NRA & Ors, Re

I have ten cases before me seeking welfare orders under s. 16(2)(a) of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (the MCA). The welfare orders are sought to authorise the deprivation of liberty that, it is common ground, is being, or will be, created by the implementation of the regime of care, supervision, control and support (the care package) upon which the welfare orders are based. If it had been thought that the care packages did not result in a deprivation of liberty it is highly likely that the relevant public authorities would have relied on s. 5 of the MCA and no application to the Court of Protection would have been made.

When the cases were transferred to me they were regarded as test cases on the directions that should be given for their determination and in particular on whether the subject of the proceedings (P) should be a party. As a result of steps taken by the Official Solicitor the position changed in eight of the cases. I shall return to this.

The issues before me were all raised in Re X. The decisions of the President in that case are reported at [2014] EWCOP 25 and 37 and the decision of the Court of Appeal is reported as Re X(Court of Protection Practice) [2015] EWCA Civ 599. The result of those decisions is that:

The issues in the ten test cases and in many like them are an aspect of the fall-out from the majority decision of the Supreme Court in P (By His Litigation Friend the Official Solicitor) v Cheshire West and Chester Council and Another; P and Q (By Their Litigation Friend the Official Solicitor) v Surrey County Council [2014] UKSC 19; [2014] 1 AC 896 (“Cheshire West”). At paragraph 10 of her judgment Baroness Hale points out that:

Cheshire West is directed to the objective component of a deprivation of liberty. Although some arguments remain on the impact of the majority view (see for example paragraph 1.20 of the Law Commission Consultation Paper of Mental Capacity and Deprivation of Liberty – the “LC Consultation Paper”) there is no doubt that this majority view has the result that the objective test covers a wide range of circumstances and that:

The range includes cases that are within the Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards (the DOLS) introduced by amendment to the MCA. Authorisations given under the DOLS can be challenged in the Court of Protection under s. 21A of the MCA. However, the range also covers a number of cases that are outside the DOLS. The ten test cases are examples of such cases and so of cases in which the route prescribed by law for authorising the deprivation of liberty and thereby

The Supreme Court does not refer to Strasbourg cases that mirror living arrangements such as those in Cheshire West or the test cases before me and I do not know whether or not the lack of such cases is because other parties to the European Convention on Human Rights (the Convention) have not taken the same view as the Supreme Court:

Counsel for the Secretary of State and the Official Solicitor also did not know what the position was in other countries and so whether the “many” referred to by Baroness Hale includes such countries or some of them.

It remains the case that many still find it difficult to characterise living arrangements that are needed for P, and which are the least restrictive option for best promoting the welfare of P, as a deprivation of P’s liberty and so a detention of P for the purposes of the application of Article 5. But any such difficulty and the position in other countries are irrelevant for family members, public authorities, providers of care and courts in this country because they are bound by the majority decision in Cheshire West.

When Baroness Hale addresses policy at paragraph 57 of her judgment she says:

The people that know P best and have often spent a long time negotiating with public authorities and getting the best care package available for P are members of P’s family. And so it seems to me that to promote P’s best interests their autonomy, dignity, status, and their past and continuing care and support of P needs to be recognised and promoted.

A way of doing that could be the funding and adoption of a process that provides the less elaborate checks referred to by Baroness Hale coupled with a recognition of the central role such carers have played and will and should continue to play in promoting P’s best interests.

At paragraph 1.21 of the LC Consultation Paper reference is made to the significant resource implications arising from the widening of the range of circumstances that give rise to a deprivation of liberty.

I directed that, if it was practical, each of the applicant local authorities should include in the evidence they had been directed by the earlier orders of DJ Marin to serve an estimate of the number of applications seeking welfare orders to authorise a deprivation of liberty they are likely to make in the next 12 months and the approximate cost to them of doing so. Some did so and their evidence indicates that the financial burden on health and social care budgets of seeking such welfare orders from the Court of Protection is likely to be of the order of tens of millions of pounds a year.

The estimates given in evidence are just and only that. Naturally, they are very dependent on the validity of the underlying assumptions about the number of cases and the frequency of the reviews that will be required. Thus far the number of applications made to the Court of Protection for such welfare orders is well below the thousands that were predicted after the decision in Cheshire West and which the evidence before me from the local authorities indicates are needed. There are a number of possible reasons for this. They include the points that local authorities are working their way through the widened range of cases covered by the DOLS, this is stretching their resources and so they have not yet got round to making such applications. Also, the uncertainties relating to the process and procedure for making such applications to the Court of Protection for welfare orders may have caused local authorities to delay making them.

However, results of the majority decision in Cheshire West are that:

The LC Consultation Paper is a recognition of these problems and it is suggesting solutions along the lines of those referred to by Baroness Hale in paragraph 57 of her judgment. However, it is not likely that any such solutions will be put in place for some time and so, for the time being, the best interests of Ps and other vulnerable people are likely to be assisted by proportionate and workable interim solutions to these problems that apply the existing COP Rules and satisfy Articles 5 and 14 and common law fairness.

In a recital to my directions order by which I joined the Crown, the Official Solicitor, by virtue of his office, and the Law Society as parties to the ten test cases I indicated that it was likely to be of assistance to the court in, for example, considering how best to further the overriding objective and apply Rule 3A of the Court of Protection Rules (the COP Rules), to have such information as is practically available concerning the provision of resources (whether publicly or privately funded) to enable P to have a litigation friend or to take part in the proceedings with or without being made a party, and the timescale for the provision of such resources.

In this context, there was no evidence from the Secretary of State, who is responsible for the funding of the Official Solicitor and legal aid, that additional funding would be, or was likely to be made, available in the near future, or of any proposed or possible changes to the relevant regulations to the provision of non-means tested, or means tested, legal aid. So the evidence indicated that the present funding regime for local authorities and for Ps and their families would continue.

At paragraph 108 of the Court of Appeal’s judgment in Re X, Black LJ commented:

“..The concern about the increased workload that may be generated by the Cheshire West decision is understandable and I do not doubt that the joinder of P as a party would be more burdensome to the system in various ways than the President's scheme and may import greater delay. The extent of the increased burden would only become apparent over time…”

It is obviously correct that the extent of the increased burden will only become apparent over time. But the well-known difficulties in identifying and appointing the Official Solicitor as a litigation friend and the costs and delays of so doing mean that it did and does not take a crystal ball to see that the joinder of P as a party in all such cases will create burdens in terms of both delay and emotional and financial cost.

I am bound by Cheshire West but not by the conclusion of the Court of Appeal in Re X, although of course I acknowledge that it is persuasive and cogently argued. But the same can be said of the President’s conclusion and the test cases were transferred to me to determine whether the streamlined process, based on the President’s conclusion, should be abandoned or modified and in particular whether, in accordance with the conclusion of the Court of Appeal, P must always be a party, and if so:

I have not included what I have and will say about the practicalities of implementing the view of the Court of Appeal in Re X,for the purposes of founding a conclusion based simply on pragmatism or resource.

If the likely practical reality of a proposed process is that it would not be fit for purpose, I acknowledge that that result could probably be avoided by the provision of further resources and that the determinative factors for me are:

The identification of the Safeguards therefore involves a consideration of:

Although the most important issue raised in argument was whether or not P must be joined as a party to all applications to satisfy the common law requirements of fairness, Article 5 and Article 14, I do not deal with this first. This is because in my view the answer to that issue is informed by the practical consequences of that approach and thus the concrete situation on the ground relating to the rival processes to supply the Safeguards.

So in Part 2 of this judgment I address the background, the matters set out in paragraphs 3(iii) and 22 above, and problems relating to the appointment of a litigation friend and an independent Rule 3A representative and their consequences in respect of the representation, help and support of P and so the procedural safeguards that party status or such an appointment are likely to give in practice.

Unfortunately, such problems and their consequences, for example, the availability of alternatives to effectively replicate in practice (as a Rule 3A representative or otherwise) the advantages and safeguards that flow from the appointment of an IMCA and a RPR under the DOLS do not seem to have been provided in evidence to the Court of Appeal. Similar gaps exist in the evidence before me and as appears below:

Also, the evidence did not contain much about what local authorities and the Court of Protection could do to provide procedural safeguards with or without P being made a party. So the evidential base for a comparison between the practical consequences of alternative processes is disappointingly thin.

In Part 3, I shall deal with the conflict between the obiter approaches. Part 4 sets out in short form my overall conclusion.

The obiter view of the Court of Appeal is directed to applications for welfare orders based on care packages that, when implemented, will result in P being deprived of his liberty and thus to the fundamental guarantees of procedure applied in matters of deprivation of liberty.

But logically the reasoning of the Court of Appeal and, in particular, reasoning based on the description of a party given by Moore-Bick LJ in paragraph 170 of his judgment could extend their conclusion to other (and possibly all) cases before the Court of Protection, notwithstanding the acknowledgment by Black LJ, at paragraph 104, that it may be possible to devise a scheme in relation to Article 5, and so deprivation of liberty, in which P was not formally a party.

I acknowledge that this possible widening of the impact of the Court of Appeal’s conclusion is for another day. But it highlights both a problem and a special feature of proceedings in the Court of Protection relating to the balance to be struck between:

I freely acknowledge that the instinctive reaction of most English and Welsh lawyers would be that P must be a party to all proceedings in the Court of Protection because necessarily the orders directly affect his or her welfare or property and affairs and so he or she needs to be bound by them and have a say in what they should contain. Indeed, this was my starting point when the COP Rules were originally drafted.

But as soon as one considers the point that the great majority of the work of the Court of Protection is (and historically has been) non-contentious and necessary property and affairs applications, it becomes apparent that the reason for the existence of the court’s jurisdiction, and its nature and effect, strongly indicate that fairness does not require a replication of the procedure for a protected party in adversarial civil litigation, namely that P must be a party and have a litigation friend before any step can be taken.

As with the Family courts (see Re R (Care; Disclosure; Nature of Proceedings) [2002] 1 FLR 755 at 771/2)aspects of the jurisdiction of the Court of Protection are adversarial but significant aspects of its jurisdiction in applying the best interests test are investigatory. Accordingly, a procedure used for adversarial issues may not be appropriate to an application that is presented as non-controversial and which, after appropriate investigation, is non-controversial. This description applies to cases covered by the streamlined procedure based on the President’s judgments in Re X.

The number of non-contentious property and affairs applications has increased year on year. Presently they are running at around 20,000 applications a year. The demographic of the population indicates that the number of those applications will continue to increase. The cost of such applications is likely to fall on P’s assets (or his or her family). These applications are made of necessity because P cannot make the relevant decisions and give the necessary instructions about his or her property and affairs, and history shows that the vast majority of them are made by honest and caring family members or carers. If there was to be an independent check of every application by making P a party and appointing an appropriate litigation friend, or by some other method, in that vast majority of cases the cost and intrusion that would be so caused would be both unnecessary and very understandably resented. Further, its financial cost would mean that P’s resources, or resources that might otherwise be used to support P, would be used on an unnecessary process. This lies at the heart of the Procedural Balance that the COP Rules strike by, for example, the Rules that P need not be a party, that P is bound whether or not he is a party and on the notification of P.

Similar issues exist on an application to appoint a property and affairs deputy. And, in those cases proportionate provisions exist in respect of the giving of security to guard against risk.

A problem relating to a high percentage of truly non-contentious applications that are obviously in P’s best interests does not arise in respect of decisions relating to P’s welfare that do not raise deprivation of liberty issues. The reason for this is that the relevant providers and supporters of the care can rely on s. 5 of the MCA (and the existence of this section may lead the Court of Protection to refuse permission to bring welfare proceedings).

The underlying purpose of s. 5 of the MCA shows that Parliament intended that when possible welfare issues and decisions should be left to those who, on a day to day basis, are caring for and supporting P.

Section 5 does not apply to a deprivation of liberty (see s. 6 of the MCA and the definition of restraint in s. 6(4)) but:

Also, the implementation of some care packages can result in an objective deprivation of liberty of some vulnerable people who have capacity but no effective choice other than to accept the care package that is offered. This is because they have nowhere else to live and do not have the resources to bring proceedings in the Administrative Court.

So, the limits placed on s. 5 by s. 6 of the MCA introduce into the welfare jurisdiction of the Court of Protection the problem that, as the test cases before me indicate, a high percentage of applications made to the Court of Protection for welfare orders based on care packages whose implementation will give rise to a deprivation of liberty are likely to be obviously non-contentious and independent checking will in fact only serve to confirm what those responsible on the ground (including devoted and responsible family members) know to be needed and so the least restrictive available option to promote the best interests of the relevant P.

The points made above concern the Procedural Balance to be struck in meeting the Requirements and the Effects in non-contentious cases and do not ignore or fail to acknowledge:

An issue to consider in identifying the right balance is the value that would be added to the safeguarding of P (and so to the Requirements) if on the face of the evidence a suitable family member or friend who has been involved in P’s day to day care was appointed as P’s litigation friend on P being made a party. Such a person might be a donee under a lasting power of attorney or could be (or could be made) a health and welfare deputy. So, I ask rhetorically: What value added would be achieved and what disadvantages would be caused by P being a party and having such a litigation friend? My answers are:

The extent of the disadvantages would depend on the answers to whether a solicitor would have to be instructed, whether there would have to be an oral hearing and the extent of the required paper work. But, on the assumption that no solicitor need be appointed, no hearing is necessary and the paper work is simple, there would still be the potential for some disadvantage caused by the emotional stress of the reaction to making P a party to court proceedings and perhaps expenditure on them that would add nothing of real value.

My experience of proceedings in the Court of Protection indicates that only rarely will a family member or friend who has not been involved in the day to day decision making be put forward as a litigation friend. The risk that such an appointment, to check what is being and should be done, will create problems within the family is obvious and high.

I shall return to the issue whether a family member can or should be appointed as P’s litigation friend (or Rule 3A representative).

If no family member, friend, donee or deputy is available or should not be appointed to act as P’s litigation friend, and it appears obvious from well-reasoned documents that P’s care package is the least restrictive option, in most cases the only available option is the Official Solicitor.

In a non-contentious case his input through those he instructs (usually solicitors) may well add nothing of value, other than the confirmation of the accuracy of other information. This is not a criticism of the Official Solicitor and those he instructs because in those cases there is nothing of value that can be added apart from that confirmation.

It follows that the delays and costs that history indicates would follow from making P a party and appointing an independent litigation friend (usually of last resort and so the Official Solicitor) in all applications seeking a welfare order to authorise a deprivation of liberty would add value either:

As discussed above, these important benefits reflect the dilemma relating to the Procedural Balance that runs through all of the work of the Court of Protection.

In my view, important starting points to a consideration of what is needed to satisfy the Requirements and the Effects are the jurisdiction of the court and the tests that apply on an application for a welfare order.

Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 4A, 16, 21A provide:

The court only has jurisdiction if the relevant P lacks the capacity to make the relevant decision (see s. 16(1) of the MCA). Capacity is issue specific (see s. 3 of the MCA) and so, for present purposes, P must lack capacity to make decisions about his care package and its consequencesand so be unable to consent to any deprivation of liberty its implementation creates (or may create).

This means that on all relevant issues the time for supported decision making is past because, by definition, if there were practicable steps that could be taken to enable P to make the relevant decisions the court would not have jurisdiction (see ss. 1(3) and 16(1) of the MCA).

It also means that s. 4(4) of the MCA is not directed to enabling Ps to make the relevant decision for themselves.

Section 16A provides that if a person is “ineligible to be deprived of liberty” by the MCA the Court of Protection may not include within a welfare order a provision that authorises him to be deprived of his liberty.

The way in which ss. 4A(3), 16(2)(a) and 16A work together founds the making of an order to the effect that the relevant person is to live at a certain place pursuant to a defined care package on the basis that the (or any) deprivation of liberty that is thereby created is authorised. That authorisation is provided by s. 4A(3).

The underlying approach of s. 16 is, as it states, that by making the welfare order the Court of Protection is making the decision which P lacks the capacity to make on behalf of P. This is reflected in paragraph 18 of the judgment of Lady Hale in Aintree University Hospitals NHS Trust v James [2013] UKSC 67, [2014] AC 591 where she says that the MCA:

----- is concerned with doing for the patient what he could do for himself if of full capacity but it goes no further.

In doing that, like a person with capacity, the Court of Protection can only choose between available options (see ACCG and Another v MN and Another [2013] EWHC 3895 (CoP) and in the Court of Appeal [2015] EWCA Civ 411). At paragraph 46, of his judgment Munby LJ said:

So, in the case of a regime of care, whether or not it involves a deprivation of liberty, the decision of the Court of Protection is effectively to give consent to that regime on behalf of P, and the same applies, for example, in respect of medical treatment that the Court of Protection concludes is in P’s best interests. All substantive decisions of the Court of Protection are governed by the best interests test.

The deprivation of liberty safeguards (the DOLS) work differently. The Court of Protection only becomes involved under s. 21A of the MCA.

In my view, the DOLS apply when P is or may be being deprived of his liberty (see AM v South London & Maudsley NHS Foundation Trust and the Secretary of State for Health [2013] UKUT 0365 (AAC)).Schedules 1A and A1 to the MCA and the relevant Codes of Practice (which relate both to the DOLS and orders made by the Court of Protection relating to deprivation of liberty) are lengthy, in parts complicated and contain the provisions for determining whether a person is ineligible to be deprived of his liberty by the MCA.

In short, Schedule A1 provides that the managing authority of a hospital or a care home is authorised to deprive P of his liberty if he is detained there for the purpose of being given care or treatment if a standard (or urgent) authorisation is in place (see paragraphs 1 and 2 of Schedule A1). A standard authorisation is given at the request of the managing authority by the supervisory body.

Paragraph 3 of Schedule A1 reverts to the concept of what P could have consented to if he or she had the relevant capacity by providing that any person (D) does not incur liability for any act which he does for the purpose of detaining (P) pursuant to paragraph 2 thereof if he would not have incurred liability for that act if P had the capacity to consent to it and had consented to it.

Before a standard authorisation can be given, positive assessments of the qualifying requirements must be made (see paragraph 12 of Schedule A1). This means that, amongst other things, the best interests test has to be satisfied and the relevant person has to be eligible to be deprived of his liberty by the MCA. It should also be noted that there is a mental health requirement and a mental capacity requirement.

The determinative issue of the best interests test that must be satisfied before an authorisation can be given is the same as the determinative question for the court when making a welfare order.

Many if not most applications under s. 21A will turn on the application of the best interests test.

It follows that:

In my view, this must be of central relevance to the determination of the directions to be given to satisfy the Requirements and the Effects and so the Safeguards.

The determinative question is not, and the court is not directly concerned with, whether P should or should not be deprived of his liberty. The fact that the welfare order will authorise any deprivation of liberty that the implementation of the care package will create is a consequence of the order and it does not alter the determinative issue for the court.

So the application of the substantive determinative test does not make it necessary or appropriate for the court to spend time on whether the relevant regime will or will not create a deprivation of liberty applying the objective test set by Cheshire West. On an application for a welfare order to authorise an objectively assessed deprivation of liberty the limited relevance of the deprivation of liberty issue relates to:

The existence of a deprivation of liberty may of course be relevant to other issues, for example a claim for damages for breach of Article 5, or whether s. 5 of the MCA applies.

The ten test cases were transferred to me at a time when the Official Solicitor had indicated that he was not in a position to accept appointment as the litigation friend of the person who is the subject of each application (P). In all of them orders had been made in standard form by DJ Batten making P a party as and when the Official Solicitor agreed to act as P’s litigation friend.

The Official Solicitor had set out his position in letters dated 6 July 2015 to the Court of Protection and to local authorities. He makes points in them about legal aid which I discuss elsewhere.

The Official Solicitor’s original position in a case in which P did not qualify for legal aid was that he would not accept appointment unless a specified minimum sum (generally £20,000) had been paid on account and that costs of legal representation might be in excess of £50,000. As confirmed by a later letter, which sets the amount that can be obtained on account of fees at £2,500, and a statement of the Official Solicitor provided during the hearing, these much higher figures must relate to a contested application which would need an oral hearing or hearings.

If what appears to be a non-contentious case turns out to be contested the streamlined process provides that it should proceed as a contested case.

By the date of the hearing on 30 and 31 July 2015, as indicated in his earlier letter to the Court stating that he was not then in a position to accept appointment, the Official Solicitor, in an attempt to identify and adopt a proportionate approach, had sought and obtained the agreement of solicitors who he retains to undertake without charge the work on the pre-acceptance funding enquiries usually undertaken by his health and welfare pre-acceptance team. That agreement lay behind the acceptance by the Official Solicitor of appointment in seven of the cases subject to the orders made by DJ Batten and in him being able to give an indication that he expected to be in a position to accept appointment in the eighth case.

Clearly, this change of position effectively de-railed those eight cases as test cases. This is because it would have been contrary to the interests of the Ps and their families not to proceed with them on the basis that the Official Solicitor had agreed to act and the solicitors he had instructed had gathered information. However, in two of the cases involving Suffolk (EG and MT) the Official Solicitor had not agreed to act and the effective “test issue” remained whether P should be a party.

In answering my questions leading counsel for the Official Solicitor indicated, and this was confirmed by a statement of the Official Solicitor provided during the hearing, that the solution he had found and adopted in those eight cases was not a long term fix and the Official Solicitor was not saying or advancing a solution that would enable him to speedily accept appointment and instruct solicitors to carry out proportionate enquiries in all applications for welfare orders in respect of care packages that are said to be non-contentious and which result in, or may result in, a deprivation of P’s liberty.

In his skeleton argument counsel for the Official Solicitor had asserted that in general terms the Official Solicitor was not at saturation point in being able to cope with cases like the ten test cases but that he anticipated that, absent further funding for his litigation friend role, such a point would eventually be reached. I am not clear whether his reference to funding for his litigation friend role includes the funding of the solicitors he instructs through legal aid or private funding. As appears below the funding of solicitors through legal aid and privately introduces significant problems.

It seemed to me that this was an approach that simply postponed the problem. In response to this view, it was confirmed during the hearing that the Official Solicitor accepted that although it is not possible to put an exact time on it what he refers to as a “saturation point” will be reached in the near future even if the Court of Protection receives only a smallish wave of such applications, rather than the expected tsunami (the timing of which remains uncertain).

The timing of the escalation of the problems faced by the Official Solicitor will depend on whether the relevant solicitors are prepared to continue to carry out the preliminary work for nothing, the numbers of the applications and the availability of legal aid on his new proportionate approach. But the reality, accepted by the Official Solicitor during the hearing (and not contested by the Secretary of State), is that absent the provision of extra publicly funded resources to enable the Official Solicitor, or someone else, to act as an independent litigation friend for P if, in accordance with the obiter conclusion of the Court of Appeal, P has to be a party to all cases of this type the process will soon become one that is not fit for purpose, because its Effects (namely the delays and costs involved) will mean that is not speedy, practical and effective.

This consequence will be alleviated but I suspect not avoided if family, friends or carers can act as litigation friends.However, the thrust of the Official Solicitor’s argument and that of the Law Society (who put in written submissions) was to the effect that it would only be in limited circumstances that family, friends or carers could so act because they would not be in a position to carry out the required independent check, in line with the majority decision in Cheshire West and the conclusion of the Court of Appeal in Re X,because they will have been involved in the best interests decision making that has identified the relevant care package.

The Official Solicitor also advanced an argument that problems might be reduced, and “a least bad result” achieved, if the Court of Protection joined P and then made an interim order in what appeared to be a non-contentious case before a litigation friend was appointed. He advanced arguments that any such order could and would be validated (see by analogy Dunhill v Burgin (Nos 1 and 2) [2014] 1 WLR 933).But, on the assumption that such orders would be valid or would be validated, this is not an effective solution because the reviews of such interim orders would have to take place earlier than those of a final order and so this proposed course would create an additional category of case in an ever increasing backlog and possibly the need for further applications to validate earlier orders.

The route to the relevant independent check urged by the Official Solicitor and the Law Society in reliance on the obiter conclusion of the Court of Appeal involves or effectively involves the retainer, and so payment, of a solicitor to act for P in all of the applications.

In Re X the Lord Chancellor had provided a note on legal aid. The Official Solicitor referred to that and to comments of solicitors he regularly instructs in the statement he provided during the hearing. Also, the Secretary of State, at my request, provided an updating note on legal aid after the hearing. The substantive position has not changed from that set out in the Lord Chancellor’s note, but some of the cross references have changed.

The first six points to note are:

The Secretary of State ended his note under the heading: “Role played by investigative representation when an oral hearing is not listed”by stating that where legal services are required for eligible individuals in relation to deprivation of liberty cases under the MCA the source of funding will be legal help. The reason for this is that, as the relevant Regulations show, investigative representation is only likely to be available when (a) the prospects of success of proceedings are unclear and substantial investigative work is required, and (b) the director has reasonable grounds to believe that once the investigative work is completed the case will satisfy the criteria for full representation.

In the context of that note that conclusion is open because it is not focusing on the position of a solicitor instructed by a litigation friend and so the course urged by the Official Solicitor and the Law Society. Legal help as “controlled work” can be applied for by someone who is proposing to become a litigation friend. It is subject to the merits and means criteria and covers advice and assistance that is likely to give sufficient benefit to justify its provision. But it does not cover (i) issuing or conducting court proceedings, (ii) instructing an advocate in proceedings, (iii) preparing to provide advocacy in proceedings, or (iv) advocacy in proceedings. On the information and argument before me, I am of the view that these exclusions mean that, save in respect of very limited introductory matters, whose only benefit is likely to be an identification of the relevant principles and thus of the information that needs to be gathered and assessed for the purposes of the proceedings, the advice and assistance that P and his litigation friend or proposed litigation friend would want and benefit from would not be covered by legal help. This is because it would relate to one or more of the areas directed to the “conduct of proceedings” that are excluded from legal help. For example, a visit to P and the placement, the preparation and presentation of a report of that, advice on the care package and possible changes to it and advice on the application of the determinative test are all directed to conducting the proceedings and advocacy in the proceedings, even if they lead to an order that is agreed and presented to the court for approval. To my mind, this means that legal help would not provide an effective basis for the funding of P as a party acting through a litigation friend (or to a P whether or not a party) for the purposes envisaged by the Court of Appeal, the Official Solicitor or the Law Society, namely the safeguards in “the conduct of the proceedings” provided by a litigation friend. In any event, if that is wrong, the financial limits for legal help and problems relating to the cap on new matter starts would mean that legal help would not effectively fund those safeguards.

That effectively leaves the possibility of a legal aid funding route based effectively on full representation, given the grounds for investigative representation. Although it was not spelt out I understand that this is the route envisaged by the Official Solicitor and the solicitors he has instructed in respect of the listed hearings and for other cases if P is joined as a party and the Official Solicitor is appointed as the litigation friend.

Full representation is only available if the Merits Regulations are satisfied which include the costs/benefit analysis and the prospects of success test.

History relating to the position concerning legal aid in respect of an application under s. 21A of the MCA (see for example Re UF [2013] EWCOP 4289), the view expressed in the Secretary of State’s note and my general experience of the approach to the grant of legal aid found a prognosis that full representation will not be regularly and promptly provided if P is made a party to all applications even if it is not precluded on the basis that it is not likely that there will be a hearing.

In his note the Secretary of State made the point that the existing regulations were made before the decision of the Supreme Court in Cheshire West and that the Lord Chancellor is (and I assume for some time has been) carefully considering the implications of that judgment for the availability of civil legal aid and whether any changes to the regime should be made. A similar response was made by the Secretary of State to paragraph 249 of the House of Lords Select Committee Report on the MCA by which, in March 2015, the committee recommended an urgent remedy to the inconsistent provision of non-means tested legal aid in cases concerning deprivation of liberty. No changes to implement such a remedy were identified in evidence and the stance of the Secretary of State in these proceedings is an indication that none are imminent or likely to effect it. This lack of action is unfortunate but represents the concrete situation on the ground.

Further, and importantly, it is clear that under the present regulations if a hearing is not listed or likely to be listed legal aid for full and investigatory representation will not be granted (see the next heading as to whether there will be a hearing).

Many Ps will satisfy the means test but the limits are not high and no doubt many will not (e.g. those who have received a substantial award in damages or who have owned a home). The process is not a “one off” and so the expense for those Ps who do not satisfy the means test is a repeating one that diverts funds from the provision of their care and support.

As I understand it, the means and the merits tests (including whether there is or is likely to be a hearing) have to be repeated for each review.

This was one of the issues that the Court of Appeal did not deal with although it is central to the availability of legal aid to fund investigation and legal representation and thus the practical implementation of the safeguards envisaged if P is made a party to all applications.

No-one has pointed to any requirement of European law or the common law that there must be an oral hearing of a non-controversial case because it involves a deprivation of liberty or a person who lacks capacity to litigate or otherwise. Indeed, such a rigid requirement would run counter to the flexibility of the approach taken to such issues by reference to the facts and circumstances of the case.

The highest argument for there having to be an oral hearing was advanced by the Law Society on the basis that P should have a right to an oral hearing as a matter of common law fairness and to satisfy Articles 5 and 14 because his or her liberty is being determined.

In advancing that argument the Law Society relied on a citation from the speech of Lord Reed in R(Osborn) v Parole Board [2014] AC 115 at paragraph 2(i). Taken in isolation the passage cited supports the mandatory argument advanced but that support evaporates when regard is had to follows in the further sub-paragraphs of paragraph 2 which clearly show that:

Further, both the Law Society and the Official Solicitor assert and accept that if P is a party and his or her legal representative consents to it both the application for an initial order and a review can be dealt with without a hearing. This is an inevitable and proper recognition of the issues involved and in particular of the determinative test and the point that fairness is a two way street.

The lack of a need for a hearing in non-controversial cases is shown, for example, by the orders made in the cases relating to LM, VS, HR and NR where the Official Solicitor accepted appointment. Those orders provide that if, after further information has been provided, the parties agree the terms of the welfare order (and so the care package) the case can or will be dealt with on the papers. In many similar applications for welfare orders:

In any such case, the only reason for having a hearing would be to try and satisfy thelegal aid criteria. If the court was to list hearings on that basis issues would, or would be likely to, arise as to whether that satisfied the legal aid criteria or whether the course taken was a contrivance.

The position is therefore that there are significant problems relating to the funding of legal representation in applications that are presented as being non-controversial and which are readily identifiable on the information provided or by limited further investigation as being non-controversial.

Firstly, this is because they are or are likely to be cases that will not require a hearing and so they do not satisfy the criteria for full or investigative legal aid and legal help will not be available or will not fill that gap. Secondly, it is because after any funded investigation they are likely not to satisfy the criteria for full representation because there will be no need for a hearing. Thirdly, absent changes in approach or regime, my prognosis on obtaining legal aid is that set out in paragraph 94above.

These legal aid problems were not squarely addressed by those advocating the implementation of the obiter conclusion of the Court of Appeal and on my analysis (without assistance of detailed argument on how the representation of P would be funded) legal aid will not be an available source of funding unless the case turns out to be contentious and so requires a hearing.

The Secretary of State argued that the deficiencies in the streamlined process and the reasons for making P a party identified by the Court of Appeal would be met by the appointment of a Rule 3A representative for P without making P a party.

This rule was not in force when Re X was before the Court of Appeal. But it was shown it in draft and did not comment on it. The Secretary of State advanced this argument on the basis that the amendment of the COP Rules to add Rule 3A introduced something new that undermined the reasoning of the Court of Appeal.

Although I accept that an independent Rule 3A representative or others, who continue to have an active role after the welfare order is made, could effectively replicate the roles of the IMCA and the RPR under the DOLS and so meet or substantially meet deficiencies in the streamlined process identified by the Court of Appeal, I do not agree.

Under the un-amended COP Rules the Court of Protection could have effectively invited someone to provide information on behalf of P and so effectively as a Rule 3A representative although the role has now been made more formal and clearer.

But most importantly I do not agree because the force of the reasoning of the Court of Appeal is directed to its conclusion that P is to be a party and so on the need for P to have that status and the procedural rights, assistance and so benefits that go with it. An assertion that the court can or even that it will (or generally will) appoint a rule 3A representative in all cases is not a complete answer to this, even though it addresses some of the reasoning.

Further and in any event, this submission is completely theoretical because the Secretary of State has not provided any evidence to show, and did not through counsel identify, how IMCAs (his suggestion) or anyone else could in practice be appointed (and so would agree to act) in the cases before me, or generally in all such cases, as an independent Rule 3A representative. It is well known that there are a number of problems relating to the possible appointment of IMCAs to take a role in proceedings including issues relating to the relevant contractual and funding arrangements and their availability having regard to the other roles they perform.

The argument as presented was therefore one that would have led to a result on the evidence that I made an order that such an unidentified independent person should be appointed as a Rule 3A representative (and it was suggested that that person be identified by the local authority) on the basis that I could confidently expect a further application on the basis that no-one could be found who could and would agree to take up the appointment.

So again judged by reference to the existing evidence (and experience of the Court of Protection) this proposed solution is not fit for purpose absent the provision of additional publicly funded resources which were not identified by the Secretary of State.

At present none exist and so any solution based on their appointment is also theoretical. However I comment that I do not accept the submission of the Law Society that it would not be appropriate to appoint one in a case concerning a deprivation of liberty particularly if it appeared to be non-contentious. Such a representative could easily do what has been done by the solicitors appointed by the Official Solicitor in the seven cases before me without any involvement by the Official Solicitor.

They all advance arguments that create a result judged by reference to common law fairness or Article 5 or Article 14 that is or soon will be one that is not fit for purpose, unless additional public funding is made available to provide one or more of (a) independent litigation friends, (b) legal or other representation or (c) Rule 3A representatives who can effectively provide the necessary safeguards.

No likely source of such funding has been identified by those who would be responsible for the decisions to provide it.

In his letter to the court (and so before he put in place the procedure that has enabled him to accept appointment in the majority of the ten test cases before me) the Official Solicitor points out that the Convention guarantees rights of access to the court that are practical and effective not theoretical and illusory. I agree. He then asserts that unless it is read down Rule 3A(4), which provides that P does not become a party until a litigation friend is appointed, makes the rights of P, if he must be a party, theoretical and illusory. I do not follow this. Firstly, it is not an assertion based on a lack of P’s right to be a party under the relevant procedural rules. Rather, it is based on a delay after an order joining P has been made and so it is the practical non-availability of the litigation friend and the problems relating to the effectiveness of interim orders that have this result.

The starting point that P is not automatically a party and the impact of Rule 3A(4) apply far more widely than in applications for welfare orders made to authorise a deprivation of liberty, and Rule 3A(4) enables the court to act quickly in a range of contentious or potentially contentious cases where this is necessary and, if as the Court of Appeal concluded, P must always be a party in cases seeking a welfare order to authorise a deprivation of liberty this can be achieved by exercising Rule 3A. So, although I agree that if P must be made a party in all such applications the reality is that the right of access to a court that this would give to P will in many cases soon not be fit for purpose. The reasons for this relate to the practical application of that joinder as of right (or effectively as of right) and not the starting point that P is not automatically a party and Rule 3A(4).

I shall not dwell on this. A number of tribunal judges have been recruited and trained to enable the streamlined process to operate. If it is not available, or not available in a suitably modified form, issues relating to the use and further training of this judicial resource or the identification of a replacement for it will arise.

If it or a substitute cannot be used further issues would arise as to how the Court of Protection could deal with applications for welfare orders to authorise a deprivation of liberty and their review, which on the evidence before me is likely to comfortably exceed its present annual caseload (around 25,000 applications of which around 20,000 are non-contentious property and affairs applications).

In short, the resource implications are not limited to the availability and funding of litigation friends but extend to the Court of Protection. The number of hearings required will have a significant impact on the judicial and supporting resources needed by the court.

This would flow from the appointment of litigation friends who do not have to retain solicitors to represent P. The absence of a funded and available independent source for such litigation friends means that the available source is family or friends.

Questions arise as to whether they can perform their role as a litigation friend without instructing a solicitor and whether they are sufficiently independent.

The Official Solicitor and the Law Society have raised this issue. It is based on provisions of Part 3 of the Legal Services Act 2007 (“the 2007 Act”).

It is an arid one because as the heading indicates, in line with the conclusions reached in Gregory v Turner [2003] 1 WLR 1149, at paragraphs 50 to 58, it is common ground that if and when the court appoints such a litigation friend:

Applying the approach set out later to the appointment of a person without a right to conduct litigation and a right of audience as a litigation friend it is difficult to envisage circumstancesin which the court would be prepared to make that appointment but was not prepared, subject to further order, to give that litigation friend the right to conduct the litigation without appointing a solicitor and a right of audience.

It is the regular practice of the Official Solicitor to instruct solicitors and counsel. The reasons for this were not gone into before me.

The issue relates to the entitlement to carry on a “reserved legal activity”. Section 13(1) of the 2007 Act provides that that entitlement is to be determined solely by the 2007 Act. The definition of a “reserved legal activity” in s. 12 of the 2007 Act includes (a) the exercise of a right of audience, and (b) the conduct of litigation. Section 13(2) of the 2007 Act provides that a person is entitled to carry on an activity which is a reserved legal activity where (a) the person is an authorised person in relation to the relevant activity, or (b) the person is an exempt person in relation to that activity. Section 14 of the 2007 Act provides that it is an offence to carry on an activity that is a reserved legal activity unless the person is entitled to carry on that activity.

An authorised person is a person who has been authorised to carry on the relevant activity (see s. 18 of the 2007 Act), for example, a solicitor or barrister and Schedule 3 defines who is an exempt person. Paragraphs 1(3)(b) and 2(3)(b) of Schedule 3 provide that a person is an exempt person if respectively he or she has a right of audience or a right to conduct litigation “granted by or under any enactment”.

At paragraph 26 of his preliminary judgment in Re X, the President concluded that a litigation friend does not have to act by a solicitor and can conduct the litigation on behalf of P. The President gave further reasons for that conclusion at paragraphs 28 to 34 of his second judgment. As can be seen therefrom he adopted the approach taken by Brooke LJ in Gregory v Turner [2003] 1149 at paragraphs 63 and 64, where he said:

The Official Solicitor sought to challenge that conclusion before the Court of Appeal. As he had done before the President, he contended that:

I agree with the Secretary of State that neither proposition is correct and the President was correct to conclude that there is no requirement for a litigation friend to act by a solicitor.

The first proposition is based on an argument that:

In my view, although there is clearly a distinction between those three roles they all fall within the task of a litigation friend conferred by the relevant Rules namely to “conduct proceedings”.

There is no definition of the phrase “conduct proceedings” in the CPR, its enabling Act, or in the COP Rules. However, the term “conduct of litigation” is defined in paragraph 4 of Schedule 2 to the 2007 Act. It is defined as: (a) the issuing of proceedings before any court in England and Wales; (b) the commencement, prosecution and defence of such proceedings; and (c) the performance of any ancillary functions in relation to such proceedings. So that definition:

So the issue becomes whether the relevant Rules empower the litigation friend:

Firstly, like the President, I agree with paragraph 63 of the judgment in Gregory v Turner and add that in my view the definition of “conduct of litigation” in the 2007 Act by reference to the particular proceedings reinforces this view. Accordingly, as a matter of language, the duty and task to “conduct proceedings” can include the conduct of litigation as defined.

Secondly, I agree that as the 2007 Act deals with the right of audience and the right to conduct proceedings separately this approach leaves open the question whether the Rules confer a right of audience. But, as a matter of language, it is in my view clear that giving someone the task or duty to “conduct proceedings”can include the conferment of the advocacy role as it is a core part of conducting any proceedings.

In my view, the determinative question is not simply a linguistic one but is whether the purpose of the relevant Rules:

In my view, the answer to the purposive question is not determined or affected by whether the litigation friend is or is not a party or is or is not to be treated as a litigant himself. I proceed on the basis that he is not and is not to be treated as either party (see, for example, paragraph 29 of the President’s second judgment and Re E (mental health patient) [1984] 1 WLR 320 at 324 F/H).

Indeed, the requirement that a litigation friend must be able to act fairly and competently, and the fact that he can be removed by the court, indicate that a litigation friend is not in the same position as a party. This is confirmed by RP v United Kingdom (App. No 38245/08), [2012] ECHR 1796, [2013] 1 FLR 744, at in particular paragraph 76 because it shows that the litigation friend is not obliged to advance any argument that P wants him to and that it would not be in P’s best interests to advance an unarguable case.

A litigation friend can only be appointed if P lacks capacity to litigate as opposed to capacity to make the relevant decisions about the care package; although generally P will lack capacity in both respects. The role of a litigation friend (which has a significant overlap with that of a legal representative appointed by a First-tier Tribunal (HESC) in a case under the Mental Health Act 1983 when the patient lacks capacity to litigate which I discussed and described in YA v Central and NW London NHS Trust and Others [2015] UKUT 0037 (AAC) in particular at paragraphs 92 to 103) shows that a litigation friend can be faced with difficult decisions in respect of both the advocacy role (directly or by giving instructions) and the implementation role and thus that both roles are integral to his task. Indeed, by applying the best interests test the litigation friend may have to control all aspects of the proceedings and, in doing so, may have to take a position that is contrary to, or does not fully accord with, the expressed wishes and feelings of a P.

Subject to the Official Solicitor’s second point, in the absence of an express provision limiting how a litigation friend can perform these roles, and thus an express provision that he must act through a solicitor, the tasks of a litigation friend provide a powerful and in my view determinative pointer that, on a purposive approach, the relevant Rules should be interpreted as conferring on a litigation friend (subject to the control of the court by his removal) all three of the roles I have identified.

This conclusion is supported by, but is not dependent upon, the minutes of the discussion recorded by the Civil Procedure Rules Committee (“the CPRC”). No equivalent discussion exists in respect of the COP Rules.

The second argument. The Official Solicitor argued that there was a common law rule that a litigation friend has to act through a solicitor and that this revived when its replication in the old rules was removed.

First, while there was an historical practice at common law that a litigation friend had to act by a solicitor, I agree with the President (see paragraph 30 of his second judgment) that this was not a fundamental or immutable rule. Further, and on the assumption that it was such a rule, I also agree with the President that it did not involve a fundamental right or something approaching it so as to bring into play cases such as Great Mediterranean Holdings SA v Patel [2000] 1 WLR 272.

Further and however it is classified, the approach at common law must have related to practice and procedure and so to what the relevant statutory Rule making powers are directed to.

The Rules of the Supreme Court (“RSC”) provided that a next friend had to act by a solicitor (see RSC Order 80 r 2(3)). However, the County Court Rules (“CCR”) contained no such requirement (see CCR Ord 10 r 12). The commentary in the County Court Practice said:

This commentary is a pointer to the conclusion that absent a provision in the Rules that relate to and govern practice and procedure the intention of the Rule makers was that a litigation friend did not have to act by a solicitor.

Those Rules are now repealed and amalgamated in the CPR and, as before, the relevant practice and procedure is dictated by the exercise and product of the relevant statutory powers that govern it.

The vires to make the COP Rules, is different and is conferred by section 51 of the MCA. It provides that rules of court “with respect to the practice and procedure of the court” may be made. Section 51(2)(e) of the MCA then provides that the COP Rules may, in particular, make provision “for enabling the court to appoint a suitable person (who may, with his consent, be the Official Solicitor) to act in the name of, or on behalf of, or to represent the person to whom the proceedings relate”. This is in wide terms that clearly cover the three roles I have described.

Silence in rules made pursuant to the widely drafted rule making statutory powers under which the RSC, the CCR, the CPR and the COP Rules are made is not a persuasive indicator that an old common law rule or practice is to be continued or, in the case of the RSC and the CCR, no longer to be suspended. The approach to the replacement of an inherent, prerogative or common law jurisdiction by a statutory one, and thus the suspension or removal of the former, is one of statutory interpretation (see for example DL v A Local Authority and Others [2012] COPLR 504, and the citations at pages 719/721 in Laker Airways v Dep of Trade [1977] QB 643).In my view, the language and purposes of the rule making powers powerfully indicate that the relevant rules are intended to provide a complete statutory code in place of pre-existing common law rules of practice and procedure and so that the lack of reference to such a rule means that the intention of the rule maker, and thus of the secondary legislation, was that it should no longer apply.

In the case of the CPR, this conclusion is supported by the approach of the CPRC. It expressly considered whether the new civil procedure rules should adopt the position under the RSC or the CCR. In the absence of any express requirement that a litigation friend act by a solicitor, I agree with the Secretary of State that the only sensible conclusion is that the CPRC was of the view that in the County Court a litigation friend did not have to act by a solicitor and decided to take that position. As I have said, no equivalent support exists in respect to of the COP Rules.

Finally:

Part 17 of the COP Rules governs the appointment of litigation friends. By Rule 140(1), a person may act as a litigation friend on behalf of P if that person (a) can fairly and competently conduct proceedings on behalf of P; and (b) has no interests adverse to those of P. Any litigation friend must also be required to confirm that he will act in P’s best interests: see AB v LCC (A Local Authority) [2011] EWCOP 3151, at paragraph 173 (endorsed by me in Re UF [2013] EWHC 4289 (COP) at paragraphs 19 to 25).

The practical difficulties of finding and appointing such an independent person, other than a family member or friend, as a litigation friend mirror those of appointing a Rule 3A representative – the solution suggested by the Secretary of State. In addition the contracts of, or relating to the provision of, many potential candidates (e.g. IMCAs) may well not cover them acting as a litigation friend and, in any event, many would not feel comfortable in doing so.

I have already mentioned the role that is often played by devoted and responsible family members in the life of P and that the appointment of a member of the family or a friend who has not been involved in the care and support of P would often be an obvious catalyst for family discord.

In supporting P, devoted and family members or friends will inevitably have considered the options available for the care of P and what is in his or her best interests. Indeed, one of them may have been or could have appointed as P’s welfare deputy. (This is not the time or place to consider whether such a deputy could consent to a deprivation of liberty).

It is also inevitable that such family members or friends will have “an interest” in the outcome of the proceedings because it affects them as well as P. Their role may have continued over the life of P, or may have started when P became less capable of looking after his or her affairs and continued after P lost relevant capacity. In my view, the fact such persons have performed that role, and in doing so have formed firm views, as to where P’s best interests lie, and have voiced those views, does not mean that they cannot meet the criteria in Rule 140(1) or that they are disqualified from acting as P’s litigation friend. This view is supported by, for example, AVS v NHS Foundation Trust and P PCT [2011] EWCA Civ 7 and WCC v AB and SB [2013] COPLR 157 which are cases in which respectively a brother and an aunt were appointed as the litigation friend.

The general reason for this is that the interest of such family members or friends does not give rise to an adverse interest to P and so to a conflict of interest, or otherwise mean that they cannot properly and effectively promote P’s best interests. Indeed, in performing their supporting and caring role over the years many such family and friends will have been doing just that by, for example, investigating, negotiating, obtaining and reviewing care and support from public authorities to promote P’s best interests at home and in the community.

The performance of that role will often mean that they have “fought P’s corner” over a long time to promote his or her best interests and that they are and will be the best or an appropriate litigation friend because they know P best, and will be best placed to ensure the promotion of P’s best interests, P’s participation in the decisions relating to the care package and the proceedings and a fully informed consideration by the court of the determinative test by:

As appears later, all of these factors go to the essence of P’s Article 5 right.

In the present context, the problems relating to their appointment as a litigation friend arises in two main ways:

If a family member or friend can be appointed as a litigation friend in such applications, there was effective and, in my view, correct common ground before me that examples of the correct approach to be adopted to their appointment are found in my decision in Re UF at paragraphs 19 to 25 and, by analogy, in AJ v A Local Authority [2015] EWCOP 5 in particular at paragraphs 82 to 91, where Baker J was dealing with the appointment of a RPR under the DOLS.

In Re UF the relevant family member was in dispute with her siblings as to what would promote P’s best interests. In AJ the RPR had taken a view in line with that of the relevant public authorities that it was in P’s best interests to go into residential care and P was objecting to this before it took place, was extremely unhappy in residential care and wished to challenge the DOLS authorisation. In broad terms, in both cases the involvement of the family member in a disputed situation meant that they could not perform the role of respectively a litigation friend and a RPR because they were firmly wedded to a particular result in circumstances that founded the conclusion that they were not, or were unlikely to be, able to take a balanced approach to factors that would determine what was in P’s best interests.

Such a situation is likely to be readily identifiable when there is a family dispute or when P is objecting to what is proposed or to what has happened or because the relevant family member or friend may be motivated by their own interests or pressures. Also, it is likely that in many cases the relevant local authority or others who the family member or friend has dealt with in connection with the care of P will be able to say and demonstrate:

The role of a litigation friend and a RPR involve them forming a view on what is in P’s best interests and advancing it although it may not accord with what P is asserting (see paragraph 144 above). It follows that:

A part of the role of a RPR is to bring proceedings under s. 21A when appropriate and so, for example, as Baker J points out when P is objecting (see paragraph 88 of his judgment). But it cannot be that in every case a RPR should test the validity of a DOLS authorisation because then they would only be the precursor to proceedings in the Court of Protection. Rather, the role of the RPR, like that of a litigation friend, involves deciding whether to issue a challenge and then advancing P’s best interests in any such challenge without advancing unarguable points (see by analogy the approach to be taken by a legal representative in a tribunal dealing with a Mental Health case which I discuss in YA (cited earlier) see in particular paragraphs (13) to (20) of the Overview and paragraphs 65 to 103 of the Decision). Objections expressed by P are a relevant but not a determinative factor for a RPR in deciding whether to issue such proceedings.

That role of a RPR and the point that a RPR does not have to issue proceedings under s. 21A mean that paragraph 137 of the judgment in AJ has to be read in the context of that case. There Baker J said:

“it is likely to be difficult for a close relative or friend who believes that it is in P’s best interests to move into residential care, and has been actively involved in arranging such a move, into a placement that involves a deprivation of liberty, to fulfil the functions of RPR, which involve making a challenge to any authorisation of that deprivation. BIAs and local authorities should therefore scrutinise very carefully the selection and appointment of RPRs in circumstances which are likely to give rise to this potential conflict of interest.”

When that is done the passage shows that in a number of cases the conflict of interest may not arise as it would not be appropriate to make such a challenge or it can be done by the RPR in a balanced way to promote P’s best interests although he or she is of the view that the placement is the least restrictive available option for the promotion of P’s best interests.

So the issue whether a family member or friend should be appointed as a litigation friend is fact and case sensitive and will turn on whether in all the circumstances the family member satisfies the relevant Rules and more generally whether he or she can properly perform the functions of a litigation friend and so in a balanced way consider and properly promote P’s best interests.

To my mind, this will often be the case because a devoted and responsible family member or friend will be able to perform the tasks to achieve the aims set out in paragraph 164 above.

However, I acknowledge that there will be other cases when the history shows that a family member or friend is not an appropriate litigation friend because, for example, (a) he or she has not been taking or is not likely to take that approach or is in dispute with other family members, or (b) the way in which the issue has arisen will mean that the pressures on, or interests of, family members of friends make this inappropriate.

I emphasise “ALL” because it is common ground, and the existing streamlined procedure recognises, that in some cases P should be a party (in the sense of “must” on a correct exercise of the court’s discretion). The essential issue is therefore whether P must be a party to such applications based on a care package that is presented as being non-contentious and so in all such cases, until accredited legal representatives are available, a litigation friend must be appointed.

In my view, the answer is “No” and so I disagree with the reasoning and obiter conclusion of the Court of Appeal on this point and prefer that of the President.

I shall consider the issue by reference to the following factors:

Baker J gives a useful summary at paragraphs 35 to 38 of his judgment in AJ which I gratefully adopt. I also adopt my own analysis in YA at paragraphs 36 to 45. These predate the decision of the Court of Appeal in Re X and the case referred to by Black LJ, namely M.S. v Croatia (No. 2) (2015) ECHR 196. But that case does not create new law or guidance as it applies and continues the earlier authorities and, in particular, the approach laid down in Winterwerp v Netherlands (1978-80) 2 EHRR 387, at paragraph 60, namely that:

By reference to that Winterwerp formulation, the heart of the issue before me is whether the fundamental guarantees of procedure applied in matters of deprivation of liberty require P to be a party to all applications for welfare orders that will authorise a deprivation of liberty.

That Winterwerp formulation was set out when the ECtHR was dealing with Article 5(4) and was applied in MS (No 2) to Article 5(1)(e).

The “process prescribed by law” demanded by Article 5(1) need not involve a court or court proceedings (for example the DOLS) but the proceedings demanded by Article 5(4) must be in a court (or tribunal). As, unlike the DOLS or sectioning under the MHA, the relevant process prescribed by law for the making of a welfare order involves an application to the Court of Protection there is no mileage in making distinctions between what Articles 5(1) and 5(4) demand.

The distinction does however, as Black LJ said at paragraph 93, show that it is the substance that matters. That substance relates to P’s direct and indirect participation in the decision making process applying the MCA (including s. 4(4) thereof) and not on party status. In other words, the debate relates to what procedural safeguards party status or other provisions bring to the decision making process and not on the right to be a party as such.

The national law in Winterwerp authorised rather that enjoined the compulsory confinement and so such a distinction is not valid. In this context, it was common ground and I agree that it is the substance of what is said in Article 5 and the relevant decisions that matters. In my view, this applies to all aspects of Article 5 and thus to whether there is a deprivation of liberty and to the procedural guarantees including an assessment of arbitrariness.

It is well established that the approach to the existence of a deprivation of liberty is governed by the Guzzardi principle. This is that the starting point in assessing whether there has been a deprivation of liberty is “the concrete situation” of the person and the consideration of “a whole range of criteria such as the type, duration, effects and manner of implementation of the [restrictive] measure in question” (see Guzzardi v Italy (1980) 3 EHRR at paragraph 92 and 93). So, in that context, it is the effects of the practical situation on the ground created by a care and treatment regime, and so its practical impact on the freedom of the relevant person to act as he or she wishes, that matter when assessing whether objectively there is a deprivation of liberty.

I have not found this “in all the circumstances, fact and issue sensitive approach” as clearly enunciated in respect of the procedural guarantees required by Article 5. But, in my view, it is the approach to be taken when applying the Convention and the common law to procedural issues relating to fairness.

Such an approach is in line with the well recognised approach in the English courts that what fairness requires is dependent on the context of the decision and so the principles to be applied in the determination of what is fair is issue and fact sensitive and should not be applied by rote identically in every situation (see for example R(Doody) v Home Secretary [1994] 1 AC 531 at 560 D/G, and Osborne referred to above and by Black LJ in paragraph 66 of her judgment). This approach is also reflected in:

That approach accords with the principles I identified at paragraph 45 of my decision in YA (cited earlier) in respect of the analogous position of the application of Rule 11(7) by a tribunal in a Mental Health Act case, which enables the tribunal to appoint a legal representative for the patient. After a discussion of recent cases including Megyeri v Germany (1992) 15 EHRR 584 Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin Campeanu v Romania (Application no 47848/08 reported on 17 July), which cites Stanev v Bulgaria (2012) 55 EHRR 22, and Ivinovic v Croatia (Application no 13006/13 reported on 18 September 2014) I concluded that:

As appears from my citations and reasoning in YA, I addthat I accept, as pointed out by Black LJ at paragraph 94 of her judgment, that the required procedural safeguards because a person is not capable of acting for himself are there to secure the Article 5 right and must not impair the very essence of it.

That returns one to a consideration of what that essence is in the particular circumstances of the case and so having regard to both:

The combination of the requirements of Article 5(1) and 5(4) to the initial decision making and the challenge of the decision made (see paragraph 182 above)shows that, when in reliance of Article 5(1)(e) there is or is going to be an objective deprivation of liberty, the essence of Article 5 is to provide safeguards that put a person who lacks the relevant capacity in a sufficiently equivalent position to a person who has that capacity and so who could himself:

Next, in my view, the principles enunciated and the guidance given in the earlier cases show that the national procedure must provide a minimum but do not demand a particular approach in different circumstances to those that existed in the decided cases. So the application of the principles and the guidance as to the determination of the minimum that is needed to meet the procedural safeguards required, and so to avoid arbitrariness in respect of deprivations of liberty however they arise, is fact and issue sensitive.

That means that the minima can vary in respect of both:

In my view, in deciding what the minimum is in the circumstances of a given case the determinative issue is whether in practice the procedure adopted enables P’s position in respect of the essence of P’s Article 5 right to be properly protected and promoted by his case and his wishes and feelings on the determinative test (having regard to the consequence that the implementation of the care package will deprive him of his liberty) being fairly and appropriately put before the court when it is considering the making of the first welfare order and on its review. This again returns one to a consideration of the performance of the steps referred to in paragraph 164 (i) to (iii) above.

In paragraph 57 of her judgment in Cheshire West Baroness Hale recognises that in deprivation of liberty cases of this type, which she has already recognised many find difficult to characterise as a deprivation of liberty because of the differences between them and other detentions within Article 5, a more simplified and less elaborate process of checking could satisfy the minimum procedural safeguards. This supports the conclusion that the Court of Protection can apply the COP Rules in a flexible way to put the necessary procedural safeguards in place.

So, in my view, the approach of the ECtHR and the domestic cases:

Black LJ’s judgment at paragraph 87 to 108 provides the most detailed and the effective reasoning of the Court of Appeal. In theory she accepted that P need not always be a party to the proceedings if P’s participation in them can reliably be secured by other means. But from the foundation of the Winterwerp test as applied in MS (No 2) she concluded that given the tools presently available in our domestic procedural law, there was no alternative to joining P as a party to all “deprivation of liberty proceedings” which she also described as proceedings where P’s liberty is at stake (my emphases).

In her view unless this was done the process was not sufficient to ensure that P would have the “opportunity to be heard”, the risk that cases would slip through the net was too great and the streamlined procedure (and necessarily the COP Rules) placed an inappropriate additional hurdle in the way of P participating in the proceedings – instead of being a party automatically, in that they include an additional process to be gone through before P is joined, namely the collection or provision of material to persuade the court that he wishes or needs to be joined.

In her view the problems with the President’s approach were, at least, twofold. First, it was heavily dependent upon P conveying a wish to be joined in the proceedings or opposition to the arrangements proposed for him, or someone else who has his interests at heart taking these points on his behalf.

Secondly, it was dependent entirely on the reliability and completeness of the information transmitted to the court by those charged with the task. In many cases, this would be the very person or organisation seeking authorisation for P to be deprived of his liberty and the possibility of a conflict of interest was clear.

Black LJ then compared the President’s streamlined procedure with the position as it would be if the DOLS applied. In that event, assessments would be carried out, an Independent Mental Capacity Advocate (“IMCA”) would be appointed where needed (my emphasis) and once a Schedule A1 DOLS authorisation had been given, there would be a RPR who would represent and support P in all matters relating to the deprivation of liberty, including making an application to the Court for a variation or termination of the authorisation.

She pointed out that the RPR is independent of those who commission and provide the service P is receiving, and is charged with making such application to the Court as is appropriate. In her view, this degree of independence and duty is lacking in the streamlined procedure.

As I have said this reasoning is confined to cases involving a deprivation of liberty. Moore-Bick LJ and Gloster LJJ agreed with the observations of Black LJ, for the reasons that she gave (see paragraphs 127 and 171).

Unsurprisingly, this is powerful and persuasive reasoning but, respectfully, in my view parts of its foundations are flawed or contain gaps.

Generally:

Importantly, I do not agree that because the determination of whether there is or is not a deprivation of liberty is based on a comparison with a person who has capacity (and so could consent to it) founds the weight given by the Court of Appeal in its consideration of the procedural safeguards to the comparison between the procedural position in respect of persons with capacity when they are being deprived of their liberty. In my view, its comparative approach in respect of the procedural safeguard gave insufficient weight to:

In my view, this flaw is demonstrated by the description of the proceedings in paragraph 86 of Black LJ’s judgment as ones where P’s liberty is at stake and the observation that proceedings under s. 25 of the Children Act 1989 are perhaps the best and certainly a closer parallel to proceedings in the Court of Protection concerning deprivation of liberty than wardship and private law proceedings (referred to and adopted as analogous by the President).

Such proceedings under s. 25 are not governed by the paramountcy principle, and so the child’s welfare is relevant but not the paramount consideration (see Re M (Secure Accommodation Order) [1995] Fam 108) and the criteria set by s. 25 relating to absconding and significant harm, or to injury must be satisfied. The approach in such a case therefore does not mirror the determinative test applied by the Court of Protection. Rather, that determinative test is one under which the best interests of P is determinative (or paramount), and is not one which poses the issue whether P’s liberty should be removed or P should be detained for a particular purposes (e.g. treatment). Rather, it asks whether the care package is the least restrictive available option to promote P’s best interests and the deprivation of liberty is a consequence and not an aim of what is applied for or what is at stake. The position in wardship and private law proceedings is similar.

I do not say that either possible analogies are complete parallels. Rather, in my view:

In addition, in my view when comparing the position of P on an application for a welfare order and the position of others faced with being deprived of their liberty the Court of Appeal does not sufficiently recognise that the relevant comparison:

In many contexts the giving of such consent by a person with capacity is an unreal prospect. But, for example, it arises in the context of voluntary patients under s. 131 of the MHA (see for example AM (cited earlier)). In such cases, there is no court involvement or other authorisation process, whilst the consent continues and the focus of procedural fairness is directed to whether the consent is based on a properly informed and fair decision making process. That focus reflects the procedure required by law (see Article 5(1)) and so what has to be taken into account by the decision maker in reaching it. The mirror of the safeguard in Article 5(4) is based on the ability of the patient to change his or her mind and to pursue proceedings.

In addressing the safeguards that would flow from having the equivalent of an IMCA appointed in certain circumstances and a RPR as occurs under DOLS (see s. 39A and 39C of the MCA and paragraphs 139 to 141 and 159 to 161 of Schedule A1; which are quite complicated but in general terms provide in defined circumstances for the appointment of an IMCA to act pending the appointment of an RPR and if the RPR appointment ceases, although an IMCA can after consulting the RPR make an application under s.21A to challenge a DOLS authorisation) the Court of Appeal:

As a consequence, in commenting on the streamlined procedure and in comparing it with the DOLS, the Court of Appeal does not consider whether the procedural safeguards that the appointment of either an IMCA or a RPR provided for in the DOLS before and after the giving of a standard authorisation:

In accordance and agreement with both paragraph 93 of the judgment of Black LJ and the approach taken by the ECtHR of looking at the practical consequences of what occurred Article 5 does not require that the opportunity referred to in, for example, Winterwerp must be provided by a right to be a party. The issue is whether the fact that P was not a party and its consequences (which include the effects of the alternative process adopted) mean that the minimum procedural safeguards were not in place.

In YA (cited earlier), I concluded at paragraphs 39 to 41 of my decision that legal representation is not a minimum requirement in all cases. I remain of that view for the reasons given. That view accords with my analysis and conclusion set out above on the approach to be taken to the identification of the minimum procedural safeguards.

As I have mentioned, the Official Solicitor and the Law Society advanced arguments that an independent assessment was required and so, in the context of the argument, that the litigation friend must be independent or instruct an independent person. The independent person identified was a solicitor unless the court ordered that the litigation friend could conduct the litigation and have a right of audience. In my view, that qualification is clearly correct and carries with it an acceptance that (a) legal representation is not always necessary in proceedings involving a deprivation of liberty, and (b) it is not always necessary for a lay litigation friend to instruct an independent person with qualifications or experience equivalent to those of an IMCA and a RPR.

I acknowledge that Baroness Hale and Black LJ refer to independence and the advantages of independence, but in my view:

The issue is whether the family member or friend will provide that independence.

As I have already mentioned in many cases the history of the family will show that family members or friends have done so by taking a balanced approach over a lengthy period of time to “fighting P’s corner” to promote P’s best interests and so that they will continue to act in this way. In my view, in such cases this makes one of them not only an appropriate choice but the best choice to act as P’s litigation friend because that person:

Examples of such cases are MJW and DPW and the two Suffolk cases before me. MJW and DPW are brothers in their early forties who were born with defective chromosones which resulted in brain damage and a range of problems that have meant that they have required constant care and supervision all their lives. Their parents who are now 70 and 69 have been actively, devotedly and constructively involved with this care throughout the lives of their two sons and until recently they have lived at home with their parents. The care packages build on respite care that has been provided and will result in them living for the majority of the time in residential care with home visits rather than at home with respite care away from home. The parents for convincing and very understandable reasons have concluded that because of their age and some health problems the time has come for their sons to make this move. The very responsible and effective role of the parents in directly and indirectly promoting the best interests of their sons is well recognised and the move is clearly the least restrictive available option that is highly likely to work having regard to the needs of their sons and their behaviour in respite care.

The Suffolk cases are comparable. EJG is 19 and has his own flat in a four flat living scheme. His autism, learning disability and bipolar affective disorder makes him very vulnerable and in need of care and supervision. His vulnerability is increased by the fact that he looks much younger than his age. His care package recognises the need to support him to become as independent as possible. His mother, who is a social worker and an approved mental health professional, has been actively and constructively involved in his care throughout his life. She supports the care package for convincing reasons and has made a witness statement asking that she be considered as AJG’s litigation friend. His parents are divorced but his father supports the care package as does his twin brother who is at university studying law and lives with his mother. The documents filed provide convincing and persuasive reasons why the care package is the least restrictive available option to best promote EJG’s best interests.

MT is 34 and has severe physical and learning difficulties and epilepsy (which is medically controlled) and he cannot communicate verbally. He is strapped to his wheelchair when in the community to prevent him falling out and to his commode for toileting. He is hoisted when personal care tasks are performed. His care package is that he shares a bungalow with two others and is under a high level of monitoring to prevent him harming himself and to ensure he takes his medication. He does not have the physical ability to unlock the door and leave the bungalow. His father has been appointed as his property and affairs deputy and is willing to be his litigation friend. His parents have been actively and constructively involved in promoting his best interests throughout his life and the reasoning in support of the conclusion agreed by them that the care package is the least restrictive available option for MT is convincing.

At this stage, I address this leaving on one side issues relating to the involvement of different or more people in the provision of the information. I am grateful to the Official Solicitor and the solicitors he instructs for gathering and providing information I sought about this through a further submission by counsel. Part of the problem relates to the presentation of care plans in a form that is appropriate for the court as opposed to the often lengthy forms and language used on the ground that are designed, amongst other things, to make them user friendly to P and carers.

Firstly, I agree that the present forms and process direct the minds of their authors to the key issues and that they can provide all of the required information to demonstrate that the care package satisfies the determinative test and no more information is needed. This is demonstrated by the MJW and DPW and the Suffolk cases. In the former, and in the NRA case the Official Solicitor, as the litigation friend, agreed a final order.

However, I agree that it would be an improvement if the key provisions of the care package were summarised and the questions presently raised in the forms were answered by reference to that summary (or provisions in the care package not mentioned therein). The summary should in particular include the level of supervision (1:1, 2:1 etc); the periods of the day when supervision is provided; the use or possible use of sedation or restraint: the use of assistive technology; and what would happen if P tried to leave. This would be an approach under which the key questions are posed and sought to be answered through the prism of the care package upon which the welfare order is sought. It would be an improvement because it would help to focus the authors of the documents on the core issues and so would assist the court and others to assess the information and reasoning provided.

I also agree that questions, or a mechanism for addressing the following issues, would be likely to further assist in clearly demonstrating whether the care package is the least restrictive available option and one that can be approved without a hearing:

In my view, the last question is particularly important because it should highlight the core of the decision making process and so the reasons why the determinative test is satisfied. It will also clarify the recent chronology of events. It will identify and answer the issues in the case and so conform to the approach that I have been trying to introduce to Court of Protection proceedings for years and which, if followed, can trigger consensus.

I accept that the following are matters that can and have given rise to concerns in the consideration of care packages and are helpful to its consideration and assessment by the court:

In my view, it would be appropriate to make changes to the existing forms and process to cover all of these points irrespective of whether there is or is not a streamlined process because they will assist in providing the core information.

I have already made it clear that in my view such an appointment could be made and often it would be the best way of providing the safeguards to promote the essence of P’s Article 5 right.

If my views that (a) as a litigation friend they do not need to instruct a solicitor or an independent person, and (b) there is no need for a hearing are correct there is no substantive difference between them giving their reasoned support to the welfare order being made without a hearing, a further hearing or further participation by P as a family member or friend, as a Rule 3A representative or as a litigation friend.

In those circumstances a process or exercise that made P a party and appointed such a person as P’s litigation friend would be a matter of form rather than substance and so, in my view, would make no difference to the consideration of whether the minimum procedural safeguards had been put in place and had been effective in the given case.

I acknowledge that the same can be said about making them a Rule 3A representative but it seems to me that such an appointment would have the advantages that it:

Whereas, the first two tasks referred to in paragraph 164 namely:

In my view, the evidence in the two Suffolk cases shows that these tasks have been performed by family members and that their participation in and approval of the care package, together with their continued active involvement in P’s life to promote P’s best interests, have provided and will continue to provide the procedural safeguards required by Article 5 and common law fairness.

I made interim orders appointing a parent as a Rule 3A representative in both cases. I have considered taking the safety first course of confirming DJ Batten’s orders joining P in those cases and making that family member a litigation friend (rather than the Official Solicitor). But I have concluded that I should not do so and that I should make appealable orders in both cases that reflect my conclusions in them that:

However, if invited to do so, I will consider whether I should discharge the appointment of the Official Solicitor as the litigation friend in one or more of the MJW, the DPW and the NRA cases and appoint a family member in his place with a declaration to the effect that as the litigation friend they can conduct the litigation and have a right of audience and need not instruct a solicitor to provide an appealable order reflecting my views on their appointment as a litigation friend and its effect.

Such orders would be relevant on the review of those cases.

Conclusion. When there is a family member or friend who can act in a balanced way to promote P’s best interests they can and should, without making P a party, effectively provide:

This conclusion accords with both of the obiter conclusions in Re X, because Black LJ accepts that P need not always be a party if his participation can be reliably secured by other means and, in my view, this is what this approach would achieve in both of the Suffolk cases.

This is a more difficult situation but I disagree with the Court of Appeal that the only available solution is to make P a party with the consequence and purpose of having a litigation friend appointed.

Rather, in my view if the Court of Protection was to conclude that the information gathered under the present streamlined process (with or without the suggested improvements set out earlier) does not meet the minimum procedural safeguards there are options that are likely to be more effective in providing those safeguards than joining P as a party and appointing a litigation friend, who if he consented to act would be likely to be the Official Solicitor.

For the reasons I have given that route to the implementation of procedural safeguards is not fit for purpose and it is unlikely that changes relating to the resources of the Official Solicitor and the funding of legal representatives instructed by him can be achieved to render it fit for purpose in the short term.

As appears below, without joining P as a party:

A problem presented by the change in position of the Official Solicitor is that I have no such test case before me and so I cannot make an order in such a case that can be appealed. In my view, the solution is for another test case or cases that raise the directions to be given in such a case to be listed before me (or another judge) rather than me making an order discharging the joinder of P in all or some of these cases before me where the Official Solicitor has agreed to act. The former course avoids the problems about there being an appealable decision and the latter course cannot ignore what the Official Solicitor and the solicitors he has instructed have done.

However I shall make some observations on such a case.

Before the Court of Appeal the Secretary of State conceded that a trigger for removal from the streamlined process would be if there was no one appropriate to consult P about his views. This was withdrawn before me on the basis of the submission that an independent Rule 3A representative could be appointed. But, as I have said, on the evidence this is not at present a practically available solution.

As the provisions in the DOLS concerning the possible appointment of an IMCA, and the appointment of a RPR, recognise there are obvious advantages that flow from a person or persons not involved in providing the care or treatment in a professional capacity or for remuneration being involved (a) in the decisions made on the terms of the care package, and (b) in keeping it under review.

This reflects the important points that:

To a limited extent the first of these advantages is also recognised by the notes to Annex C in the general information about completing COPDL 10. But, unhelpfully this does not say when it would be appropriate for the consultation with P to be by an IMCA rather than the allocated social worker.

An allocated social worker regularly gives independent views, and many social workers who given evidence in an application could be IMCAs for other Ps. But, the lack of input from persons not directly concerned in a professional capacity or for remuneration with the formulation, implementation and commissioning of the care package is a weakness in the streamlined procedure, notwithstanding the dedication and independent thinking of many who are so involved.

It is easier to remedy this weakness than it is to provide a safeguard focused on the monitoring and review of the implementation of the care package on the ground. Absent the identification and funding of a resource (other than family and friends) the only way that it has occurred to me that this monitoring safeguard can be addressed by the court is in the frequency of its reviews or by including interim reviews in which it assesses reports.

It is common knowledge that things can go wrong and a care package can be inappropriate and as a result the best interests of Ps are not being promoted and they are suffering harm. It is also common knowledge that the views of an outsider looking at matters from the perspective of what is in P’s best interests can be helpful and can identify issues and promote changes that are beneficial.

Also, as shown by the cases where the Official Solicitor accepted appointment and orders were not made, I accept that the views of someone who has visited P and the placement and spoken to those involved there in giving the care is useful and informative. However, I should add that if the cases before me had been dealt with under the streamlined procedure I would have expected the judge to have picked up the need for the further information so identified in them.

But the chances that the court will not pick up the need for such information or other matters will be increased if there is no involvement by someone on the ground who (a) is not professionally or for remuneration involved in giving or commissioning the care package, and who (b) has assessed the care package and seen P and visited the placement.

I also agree that the reliance in the streamlined process on P not asking to be a party is problematic because it is not likely that P will have the capacity to weigh up the pros and cons of that decision (see, for example, the YA case).

Black LJ refers at paragraph 107 to examples where things went wrong. These were referred to in the evidence before me. I asked for further information about them to enable me to assess what procedural safeguards would have avoided them. No such information was given and so I am not in a position to consider whether, and if so when, joining P as a party would have avoided them in those cases. The first relates to the quality of the evidence on capacity and the second to points referred to above in the improvements suggested. On the face of it, there is nothing to suggest that the experience and skills of the Official Solicitor or the solicitor instructed by him (both of which I acknowledge) were important factors. It is also trite to observe, as I have done above, that no process can provide safeguards that guarantee that issues are not missed.

In cases where there is no family member or friend who the court can rely on for assistance the investigative issue for the Court of Protection is whether it should make the welfare order sought notwithstanding that the tasks referred to in paragraph 164 (i) and (ii) have not been carried out (or the information relating to them has not been confirmed on the ground) by someone who has seen P and the placement and has sufficient independence from those providing the care package professionally or for remuneration.

The best interests assessor might have that independence and their contact with P and the placement and their reasoning may be sufficient to demonstrate that there is no issue relating to the medical evidence on capacity and that the care package satisfies the determinative test. But my understanding is that at present the best interests assessor does not usually have that independence.

If that is so, the cases will be fact sensitive but in my view (and although I acknowledge the skill and independence of social workers and providers of care packages) it is unlikely that the court would be able to conclude that the procedural safeguards were satisfied without obtaining further information from someone who is not involved professionally or for remuneration in the provision or commissioning of the care package.

However, in contrast to the Court of Appeal and subject to further argument in a test case or cases, I consider that the way in which the Court of Protection can best do this is for it to exercise its investigatory jurisdiction to obtain information through obtaining s. 49 reports or through the issue of a witness summonses. This keeps the matter under the control of the court rather than invoking the necessity of appointing a litigation friend with the problems and delays that history tells us this entails and will entail.

I do not for a moment suggest that absent further resources being provided there will not be problems and delays in taking this course. Also, and importantly, I recognise that it would be focused on Article 5(1) and would not provide for monitoring on the ground until it is repeated from time to time for that purpose. But, as I have said, the appointment of a litigation friend will also not provide that monitoring.

This returns me to the argument advanced by the Secretary of State that a Rule 3A representative identified by the local authority be appointed.

The way in which he advanced this argument shows that he must recognise that if this was a practically available option it would replicate the input that I have decided can be provided by an appropriate family member or friend and so satisfy the procedural safeguards required by Article 5 and common law fairness in non-controversial cases, without joining P as a party.

To my mind, that replication is an obvious solution that will provide the necessary safeguards more efficiently and at less expense than either:

So I urge the Secretary of State and local authorities to consider urgently, and in any event before a test case or cases of this type are before the court, how this solution can be provided on the ground.

If it is not, the likelihood that in such cases the Court of Protection will not provide a procedure that satisfies Article 5 and is fit for purpose, and so will not promote the best interests of the relevant Ps, cannot be ignored and, in my view, alternatives to address this risk (e.g. changes to legal aid or the resources provided to the Official Solicitor or the provision and funding of accredited legal representatives) should be addressed immediately.

On the assumption that either or both (a) all Ps who are the subject of applications for welfare orders that will authorise a deprivation of liberty, or (b) all Ps who are the subject to such applications that are presented as and shown to be non-controversial, constitute a class with the requisite status for each of the Ps within them for the purposes of Article 14, I have concluded that my assessment of the Requirements and Effects and thus the Procedural Balance, which have led me to conclude that the procedural safeguards required do not found the conclusion reached by the Court of Appeal in Re X that those Ps must be made parties to all such applications also founds the result that the COP Rules and a practice of not joining all such Ps as parties to such applications, has an objective and reasonable justification and is not discriminatory.

A brief summary of my conclusions is that: