Kent County Council v D & Ors

This is a re-hearing to consider certain findings I made on 6 January 2015. Those findings were in a judgment I gave at the end of a contested fact finding hearing in three related care cases, known as the D, E and F case. The proceedings concern six children, whose ages range between 3 to 15 years. The previous hearing considered the factual basis upon which the Local Authority (LA) alleged the threshold criteria had been established in each of the cases.

The findings I made are set out in a schedule of findings dated 6 January 2015, which are set out by way of an annex to this judgment.

One of the central issues in the case were allegations of sexual exploitation made by a 16 year old girl, Z, which implicated the three mothers in these proceedings. As part of the police investigation Z was the subject of a number of preliminary meetings with the police and social workers, ABE interviews and section 9 statements. Z did not give oral evidence in the family hearing. I considered a Re W application in early November and concluded that she should not give oral evidence, due to the harm such a course was likely to cause her. The reasons for the decision are set out in the judgment dated 7 November 2014. That ruling was not appealed.

In the January judgment I did not consider all the findings sought by the LA, based in whole or part on Z’s evidence reached the required standard. Some did for the reasons I set out. The findings I did find established are:

Following the conclusion of the fact finding hearing in January the parallel criminal proceedings started on 12 January. Two of the mothers in the care proceedings, AK and JE, were defendants in those proceedings, together with 5 male defendants facing charges of sexual exploitation concerning Z. Z gave oral evidence in those proceedings over a period of 9 days. In addition, prior to giving oral evidence she was able to view her ABE interviews and read her section 9 statements. That memory refreshing procedure was video recorded. The criminal proceedings concluded on 6 March 2015 when the criminal trial judge, HHJ O’Mahony, acceded to the application at the end of the prosecution case that there was insufficient evidence for the case to continue on the basis of the inherent unreliability of Z’s evidence. He gave a detailed ruling which is available to this court.

That determination resulted in applications being made by the following parties for a re-hearing regarding the findings made against them that related to Z’s evidence:

On 29 April 2015, for the reasons set out in the judgment on the same date, I granted the applications for a re-hearing in relation to findings (i), (ii), (iv) and (v) above. I refused the application made by JS in (iii) above.

There were pending appeals against some of my findings by AK and JS in January. The Court of Appeal was aware of the re-hearing applications. Subsequently AK withdrew her appeal and it was dismissed on 9 July 2015. Following my refusal of the application by JS to re-open any findings about him he pursued his appeal. The application by JS for permission to appeal findings made against him was refused on paper by McFarlane LJ on 13 July 2015; it has not been renewed.

This re-hearing started on 14 September, the evidence concluded on 29 September. I have had the benefit of comprehensive written submissions from all the parties, including a detailed schedule of third party evidence relevant to the allegations made by Z. In addition I heard oral submissions on 2 October 2015. Both the written and oral submissions were, as one would expect from the expertise of advocates in the case, of the highest standard.

The parents in these proceedings have been the subject of intense forensic scrutiny by both the family and the criminal courts over many months. Whilst this has been unavoidable, it is to their credit that each of them has shown enormous commitment to these proceedings. They have each been largely reliable in attending court and giving instructions to their legal teams. It should not be forgotten that these proceedings have been conducted in a language that is not the parents’ first language. They and the court have had the considerable benefit of having continuity of interpreters, who have each been of the highest standard and have been willing to assist in what ever way they can to ensure the proceedings have run smoothly.

In his written submissions Mr Storey Q.C. placed emphasis on the difficulties members of a Roma community face. This court is acutely aware of those difficulties and is very conscious of the background of the families in this case and has sought to ensure that all steps that can be taken have been, to ensure these proceedings have been conducted in a way that enable the parents to properly and effectively participate.

In the January judgment I made a number of criticisms of the police investigation (see in particular paras 432 – 435). In his ruling in March HHJ O’Mahony agreed with those concerns and expressed his own concerns about the investigation in trenchant terms. I hope that any review of the police investigation will take on board what has been said in both sets of proceedings about the investigation. Like HHJ O’Mahony I appreciate that this investigation was a difficult and challenging process for all those involved dealing with a young, vulnerable person as Z.

This hearing has done little to improve the position regarding the investigation. Whilst this court recognises the enormous sensitivities involved in this type of investigation, it is clear that some of the decision decisions taken have seriously undermined the evidence. For example, the decision made not to challenge Z in relation to possible inconsistencies, the methods used to put her at ease and gain her trust seriously risked being seen by her as encouragement, with the consequence of undermining the quality of her evidence. When looked at in the context of her low IQ and the information regarding her tendency to confabulate (which information was only available after all the interviews and discussions with her had concluded) made the task for this court challenging when evaluating the reliability of the evidence to support any of the findings sought in January. The events since January, has undoubtedly made that task significantly more challenging.

The new material relied upon to re-open the findings can be summarised as follows:

The courts overriding objective is to deal with cases justly having regard to the welfare issues involved. The factual and welfare issues in this case could not be more serious or complex. The threshold findings relied upon by the LA are the only basis upon which they are justified, by law, in seeking to interfere with the Article 8 rights of each of the adults and children.

Although the LA submits that the family court was aware of and alive to the significant emotional, psychological and intellectual difficulties of Z and the inconsistencies in her evidence at the time of the family hearing it acknowledged in April the procedural bind the court is in.

At this hearing I have considered the agreed bundle of documents, which consists of the majority of the material that was before this court previously, together with the transcripts of the relevant evidence in the previous proceedings before me and transcripts and further documents from the criminal proceedings. I have viewed the passages of the memory refreshing exercise I was asked to. I have heard the oral evidence of Kayleigh Jones, Claire Ledger, DC Verier, DI Cooper, DC Brightman, SS, CC, AK, JE, LF and JC.

Z left the UK on 12 June 2015 to join her mother in Slovakia with the consent of the LA in whose care she was, and the approval of the court seized of proceedings that concerned her. This court determined on a renewed Re W application on 22 July 2015 that Z should not be required to give oral evidence, on the basis that on the information available to the court it would be contrary to her welfare to do so. Directions were made for any further information that became available concerning Z. No further relevant information was made available to the court and there was no renewal of any Re W application.

The LA took steps to make contact with ZM (Z’s mother) to enquire whether she would be prepared to give evidence by video link. The indications were that she would, but in the event no party sought to cross examine her in this hearing. She had given evidence in the previous family proceedings and the criminal proceedings.

All parties have provided written submissions and have had the opportunity to make oral submissions as well.

The parties have been able to agree the law and any direction I should give myself when considering Z’s evidence, in particular that the court has not had the advantage of her giving oral evidence. Save for what I set out below it remains as I set out at paras 28 – 52 and para 427 of the January judgment. I have the principles set out there very much in mind and do not propose to add to this judgment by setting them out again.

In addition regarding threshold the court’s attention is drawn to Re A [2015] EWFC 11 (paragraphs 8-16 and 62, 63 and 76). In this case Sir James Munby P gives a timely reminder of the need for a LA to ensure that facts in issue are supported by proper evidence and that a link is established between the facts in issue and why the LA asserts that significant harm has been suffered or is at risk of being suffered by any child subject to proceedings. The court is also referred to Re J (a child) [2015] EWCA Civ 222 paragraph 45 per McFarlane LJ where he states (approving the President’s observations in Re A (ibid)) “There was a need for the judge to make clear and sufficiently reasoned findings of fact with respect to any disputed issues. There was then a responsibility upon the judge to identify whether, and if so how, any of the facts found either alone or in combination with each other, established that J was likely to suffer significant harm in the care of either or both parents. Finally it was necessary for the threshold findings to identify (at least in broad terms) the category of significant harm that the judge concluded was likely to be suffered by J.”

I do not propose to set out the background to this matter again. It is comprehensively dealt with in the January judgment at paragraphs 54 to 422 and I refer to that judgment for the detailed background.

I have set out above the events since January that have led to this hearing.

The evidence from Z has been put under renewed scrutiny in this hearing.

It is right that the main reason why the re-hearing was sought was the collapse of the criminal trial and the reasons that underpinned that. Obviously this court is not bound by any conclusions reached by HHJ O’Mahony in his ruling, but the evidential position that brought about that conclusion is clearly very relevant.

The first matter is that prior to her first ABE interview on 6 March 2014 Z had made serious allegations against a number of individuals, including two people who were defendants in the criminal proceedings. In the meetings Z had with DC Verier (KV) and Kayleigh Jones (KJ) on 13 and 20 February Z implicated a number of people as causing sexual harm to her.In the first meeting JDI, MC, and A. In the second S, T, RK and RF. In her the memory refreshing exercise and her oral evidence in the criminal proceedings she withdrew her allegations against a number of men including A, S, RF, T and U.

Two of these men, RK and A, she had described in her oral evidence as having been very kind to her; RK was a former boyfriend. She went further in her oral evidence in that she denied she had ever said to KV in her meeting on 13 February anything unpleasant about A.

It is submitted that the importance of this is that it is now known that prior to the first ABE interview Z had already told untruths about a number of men regarding serious sexual offences. As Mr Storey submits, this was also at a time when those who were speaking to Z were ignorant of the information that subsequently became available about Z’s low IQ and suggestibility.

It is submitted that this behaviour by Z supports the suggestion that Z has the capacity to make up allegations against people for little or no reason. Two of the people she had made up allegations about, RK and A, she subsequently described as having been very kind to her.In other instances, when she has given a reason it has been a slender one (such as the allegation of assault against her father when she stated she wanted him to be in prison, to then subsequently state she had made the allegation as he had refused to allow her to attend a disco). This behaviour, it is submitted, supports the evidence given by Z’s mother, ZM, in the previous family proceedings that Z was someone who would ‘make up stories, someone who made up allegations of sexual abuse against people’. ZM said something similar in her oral evidence in the criminal proceedings.

Feeding into this is the further inconsistent oral evidence given by Z about a number of other matters. For example, the times she was allegedly taken to Town C. In her ABE interview it was twice, in examination in chief in the criminal court it was 30 – 40 times and in cross examination she said it was a mistake. The rest are set out in HHJ O’Mahony’s ruling.

Another feature of Z’s evidence is the additional information regarding what occurred in City A. It is suggested to have been missed by all the parties in the family proceedings that buried within the papers was a separate reference by Z to her family selling her for sex. This arises from a question put in the criminal proceedings by Mr Saxby Q.C. (leading counsel for RB). At the time of the first family hearing it was thought this had only been said by her once (to PC Swift, which she subsequently denied). It now appears that the records show this was possibly done on two separate occasions, to two separate people. The second occasion was two days prior to the time with PC Swift to someone called N (although the records available do not specifically record her saying to this person she was sold for sex but that question was put in the criminal case without objection being raised). It is pointed out that this now lends more support to such behaviour by her own family, further supported by her reaction recorded in her meeting with KV on 26 March 2014 when asked if her parents had ever received money for her she ‘looked extremely sad and refused to provide an answer or make eye contact’. This additional information resulted in both KV and KJ agreeing with Mr Storey in cross examination in this hearing that if they had known about these reports from City A they would have considered removing Z from her parents care, both for her own protection and so she was in a neutral environment.

She gave oral evidence in the criminal proceedings as she did in the previous family proceedings, but was not required at this hearing. The court has the benefit of transcripts of her evidence from both sets of proceedings.

In relation to her evidence given in both sets of proceedings it is submitted on behalf of AK that it is of note that despite the evidence of the close relationship between Z and her mother Z made no mention to her of any the allegations she makes against AK. She gave evidence of Z taking money from her, that she had wrongly reported her father for physical abuse and when asked about the time when Z alleged she was sexually assaulted in Slovakia she agreed Z was someone who would invent such an allegation.

In the criminal trial her ABE interview was excluded, following a voir dire where DC Brightman gave oral evidence. The basis of that was due to the number of times she was seen prior to any ABE interview, the circumstances of those occasions (for example, for an extended period immediately after her mother had been arrested) and the risk of the combination of pressure and leading questions and the lack of safeguards afforded by the ABE guidelines.

CC gave oral evidence at this hearing; she didn’t in the previous family hearing. She had the opportunity to view her four ABE interviews prior to giving oral evidence, the practical arrangements for that having been agreed between the parties. It is recorded that whilst she was watching the 20 June interview she commented that the Roma community were upset with her because she was telling the truth. In oral evidence she said JDI’s mother came to her sister’s house, as she didn’t want her son to go to prison and wanted CC to withdraw her statement. CC said she wasn’t there at the time. She also commented whilst watching that interview that she (meaning Z) sold herself.

In her oral evidence she denied being sold for sex by anyone and the allegations made about her behaviour by Z. She denied FF (JDI) was selling anyone for sex, in her words ‘Z was doing it for pleasure’. She did accept that once FF had tried to sell her for sex and she refused (this confirmed what she said in her interview on 20.6.14). She had not seen Z having sex with men with her own eyes ‘but I knew she went’. She said Z went to see men for money to have sex, she went on her own.

There is some force in the criticisms made about pressure being put on CC by the police, in particular putting forward matters as fact rather than allegations (such as DCB saying that lots of people had been arrested and were in prison for selling people for sex) and the number of occasions she was seen without proper compliance with the ABE guidelines. Against that is the fact that she had the opportunity to view all her ABE interviews prior to giving oral evidence and apart from placing an emphasis on Z going for sex with men on her own and that she was doing it for pleasure, she did not resile from what she said in her ABE interviews and confirmed they were true. This included (i) in her interview on 30.5.14 describing being taken by FF and others to visit a man in London who gave her money to talk to her; (ii) when asked about Z at the start of the 20 June interview she said ‘I don’t know how, how we have met up. I have already forgotten that. I know about something it is that she was sold and erm FF was selling her. She was doing it with err joy because she wanted to do it for her family for her mama. She has said that to me by herself.’ In that interview she gives detailed descriptions of Z being driven by FF to locations in Town B and Town A to have sex, which he arranged and she came out with money. She refers to Z saying she was doing this so her family could eat.

She did not give oral evidence in the earlier family proceedings or the criminal proceedings, but did at this re-hearing. She was given the opportunity to view her ABE interview prior to giving evidence. Having had the opportunity to do so she prepared a statement setting out her corrections. Those corrections had a common theme which distanced her, AK and JE from Z and emphasised that Z was selling herself rather than by others. As a result of that statement, prepared at court just before she was due to give evidence, she was not required for cross examination, although she confirmed on oath that she had not been approached by anyone to change her evidence. In her statement she says following a recent conviction she has moved away from the Kent area and no longer takes drugs.

The main criticism of her ABE interview is that it is apparent that before the interview started a number of people had been discussed with her. Mr Storey relies on the ABE interview that despite being repeatedly asked she states that there is no problem with AK, although accepting that she takes pica. She did not suggest at any stage that either AD or KD were at risk; in her words they were ‘safe’. It is said this was not a witness trying to protect AK, as she acknowledged she took pica. She did not suggest during her interview that Z was forced to have sex.

Having reviewed the interview again in the light of the recent statement from SS it is not without significance that this is a person who at the relevant time had a close relationship with AK to the extent that she visited her to take drugs together. Whilst she now seeks to place the emphasis on Z selling herself it is of note in her interview she describes Z being taken to different towns with guys and comments ‘..whoever was her boss or like that, they was using her..’ and in her statement acknowledges Z was used by her boyfriend.

She was seen on a number of occasions as set out in my previous judgment. There has been renewed scrutiny at this hearing of the record of the meeting with her on 3 July when it is said she gave details about the inter-relationship between AK, JE and JC.

Both Mr Storey and Mr Larizadeh forcefully make the point that a flaw in the investigation is the failure of the police or LA to speak to AD (who would have been able to give valuable evidence about what was going on in the D household). She did not go to the Country A to live with her father until 1 July 2014. They further rely on the failure of KJ to be able to recognise the dangers of leading questions. She visited KD alone, which coupled with her evidence that she believed Z and the fact that the note does not record all the questions asked risked a lack of neutrality or care regarding the questions she may have asked KD.

Against that are the details that are in the account given by KD at the meeting on 3 July. The note records what KJ said to KD at the beginning, that she was going to give her a list of first names and if she recognised the name for her to tell who this person was and how she knew them, and if she didn’t then just to say she does not know. KD gave a detailed description of Z (girl who dyes her hair black and draws whirls on her face) and said she came round her house and that her mother would take her out, but she didn’t know where. She gave an accurate description of SS and her relationship with AK. She was also able to describe JE, her children and that she was called ‘I’. She could identify JC, her relationship with JE and was able to say she did not know who her children were. The note records KD as being able to say when she did not know people, and to distinguish between people who she saw in the home and in the town centre.

I have carefully re-considered the position again regarding this note. Whilst I have weighed in the balance the criticisms that are made of it, in particular that it is a hearsay account, it is a note that I consider the court can attach some weight to. I have heard KJ give evidence about it. Whilst she was at times somewhat defensive about it, first saying that it did record all the questions asked and then recognising that probably was not the position. In her evidence she said whilst KD was initially reluctant to talk (as described in the note) her demeanour when they did discuss the names was described as calm, happy to talk and open. The note carefully records KD was able to say when she could not give information about people, or only limited information (for example she knew JC, knew she had children but did not know their names) which lends support to the weight to be attached to it. KJ was able to deal with any suggestion that KD may have been confused about the N she was talking about in the context of JE, she agreed there was a possibility it could be JE’s daughter but said it did not readily flow from KDs description of N being introduced to JE, who was her mother. It is clear that is a reference to Z being introduced to JE.

The written submissions on behalf of AK and the LA analyse the description given by KD of someone called E. The LA submit that it is RB (relying on the description of the tattoo and the general physical description) whereas Mr Storey submits that a number of features point to it being a unrelated friend of AK. He relies on the fact that KD’s description does not match other information in the papers about RB, in particular she describes him as being tall and skinny, that he is married and has 2 children and E is a common name. I agree on the face of the information available whilst suspicious is equivocal as to whether KD was describing RB or not.

Much criticism has been made of these reports. They are, as Mr Storey puts it, as the bottom of the evidential food chain to such an extent that they are no more than ‘tittle tattle’ and should not be used to prop up an already weak case. He makes the obvious points that the reporter is not known, no attempt has been made by the LA to identify them, produce a statement from them and call them to give evidence. As a result, he submits, they barely amount to evidence.

Mr Feehan recognises they are hearsay accounts and the court should treat them with caution. However, he relies on the accuracy of many of the details given in them to lend support to other evidence, particularly that of Z, who was very unlikely to have known about the content of them.

In addition to the criticism this court made in the January judgment and HHJ O’Mahony in his 6 March ruling, further matters have emerged to the forefront during this hearing. They can be summarised as follows:

In very large part the evidence of each of these Respondents took the same course as in the previous hearing, which I dealt with at length in the January judgment.

In AK’s evidence the LA relied on some inconsistencies between the evidence given previously and at this hearing. For example, that AK sought to give a further explanation for her telephone contact with JDI and MC that they were buying and selling things other than furniture. When asked about the information found in her home that suggested she had arranged marriages for herself and AD, she maintained her denial about her involvement in such an arrangement but AK’s answers focussed much more on the fact that she had not got the money that the documents clearly intended she should. As she said ‘That is how it should have happened but it didn’t’. This, together with her unconvincing account of hers and AD’s marriages, strongly supports that she had been involved in arranging marriages for herself and AD. When pressed about how KD could give a description of Z if she had only visited her home once, she said KD saw Z on the occasion when AK shouted at Z for making a noise outside her flat, when Z visited their neighbour and when she saw her in the town. She was again pressed about what the LA submits corroborates what Z says, AK denied some of the material in the intelligence reports and what was reported by SS’s father. She denied knowing RB prior to their arrest. When pressed about the recording in her custody record, the day after her arrest which stated she had more information to give but was afraid others might hear, she denied any suggestion that related to any gang or person. She denied she said she was afraid, only worried about her children and the further information she had was that Z’s family were selling her. When pressed again about why the phone records show Z phoning a number attributed to her she responded ‘I don’t know’.

In her evidence JE denied ever speaking to Z or knowing about either of her daughters (IE and NE) knowing or socialising with Z or Z staying at her home. When pressed about the detail KD is able to give of JE and her children she described an occasion when she met AK at a mutual friends house when they both had their children with them. She denied any knowledge of people who JS may have been in contact with and repeated that they each used each others phones.

JC in her oral evidence confirmed what she had said previously about attending AK’s home to take drugs, although said it was only ‘maximum 4 times’ but denied they were good friends. She denied again using the name ‘I’ and could not give any explanation as to how Z would know who her children are. She was pressed again about the events outside a hotel in Town A on 5 September, she denied her daughter SF was present and said she was with someone called PF. She accepted she was close to IE but denied telling the social worker at a visit on 11 April that IE and Z had tipped off the police about her being a prostitute when in fact they were selling themselves. She said the social workers were asking her to care for IE. She denied IE’s account to the social worker that she would be with Z and others in a street in Town A and could not account for how CC could give details about her children. She was pressed again about her explanation for Z’s visit to her home on 13.5.13, she said she did not know why she came to her home and could only respond ‘’I don’t know – someone told her I lived there.’

Finally, LF’s evidence can be taken quite shortly. He was asked by Mr Feehan about the reports in the papers of members of his family having knowledge of Z and Z’s visit to their home for a bath. His answers remained the same as in the previous hearing, he knew nothing about JC’s drug use, Z or why she came to their home for a bath and he did not ask anyone.

In considering these findings afresh I remind myself of a number of key matters:

Mr Storey was careful, in his well crafted submissions, not to make what was in effect a submission of no case to answer (recognising what is set out in cases such as Re Z [2009] 2 FLE 877). What he submits is that Z’s evidence is now so undermined and unreliable that it cannot be supported by what is, in effect, hearsay evidence that there has not been adequate or proper opportunity to challenge.

Mr Feehan on behalf of the LA recognises the difficulties there is with the reliability of the evidence from Z, but submits that when looked at in the context of the corroboration that is available, albeit from mainly hearsay evidence, demonstrates that some aspects of her account is in fact credible to the extent that it is more likely than not that it occurred. He fully recognises there is no burden on the Respondents, but submits the court is entitled, when considering the wide canvas, to take into account in evaluating the evidence the Respondents evidence too. That must be correct although the court must be alive to ensuring that a weak case is not bolstered by evidence other than that called by the LA with the result that the burden of proof is reversed.

This court in the previous hearing analysed and evaluated the evidence then available. On a fresh analysis and evaluation, in the light of the new material outlined above, I have reached the following conclusions in place of the findings set out at paragraph 4 above:

I have reached those conclusions for the following reasons:

I shall now turn to consider threshold in the light of my findings. In considering this aspect I remind myself of the cases in paragraph 22 above and the need to identify whether, and if so how, any of the facts found establish that the child was likely to suffer significant harm (including which category) in the care of either or both parents. I also have in mind the observations in the cases cited that the courts are not in the business of social engineering, I have very much in mind the wise words of Hedley J in Re L (care: Threshold Criteria) [2007] 1 FLE 2050 at paragraph 50 and the need for the facts proved give rise to the risk of significant harm to the child.

In this case the threshold has become of increasingly academic interest as KD is no longer in this jurisdiction and there are no immediate plans for her to return. She has lived with her father in the Country A since November 2014. All parties in the D case support an Article 15 transfer and agree the Country A is the appropriate jurisdiction to determine welfare issues relating to KD.

In the light of that I question the purpose served in determining the threshold criteria. Subject to hearing any further representations from the parties in the D proceedings a more proportionate response would be to give the LA permission to withdraw these proceedings, give leave to the parties to disclose the papers to any lawyers, the social services equivalent and any relevant court in the Country A.

In considering this aspect of the case the court recognises that there is limited evidence of significant harm being suffered by the children in the E family at the time proceedings were commenced. The focus is on the risk of future significant physical and emotional harm. The level of risk is very likely to be further informed by the evidence due to be filed for the welfare hearing.

Pending the welfare hearing and the further evidence the findings made against both JE and JS support the fact that there are reasonable grounds to believe the threshold criteria were established on 8 May as follows:

Like the E case the threshold criteria is likely to be further informed by the evidence that is due to be filed for the welfare hearing. Neither of the parents in the F case dispute that the threshold is met by the findings made to date. I agree. I direct the parties to submit an agreed document for approval.

That she was more involved with Z than she revealed (466). She was in regular contact with Z (481)

That she was involved in the arrangements for Z being sold for sex, knowing that she was under 16 (484)

That she was at least complicit in causing or permitting the exposure of Z to inappropriate and abusive sexual activity, knowing that she was under 16 (482, 497)

That she kept Z in her home against her (Z’s) will (485)

That she was a regular drug user including taking methamphetamine and cocaine (507).

That she took drugs in her home with others on most nights. The drug paraphernalia was kept in the home and put KD at risk of finding them. The fact that she took these drugs and kept paraphernalia in her home put KD at risk of significant harm (507).

That her drug taking affected her ability to care for any child in her care (508).

That she has been involved in arranging marriages (544)

That she was participating in criminal behaviour that was very likely to put KD at risk of significant harm either from the people who AK was associating with or that she (AK) would be likely to be arrested and be the subject of a criminal investigation (544).

That her knowledge of Z was significantly more than she revealed and this was due to more direct contact she had with Z than she said (480). She was in regular contact with Z (481).

That she was close to AK and remained in regular contact with her since their time working together at a hotel in Town A (473)

She was probably at the least complicit to some extent in what was happening to Z in terms of her being sold for sex. The precise extent of her involvement/complicity is difficult to say but the Court is only able to make positive findings that she knew Z was being sold for sex and that she knew Z was under 16 years old and she took no action in relation to this (482 and 497).

That she pretended to sell herself to men with the intention of robbing them. On occasions she did this with others including JC (480, 509).

That she was taking methamphetamine in the home whilst caring for the children (503(4)).

That she knew that JS was abusing drugs (501).

That she knew JC was abusing drugs (501).

That she permitted or facilitated the supply of drugs to JC by JS from the family home (501, 503).

That she failed to protect IE from a violent relationship with an adult PD when she was a child (525).

That she was charged together with her daughter IE of theft of the wallet of a man from a kebab shop in Town A on 1^st or 2^nd December 2013.

Two electronic devices were seized from an address in Town A on 7^th May 2014, where JE and JS were living with their children. Images of child like people which are indecent as particularised in the schedule of DC Brightman at page 5023 of Bundle P were contained on the drives of those devices. A number of those images were the same across both devices.

That her relationship and knowledge of Z was far more than she has said (480) and that she was in regular contact with Z (481).

She was probably at the least complicit to some extent in what was happening to Z in terms of her being sold for sex. The precise extent of her involvement/complicity is difficult to say but the Court is only able to make positive findings that she knew Z was being sold for sex and that she knew Z was under 16 years old and she took no action in relation to this (477 - 480, 482 and 497).

That she pretended to sell herself to men with the intention of robbing them. On occasions she did this with others including JE (480, 509).

That from October 2012 to May 2014 she was addicted to methamphetamine and on occasion took drugs in the family home when she had the care of the children (499, 503(1))

That she frequently went out all night in search of drugs, or because she could not sleep due to the effect of drugs, and left the children inadequately supervised (499, 503(1))

That she failed to protect her daughter SF in that SF engaged in a relationship with an adult boyfriend MR and was physically assaulted by him in the course of that relationship. Children in the care of JC may be at risk of such harm in light of their mother's inability to take effective steps to protect SF in this way and the Court's concern that she did not display any real understanding of these historical difficulties with SF in her oral evidence. (527)

That she permitted known sex offender, her brother JAC, to use the family home. It is more likely than not that JAC spent time alone with the children (528).

That she was convicted of possession of amphetamine on 8.2.2014 and accepted a caution for possession of amphetamine on 10.1.2014.

That he was supplying drugs to JC from his home address (503(3)).

That he introduced JC to drugs (501).

That he has greatly underplayed his drug taking and the circumstances in which he gets drugs. That he abused methamphetamines (501, 503(3)).

That he failed to protect IE from a violent relationship with an adult PD when she was a child (525).

That JS received a caution for slapping JE and there were arguments between them that resulted in the police being called, the most recent record of which is in October 2012 (538).

That he has admitted an offence, namely sexual intercourse with another person younger than fifteen years of age JS, was 19 years old at the time of the offence.

That he has convictions for other criminal offending including whilst in Slovakia for theft and in the UK for possession of an offensive weapon on 25^th November 2013.

Two electronic devices were seized from an address in Town A on 7^th May 2014, where JE and JS were living with their children. Images of child like people which are indecent as particularised in the schedule of DC Brightman at page 5023 of Bundle P were contained on the drives of those devices. A number of those images were the same across both devices.

That he knew of the sexual exploitation of Z by individuals, although not specifically of her being exploited by JE (493).

That he knew about JC’s drug abuse but failed to protect his children therefrom (502, 503(2))

That he was aware of JC pretending to sell herself to men with the intention of robbing them (511)

That he failed to protect his daughter SF in that SF engaged in a relationship with an adult boyfriend MR and was physically assaulted by him in the course of that relationship. Children in the care of LF may be at risk of such harm in light of their father's inability to take effective steps to protect SF in this way and the Court's concern that he did not display any real understanding of these historical difficulties with SF in his oral evidence. (527)

That he permitted known sex offender, his brother-in-law JAC, to use the family home. It is more likely than not that JAC spent time alone with the children (528).

In urgent cases, the provisions of this Regulation shall not prevent the courts of a Member State from taking such provisional, including protective, measures in respect of persons or assets in that State as may be available under the law of that Member State, even if, under this Regulation, the court of another Member State has jurisdiction as to the substance of the matter.

The measures referred to in paragraph 1 shall cease to apply when the court of the Member State having jurisdiction under this Regulation as to the substance of the matter has taken the measures it considers appropriate.