Dorset County Council v Goodall

This is an application by Dorset County Council for an order committing Mr. Martin Goodall to prison for contempt of court by breaching a series of injunctions made against him on the application of the Local Authority.

Mr. Goodall attended court this morning but subsequently, in circumstances I shall describe below, left the building and has not attended the hearing. I am satisfied that he has had full and proper notice of the hearing and that in all the circumstances it was appropriate to continue the hearing in his absence.

The background to the case is summarised helpfully by Mr. Anthony Hand in his case summary for today’s hearing.

Mr. Goodall is the father of three children, all girls: R, now aged 12; E, now aged 10; and B, now aged 7½. All three girls have been removed from their parents’ care and have now been adopted.

The history of the litigation can be summarised as follows.

On 7^th August 2013 the magistrates, sitting in the Family Court, made care orders in respect of all three girls, together with placement orders authorising the Local Authority to place the children for adoption. On 28^th October 2013, His Honour Judge Meston QC dismissed Mr. Goodall’s appeal against the making of the care and placement orders. An application was then made by Mr. Goodall’s brother, the uncle of the girls (hereafter referred to as “RG”), for contact. On 17^th February 2014 that application was dismissed by His Honour Judge Bond. The judgment given by Judge Bond on that day recorded the evident hostility shown towards the Local Authority by RG.

Mr. Goodall then appealed to the Court of Appeal but his application for permission to appeal was dismissed by Lady Justice Arden on 18^th February 2014. Shortly afterwards Mr. Goodall issued an application to revoke the placement orders. That application was dismissed by the Magistrates on 28^th April 2014. Mr. Goodall then appealed that decision to Judge Bond, sitting in Bournemouth. On 4^th September Judge Bond refused Mr. Goodall’s application for permission to appeal against the dismissal of his revocation application.

Mr. Goodall and RG then appealed to the Court of Appeal once more. On 4^th November 2014 Lord Justice McFarlane dismissed that application as totally without merit. Shortly afterwards Mr. Goodall issued a second application to revoke the placement orders. That application was dismissed by His Honour Judge Bond on 25^th November 2014.

In the summer of 2015, the carers of B applied to adopt her. Mr. Goodall applied for permission to oppose the adoption application. That application was listed for hearing on 20^th August 2015. In the event Mr. Goodall did not attend that hearing, instead asking for an adjournment by email. On 21^st August, Judge Meston dismissed the application.

Against that background of proceedings concerning the three girls, the Local Authority asserts that Mr. Goodall and his brother RG were guilty of repeated acts of behaviour that warranted the granting of injunctions to protect the girls, their carers and Local Authority staff.

Following a series of adjournments, the contested hearing of the application for injunctions took place on 17^th July 2015. After a hearing lasting all day, His Honour Judge Meston reserved judgment until the following Monday, 20^th July. Mr. Goodall and RG acted in person at the hearing before Judge Meston, as they have for much of the proceedings over the last few years.

The Local Authority’s case within the injunction proceedings was that Mr. Goodall had tried unlawfully to restrain a member of the Local Authority staff, believing erroneously that he was entitled to carry out a citizen’s arrest on the social work manager, threatened to have European Arrest Warrants issued in respect of social workers and the girls’ school head-teacher, abducted one of the children from their foster placement prior to Christmas 2014 – a matter in respect of which Mr. Goodall was subsequently convicted of a criminal offence.

On the basis of those allegations and other matters, the Local Authority, as I have said, applied for injunctions and on 20^th July 2015 His Honour Judge Meston QC, at a hearing attended by Mr. Goodall and RG, made a series of injunctions in the following terms.

The first injunction was under the inherent jurisdiction. The Local Authority had previously sought permission under section 100 of the Children Act 1989 to apply for an injunction under the inherent jurisdiction and an order had been made by Judge Bond on 30^th October 2014.

By the first further order made on 20^th July 2015, that order was renewed by Judge Meston in the following terms:

The second injunction was made under the Protection from Harassment Act 1997. The terms of that injunction are as follows:

The third injunction was made under the Family Law Act 1996. That order provided as follows:

Each of the orders contained further orders in these terms: (1) An application by the father for permission to appeal was in each case refused. (2) An application by the father and RG for transcripts of hearings on 5^th June and 17^th July 2015 was refused, the court not being satisfied that it was necessary in the interests of justice for such transcripts to be obtained. (3) There were no order for costs made save for assessment of the children’s publicly funded costs.

The orders were subsequently personally served on the father and RG. The father applied to the Court of Appeal for permission to appeal against the injunctions. That application was considered on paper by Lady Justice Macur on 24^th August 2015 and refused as totally without merit.

Subsequently the father applied to Judge Meston to revoke the orders made on 20^th July 2015. That application was refused and those orders remain in force.

Before turning to consider the application before me today, I should briefly mention three other matters.

First, in the summer of 2016, Mr. Goodall filed an application for the committal to prison of the Head of Children’s Services for Dorset County Council. That application was dismissed.

Secondly, towards the end of 2016, Mr. Goodall filed an application for damages against the Local Authority. That application was considered on 24^th March 2017, and on that occasion the court found that the Local Authority had acted unlawfully before the making of the Adoption Orders in respect of the two older children, R and E, by allowing the surnames of those children to be changed prior to the making of the Adoption Orders without the consent of the parents or the leave of the court. However, as the Local Authority had made an offer to compromise the proceedings before the hearing which had been refused by Mr. Goodall, he was ordered to pay part of the Local Authority’s costs.

Thirdly, as I set out above, each of the children has now been adopted by their respective carers.

The Local Authority alleges that Mr. Goodall is in breach of all three of the orders made by His Honour Judge Meston on 20^th July 2015.

On 31^st March 2017 the Local Authority filed a notice of application to commit him for contempt of court for breach of those orders.

On 12^th May 2017, His Honour Judge Meston made a case management order in the committal application in the following terms. He listed the application for a hearing on 23^rd June 2017 with a time estimate of one hour. Service of the application having not yet been affected, he directed that delivery of (1) a sealed copy of the application by the Local Authority for the committal order with supporting evidence, (2) a sealed copy of the hearing notice to attend the Family Court at Bournemouth on 23^rd June and (3) a sealed copy of the order of 12^th May 2017 by placing them in a sealed envelope addressed to Mr. Goodall through the letterbox of his address, shall be deemed to be good and efficient service of those documents upon the day on which they are so delivered. He further directed that copies of the documents identified in the previous sentence should be sent by the Local Authority’s solicitors to Mr. Goodall by email.

On that basis Judge Meston directed the Local Authority was not required to serve the application for alternative service on Mr. Goodall but noted that any person not served with a copy of the application before the order was made was entitled to apply to have the order set aside and varied, adding that such an application must be made within seven days after the date on which the orders were served.

A statement of service was subsequently filed dated 1^st June 2017, stating that, in the event, on 1^st June 2017 a process server did personally serve Mr. Goodall with the following documents: the notice of application to commit, further copies of the three injunction orders made on 20^th July 2015, an affidavit in support of the committal application by Jonathan Wade of Dorset County Council, and a copy of the order of 12^th May 2017.

The application thus came back before Judge Meston on the 23^rd June. In the event, however, that hearing did not proceed. An email was sent by Mr. Goodall to the court stating that he was unable to attend due to illness. A further email from the Local Authority asked for the hearing to be adjourned, stating that the Local Authority wished to add to the list of alleged breaches. Judge Meston therefore adjourned the application to 12^th July 2017 and gave directions concerning the production of a medical certificate by Mr. Goodall if he wished to contend at that hearing that he was too unwell to attend, stating further that if he failed to attend the next hearing without good reason the court may proceed in his absence, and further giving the Local Authority leave to amend the schedule of alleged breaches by 30^th June and making provision for the service of the amended schedule and the order on Mr. Goodall.

On 4^th July the Local Authority filed an amended schedule of breaches. On 5^th July, in accordance with the order of 23^rd June, service of the amended schedule and order of 23^rd June was effected by posting the documents through Mr. Goodall’s letterbox as provided for in the earlier court order.

At the hearing on 12^th June Mr Goodall attended before Judge Meston. He informed the Judge that he had made a complaint against him. He also attempted, it seems, to caution the Judge and effect a citizen’s arrest. He then applied for the Judge to recuse himself. The Judge acceded to this application. In his short judgment setting out his reasons for so doing, Judge Meston said:

The reference to criminal proceedings in that passage from the judgment is a reference to a prosecution for an alleged breach of the restraining order made in the harassment proceedings. Those proceedings are, as I understand it, still outstanding.

On 22nd August the case was listed for final hearing before me on 27^th October, with a time estimate of one day. On 24^th August the Supreme Court refused the father’s application for permission to appeal against Lady Justice Macur’s order of 24^th August 2015.

On 27^th October the matter came before me as directed. Before that hearing, the court officer received an email from Mr. Goodall indicating that he wished to call a number of witnesses at the committal hearing and that the application could not proceed on the date on which it was listed. For that reason and because I considered that it was likely that the hearing would exceed one day – the time estimate allotted by Judge Meston – I decided to adjourn the hearing to a later date whilst retaining one hour of court time on 27^th October for case management.

At that hearing on 27^th October, Mr Goodall attended and addressed the court. He asked me to direct that the Local Authority should produce a number of witnesses – I believe eighteen – whom he wished to cross-examine at the committal hearing, including the Chief Constable of the County, the Chief Executive of the Local Authority, various police officers, various employees of the Local Authority, and the children’s adopters. I refused that application on the basis that none of those witnesses were relevant to the matters to be determined at the committal application. I also refused a number of other directions sought by Mr. Goodall.

Mr. Goodall asserted that he was treated unfairly and in breach of his human rights at that hearing. I reject that suggestion.

I made further directions at the conclusion of the hearing, including that Mr. Goodall file a statement in response to the statements filed by Mr. Wade in support of the application to commit by 4pm on 9^th November and I listed the matter for a hearing lasting one and a half days on 27^th and 28^th November. In the event, no further statement was filed by Mr. Goodall in accordance with that direction although, on 10^th November, he sent a further email to the court office restating his intention to call a large number of witnesses at the hearing.

At the start of today’s hearing, when the case was called on, Mr. Goodall did not appear. Mr. Hand informed me, however, that Mr. Goodall had attended court with his brother, RG. Mr. Goodall had made it clear that his case was not going to get a fair hearing before me and he would apply for an adjournment. Mr. Hand further informed me that his brother, RG, then attempted to caution Mr. Hand and informed him that he was under arrest and that after the hearing he should go with them to a police station. Mr. Hand informed me that he had last seen Mr. Goodall and his brother leaving the building on the other side of the security gate. The security staff confirmed that Mr. Goodall and his brother left the building and uttered words to the effect that they were going to Strasbourg.

I proceeded to hear the application in Mr. Goodall’s absence. I am entirely satisfied that this was fair. Mr. Goodall had notice of the hearing, had every opportunity to file evidence in response to the Local Authority, and had attended but then left for no good reason.

The amended schedule of breaches relied on by the Local Authority reads as follows.

Two affidavits in support of the application to commit were filed sworn by Jonathan Wade, the Service Manager for Health and Protection for the Local Authority.

In his first affidavit Mr. Wade confirms that the postings on the Facebook page on 10^th January 2017 as alleged in breach no. 1 in the schedule. In respect of that breach, Mr. Wade asserted that it constituted a clear breach of the injunction in that it caused further annoyance and distress to members of the Local Authority staff. Mr. Goodall, by posting this information in the public domain, has caused staff to feel harassed, intimidated and threatened. Further, he asserted that the comments were defamatory in that, whilst the police are investigating allegations made by Mr. Goodall, there is no evidence to support the assertion that the social workers have covered up the abuse of children in foster care or that Ms. Tough or Ms. Ward are in any way involved in institutional abuse.

Mr. Wade further asserted that Mr. Goodall had not been caused harm for the past four years by Local Authority’s ‘utter lies’ and there is no evidence to support the assertion that social workers have been anything other than truthful in the exercising of their statutory duties to ensure the protection of the three children from significant harm caused by their parents. Mr. Wade said that Mr. Goodall had produced no evidence of corruption and as such no evidence exists this was a further defamatory comment.

