HO v TL

I shall refer to the parties as W (wife) and H (husband).

It is common ground that H shall retain the family business. His first proposal on 1 December 2022 offered W a total sum in her hands (including her own assets) of about

At trial therefore the difference between the parties was about £5m (£10.9m v £5.9m). The combined costs are about £1.55m, nearly a third of the disputed sum, which rather speaks for itself.

I heard from H, W and the SJE business valuer, Mr Andrew Caldwell. It was sad to see the antipathy between the parties, which I am convinced has been significantly exacerbated by these proceedings which commenced as long ago as September 2021. W was at times visibly emotional, but I am sure H, although more collected, has also been impacted by the litigation and the breakdown of the marriage. The children, I am told, have suffered, and in my judgment a clean break is vital. For W, there is a tangible sense of loss as she exits the marriage, the family business and the lifestyle. As to their evidence generally, I felt that at times W was a little unrealistic about the lost marital standard of living which she wants to replicate as much as possible. H was somewhat evasive and legalistic about his trust interests, deferring to the trustees’ “brick wall” replies without focusing on the realities of what is needed here.

H is nearly 49 years old. W is 56. She has been diagnosed with a number of health issues.

They met in London in 2002 at a time when H was working in banking, and W in asset management. They married in September 2003 and separated in August 2020, so that this was a marriage of some 17 years. Their three children are 19, 18 and 16 years old.

During the marriage, they were based mainly in Country A, living in City A, which allowed them easy access to their Country B business interests. They also spent time at their home in Country C, and travelled extensively for business and pleasure. The children were educated in Country A until they reached 13 when they attended boarding school in England.

Currently, H divides his time between Country D, Country C and Country B. W lives in rented accommodation in London SW7 at a cost of £120,000 pa, having relocated to England shortly after separation.

In 2005, the parties co-founded a hotel group centred in Country B, known as Company M. W’s family member invested in the business and holds a minority stake. Although the business has had a variety of interests, its core is a luxury beachfront hotel on an island (Country B). The original funding was provided by H’s family, and W added thereto with assets of her own. W describes the business as a way of life for them, which I consider to be an accurate assessment. It was the centre of the marriage and the family. Broadly, W was responsible for sales and marketing, and H oversaw operations. They worked together on strategy, ideas, and general decision making. I am satisfied that it has taken a great deal of hard work by both of them to build the business over many years.

In 2017, the business was placed in one of H’s family trusts (now renamed Trust X) and W was added as a beneficiary. Through the trust structure, H and W own 90.25% of the business, and W’s family member 9.75%.

The parties received a combined total of £240,000pa by way of consultancy income from the business. Additionally, in the last 7 years the total dividends paid from the business to the owning trust was about $1m, or approximately $150,000pa. H says that for the year Jan 2019 to Jan 2020 (the last full year before separation), the family’s personal expenditure was just over £500,000, and he produces a schedule to corroborate that figure. In addition to these sums, I am satisfied that the business met certain expenses direct, such as first class and business flights where the foreign travel might be deemed to be for research purposes, occasional holidays, life insurance, health insurance and some miscellaneous smaller items.

It strikes me that this is not the whole picture of the lifestyle enjoyed by the parties. They had during the marriage the use and enjoyment of magnificent properties and opportunities which cannot readily be measured in economic terms. They used their homes in Country A and Country C. They travelled internationally. They used the luxury hotels owned by the business for personal enjoyment and pleasure, enjoying all the facilities and activities. This enabled them to entertain and mix with wealthy guests who invited them for reciprocal holidays. Their house in City A is cheap by English standards but is on a prestigious estate, with ample room and facilities. The classical property in Country C, to which they are both attached, is spectacular, but again modest in value. It has land on which there is a farm and winery, and was used by the family for frequent entertaining. They had the benefit of full-time staff at their properties; for example, the cost of staffing the property in Country C is about £50,000 pa.

There is no doubt that H entered the marriage with far greater resources than W. Counsel on his behalf has presented a table demonstrating to my satisfaction that (using current values), his pre-owned trust interests, ownership of a flat in London, part ownership of the property in Country C (he later bought out his brother in 2015), and a property in Country D, have a present day value of £7.295m.

W entered the marriage with a property in London, investments and pensions with, again, a combined present-day value of £1.366m.

During the marriage H’s parents contributed a further approximately £4.1m to assist in establishing and growing the business.

