Husband alleged, the Wife confirmed that at no time did she feel the marriage was not valid. When Mr Thomas says he will leave it to the Court to measure this aspect of the Husband’s behaviour against the test, he was right to say this in the context of their being a dearth of evidence to draw upon. It could have been pleaded that the Husband’s behaviour had a devastating effect on the Wife as the denial goes to the very heart of their union; this is not how this issue was pleaded to the Court. If I look at this aspect of the Husband’s behaviour wholly objectively, I could reach a conclusion that no party to a marriage could reasonably be expected to live with their spouse when the spouse is in absolute denial of the lawful existence of the marriage. However, the application of the test is, as I have stated above, more nuanced; I have to reach a conclusion as to how this behaviour has affected this Petitioner. The evidence of this is limited to the wording contained in the Wife’s statement. It is not even pleaded in the Amended Petition. While I accept that the Wife was extremely pleased to be able to prove that she had been lawfully married to the Husband there is insufficient evidence before the Court for me to find that the Husband’s continued denial has so much impact on the Wife that this Wife cannot reasonably be expected to live with this Husband.

Before moving onto the evidence of the Parties I must, for the sake of completeness reiterate that I have chosen to use as examples of pleaded behaviour those referred to in the closing submissions of Mr Thomas. I can assure the Parties that I have considered all the allegations mentioned in the Amended Petition and where they are not covered by the above there are no allegations which I consider would support any different conclusion as I have reached when viewed in the whole context of the marriage, even if proved.

I pause at this stage to record my general assessment of the Parties’ evidence as given to the Court.

I found the Wife to be a largely ineffectual and unconvincing witness. The oral evidence of the Wife was peppered with inconsistencies and contradictions of her own written evidence. The following serve as examples:

The Wife’s evidence regarding her Avon agency was that the Husband was controlling to the extent that he told her where to canvass: her oral evidence contradicted this as she confirmed she was told by the company where to canvass.

The Wife’s written evidence regarding financial control was clear that the Husband had total control of the finances to the extent that he deprived her of money and the ability to spend it as she chose: her oral evidence was that not only did she have access to substantial savings (enough to buy a caravan) but that she had free access to money and was not limited by the Husband in her day-to-day savings.

In oral evidence the Wife openly confirmed, “We had a joint bank account; I got money for myself and the children from it during the marriage … I had my own bank account and a joint bank account with the Respondent … I have no idea if my accounts were empty, there must have been some money in them.” These are statements inconsistent with the Wife’s Amended Petition which contained the following allegation: “The Respondent would make sure that the Petitioner gave all of her money from her bank account to him to pay towards the marital home that they were going to buy. This left her penniless and totally dependent upon him.”

The Wife’s evidence regarding the children was that the Husband controlled their movements in the house and that she had to leave to house to give them freedom: during oral evidence she confirmed that the children were restricted to a large family area and that she had the ability to let them roam as they wished during the day when she was able to supervise.

Further the Wife made major concessions during her oral evidence which were inconsistent with the picture she paints in her statement. For example, she said she did not feel bullied in general despite stating in para 19 of the statement that, “Ultimately the Respondent is a bully.” The absolute language that is a feature of the Amended Petition and the statement is simply not replicated in the Wife’s oral evidence. While this may be acceptable and understandable in small measure, where it is in large measure it must, in my judgment undermine the integrity and reliability of the allegations as a whole. The following exchange gives an example of such:

During her evidence the Wife accepted that the Husband was untidy before and during the marriage and went on specifically to deny that the Husband’s untidiness was pleaded as a ground for her divorce. This is despite the Amended Petition containing the allegation:

Making allowances for nerves and the fact that no-one ever remembers events perfectly (such is the nature of recall) I found the Wife’s evidence significantly to lack reliability. I do not think the Wife was deliberately lying in her oral evidence. I think she was being honest. I have formed the opinion that the particulars of the Amended Petition and the Wife’s statement do not present as a accurate picture of the behaviour of the Husband as they might or should have done.

I found the Husband to be a credible and reliable witness. At no point was I able to identify a material inconsistency in his oral evidence. The Husband made concessions and was clear in his explanations giving context to the Wife’s claims; for example, referring to the Avon allegations he said there were bits which were true and bits which were untrue, and he was able to explain convincingly his role in supporting the Wife’s business with clarity and, I concluded, without exaggeration or minimisation. The Husband offered an explanation for the Wife’s allegation of financial control saying that she is probably confusing control with dependency, which I accept.

Where there is a difference between the evidence of the Husband and the Wife, it is the Husband’s evidence I prefer.

In my analysis of the Husband’s behaviour and the effect this will have had on the Wife I have first to contextualise the behaviour with regard to the Husband’s diagnosis of autism as alluded to above. As I stated in my introduction, I must consider the effect of the Wife’s knowledge of the Husband’s late diagnosis of autism and how this informs my application of the test. The evidence I have, suggests that the Wife did not know the Husband had a formal diagnosis of autism until after the Parties separated: after the proceedings were issued but before the Petition was amended.

I am satisfied, having heard the evidence and considered the reference material I have named, particularly the ETBB, that the Husband’s autism is likely to have had a significant impact upon the manner he has behaved throughout the marriage (and where relevant, before the marriage). In so far as there was a period the Wife did not know of the diagnosis of autism it may be understandable that she may have reacted badly to aspects of the Husband’s behaviour. Once, though, the Wife (as a trained and qualified social worker) was put on notice of the diagnosis, either formally or otherwise, it is appropriate to expect her to make such allowances or adjustments as are reasonable. Rather than making simple allowances, my view is that the Wife has sought to capitalise upon the Husband’s autistic traits as evidence of behaviour to attempt to satisfy the test. I am not suggesting that any type of behaviour from someone who is autistic has to be tolerated; that would make a nonsense of the way the Court of Appeal has directed the test should be applied. I am looking at this marriage and this Petitioner and this Respondent. Here we have a marriage between a doctor and a social worker; both professionals who can reasonably be expected to show a level of empathy and professional understanding of the personalities of the other within the marriage they have committed to.

