The Friendly Trust's Bulk Application

This ‘bulk application’ dated 24 September 2015 is made by The Friendly Trust (‘the trust’). It concerns several subsisting orders appointing its office-holders as property and affairs deputies and a number of new deputyship applications.

The Friendly Trust is a not-for-profit organisation formed in 1996 to help people with disabilities. It had 52 active deputyships in September 2015.

The Co-ordinator of The Friendly Trust is Ms Alison Brunt who has completed the application and filed statements on the trust’s behalf.

The vast majority of routine uncontested deputy applications made by not-for-profit organisations, and by local authorities seeking the appointment of a local not-for-profit organisation, are considered and dealt with by authorised court officers (‘ACOs’).

Consistent with that, this application was dealt with initially by an authorised court officer, Mr James Batey, and documents filed by the trust bear the title ‘James Batey’s applications’.

Authorised court officers are civil servants who although not legally qualified are authorised by the Senior Judge or the President to exercise the jurisdiction of the court in such circumstances as are set out in the relevant practice direction.

Part of the application is routine. The trust asks that all existing orders are amended so as to record the deputy as being ‘The postholder of Co-ordinator of The Friendly Trust’. (I note that in one email the trust requests the alternative wording, ‘the Holder of the Office of the Co-ordinator of The Friendly Trust’).

The bond company which provides the deputy’s security is content for the orders to be amended in this way given that it is a matter of administrative convenience only and does not affect any person’s rights or obligations. I have therefore asked an authorised court officer to liaise with the trust and to issue an order which provides for the preferred form of wording to be read into existing orders.

The second part of the application is more difficult. Ms Brunt, the Coordinator of the The Friendly Trust, also sought a general bulk order that the Friendly Trust is permitted to charge fixed costs up to the amount allowed to solicitors in the relevant practice direction, so that the trust ‘can continue to provide a Deputyship service on viable terms’. Furthermore, ‘The Applicant requests that this permission to charge is retrospective in relation to all existing Deputy orders as well as applying to future orders’.

The way in which the second part of the application was formulated is problematic for at least three reasons.

Firstly, as this case neatly illustrates, there is no common understanding of what the term ‘bulk application’ means or when one is authorised by the rules and appropriate.

Ms Brunt says that the Public Guardian advised her to make a bulk application, she then discussed this with Mr Batey, and he told her that she did not need to give notice of the application to the persons who would be adversely affected by it.

I do not share that view. The second part of the application goes well beyond administrative convenience and affects the rights, obligations and financial position of many individuals. It is not sufficient to exhibit a list of ‘Court of Protection involvements’ to the application as a substitute for naming and notifying or serving those directly affected by it. In the first place, the rules provide for notification or service unless dispensed with by order. Secondly, the Mental Capacity Act 2005 provides that a decision-maker must, so far as reasonably practicable, permit and encourage the relevant person to participate as fully as possible in decisions affecting them. Thirdly, the decision-maker must have regard for their wishes and feelings and any other factors they would be likely to consider. Fourthly, the rules of natural justice require that people are informed of applications and proposed decisions that affect them. Fifthly, each incapacitated person is an individual with their own interests and financial circumstances. It is not be assumed that what is in the best interests of people generally, or has a general benefit in terms of cost or administrative simplicity, is in the best interests of any particular individual. Sixthly, the approach is difficult to reconcile with Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

A list of ‘Court of Protection involvements’ exhibited to the application named 111 clients ‘involved’ with the Court whereas the application itself stated that the trust has only 52 active deputyships. Who was affected by the application, and would be affected by any order, needed to be firmly established and the persons notified. The suggested bulk order approach without any notification meant this was not properly considered.

Given these considerations, I required the applicant to serve all persons affected by the application and the court was notified on 20 April 2016 that they had been served in accordance with my direction. Only 28 notification forms were filed.

I queried this because of the previous reference to 111 ‘Court of Protection involvements’ and 52 deputyships and the fact that the trust was seeking a bulk order which applies ‘to all existing Deputy orders …’

The answer was that, ‘We thought we COP14’ed [notified] everyone who was still alive and could afford to pay...  I apologise if we have missed anyone who should be included.’ That position is inconsistent with an application for a ‘bulk order’ which is to apply ‘to all existing Deputy orders …’ and not simply those persons who (at present) the trust considers can afford to pay. Furthermore, as will be seen, some of the persons notified have very small estates indeed and may well not be able to afford the higher sum claimed.

The second reason for finding the formulation of the application to be a problem is the seeking of a bulk order that applies ‘to future orders’ as well. In relation to future applications, the trust is at liberty to apply for whatever costs order it thinks appropriate in a future case at that time. The person affected, and anyone else notified, may then object if they wish. I have no power to bar those people from seeking a different costs order when their case comes before the court and in any case such a provision would be unfair. Nor can I bind another judge to exercise their discretion in a particular way in relation to a case that does not yet exist.

The third reason for finding the application’s formulation to be problematic is the ambiguous use of the word ‘retrospective’ (‘The Applicant requests that this permission to charge is retrospective in relation to all existing Deputy orders …’).

Was that simply an application to vary 52 (or 111) past orders so that from the date of my order onwards the trust has authority to charge the new amount? Or was it an application to rewrite the original orders retrospectively so that each of them is now to be read as if it authorised the deputy to charge the higher solicitor’s fixed costs at the time it was made? The effect of that would be that each affected individual is suddenly liable to pay an additional deputy fee for each year the deputyship has been in force — the additional annual fee being the difference between that permitted by order actually in force at the time and the order now deemed to have been in force. Or, lastly, was the deputy asking the court in an indirect way to relieve it from any liability it has or may have incurred in the past on account of charging fees in excess of those permitted by the orders in force at the time, i.e. an application similar to that made in unauthorised gifting cases?

The answer to these questions has only slowly became apparent to me because regrettably the relevant history was not set out in the trust’s application or in Ms Brunt’s witness statement in support, and the court was not provided with copies of the 52 (or 111) orders which the application related to.

According to a case transfer note prepared by Mr Batey on 27 November 2015, it appeared (but was not recorded in the application itself) that Ms Brunt had been advised by Mr Alan Eccles, the Public Guardian, to make this application at or after a meeting between Mr Eccles and the Friendly Trust, ‘which came from an OPG assurance visit’. Mr Batey’s note continues:

I would be surprised if the opinion expressed in the final paragraph of that note is correct. Who is ‘a solicitor’ is defined by statute (see e.g. Solicitors Act 1974) and the work undertaken by The Friendly Trust is not undertaken by or under the supervision of a solicitor. Furthermore, as will be seen, the practice direction leaves the issue of whether to extend its provisions to not-for-profit organisations at the court’s discretion. The best a non-solicitor deputy can hope for is that, when making a deputy order, the court will exercise its discretion to allow a non-solicitor deputy fixed costs at the solicitor rate.

Because Mr Batey’s note referred to the Public Guardian, on 14 December 2015 I directed the Public Guardian to file a statement setting out his view in relation to the applications. The relevant part of his position statement of 18 January 2016 reads:

Ms Brunt filed a statement in response on 31 December 2015 in which she informed me that:

Ms Brunt says therefore that the advice she received from the OPG on 22 April 2015 concerning allowable charges differed from that given to her between 4 July 2014 and that date.

In a further statement dated 11 January 2016, Ms Brunt informed me that charging by the trust is discretionary and that many service users are not charged. The Friendly Trust does ‘not levy an hourly rate’. Rather,

In an email dated 24 February 2016, Ms Brunt then states:

In a further statement filed by the Public Guardian on 24 February 2016, Mr David Richards states:

Ms Brunt responded to this statement on 25 February 2016:

Mr David Richards filed a further statement on 1 March 2016:

With regard to the ‘retrospective authority’ issue, on 30 June 2016 I asked Ms Brunt to clarify the following issue: ‘Where an ACO allowed you fixed costs have you claimed solicitors’ costs in any cases since receiving the order?’ Her response was that ‘The Friendly Trust have charged service users the rates set out in our own charging policy. This is not, and have never been as much as the maximum allowed under the Fixed Costs Practice Direction B.’

To me that answer suggested that in some cases the trust had charged at up to the solicitor’s rate in the practice direction and, following further communication, the trust states that it does seek ‘retrospective approval of charging.’

I take this to mean that the trust is seeking a bulk order which relieves it of any liability it has incurred in the past to persons under its deputyship on account of charging deputy fees in excess of the local authority fixed-costs rate.

Also with regard to the ‘retrospective authority’ issue, on 14 July 2016 I attempted to clarify with the OPG whether Ms Brunt had received advice that she could charge fixed-costs at the solicitor’s rate.

In Mr Richards’s absence, I received a reply from a member of the professional team responsible for supervising Ms Brunt at the time. He informed me that, ‘The position of the professional deputy team is (and I believe always has been) that a non-solicitor deputy may charge for costs as prescribed in practice direction 19B as a solicitor but only were the court order makes provision for the deputy to take fixed costs’. That view is completely at variance with the position taken by the Public Guardian himself at the meeting with Ms Brunt and by the OPG in the course of these proceedings.

I asked Mr Richards whether I was right to conclude from that response that ‘the professional deputy team has been advising non-profit-organisation deputies that if they have an order authorising fixed-costs they can charge solicitor's fixed costs, contrary to Mr Eccles's view and that of the court and SSCO? Or that some members of the team have?’ He informed me on 21 July 2016 that,

It has taken a long time to establish the relevant history and I have been concerned by some aspects of the application and what I have read. For example:

For the above reasons, I accept the following submissions of the Public Guardian:

On the evidence before me, I find that the trust performs a very valuable service to the local community. However, I also find that overall its understanding of a deputy’s functions and the quality of its deputy work is not equivalent to that of a solicitor deputy.

Nor, based on what I have seen, do I think that it has been demonstrated that overall it provides a higher quality of service than a public authority.

While there is always a discretion to allow a deputy more than the local authority fixed-costs rate in a particular case, I do not think that a bulk order allowing up to solicitor’s fixed costs in every case is justified on the basis that the level of service provided by the trust is equivalent to that provided by a solicitor deputy.

The Applicant is unrepresented and the bulk application concerns a significant number of people with low-value estates who fall outside the legal aid scheme and cannot afford legal representation or the services of the Official Solicitor. It has not been practicable to join those notified or affected by it as parties or to identify a suitable unpaid rule 3A representative for so many individuals. Their interests have been protected to a considerable extent by the Public Guardian’s involvement. I have proceeded inquisitorially out of necessity, giving directions and receiving and passing on statements electronically. I have been able to draw on the valuable submissions of the trust, the Public Guardian and the SCCO summarised in this judgment. I have not, however, had the benefit of legal argument.

The relevant law is found in the Mental Capacity Act 2005, the Court of Protection Rules 2007 (supplemented as necessary by the Civil Procedure Rules 1998) and in practice directions issued under section 52 of the Mental Capacity Act 2005.

The 2005 Act generally provides that costs are a matter for the court’s discretion (s55(1)) and that the court has full power to determine by whom and to what extent the costs are to be paid (s55(3)).

Section 19(7) of the 2005 Act provides that:

As can be seen, there is a statutory right to reimbursement of expenses. However, it is the court’s order appointing the deputy which provides any legal authority for remuneration.

Rules 167 and 168 of the Court of Protection Rules 2007 provide as follows:

By rule 155, the term ‘detailed assessment’ means ‘the procedure by which the amount of costs or remuneration is decided by a costs officer in accordance with Part 47 of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998 (which are applied to proceedings under these Rules, with modifications, by rule 160)’. The term ‘fixed costs’ is ‘to be construed in accordance with the relevant practice direction,’ which is Practice Direction PD19B – Fixed costs in the Court.

The legal position can be summarised in the following way. The order appointing a deputy for property and affairs needs to specify what remuneration (if any) the deputy is allowed because the court’s order constitutes the only authority the deputy has to be remunerated for carrying out the deputised functions. The options are that the order may:

The detailed assessment option in paragraph (e) is subject to a caveat in the case of low-value estates. Where the incapacitated person’s net assets are under £16,000:

The applicable fixed costs practice direction is Practice Direction PD19B – Fixed costs in the Court.

The authority for this practice direction derives from:

The court in Bovale Ltd v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government [2009] EWCA Civ 171, [2009] 3 All ER 340, [2009] 1 WLR 2274 considered the status of practice directions and the circumstances in which a judge may depart from them. The issue of a practice direction is the exercise of an inherent power of the court even when made under statutory authority. However, this does not mean that a judge dealing with an application can simply vary practice directions or alter rules with general effect; they are binding on her/him. In particular, a judge’s wide case-management powers in individual cases cannot be construed ‘as giving the power to individual judges or any court simply to vary the rules or practice directions generally’ (Bovale, para. 26). If there is a gap in the rules and practice directions, there is no impediment to a court making the order that is most appropriate to the case before it under its case management powers, or prescribing or suggesting a procedure which should be followed.

Practice Direction PD19B currently provides that if the court’s order authorises fixed costs:

There is no VAT chargeable in public authority appointments so this is a further saving to the incapacitated person (assuming clients pay the VAT in solicitor deputy cases).

The practice direction is revised periodically so as to enable the fixed costs rates stated in it to be increased, to allow for inflation and other relevant considerations. The draft new practice direction increases the existing amounts but maintains different rates for solicitor deputies and local authority deputies.

As far as I can ascertain, there has been only one significant change in the wording of PD19B that is relevant to this case during the period with which I am concerned.

Consistent with the position historically (see below), the original Practice Direction PD19B, which was in force until 1 February 2011, made no provision for fixed costs and expenses in respect of anyone other than solicitors and office holders in public authorities. The fixed solicitor rates were higher than the public authority rates and the term ‘professional deputy’ was used as a synonym for a solicitor deputy.

Subsequent PD19B practice directions, from February 2011 onwards, have included the following additional paragraph:

That paragraph indicates that (a) solicitors are distinguished from not-for-profit organisations and (b) the court has a discretion (‘may’) to extend the solicitor and local authority fixed costs provisions in the practice direction to not-for-profit organisations. In other words, the court’s order may at its discretion provide that a not-for-profit organisation deputy or ‘other professional’ shall be entitled to fixed costs at the solicitor or local authority rate. To my mind, it is impossible to read that paragraph as saying that not-for-profit organisations are ‘entitled’ to fixed-costs at the solicitor rate or are to be treated as if they were solicitors.

Indeed, following the revision in February 2011, it was commonly understood that not-for-profit organisations were usually standing in for a local authority so that, unless specified otherwise, it was the local authority rate which applied. Clearly that is no longer a common understanding. It follows that today court deputy orders which authorise a not-for-profit organisation deputy to have the benefit of fixed-costs without specifying the rate are defective.

The inclusion in 2011 of a reference to ‘not-for-profit organisations’ recognised the fact that local authorities were increasingly outsourcing deputy work to such bodies (while others were outsourcing it to local solicitors or asking the court to appoint a panel deputy).

Running alongside this development, some individuals without legal qualifications have formed companies offering the service previously provided by local authorities to citizens whose estate is of relatively low value.

Nowadays some local authorities are at pains to point out that the 2005 Act requires a deputy to consent to being appointed so that they cannot be required to take on the duty.

That is true but such statements need to be understood in the context of the legislative history. Section 48 of the National Assistance Act 1948 imposed a statutory duty on local authorities to take reasonable steps to protect an incapacitated person’s moveable property (including therefore chose in action) following admission to a hospital or care home where no other suitable arrangements could be made, e.g. by family members.

The problem initially was that the 1948 Act did not invest local authorities with sufficient powers to discharge this duty. Consequently, the Mental Health Act 1959 amended the 1948 Act so as to enable a local authority to defray any expenses incurred by its officers in relation to acting as a receiver (the old term for a deputy).

The duty set out in section 48 of the 1948 Act is now to be found in section 47 of the Care Act 2014, as part of a local authority’s safeguarding duties.

Although local authorities often say that they have no statutory duty to act as a person’s deputy, it can be seen that this is something of a simplification. Deputyship was only ever a means by which a local authority could fulfil a statutory duty.

Local authorities have a statutory duty under the Care Act to protect an incapacitated person’s property in certain circumstances and applying for deputyship may be the only practical means by which they can discharge that duty unless they can outsource the work. Furthermore, only the work, not the statutory duty, can be outsourced.

In the course of these proceedings the Ministry of Justice has been in the process of revising the existing fixed costs practice direction. A new Practice Direction 19B is expected shortly and hopefully it will address and resolve some of the existing difficulties.

The current draft Practice Direction PD19B includes the following proposed change to the practice direction, essentially (it seems to me) in order to re-emphasise what was intended in 2011:

I must decide this case according to the current practice direction but it is sensible to consider whether what I say is likely to hold good shortly and whether I should adjourn the making of a final decision.

This Applicant has not been legally represented and in order to keep costs down the application has proceeded inquisitorially. As part of the court’s inquiries, I requested a statement from the Senior Courts Costs Office and on 3 March 2016 received the following, very helpful, response:

Having regard to the above considerations, it is appropriate in the interests of justice for me to summarise, and where necessary make clearer, the approach I have taken, so that any errors can be ascertained and corrected on appeal.

It is the court’s order which provides legal authority for remuneration.

Most uncontested property and affairs deputy orders are now made by Authorised Court Officers.

The section of Practice Direction PD19B which deals with solicitors fixed costs and their rates is headed in bold, ‘Remuneration of solicitors appointed as deputy for P’ —not ‘Remuneration of solicitors, not-for-profit organisation and other professionals appointed as deputy for P’.

The practice direction continues the historical distinction of prescribing different fixed rates for solicitors and local authorities. Solicitors are routinely entitled to higher fixed costs than public authorities. This is because they commonly manage higher value or more complicated estates, have greater legal expertise and higher professional and staff costs than local authority deputy departments. Since 1948 the nature of a local authority’s statutory duties has meant that historically they are deputised to manage lower-value estates which local solicitors would be unwilling to manage for economic reasons.

The practice direction does not provide that not-for-profit organisations, accountants, etc are entitled to the solicitor fixed rate and nothing in paragraph 2 indicates an intention that the court will routinely direct that the solicitor rates ‘provisions’ shall apply in not-for-profit organisation cases rather than the public authority rates ‘provisions’.

This is not a gap in the practice direction. Rather, the practice direction explicitly leaves to the court’s discretion in each case the issue of whether and how to apply the practice direction provisions to a not-for-profit organisation deputy.

A ‘one size fits all’ bulk order approach of the kind sought here is inconsistent with the exercise of discretion.

Because some local authorities now outsource low-value deputy work to not-for-profit organisations, such organisations inevitably manage more low-value estates of the kind managed historically by local authorities than do solicitors. However, some organisations do also take on higher value cases, which again points away from a bulk order approach that prescribes a single fixed rate in all cases managed by such an organisation.

The fact that paragraph 2 of Practice Direction PD19B leaves to the court’s discretion whether and how to extend its fixed-costs provisions to not-for-profit organisations on a case-by-case basis is consistent with the Act and the rules. These give the judge or ACO a discretion to make one of a number of costs orders, i.e. to make that order most appropriate to the particular case.

The court order appointing the deputy may:

The detailed assessment option in paragraph (e) is subject to a caveat in the case of low-value estates. Where the incapacitated person’s net assets are under £16,000:

The making of a deputyship costs order therefore involves the exercise of discretion based on the facts of the particular case before the judge or ACO. Those facts include the financial circumstances of the individual, the complexity of the case, whether the case is outsourced local authority work, whether it is done under a contract with a local authority, who will be undertaking the duties and the various other circumstances relevant to particular case. While cost orders are not governed by section 4, the court’s decision also includes considering the individual’s best interests in a general sense insofar as it would not be a proper exercise of the court’s discretion to make a costs order that is contrary to the person’s best interests. For example, by authorising a more expensive fee-structure than is fair and necessary.

The Friendly Trust asks me to make a bulk order authorising it to charge costs up to the solicitor’s rate in the practice direction because ‘the local authority rate is so low as to be uneconomic’.

With regard to their representations about the affordability of deputy work, the prescribed rates of remuneration set out in the practice direction involve public and court policy considerations that are not properly within my remit. If I were to extend generally the solicitor’s rate to The Friendly Trust, out of sympathy for their general submission that local authorities and organisations which accept their outsourced work are finding the local authority rates to be uneconomic, then inevitably all other such organisations would expect to be treated equally and to be authorised to take fixed-costs up to the solicitor’s rate. That would undermine and defeat the practice direction.

The fixed costs rates prescribed in the practice direction are revised periodically following a consultation exercise carried out by the Ministry of Justice and the rates are then approved by the President of the Court of Protection. A judge cannot properly make a bulk order that has the intention or consequence of increasing or decreasing the prescribed fixed rates with general effect.

Likewise, the power to fix the amount which a deputy is to be paid cannot be exercised in a general way with the intention of generally increasing by the back door the fixed-rates prescribed in a practice direction.

Rather, the judge or ACO must consider carefully the facts of the case before them, together with any costs submissions, and then exercise their discretion appropriately by making that order from the options listed above most appropriate in that case.

When deciding how to exercise their discretion, judges and ACOs may often wish to consider the following points, together with all other relevant considerations:

I am aware that the other full-time district judges in the Court of Protection similarly apply the above approach to deputyship applications.

To my mind, there can be no justification for making a bulk deputy costs order which applies to all future cases.

There can also be no justification for making a bulk deputy costs order which rewrites original costs orders retrospectively so that each of them is to be read as if it always permitted the deputy to charge the incapacitated individual some higher rate than that permitted by the order actually made and in force at the time. The order that was made could have been appealed or been subject to a request for its reconsideration at the time.

Until recently it was commonly understood that not-for-profit organisations were most often standing in for a local authority so that it was the local authority fixed-rate in the practice direction which applied unless the order specified otherwise. Consistent with this historical context, existing deputy orders which allow a not-for-profit organisation fixed costs without explicitly specifying a rate should be interpreted as authorising the local authority rate.

Such an approach is also consistent with the general approach taken to interpreting costs clauses in court orders. For example, where an order does not specify whether costs are allowable on the indemnity or standard basis, it automatically defaults to the less generous standard-based costs.

Where a deputy has charged more than the sum authorised by the order appointing them, the deputy may apply to the court for an order relieving it from any liability it has or may have incurred in the past. The court may allow the application in whole or in part or refuse the application, in which case repayment would be required and in default consideration given to calling in the security bond.

Separately from any decisions the court makes in respect of charging outside the terms of its orders, the Public Guardian would no doubt review the cases in order to understand how that state of affairs came about and consider matters such as supervision and whether to apply for a new deputy to be appointed.

For the reasons already stated, I do not accept that the service provided by The Friendly Trust in these cases has been equivalent to that provided by a solicitor.I do not wish to rehearse the history but clearly there has been confusion about what the law has required of office-holders of The Friendly Trust and some arrangements have needed to be reworked or set to one side.

It is not for me to give general guidance as to when a bulk application is appropriate, what practice directions or rule changes may be necessary or whether the exercise of a discretion to allow costs which exceed the local authority rate falls outside Practice Direction PD3A. Those are issues for the President, Vice-President and Senior Judge to consider.All I can say is that the ‘bulk application’ approach in this case was patently unsuitable.

Having tried to distil the law and general considerations applicable to applications such as this, I turn now to each of the applications before me to see if the Applicant has established in any of these particular cases that a higher fixed-rate should be allowed than that fixed for local authorities.

I have considered very carefully whether simply to dismiss the application. In my view, there is much to be said for doing so and that is certainly the approach I would have taken had the application been referred to me at the outset. However, it was the court which advised The Friendly Trust to make the application in this way and the application was up-and-running by the time it reached me. The trust is now in an awkward legal and financial position and it is in the best interests of its deputy clients to see if something can be salvaged which avoids the need for an entirely new set of legal proceedings. That is a pragmatic approach to this particular case given the unenviable position in which the court finds itself.

As already noted, the trust eventually gave notice of the application to 28 people. In addition, a number of new deputyship applications have been filed while the proceedings have been in progress. These have been passed to me to consider so that a common approach is taken to the existing orders and the new applications.

It is convenient to take the new applications first.

There are ten such applications:

The local authority requested that the application be made by the trust. DSC lives in his own house worth £170,000. He has £80,000 in the bank and receives pension credit and Disability Living Allowance.

The court’s decision is that the deputy is entitled to receive fixed costs at the local authority rate in relation to the application and to receive fixed costs at the local authority rate for the general management of DSC’s affairs. Security was set at the basic bond level of £21,000.

A deputy order was made in 2011 at which time security was set at £130,000. That deputy is unable to continue and the local authority asked the trust to make the application and to take over as JB1’s deputy. The trust is already JB1’s ‘corporate appointee’. JB1 has Down’s syndrome and lives in a care home. She receives Severe Disablement Allowance and Disability Living Allowance, has £58,000 in the bank and £34,000 invested.

The court’s decision is that the deputy is entitled to receive fixed costs at the local authority rate in relation to the application and to receive fixed costs at the local authority rate for the general management of JB1’s affairs. Security was set at the basic bond level of £21,000.

WL lives in a care home. He lives in his own property and has £67,000 in the bank. He receives an occupational pension and the state pension. The trust was asked to make the application by the relevant local authority.

The court’s decision is that the deputy is entitled to receive fixed costs at the local authority rate in relation to the application and to receive fixed costs at the local authority rate for the general management of WL’s affairs. If the deputy would prefer their costs to be assessed then a detailed assessment is authorised. Security was set at £70,000.

DT lives in a care home. She has £1,000 in the bank and £2,000 of investments. She receives pension credit. She does not own a property. The trust was asked to make the application by the relevant local authority.

The court’s decision is that the deputy is entitled to receive fixed costs at the local authority rate in relation to the application and to receive fixed costs at the local authority rate for the general management of DSC’s affairs. Security was set at the basic bond level of £21,000.

A short order was made in JBO’s case in favour of the trust in 2004. Her capital has increased since then. She now has £11,000 of national savings bonds and £8,000 in the bank. The trust requests ‘permission to take a fee for our services, in line with our charging policy and not exceeding Court of Protection fixed costs’.

A deputy order was made. The court’s decision is that the deputy is entitled to receive fixed costs at the local authority rate in relation to the application and to receive fixed costs at the local authority rate for the general management of JBO’s affairs. Security was set at the basic bond level of £21,000.

MRA lives in a care home. She is a joint tenant of the matrimonial home which is valued at £120,000. Her husband still lives there. She has £57,000 in the bank and £87,000 of investments, and receives the state pension.

The court’s decision is that the deputy is entitled to receive fixed costs at the local authority rate in relation to the application and to receive fixed costs at the local authority rate for the general management of MRA’s affairs. If the deputy would prefer their costs to be assessed then a detailed assessment is authorised. Security was set at the basic bond level of £21,000.

JB lives in a care home. He has assets of around £45,000 at present but a ‘large debt is owed to the local authority in respect of outstanding care charges’.

The court’s decision is that the deputy is entitled to receive fixed costs at the local authority rate in relation to the application and to receive fixed costs at the local authority rate for the general management of JB2’s affairs. Security was set at the basic bond level of £21,000.

RTO has assets of approximately £125,000. He does not own a property and lives in sheltered accommodation. The trust was asked to make the application by the relevant local authority. The application has not yet been determined.

RM lives in a care home. He does not own a property. He has £21,000 in the bank and receives a state pension and occupational pension. The trust was asked to make the application by the relevant local authority.

The court’s decision is that the deputy is entitled to receive fixed costs at the local authority rate in relation to the application and to receive fixed costs at the local authority rate for the general management of RM’s affairs. Security was set at the basic bond level of £21,000.

EGR was in hospital when the deputyship application was made at the request of the relevant local authority. She receives the state pension and pension credit. She has property worth £100,000 and £340 in the bank. Financial abuse has been alleged and extra time may be required compared with a standard case.

The court’s decision is that the deputy is entitled to receive fixed costs at the local authority rate in relation to the application and to receive fixed costs at the local authority rate for the general management of EGR’s affairs. If the deputy would prefer their costs to be assessed then a detailed assessment is authorised. Security was set at the basic bond level of £21,000.

One of the persons given notice in April 2016 was in fact the subject of a new application. Therefore, only 27 existing cases were subject to notification. It will also be seen below that one of those persons is not subject to a deputyship order.

The new applications referred to above were easy to deal with. In each case the application file contained a COP1 application form and the other prescribed forms designed to give the judge or ACO the information which s/he requires to make an order; in particular, the COP1A Schedule of property and assets and a COP3 medical certificate.

A ‘bulk application’ of this kind gives the court none of that required information. Indeed, in this case it was not entirely clear which individuals it was meant to cover, let alone what their individual circumstances are, how much work is likely to be required of the deputy and so on.

With regard to the 27 existing orders, the COP14 notices filed by the trust did not provide the court with a Court of Protection case number — all simply state, ‘JamesBates bulk app’ — and nor was the court provided with copies of the original orders. Because the court advised the trust to make a bulk application of this kind, the Technical Specialist team in the court and I have gone to considerable effort to try to establish who is covered and what the current orders provide by way of costs.

Each case is briefly described below, together with the court’s preliminary view and directions as to what evidence or action is required before a final decision can be made. The trust must file a COP24 statement within 28 days which deals with each case in turn and includes the following information for each person:

Had the bulk application proceeded in the way envisaged and the proposed bulk order permitting solicitor’s costs granted without consideration of each individual’s circumstances then on the evidence presently before me it is likely that considerable injustice would have resulted.