H also points to loans made to him by one of his family trusts (Trust Z), of which the funds derived from his parents, to fund property purchases during the marriage:

There is no doubt that the bedrock of the parties’ wealth was laid by H’s greater pre- marital wealth and extra-marital capital injections by H’s family, all of which far exceeded W’s pre-marital assets. The total sums can be tabulated as follows:

On the other hand, the monies on H’s side which were originally non-marital in nature, largely went into the family business and family properties. It is my task to assess the extent to which those sums have, over time, acquired a marital nature such that they are now subject to the sharing principle.

As a matter of practice, the court will usually embark on a two-stage exercise, (i) computation and (ii) distribution; Charman v Charman [2007] EWCA Civ 503. Turning to computation first, there are three disputed areas:

The relevant legal principles seem to me to be as follows.

First, it is for the court to determine the value, not the expert.

Second, valuations of private companies can be fragile and uncertain. In Versteegh v Versteegh [2018] EWCA Civ 1050 Lewison LJ said at para 185:

“The valuation of private companies is a matter of no little difficulty. In H v H [2008] EWHC 935 (Fam), [2008] 2 FLR 2092Moylan J said at [5] that "valuations of shares in private companies are among the most fragile valuations which can be obtained." The reasons for this are many. In the first place there is likely to be no obvious market for a private company. Second, even where valuers use the same method of valuation they are likely to produce widely differing results. Third, the profitability of private companies may be volatile, such that a snap-shot valuation at a particular date may give an unfair picture. Fourth, the difference in quality between a value attributed to a private company on the basis of opinion evidence and a sum in hard cash is obvious. Fifth, the acid test of any valuation is exposure to the real market, which is simply not possible in the case of a private company where no one suggests that it should be sold. Moylan J is not a lone voice in this respect: see A v A [2004] EWHC 2818 (Fam), [2006] 2 FLR 115 at [61] – [62]; D v D [2007] EWHC 278 (Fam)(both decisions of Charles J).”

Third, I suggest that the reliability of a valuation will depend on a number of factors such as: (i) whether there are applicable comparables, (ii) how “niche” the business is,

Fourth, in practice the choices for the court will be, per Moylan LJ in Martin v Martin [2018] EWCA Civ 2866 at para 93: (i) “fix” a value; (ii) order the asset to be sold; and

Fifth, whether a business should be retained by one party, or sold, or divided in specie will depend on the facts of each case. Relevant features will include whether the business was founded during the marriage or pre-owned, whether it has its origins in one party’s non-marital wealth, whether the parties were both involved in its strategy and operation, the ownership structure of the business, whether Wells sharing is practical or realistic given that it will usually continue to tie the parties together to some extent, and how to ensure a fair allocation of all the resources in any given case.

Sixth, as was pointed out in Wells (supra), Versteegh (supra) and Martin (supra), there is a difference in quality between copper-bottomed assets and illiquid/risk-laden assets. As Moylan said LJ at para 93 of Martin (supra):

“The court has to assess the weight which can be placed on the value even when using a fixed value for the purpose of determining the award to make. This applies both to the amount and to the structure of the award, issues which are interconnected, so that the overall allocation of the parties’ assets by application of the sharing principle also effects a fair balance of risk and illiquidity between the parties. Again, I emphasise, this is not to mandate a particular structure but to draw attention to the need to address this issue when the court is deciding how to exercise its discretionary powers so as to achieve an outcome that is fair to both parties. I would also add that the assessment of the weight which can be placed on a valuation is not a mathematical exercise but a broad evaluative exercise to be undertaken by the judge”.

Seventh, when deciding how to reflect the illiquidity or risk in a private company, the court has three choices:

I heard from Mr Caldwell. He was impressive. His written reports are clear, as was his oral testimony. He was balanced, collected and even handed. All attempts by the parties to take him to higher figures (per W) or lower figures (per H) if anything reinforced the good sense of his report and valuation.

He valued the business on the Discounted Cash Flow basis, adopting a discount rate of 20.3%, whilst considering, but discarding, alternative valuation methods. He produced reports in July 2022, September 2023 and October 2023. He has replied to numerous detailed questions.

He puts the value at $11.688m. I understand that to be a net figure as I am told the ownership structure would not generate any tax in the event of a sale. He accepted that there is a lack of direct comparable sales to act as a cross check, but an EBITDA valuation is in the same ballpark. He told me that this is a figure which he reaches on a willing buyer/willing seller basis. He said there is no meaningful liquidity in the business; it has no distributable cash above its business needs.

He did not apply any discount for lack of marketability. In his view, although the market is niche, there may well be acquisitive hotel groups or other prospective purchasers out there who would be interested. He told me he thinks the business is quite an attractive proposition.

Although he acknowledges that future maintainable earnings are based on forecasts, and therefore subject to crises which have befallen the business in the past, including Covid, local terrorism and natural disasters (such as three cyclones in 17 years), he estimates sustainable dividends for the parties’ 90.25% going forward as:

Mr Caldwell assesses an appropriate combined salary for the work of H and W at

There are a number of areas of dispute which I must resolve. Issue 1

First, there is a plot of land which has been earmarked by the business for a separate private residence development. It was considered in 2013 but not progressed, as it was not thought to be viable. A residential development is high risk in Country B, there is no freehold tenure on the land, and there is no evidence that planning would be granted. It is in a conservation area which complicates the position. The parties cannot agree precisely on the size of the area; either 2.5 or 4.5 hectares. A property valuer has reported in the alternative and put the value at either $107,000 or $167,000. The SJE has incorporated the lower figure (subject to a 30% discount). The figure is de minimis and I propose simply to split the difference (allowing the 30% discount), which must be added to the SJE business figure of $11.688m. That gives a total of $11,709,000.

At the other end of the island from the main hotel is what is known as Hotel N, a much smaller site with 10 units requiring refurbishment, and a main centre which needs to be completely replaced. It was bought in 2018 for $978,000. The parties intended to open a hotel there in 2024. It was planned to be a different offering from the main hotel; smaller, less premium, with fewer facilities. Mr Caldwell proceeded on that basis and factored in potential revenue from the proposed development. Shortly after he first reported, H told him that it was unworkable for funding and other reasons, and that he did not intend to go through with the development. That had a knock-on effect for the report which was predicated on the assumption that Hotel N should be included as an income-generative prospect. The consequence was that the business valuation dropped from $12,784,108 to the current figure, a reduction in value of about $1m. Mr Caldwell has valued Hotel N at the net asset figure attributable in the accounts of $295,878 rather than on an income approach.

To redevelop the site would require up to about $1.5m of investment. To attribute a higher value than $295,878 would, in my judgment, be speculative. Investment and energy must be devoted to the project. The timescale is unclear, funding may be difficult to secure, and there are the usual risks associated with developments of this nature.

At the start of the trial, both parties wanted to retain Hotel N. In her evidence, W told me, with some emotion, that having heard H in the witness box she felt that it would be difficult for her to take on Hotel N. In her view, H would not treat her well, and would make her life too difficult. She told me it would be too big a risk for her. I observed the ill-will between the parties. Time, and the conclusion of the proceedings, might be a mitigating factor in the future, but there is at present no love lost between them. H fears that their personal warfare could turn into corporate warfare if W were to set up a nearby hotel. I bear in mind that the children have suffered as a result of the breakdown of the marriage. For their sake, in my judgment a clean break in every sense is desirable. The relationship between their parents risks, I consider, continuing to be poisonous if they are locked in commercial competition on the same small island (Country B), looking towards similar markets and working with the same agents.

I was told on W’s behalf by counsel in closing that W does not formally abandon her claim for Hotel N, but would understand if I decided not to transfer Hotel N to her. In the end, I have decided that it is appropriate for H to retain it so as to ensure as definitive a separation as possible, in personal, financial and commercial terms.

The SJE has prepared his final figures on the assumption of 60% hotel occupancy rates; that is an increase from 55% in his first report. W contends that 65% occupancy is more realistic, which would increase the value, whereas H contends for 55%, which would decrease the value. The difference is significant; about $2m each way.

Mr Caldwell was cross examined on this issue at some length by both parties. He says that the 10-year forecast is occupancy at 55%, and that between 2015 and 2019 the actual occupancy rate was 50-56%. He recognises it was 67% in 2022, but says that was due to carry over from Covid, and in any event these were Country A tourists who pay less than Americans and Europeans. In 2023, the average occupancy rate was 57%. This included February, March, and part of April when the hotel was struck by a cyclone/tropical storm, and numbers were low as a result of closures, but it was low season and the forecasted occupancy was not much higher; in any event, if one excludes those three months, the average is about 60%. It is because of the updated 2023 information that Mr Caldwell revised his assumption from 55% to 60%. It was suggested to him that he should have carried out a weighted average on a monthly basis which, so it was said, would have captured higher room rates in high season. But he was never asked to do this in his reports, it was put for the first time when he was in the witness box, and in any event, I consider that his approach of doing annual averages fairly captures the highs and lows.