For the sake of completeness, I have considered whether is necessary or appropriate for me to find whether the marriage has broken down irretrievably. My view is that it would be potentially wrong to make this finding at this stage. Upon the dismissal of these proceedings either party may commence fresh proceedings under the new law, and it will be for a judge in those proceedings to make such a declaration if appropriate. It is unnecessary that I do so, and to do so may be seen as to fetter the discretion of the Court in any future applications.

It follows from my observations above that I am unable to make findings supportive of specific elements of the Husband’s behaviour which would meet the test. Looking at the whole picture and applying the five point test of Munby P in Owens I am not satisfied that the Respondent has behaved in such a way that the Petitioner cannot reasonably be expected to live with the Respondent.

The Respondent seeks various costs orders against the Petitioner and her solicitor. The Petitioner does not seek any orders for costs save for assessment of her legal aid costs.

Part 28 of the FPR contains the following provisions regarding the Courts ability to make costs orders and its discretion not to do so

The Court may at any time make such order as to costs as it thinks just.

28.3.(1)  This rule applies in relation to financial remedy proceedings.

In KS v ND [2013] EWHC 464 Lord Justice Ryder made the following observations:

The case of Gojkovic v Gojkovic (No 2) [1991] 2 FLR 233 gives authority for the concept that where the no order principle does not apply in matrimonial proceedings by virtue of R28.3(5) there should be a rebuttable presumption (my emphasis) that costs will follow the event. This approach also received approval more recently in Solomon v Solomon & Ors (Rev 1) [2013] EWCA Civ 1095.

History of the divorce litigation

The following orders have been made throughout the divorce proceedings which are the potential subject to adjudication as to whether a costs order should be made.

Following the conclusion of the divorce hearing the parties were encouraged to agree outstanding costs and in default a timetable for written submissions as to liability was set which has been complied with by both parties. The Court now has the benefit of the parties’ written submissions. This aspect of the judgment has been considered by the Court without a further hearing, the Court considering it disproportionate for such a hearing to take place.

I have carefully considered both parties submissions and make the following observations which the parties should consider to be findings for the purpose of my decision as to respective costs liabilities. The parties should recall that I have retained personal conduct of this case since dealing with the Respondent’s various appeals against the orders of district judges and have, as a result of judicial continuity, had the benefit of an in-depth knowledge of the proceedings. I consider myself to be uniquely placed to make the following findings without the need for further expansion or justification.

The divorce suit has been hotly contested by the Respondent. The essence of the defence to the divorce was in two parts. The first and most significant element of the defence was that the parties were never legally married. It was the Respondent’s case that the parties had undergone a ceremony of marriage in Australia but that the marriage was not legally recognised by the Australian authorities as amounting to a lawful marriage upon which a petition could be issued. The Respondent took advantage of the Petitioners inability to locate a certified copy of the marriage certificate; the petition was supported by a record of the marriage ceremony which was considered sufficient by the Court staff to issue the petition and for the divorce to progress to a decree nisi (subsequently appealed and rescinded for unconnected reasons). During the proceedings the Petitioner’s solicitor faced immense challenges in obtaining a certified copy of the certificate from Australia and incurred significant expense in doing so. Once the copy was obtained, I struck out this element of the Answer and ruled in an extempore judgment that the Respondent had known all along that the marriage was lawful. The Respondent attempted to appeal this decision and ruling but was unsuccessful. In my judgment the Respondent’s approach in this regard was conduct which it is appropriate to take into account when considering the question of liability for costs.

The Respondent made an open offer in February 2022 to the Petitioner to compromise the proceedings and prays this in aid of his case that he should benefit from an order for costs. The offer was wholly conditional upon the Petitioner:

Regarding this proposal I make the initial observation that the first condition is misconceived as an amended pleading dates back to the date of issue of that pleading, when the Respondent had not indicated he would consent to a divorce. My more condemning observation is that in my judgment, this was not a genuine attempt to resolve matters between the parties. Quite the opposite, it was an attempt by the Respondent further to engage the parties in continuing protracted and expensive litigation.

It is of note that the Respondent is not a stranger to the litigation process and must be fully acquainted with how matrimonial litigation can become extended unless steps are taken to limit its course. The Respondent’s previous divorce led to 3 reported Court of Appeal decisions. In addition, the parties have been extensively involved in private children proceedings which began in this Court and have been subsequently transferred to the Family Court at Lancaster. My assessment of the offer made by the Respondent is that it was entirely reasonable and appropriate for the Petitioner to refuse the offer. I go further to say that the making of an offer in these terms was more likely than not an attempt by the Respondent to place inappropriate pressure on the Petitioner and was an attempt to extend the course of this litigation unnecessarily and in contravention of the Overriding Objective. Thus, it was conduct which I take into account in my analysis of costs liability.

Having regard to the Court’s discretion as set out in the law above and looking at the overall picture, including the findings I have made, it seems to me that fairness must dictate that where there is a presumption that costs should follow the event, that presumption should be rebutted and that there should be no further orders in relation to costs either in the main suit or the related financial proceedings.

My order will be: