Newcastle-Upon-Tyne City Council v TP (Best Interests)

This is the third judgment in respect of TP within these proceedings. The court has previously made findings of fact and has considered TP’s capacity, concluding that TP lacks capacity in respect of decisions as to the conduct of this case, as to residence, care and contact.

The court is now tasked with a most difficult decision in respect of best interests. It is a heavy responsibility deciding what is best for someone else, particularly when that person has made very clear their own wishes in respect of the future, wishes which are contrary to the advice of all the professionals.

TP has been clear and consistent. She wishes to return to live with FW. If asked, she is unambiguous in her response that she wants to return to live in Gosforth with FW. The local authority submits that it is not in her best interests to do so. The Official Solicitor, in representing TP, with reluctance, because of TP’s strong views, supports the local authority application but submits that the local authority evidence does not support long-term orders.

In respect of best interests I heard oral evidence from Dr Hughes, Laura McDonald, Rebecca Horsfall and Chris Wall, the independent social worker, as well as having the opportunity to consider the documentary evidence filed on behalf of each of them. The Official Solicitor rightly, and in accordance with the Act, has sought to test the evidence at every stage, particularly in light of the strength of TP’s feelings. As Miss Gardner has submitted, they have left no stone unturned in interrogating the evidence before the court.

The court has been fortunate in having experienced and conscientious counsel arguing the case before it. I am very grateful for the care with which the case has been presented and argued by both counsel. It makes my task easier. However, the decision in this case is far from an easy one.

The independent social worker said he had struggled with this matter. He told me it was one of the most finely balanced situations in which he had been involved. However, he had concluded it was not in TP’s best interests to return to live with FW.

Section 1(5) of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 reads:

“An act done or decision made under this Act for or on behalf of a person who lacks capacity must be done or made in his best interests.”

Section 4 of the Act is headed “Best interests” and section 4(1) details what the court must not rely upon, namely:

“The person’s age or appearance and a condition of his or an aspect of behaviour which might lead others to make unjustified assumptions about what might be in his best interests.”

However, of course, section 4(6) sets out that:

“The court must consider as far as reasonably ascertainable:

(a)

The person’s past and present wishes and feelings and in particular any relevant written statement made by him when he had capacity;

(b)

The beliefs and values that would be likely to influence his decision if he had capacity; and

(c)

The other factors that he would be likely to consider if he were able to do so.”

Section 4(4) states:

“He must, so far as is reasonably practicable, permit or encourage the person to participate or to improve his ability to participate as fully as possible in any act done for him or any decision affecting him.”

TP has been seen and spoken to frequently by her solicitor and I have visited TP. She has not attended court but has not expressed a wish to so do. I am satisfied that Miss Gardner has been at pains to represent and put forward TP’s views to the court.

Both counsel have reminded me that before any decision is made on behalf of an incapacitated person, regard must be had to whether the purpose for which it is needed can be as effectively achieved in a way that is less restrictive of the person’s rights and freedoms of action in accordance with section 1(6). In fact, the course which the local authority urges upon me, which the Official Solicitor supports, is the most restrictive option before the court or even which one might contemplate. The Act requires the court to look at best interests alongside the least restrictive options. However, it is TP’s best interests which are the imperative and the least restrictive way of achieving those best interests is required.

The checklist of consideration for the court is set out at section 4(6) and it is not very extensive. However, it makes clear that the person’s past and present wishes and feelings are as important to someone who lacks capacity as they are to anybody else. I was referred to the decision of Peter Jackson, J, in Wye Valley NHS Trust v B [2015]EWCOP 60, where he pointed out that a finding of lack of capacity does not operate as an off switch for her rights and freedoms. TP’s wishes and feelings may not necessarily determine the outcome of the case but are a factor of significant importance, particularly when so clearly and consistently expressed.

The court is being asked to deny TP those very wishes which she has made known and maintained since she was removed from FW’s home. The proposed interference in TP’s family life is huge. The question the court must determine is whether it is proportionate or justified in all the circumstances. The ISW, Chris Wall, in an email dated 21^st October expressed himself as follows:

“The continuing overruling of TP’s wishes is uncomfortable. However, there are considerable concerns. At the time of my initial report I had concerns that the protection may be worse than the harm. This is certainly how TP views the situation. I have put some of my concerns around this issue down to what I believe to be the inappropriate nature of the placement. With TP’s mood lifting and actually liking the placement where she is and her consistency remaining, this leads me to think that the balance is shifting further towards the theory that the protection itself may be worse than the harm.”

The court has had to undertake a complex balancing exercise, whether TP is at greater risk of harm in circumstances where she is separated from FW or in circumstances where, in accordance with her wishes, she lives with him. Miss Gardner reminds me that an assessment of best interests under the Act is a process by which the decision maker must consider matters from TP’s point of view. In Aintree University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust v James [2013] UKSC 67 at paragraph 45 Lady Hale opined:

“Finally, insofar as Sir Alan Ward and Arden LJ were suggesting that the test of the patient’s wishes and feelings was an objective one, what the reasonable patient would think, again I respectfully disagree. The purpose of the best interests test is to consider matters from the patient’s point of view. That is not to say that his wishes must prevail, any more than those of a fully capable patient must prevail. We cannot always have what we want. Nor will it always be possible to ascertain what an incapable patient’s wishes are. Even if it is possible to determine what his views were in the past, they might well have changed in the light of the stresses and strains of his current predicament. In this case, the highest it could be put was, as counsel had agreed, that ‘It was likely that Mr James would want treatment up to the point where it became hopeless.’ But insofar as it is possible to ascertain the patient’s wishes and feelings, his beliefs and values or the things which were important to him, it is those which should be taken into account because they are a component in making the choice which is right for him as an individual human being.”

There is a tension which is highlighted in this particular case before me between protection and harm. Munby, J, as he then was, in Re: MM (An Adult) [2007] EWHC 2003 (Fam) held that:

“The fact is that in this type of case the court is exercising an essentially protective jurisdiction. The court should intervene only where there is a need to protect a vulnerable adult from abuse or the real possibility of abuse...”

I note that this case was about a vulnerable adult.

“The jurisdiction is to be invoked if, but only if, there is a demonstrated need to protect a vulnerable adult. And the court must be careful to ensure that in rescuing a vulnerable adult from one type of abuse it does not expose her to the risk of treatment at the hands of the State which, however well intentioned, can itself end up being abusive of her dignity, her happiness and indeed of her human rights. That said, the law must always be astute to protect the weak and helpless, not least in circumstances where, as often happens in such cases, the very people they need to be protected from are their own relatives, partners or friends.”

Clearly these words are relevant in relation to those persons who are incapacitated.

At 119 the learned judge goes on to say:

“There is one final point to be made. The court, as I have said, is entitled to intervene to protect a vulnerable adult from the risk of future harm – the risk of future abuse or future exploitation – so long as there is a real possibility, rather than a merely fanciful risk, of such harm. But the court must adopt a pragmatic, common sense and robust approach to the identification, evaluation and management of perceived risk.”

Paragraph 120:

“A great judge once said, ‘all life is an experiment,’ adding that, ‘every year if not every day we have to wager our salvation upon some prophecy based upon imperfect knowledge’... The fact is that all life involves risk, and the young, the elderly and the vulnerable, are exposed to additional risks and to risks they are less well equipped than others to cope with. But just as wise parents resist the temptation to keep their children metaphorically wrapped up in cotton wool, so too we must avoid the temptation always to put the physical health and safety of the elderly and the vulnerable before everything else. Often it will be appropriate to do so, but not always. Physical health and safety can sometimes be bought at too high a price in happiness and emotional welfare. The emphasis must be on sensible risk appraisal, not striving to avoid all risk, whatever the price, but instead seeking a proper balance and being willing to tolerate manageable or acceptable risks as the price appropriately to be paid in order to achieve some other good – in particular to achieve the vital good of the elderly or vulnerable person’s happiness. What good is it making someone safer if it merely makes them miserable?”

A person is not to be treated as unable to make a decision merely because he makes an unwise one. TP wishes to live with FW. Is that merely an unwise decision? If so, the court should not interfere. The court is faced with circumstances whereby it is really all or nothing. There can be no halfway house for reasons which I will explain in more detail in due course.

The realistic alternatives which are available to the court are making orders whereby TP resides in accommodation provided by the local authority with no direct contact with FW at all, which is very much against TP’s wishes, or alternatively TP returning to live with FW which, in all likelihood, will result in no realistic prospect of TP receiving any support from social workers, community care or attending at college and she will be totally dependent upon FW with TP being required to act in accordance with FW’s direction. The court must consider, however, if this is so bad if it is in fact what TP wants.

TP does not recognise any difficulties or negatives associated with the second alternative. In fact it is apparent that she has been comfortable with and welcoming of being relieved of making decisions. As Miss Gardner asked of the independent social worker, Chris Wall, if it does not make her feel bad, she wants him, so what is the problem? While very conscious of what Lady Justice Black says at paragraph 51 in K v LBX & Ors [2012] EWCA Civ 79, namely:

“Judges who try family cases of all types know how infinitely variable are the considerations that need to be considered in determining what is in somebody’s best interests. Norms and values of society change over time, as do the ways available to attempt to meet people’s needs. There can be no substitute for a careful analysis of the evidence in the particular case. Factual disputes have to be determined and the recommendations and opinions of professionals evaluated in order to arrive at a conclusion. This is the everyday work of those who try cases involving children and increasingly it is becoming a routine exercise for those who sit in the Court of Protection. I would not wish to impose upon that exercise a structure which is not contained within the Act which confers the various powers and duties and dictates how they should be exercised.”

As I have said, I am very conscious of those words of Lady Justice Black, but Mr McCormack has referred me to an article which was based on the keynote address by Peter Jackson, J, given at the AMPA conference, Taking Stock, Mental Health and Mental Capacity Reform, on 12^th October 2012. In this address the learned judge suggests a framework which can be used as a checklist in Court of Protection cases. He sets out:

“Here is a checklist that might have appeared in section 4 but did not. I have stolen most of it from existing well-tried checklists. It requires a decision maker in personal welfare cases to consider all the relevant circumstances and, in particular, the following:

-

Past and present wishes and feelings;

-

Beliefs and values;

-

Age, background, race, culture and language;

-

Physical, emotional and educational needs;

-

The extent to which they are being met; Relationships with relatives and other significant persons;

-

The promotion of independence;

-

The preservation of dignity;

-

Harm or likelihood of harm;

-

The effect of any change of circumstances;

-

The range of services that are available; and finally, in cases concerning life preserving treatment,

-

The right to life.”

It is a useful suggested framework, or aide memoire, as to the relevant circumstances to consider and in this case before me Mr McCormack has taken from the bullet points eight matters for the court to consider in evaluating the evidence the court has to consider, and in respect of the decision which the court must make. It is neither an exhaustive nor limiting list, but it is helpful in considering the factors which a person would wish to consider if he was able.

The past and present wishes and feelings are of major relevance in this case but do not outweigh or override everything else. TP has told all the professionals and anyone who may discuss it with her that her wish is to return to live with FW and to be in the Gosforth area. Rebecca Horsfall, the social worker, told me that TP does not see the potential harm which FW presents and the independent social worker, Chris Wall, said that TP sees FW as protecting her from harm. There has been a constant effort on behalf of the local authority and Official Solicitor to engage TP and involve her in the proceedings. As Mr McCormack has submitted, it has been successful to the extent that TP has been able to give her clear views to the court. She is aware proceedings are ongoing and knows the decisions which are open to the court in that the court can say she can or cannot return to FW. She sees no reason why she should not so return.

At present TP will not consider any other option. Rebecca Horsfall and Chris Wall were both of the view that while there remains even a slight possibility of TP returning to FW TP will not consider any other option. The ISW, Chris Wall, addressed the issue that TP has had no chance to grieve properly and cannot accept that FW has gone out of her life because, as the independent social worker said, he has not gone. TP has been denied any opportunity of grieving and therefore of moving on. Chris Wall sees that situation as emotionally harmful. I agree and it must be remedied as soon as possible. The finality of an order may affect TP’s views over time and her views may not be as entrenched as they are forever. TP has not had the opportunity to consider her future if living with FW ceased to be an option available to her and an option whereby she could return to live with FW.

TP’s beliefs and values have been developed as a child, as a young person and as an adult growing up with her parents and sisters. They have developed in circumstances where she has been protected in her family environment and has benefited from a quite wide social network, including her sisters and their friends. I heard evidence earlier in the proceedings from both TP’s sisters, who described a normal sisterly relationship, albeit limited by reason of the fact that they live in the USA. However, they described regular visits to the United Kingdom and TP visiting them and their families in the United States. TP had been cherished and historically had been an important person to her family and to her friends. These experiences have worked to shape the person whom TP is.

Mr McCormack described the evidence of TP’s sisters as poignant and compelling. TP’s relationships with her sisters, and indeed anyone other than FW, have been virtually non-existent since she went to live in his house. Familiar people, like her sisters, friends, neighbours, her GP of 20 years, no longer had any contact with her. Her world had largely diminished to and become limited to FW. When living with her parents TP was probably overprotected. As Chris Wall described in evidence:

“Control in its nicest way throughout her life. When the control from her parents was gone it left a big gap and it was a big change that TP had to start making decisions. Then along comes FW, not a nice control. The control from her parents was about TP as they saw it then. This control from FW is about FW’s interests. It is about him. TP is now hooked into FW. It is a dynamic of that control.”

I find TP has opted for what is familiar to her. She knows Gosforth, she was residing with FW in Gosforth in a similar type of property to what she was used to and decisions were being made for her. It is what she knows. Rebecca Horsfall and Dr Hughes referred to their experience of people with learning disabilities having a concrete way of thinking and TP being unable to organise her thoughts to consider all the available options. TP is a sociable person and it is said that she craves, indeed needs, the care and support of others.

Her physical, emotional and educational welfare, Mr McCormack submits, cannot be met by FW. It is of concern that TP’s attendance at her GP, who has, as I have mentioned, known her for a period of some 20 years, ceased because FW fell out with TP’s GP practice. Dr Hughes’ evidence was that people with learning difficulties generally do not live as long as the general population because they are less able to identify and respond to health conditions. While FW may take TP for medical assistance in relation to acute conditions there are as well subtle difficulties and medical needs which require continuous oversight by health professionals. People with learning difficulties are not good at spotting something going wrong. Prior to living with FW TP kept regular appointments with her GP and her health needs were monitored. That oversight ceased because it did not fit in with FW’s own views and agenda and his intransigence in dealing with anyone with influence over TP.

TP did attend college. It is the view of Adult Services that she enjoyed it. The social worker met TP at college and thereafter TP did not attend. FW did not want TP to go to college, meet with the social worker and so TP ceased to access this form of support, socialisation and indeed education.

Dr Hughes described the risk factors to TP’s wellbeing if she returned to FW’s care. Dr Hughes said she would continue to be cut off from the supervision of professionals, cut off from medical oversight and from her sisters and friendships. Dr Hughes said that if she is cut off from social care and any opportunity for support from social care then social care will lose the ability to capture if TP is deteriorating in emotional wellbeing or physical state, both of which can be subtle in their progression. TP would lose the ability to broaden her horizons by attendance at college and interaction with others such as her sisters and friends. Relationships which could be positive for TP would be lost. She would lose the opportunity to be a sister or friend and would just become a person cared for and reliant upon someone else.

Dr Hughes pointed to a gradual erosion of her psychological welfare and that TP would function to meet the needs of others and not herself. Dr Hughes gave evidence that:

“Over time she will have to let go of her wants and desires and allow herself to be dominated by another person. There is a risk to mood which might lower so that she would become depressed. The risk is more so to self-esteem. It is domestic violence without the violence.”

I am conscious that upon removal from FW’s home TP’s mood did deteriorate and she was viewed as depressed. However, more recently she has started to join in with activities and has been out and has had her hair and nails done. She has been out to pub lunches and to see a local community comedian. TP is described as more relaxed and confident and more happy to access the community. She has joined in with decorating the home for Christmas. She has participated in a games evening and she will sit in the lounge and it is said she is quite relaxed with the staff. It is an improvement on her mood and demeanour as to when she first resided at this placement.

The promotion of independence for an adult with learning difficulties is important. Following up on K v LBX and contained within the article to which I have already referred, 39 Essex Chambers’ Court of Protection newsletter contained the following passage:

“The decision is to be welcomed for a number of reasons. It should ensure that proper recognition is given to the right to private life of adults who lack capacity. Concepts of autonomy and self-determination have not, for obvious reasons, featured strongly in cases involving children and there can be a tendency to rely on the approach taken in family proceedings even though the MCA concerns adults. Promoting autonomy and self-determination are clearly of much greater significance in relation to incapacitated adults. While there are no doubt similarities between the functions of a judge in family proceedings and in MCA welfare proceedings, adults are not children and caution is required in drawing analogies between two groups or assuming that approaches relevant to one group can be translated to the other.”

I heed that timely warning. The court must not apply a paternalistic approach but recognises Dr Hughes passionately advocated the right of people with learning disabilities to have a meaningful and valuable life and to have choices and appropriate independence.

The evidence before me details TP as towards the severe end of mild disability with global impairment in her intellectual ability, who struggles to think outside her immediate experience. She allows others to dominate. As Dr Hughes opined, TP’s experience of FW’s behaviour is not so negative. She does not see what we see. He has bought her things, he has cared for her. However, what Dr Hughes and others have seen is FW’s coercive and intimidating behaviour and FW referring to TP in a persistently derogatory way. He refers to her as a broken flywheel. He said she needed babysitting, she was not right, he is saving her. Dr Hughes gave evidence early in the case that to repeatedly draw attention to a person’s limitations at best is not helpful and at worst psychologically damaging. Dr Hughes referred to TP having no space to have a thinking mind of her own when dominated by FW. Margaret R, TP’s sister, talked about TP being “Lost to us.” Rebecca Horsfall said that TP needs a period of rehabilitation because she has lost skills, such as cooking and being part of a household. The independent social worker, Chris Wall, and others have said to the court that TP has lost her voice.

FW is doing the opposite of what one would expect a supportive family member or concerned person to do on behalf of TP. In fact he is undermining her so that she is dependent upon him in a very negative way. Chris Wall highlighted that TP may be in fear of losing FW who had replaced what was the benign control of her parents and replaced it with a very different sort of control, the intricacies of which were not apparent to TP.

TP apologises and worries about getting it wrong, says that it is her fault. In answer to the question why should she be so worried Chris Wall was of the view that she would do anything to keep FW. He said:

“If she returns to FW he ‘wins’ and he becomes her saviour. He has saved her from the nasty Social Services. He becomes her hero, thus reinforcing the very negative situation where TP identifies with him and his agenda. The Stockholm Syndrome, where TP’s real identity is lost.”

In these circumstances I find that TP is meeting FW’s needs and her needs are subsumed in his and his need to gain control, as indeed he has demonstrated by cutting her off from any outside influence, such as her sisters, her familiar GP and community support.

Dr Hughes expressed her concern that in the long-term the unconscious psychological processes would result in TP adopting the persona of a broken, daft, not right person. Anyone in a relationship who is continually exposed to such messages will take that into themselves and accept and believe that they are not right. Dr Hughes said that the message given by FW to TP, that she needs him and he keeps her safe, is a very compelling message for her. The consistent communication that “your wellbeing depends on me” creates the implicit fear that that person has to be kept, whatever the cost. Dr Hughes said it was not a conscious process but at some level TP’s behaviour and responses are driven by the need to keep the situation going.

FW has done some good things for TP. He has provided a roof, he has fed and watered her and provided, from TP’s point of view, a safe setting which has made her happy. Dr Hughes questions how happy it has made her. Dr Hughes saw something different, which she said TP, because of her learning disability, could not recognise, namely, that TP was being cared for but in such a manner as to make her dependent psychologically and physically. Her choice and independence were being eroded so that TP’s world was FW’s world. Her personality would be gradually eroded so that TP lives in the relationship to meet FW’s needs, not her own.

Dr Hughes’ view was that TP was likely struggling on her own. It is likely she needs to live with other people. She needs company all the time. It has been shown that she can engage with staff and Dr Hughes said in evidence that she can see that continuing in the future and in that right setting where TP’s independence and needs are recognised and met she could see TP making very good progress and having a valued and meaningful life with the ability to enjoy and cherish a degree of independence.

I have made findings as to the harm that TP has sustained which has resulted in the present situation. While not criticising the local authority the Official Solicitor has raised questions as to why the matter was not referred to court earlier. It is always very easy with hindsight. The local authority was trying to manage the case without coming to court. At the time financial abuse was seen as the main problem. The extent of FW’s dominance over TP only became apparent by degrees, the crunch point, it seems, being FW interfering with the assessment process and Dr Hughes being able to spend much more time with TP and FW than had been possible for the social workers and for Dr Hughes to use her expertise to weigh up the situation and relationship between FW and TP. The local authority said that it had difficulty gathering evidence of harm until that point and the missing of the medical appointments when the referral for rectal bleeding was missed was a pivotal factor. At that point the local authority felt that it was justified in applying to take TP out of FW’s care. Unfortunately the available placement was not one which was best to meet TP’s needs and as time passed and a decision as to the future was due to be taken it was not felt to be in TP’s interests to move her to a different placement. TP has now started putting down roots in her present placement which, it is agreed, should not be a long-term placement.

I am satisfied that if TP returned, as she wishes, to FW her needs would not be met and her best interests would not be served. Although I give weight to TP’s wishes, as I must, her wishes at this stage and in light of the evidence cannot outweigh the harm to which she would be exposed in FW’s care.

It has not been an entirely easy decision, but in fact once all the evidence has been available and analysed there is in fact only one decision which meets TP’s best interests. It is a massive interference with TP’s life and against what she has consistently stated to be her wishes. However, I have made findings as to the harm which she has sustained in the past which will continue and is likely to be exacerbated in the future if she resides with FW.

I have considered not just TP’s expressed wishes but, as far as I can, with the help of the professionals the reasons behind those wishes. I have taken account of the evidence of the social workers, Dr Hughes and the independent social worker, Chris Wall, as to the harm to TP if she returned and the fact that her needs would not be met but subsumed in those of FW. She would lose her identity.

When she is separated from FW the professional view is that she can have a valued and meaningful life and connection with people, like her sisters, who care for her and want the best for her. If she returned to the circumstances and control in FW’s mind his control would be justified and endorsed by the court. It would give more power to his argument. Chris Wall’s view was expressed that it would be putting TP back into a worse situation. It would make TP more worried about losing FW. FW views himself as 100 percent right in any event and therefore he would be of the view he would be able to do what he likes without regard to anyone else.

TP has said if she goes back that is it. She told Rebecca Horsfall: “If I go back to FW I can shut the door and not be bothered by anyone.” Thus the reality would be that FW would be in total control and it would be his needs which would be met. TP would be isolated from anyone FW thought could influence TP and the harm envisaged by the professionals would continue unabated. The evidence before me was that it is likely that his narcissistic personality would increase and intensify his behaviours. Therefore it is not an option to try and test out a return. It would be harmful and not in the best interests of TP. It follows therefore that contact will need to continue to be restricted. To enable TP to fulfil her potential she needs to be free from the influence of FW which would be exerted even in a supervised setting. Neither TP nor FW have taken up the opportunity for indirect contact, but that option should remain open.

If the harm is too great to contemplate either a temporary or enduring return of TP to FW’s care then the future difficult question arises as to where TP should reside. A return to her flat in Gosforth would inevitably mean a return to FW and therefore is not in TP’s best interests and the continuation of the tenancy ceases to be a sensible financial option.

The local authority’s view, supported by the independent social worker and the Official Solicitor, is that TP’s needs would best be met in an independent supported living placement. However, Chris Wall’s recommendation is that until this decision is made as to whether she can return to live with FW and TP has had the time to grieve she will not buy into an alternative placement. She needs that time and the next move should be one, as Chris Wall said, that, “She is up for.”

TP needs therapeutic work which should take place where she is and before the transition process is likely to be successfully completed. There must be focus upon how TP can be supported for the future in light of the decision made by the court not to countenance her return to live with FW. It must be taken at TP’s pace. It will be a process and no one can say at present that the process will be successful. It seems some progress has been made in getting TP to interact more with the staff and activities provided in the placement where she is, but whether progress is maintained after TP is informed of the court’s decision remains to be seen. It is, of course, hoped that with the decision made TP will be able to move on.

The Official Solicitor agrees with the proposals of the local authority, but only on a short-term basis. However, it must be of a sufficient period to enable TP to grieve and hopefully move on. It is impossible to determine how long will be required, but it is suggested that there should be a review in three months and a consideration in six months. Although the independent social worker seemed to take the view that September would be the correct timing it would seem a sensible framework to look at this matter in three months to see if progress is being made and to review the position in six months with the court receiving written evidence as to the progress or otherwise that TP has made.

Rebecca Horsfall said in evidence that, “What I feel certain of is we are in this position because we feel strongly we are trying to do our best.” I endorse that view. As I have said, this has not been an easy case for anyone involved within it and the social workers in particular have not had an easy task but have at each juncture within their resources, I am satisfied, tried to do their best as they saw it for TP in circumstances which were very demanding of them. The outcome which all involved in the case have hoped to achieve is that TP’s rights and freedoms will be protected so that she is enabled to live her life to her full potential. Time will tell whether such outcome has been achieved.