Having heard the SJE, H and W, I am satisfied that it is appropriate to take a 60% occupancy rate.

On one occasion, about two years ago, a management/consultancy charge of

H told me that attempts to find an alternative scheme, or to make the previous scheme compliant, have so far failed. W considers that a way will be found. I cannot make a definitive finding on this. It seems to me that there is a possibility that an arrangement will be found, but as with much else in the hotel business there is no certainty.

Mr Caldwell’s assumptions are based on annual insurance costs of about $90,000pa. H tells me that as a result of the cyclone/tropical storm earlier this year, the premium will now increase to $250,000. Mr Caldwell agreed that, if so, the valuation would decrease. It seems possible that there will be increased insurance costs, but I had limited evidence on this and cannot definitively say by how much.

The business made an insurance claim of $850,000 arising out of the cyclone/tropical storm earlier this year. The cost of at least some of the repairs has already been incurred (H told me that £350,000 remained to be paid) so that a successful claim could, it seems to me, amount to additional funds receivable by the business which might add to the value thereof. The problem is that it is unclear to what extent it may succeed. The insurers have offered $150,000. H thinks it may go to arbitration. Again, for me to assess what sum might be receivable risks entering into speculation.

H seeks a discount of 1/3rd on the business value to reflect risk and liquidity issues. He says: there is no real market for sale; there are no distributable cash reserves; the business is not diversified, consisting of one hotel; it carries a number of risks, including political instability, terrorism, fires and cyclones; there are question marks about the long-term future of tourism in the area.

Undoubtedly, there are inherent risks. But to my mind these are not sufficient to justify any accountancy valuation discount for the following reasons:

I conclude that the value of the business is $11,709,000; the sterling equivalent is

At issue between the parties is the accessibility of H’s trust interests.

I approach the legal principles as follows:

In this case, there are three relevant trusts, all managed by professional corporate trustees and all subject to Country E or Country D Law:

Trust X owns 90.25% of the hotel business; it has no other assets. The original trust (under a different name) was settled by H’s mother in 2006. H was named as the principal beneficiary, and his children as additional beneficiaries. In 2017, W was added as a beneficiary. On the face of it, it qualifies as a nuptial settlement under English law and is therefore capable of variation under s24(1)(c) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973. As a protective/enforcement measure, W applied for variation of the settlement, and invites the court to adjourn the application until any award I make is implemented. H has not quarrelled with that approach.

Trust X (and therefore the business) was funded by:

The value of the trust is 90.25% value of the business. There is no dispute that it is a resource within the meaning of s25(2)(a) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973. H will retain it via the trust, and W will be removed as beneficiary. I do not therefore consider I need delve into the background material and correspondence exchanges with the trust’s solicitors.

This fully discretionary trust (both as to capital and income) was settled by H’s father in 2002 upon the sale of his business. The trust deed has not been provided, but I am told there is a wide class of beneficiaries, including H. I assume his mother was also a beneficiary as I am told she derived some benefit from the trust during her lifetime. The value is about £2.25m in cash after recent sale of a commercial property.

By letter of wishes on 16 September 2002, H’s father requested that after the death of himself and his wife, the trust fund be divided into equal shares for the benefit of H and his brother. He died many years ago, and his wife (H’s mother) in November 2022. On current figures, a notional 50% allocation to H is £1.125m.

The trustees, via solicitors’ correspondence, have stated that: the trust is dynastic; any request by a beneficiary would be given due consideration, taking account of the interests of other beneficiaries; it is not the case they would be duty-bound to provide any sums requested. That seems to me to be an unexceptional summary of their duties and powers, but I will need to consider what their likely approach would be if requested to provide funding to H.

Trust Z was settled by H’s grandmother in 1975. It too is a fully discretionary trust, with the class of beneficiaries consisting of H, his brother, their two half siblings, and remoter issue. A letter of wishes from H’s father dated 16 September 2002 requests as follows:

As a consequence of the death of H’s mother in November 2022, the children’s fund earmarked for H, his brother and half siblings has increased by the amount of his late mother’s earmarked portion. H was asked about this in the witness box. He was at best confused, and at worst evasive. He denied that he had seen the letters of wishes for this trust and Trust Y, but accepted that copies were kept in a cupboard in the property in Country C; this did not really make sense to me, although I add that W appears to have obtained copies herself after separation and asked questions of H without disclosing the fact that she had the documents, contrary to well-established Imerman principles. H seemed reluctant to acknowledge the obvious, namely a greater sum potentially available to him as discretionary beneficiary in a substantial trust as a result of his mother’s death. He repeatedly told me that it is a discretionary trust, which is self-evident, as if that fact alone meant his interest was unaffected by his mother’s death. I am satisfied he had always known he would benefit upon his mother’s death in that his notional allocation would increase. To say, as he did, that he thought her death had no impact on the trust was little short of ridiculous. W told me, and I accept, that it was well known within the family what would happen, in general terms, on H’s mother’s death. She also told me that it was well understood the trusts were there to support the family which, at one level, is a statement of the obvious, but I did not detect H truly acknowledging this.

I made orders on 19 December 2022 and 21 March 2023 for H to explain the impact of the death of his mother on the trust and the notional allocations to beneficiaries, and to use his best endeavours to obtain such information from the trustees. On 24 February 2023, solicitors for the trustees stated in short terms that “The Trustee does not consider that your mother’s death affects your interest in the trust”. Although that might have been technically correct, given the discretionary terms of the trust, it was a less than full response. On 6 April 2023 the trustees responded through solicitors confirming (as I understand by a plain reading of the letter) that, if the letter of wishes were to be followed, H would have a 38% notional allocation in the combined whole fund (the

The total fund is about £27m. That comprises:

I am satisfied (not least because H himself said so through counsel) that prior to his mother’s death, his notional part of the trust fund was about £5.25m, from which he had received loans (but not outright distributions) of £4.45m, leaving about £800,000 of unused funds notionally allocated to him.

Now, as a result of his mother’s death, I am satisfied that his notional 38% share is about £10.26m. After deducting the £4.45m of loans already received by him, his “headroom” of unapplied funds forming part of his notional allocation is about £5.8m. I say “notional” as the trustees may decide not to effect a formal partition or sub-fund arrangement, but the principles are clear. In passing, I note that H has in the past received distributions of £400,000 which might reduce the notional sum of £10.26m, but the figure is relatively modest in the context of the case, and no clear evidence was provided by H or the trustees on this.

H was notably confused about the figures in his evidence about his notional allocation, suggesting that it might be less because his mother had drawn on her allocated share before death. I did not understand this, and in any event, it is for H and the trustees to provide clarity on the figures if there is any doubt.

In terms of the likelihood of making funds available, solicitors for the trustees have stated in a number of letters:

In my judgment, 50% of the Trust Y fund, and 38% of the Trust Z fund, should be treated by me as notionally allocated to H, and a resource available to him. I say this for the following reasons:

In their written communications via solicitors, the trustees have been very careful not in any way to be seen to fetter their discretion. That is perfectly reasonable. But in my judgment, they would, if requested, be willing to assist H and advance monies from either or both trusts. Such sums could be a significant portion of the notionally allocated funds. I am satisfied that the Charman test is satisfied, and these should be treated as accessible resources. I am also satisfied that to frame an order in such a way as to require H to realise sums, potentially from the trusts, would not cross the boundary into improper pressure as referred to in Thomas (supra).

Dealing swiftly with other computation issues:

I find that the resources are as follows:

Where the result suggested by the needs principle is an award greater than the result suggested by the sharing principle, the former shall in principle prevail; Charman (supra). It is therefore necessary for me to consider the extent of the assets which are fully matrimonial, and therefore to be divided equally. The evaluation by the court of the demarcation between marital and non-marital assets is not always easy. It must be carried out with the degree of particularity or generality appropriate in each case; Hart v Hart [2018] 1 FLR 1283.

It seems to me that the following assets, albeit sourced with monies provided on H’s side, should be regarded as fully matrimonial and therefore prima facie susceptible to equal division:

In reaching these conclusions, I also bear in mind the length of the marriage, the full contributions made by the parties during the marriage, and the fact that W applied much of her own pre-marital wealth to the family economy.

Thus, the equal sharing principle can be tabulated as follows:

To that should be added the proceeds of W’s London property (£476,859), and her pensions (£206,127) which are non-marital on her side. Accordingly, her entitlement under the sharing principle is:

W has experience and skills. She is, however, 56 years old. She told me, and I accept, that she is exhausted after two careers. Her priority is to stabilise the family. She wants to be able to travel the world, as she did during the marriage, which would prevent her from holding down a full-time job. H suggests she could obtain a well-paid marketing job at up to £120,000pa. In my view, that is unrealistic. Indeed, in my judgment the most that can and should be ascribed to her is modestly-paid part time employment in a field which is congenial to her.

In WC v HC [2022] EWFC 22 I said this about needs at para 21 (xii) – (xvi):

The use of the standard of living as a benchmark will depend on all the facts of the case. The longer the duration for which needs are to be met in the future, the more likely it is that the court will not assess those needs at the marital standard of living throughout that period; BD v FD [2017] 1 FLR 1420 at paras 118, 119, and 122.

I was referred to comments of Mostyn J in SS v NS [2014] EWHC 14:

“The essential task of the judge is not merely to examine the individual items in the claimant’s budget but also to stand back and look at the global total and to ask if it represents a fair proportion of the respondent’s available income that should go to the support of the claimant”.

That, however, concerned a case of ongoing spousal periodical payments. I do not think an approach by way of share of income is as pertinent where a clean break on the basis of a whole life Duxbury award is envisaged.

Finally, I observe, for it is an issue in this case, that at para 31(b) of Y v Y [2012] EWHC 2063 (Fam) Baron J said this:

“When a marriage breaks down I doubt, in the normal course of events, that it will be unreasonable for a “country” spouse to seek to live in London or some other part of England and Wales”

I would add that on marriage breakdown it is not unreasonable per se for a spouse to wish to move from one country to another. It will all depend on the facts.

W seeks a total of £10.9m, broken down into a housing fund of £5.6m and capitalised maintenance of £5.3m as follows:

As to London housing, W puts forward property particulars in SW7 in a range between

I have taken all matters into account when considering housing. In my judgment, the claim for three properties is manifestly excessive. The family had two homes during the marriage (Country A and Country C) with a combined worth of about £1.2m. To seek properties in those countries as well as a £4m home in London is untenable. It is W’s choice to come to London, and in principle it is not unreasonable for her to do so. She has friends and family here, and all the children are studying at school or university in England or Country D. She feels safe and secure here. The difficulty, it seems to me, is that she is endeavouring, as far as possible, to replicate her previous lifestyle in Country C and Country A while in addition having what she says would be her number one priority, a family home for her and all the children in London, which she intends to have as her permanent home. She cannot have it all. By choosing to input so much of her award into a £4m property in London, it is inevitable that her ability to spend as freely as she would like will be curtailed. She is electing to prioritise housing over lifestyle; that seems to me to be the inevitable consequence of her decision to move to London. Had she elected to make her main base in, say, Country A, she would have had far greater funds available for a second home and her income requirements.

As is usual, I do not have property particulars between those put forward by the parties. I have decided that an appropriate total housing fund is £3.25m, inclusive of costs, taxes and refurbishment. Whether she invests all of that sum in a London property, or part of it in a second property abroad, is of course for her to decide.

I will not allow an additional sum for a car as she already has a Mini, a sports car and a classic car.

Turning to income needs, her Form E budget is £487,567. Her case at trial is

Accordingly, her total financial needs are:

She has £1,032,842 in her own name (net assets and pensions). By agreement Company P, a beach site in Country G valued at £45,000 ($55,000), will be transferred to her by agreement so that she will have £1,077,842. The required lump sum to be paid by H is therefore £6,672,158.

I am satisfied that it is reasonable to give H some time to raise the monies, but he must pay a proper level of support in the interim, including the costs of W’s rented accommodation. As it happens, the lease on W’s current rented property expires in July 2024 and she intends to extend it for a year to about July 2025, at which point she would like to buy a property.

H and the trustees will need to consider how best to meet the sums ordered. On my findings, there is no reason why it cannot be done reasonably swiftly. Of course, the sooner the monies are paid, the sooner the interim provision will cease. I will order H to pay:

I will further order as follows:

I am satisfied that H is able to meet the sums ordered. He can, on my findings, raise funds from the following sources:

I am satisfied that the overall award of £7.75m is fair. H will retain the balance of about

This overall split of resources in H’s favour is a proper reflection of what seem to me to be the main features of the case:

Finally, I have at all times had in mind the s25 criteria, and I have considered, and evaluated, all the evidence and submissions in the round.