In his statement Mr. Wade then proceeded to confirm the further Facebook posting as asserted in breach no. 2 of the schedule. In respect of this alleged breach, Mr. Wade stated that it constituted a clear breach of the injunction in that Mr. Goodall has caused staff to feel harassed, intimidated and threatened. Whilst the County Council is confident that no further action will be taken by the police against members of staff, Mr. Wade asserted that Mr. Goodall’s actions had caused significant alarm to individual officers and further annoyance to the Local Authority’s staff in general. Mr. Wade claimed that Mr. Goodall had no evidence to support his assertion that any criminal charges will be brought. Further, the comments were defamatory because no charges had been brought. Although the Local Authority had been found to have failed to prevent the children being named by their adopted names prior to the adoption order being made, there has been no finding that the Local Authority had unlawfully changed Mr. Goodall’s surname so as to cover the abuse allegedly suffered by the girls in care or that the girls did indeed experience any abuse during their time in care.

Mr. Wade further stated that the father had contacted Mr. Crawford as alleged in breaches nos. 3 and 4 in the schedule. In respect of the telephone call on 10^th January 2017, Mr. Wade asserted that Mr. Goodall had stated that he wanted to raise concern about the three social workers, “Aldwell, College and Cain”. Mr. Goodall stated that there had been a recent court case and the staff he named were under investigation in respect of perjury and misconduct in public office. Mr. Goodall advised that there was a criminal investigation ongoing and that he would be taking steps to obtain “interim protection orders” concerning their fitness to practise due to them being in breach of codes of practice and standards and ethics. In respect of the email sent on 17^th January, Mr. Wade produced a copy of the email, the terms of which are set out above.

In respect of breach no. 5 in the schedule, Mr. Wade confirmed that on 6^th February, Mr. Goodall had made five calls to members of the Local Authority staff as set out. In his statement Mr. Wade gave details of the five calls.

In respect of breaches nos. 7, 8 and 9 in the schedule, Mr. Wade asserted that Mr. Goodall was continuing to display numerous photographs of the children on Facebook and to refer indirectly to the children being removed from his care and adopted. Mr. Wade pointed out that Mr. Goodall shares parental responsibility for the children and had not sought any consent from the court to publish the photographs or from the Local Authority or the adoptive parents. The children being of an age where they might have access to Facebook, Mr. Wade asserted that Mr. Goodall’s continued refusal to comply with the injunction puts the children at risk of emotional harm. Copies of the Facebook pages were exhibited to Mr. Wade’s affidavit as a small selection of the photographic entries on his Facebook account as of 30^th February 2017. These screenshots exhibited show photographs of the children. At the hearing I was shown the father’s current Facebook page.

I am satisfied on the evidence of Mr. Wade that images of all three children were displayed and continue to be displayed on Mr. Goodall’s Facebook page. Mr. Wade informed the court in his affidavit that the adoptive parents are very concerned about the photographs of the children on Mr. Goodall’s Facebook page. They have rightly advised the social worker that, “They are our children and he is posting photographs of our children”. The adoptive parents are concerned about the children seeing information on social media and that the children will become upset. They feel they have no alternative but to look at the Facebook page regularly to ensure that Mr. Goodall is not making any inappropriate comments or doing anything else inappropriate. They are concerned about the risk from harm which he may cause and wish to monitor his actions.

In respect of the amended additional grounds added to the schedule, Mr. Wade in his second affidavit states that the adoptive parents of B informed the previous social worker about the various telephone calls as described in the schedule breaches 10 and 11 set out above.

In respect of breach no. 12, Mr. Wade in his second affidavit confirmed that on 26^th April 2017, R’s adopters informed the previous social worker, Miss College, that Mr. Goodall had sent R further birthday cards.

In respect of breach no. 13, Mr. Wade stated in his second affidavit that Mr. Goodall told B’s adoptive parents on 15^th May, as alleged in the schedule, that he was coming to get her, whereupon the adoptive father called the police.

Finally, Mr. Wade confirms that the further Facebook posts, as described in the schedule under breach no. 14 as set out above, are on the father’s Facebook page.

Mr. Wade gave brief oral evidence in which he confirmed the truth of his affidavits.

In order to find that an alleged contemnor is in contempt of court, the court must be satisfied to the criminal standard that the breach has occurred. In other words, the court can only find that the Local Authority has proved the allegation if it is sure that the allegation is true.

In respect of breaches 1 to 5 and 7 to 14, I am satisfied in each case that the allegations as asserted in the schedule are proved to that criminal standard of proof. In each case I am sure that the father has acted in the way alleged by the Local Authority and broken the orders as alleged.

I therefore find that Mr. Goodall is in contempt of court in respect of those 13 allegations in the schedule.

I exclude allegation no. 6 because, in my judgment, that allegation is not pleaded with sufficient particularity to enable a court fairly to make any finding.

I turn to consider what order I should make in consequence of the breaches as I have found.

I accept that any parent whose children are made the subject of care orders and then adopted is bound to suffer the greatest possible anguish and distress. Whatever the circumstances leading to a care order being made, it is always a tragedy for any parent to lose their child in this way, and this father is no exception. I accept that some expressions of distress and frustration are inevitable in such cases, but the conduct of Mr. Goodall goes way beyond anything that is reasonable. His behaviour towards Local Authority staff and towards those caring for his children is intolerable and inexcusable. His repeated postings on Facebook of images of the children and references to the children is potentially extremely harmful to the children.

In those circumstances I regard his misconduct as extremely serious and unquestionably sufficiently serious to warrant a sentence of imprisonment.

The sentence which I consider appropriate is three months’ imprisonment in respect of each finding of contempt, those sentences to run concurrently.

The Local Authority has indicated that it does not press for Mr. Goodall’s immediate imprisonment.

That is, of course, a matter for me. I regard these breaches as extremely serious and I have given serious consideration to imposing an immediate custodial sentence today. Having reflected carefully, however, I have decided not to order his immediate imprisonment. Instead I will suspend the sentence for a period of two years on condition that Mr. Goodall hereafter complies with the orders of 20^th July 2015, which remain in force.

If Mr. Goodall breaches the orders again, for example by maintaining photographs of the children on his Facebook page, I anticipate that the Local Authority will apply for the immediate sentence to be activated, as well as applying further for his committal for the further breach. In those circumstances it will be almost inevitable that Mr. Goodall will face immediate custody.

The orders of 20^th July 2015 remain in force and Mr. Goodall must comply with them unconditionally.

In respect of the two matters Mr. Goodall sought to impose as conditions for his future compliance with those orders, I make it clear that I do not think it appropriate for any conditions of that sort to be imposed as conditions of the orders. Those orders must be complied with unconditionally. That is the order of the court.

In respect of those two matters he raises, in communicating with Mr. Goodall it is plainly right that one member of staff should be nominated by the Local Authority to act as the means of communication, and no doubt the Local Authority will identify someone to act in place of the individual previously mentioned in the orders of 20^th July.

The second matter which Mr. Goodall sought – without justification – to impose by way of condition, was that the Local Authority should enter into mediation as a first step towards a resumption of contact between Mr. Goodall and the girls. Mr. Goodall must accept the reality that the three girls have now been adopted. There is no prospect of any resumption in contact with them now that they have been adopted and consequently, in my judgment, no justification for any “mediation” between the Local Authority and Mr. Goodall on that issue.

As set out above, the orders of 20^th July 2015 remain in force unconditionally and Mr. Goodall must comply with them.

In conclusion I wish to say this.

The family justice system depends on the hard work and professionalism of all those involved in it. That includes, in particular, the Local Authority’s social work staff, the lawyers who represent all the parties in proceedings, court staff and judges. Those individuals have to accept, of course, that parents whose children are the subject of care proceedings will have strong feelings; but, equally, all those professionals are entitled to be treated with respect. This court will take whatever action is necessary to ensure that the safety and security of those professionals is protected.

In this case Judge Meston found that the Local Authority had in one respect acted improperly, namely by permitting the children to be known by their adoptive surname shortly before the Adoption Orders were made. Apart from that error, I can see no evidence of any error or misconduct or action on the part of the Local Authority which justifies any criticism whatsoever. They have done their work, in my judgment, with proper professionalism, acting as they rightly believe in the interests of the three girls whose welfare was the paramount consideration in the children’s proceedings.