Field v Regina (Rev1)

This is an appeal against conviction by leave of the single judge. On 21 March 2019, in the Crown Court at Oxford (Sweeney J), the appellant, now aged 30, pleaded guilty to four counts of fraud (counts 4, 8, 9, 10 on the original indictment, “OI”) and two counts of burglary (counts 11 and 12 on the OI).

On 9 August 2019, before the same court, the appellant was convicted by the jury of the

He was acquitted by the jury of conspiracy to murder (count 3 TI), attempted murder (count 4 TI) and possession of an article for use in fraud (count 8 TI). Counts 3 and 4 related to Anne Moore-Martin and Count 8 to Elizabeth Zettl.

On 18 October 2019, before the same court, he was sentenced to imprisonment for life, and the period of 36 years was specified as the minimum term under section 269(2) Criminal Justice Act 2003.

He had two co-accused. Tom Field (“TF”), the appellant’s brother, was acquitted by the jury of one count of fraud (count 6 TI). Martyn Smith (“MS”) was acquitted by the jury of murder (count 1 TI), conspiracy to murder (count 3 TI), three counts of fraud (counts 2, 5 and 6 TI), burglary (count 7 TI) and possession of an article for use in fraud (count 8 TI).

The appellant appeals against his conviction on count 1. He also applies for an extension of time in which to seek leave to appeal against sentence, following identification of a potentially unlawful element of the sentence by the Registrar. This latter application has been referred to the full court by the Registrar.

The appellant accepted that from late 2012 until mid-2017 he had pretended to be in a genuine and caring relationship first with the deceased, PF and subsequently, with Anne Moore-Martin (“AMM”), when instead he was seeking to manipulate and exploit them for his own gain. He admitted several frauds against PF and AMM, along with burglaries at the homes of other elderly people in the same street.

PF was aged 69 years old when he died in October 2015. He lived at 3 Manor Park, Maids Moreton, Buckinghamshire having shared the house with his mother until her death in 2002. He was a retired English teacher, although he continued to lecture at the University of Buckingham. He was a novelist. He experienced good health, remained mentally sharp and kept detailed journals. He found it difficult to resolve his strong Christian beliefs with his gay sexuality. As a consequence, throughout his adult life he remained celibate and although he was close to his family and had a wide circle of friends, he was said to have been a lonely man who craved love and affection.

The appellant, in his early twenties and studying at the University of Buckingham in 2012, appreciated and ruthlessly exploited PF’s vulnerability. He set about seducing PF, claiming to share the same interests and beliefs. He moved in with PF in 2013. The two men commenced what PF thought was a mutually loving and supportive relationship. In 2014, the appellant proposed, and they arranged, a “betrothal ceremony”. PF was persuaded to change his will so that the appellant would receive a large inheritance. In 2015, the appellant gave the impression that he was caring for PF, who appeared to be suffering from a mystery illness, potentially some form of dementia. In fact, the appellant was covertly drugging PF but suggesting to others that the latter was drinking too much and was developing a suicidal ideation.

PF was found dead in his home by his cleaner on 26 October 2015. He appeared to have drunk himself to death. The appellant inherited substantially from his estate.

The issue left for the jury by the judge on count 1 was whether they were sure the appellant, with intent to kill, had given PF alcohol and/or Dalmane (a drug prescribed for insomnia), and/or smothered him causing his death. Whether the judge’s directions to the jury in this regard were correct in law is the focus of this appeal.

Shortly before PF was found dead, the appellant also began a relationship with AMM, aged 83, the circumstances of which were relevant to the course of the investigation into the death of PF.

AMM lived alone at her home, 6 Manor Park, in the same street as PF, and was also a retired teacher. She was a regular Catholic churchgoer with a strong faith. She suffered from two brain conditions, but her intellectual powers were still good for her age. As with PF, the appellant realised that she was lonely and therefore vulnerable to his seduction and exploitation.

The appellant sent AMM cards, gave her gifts and researched sex with the elderly on the internet. Only a month after PF’s death (in November 2015), the appellant began a sexual relationship with AMM. He again set about falsely persuading her that he loved her, so that he could exploit her. He wrote messages on mirrors in 6 Manor Park, successfully persuading her that they were messages from God. These were designed by the appellant to persuade her to change her will and to leave her home to him, rather than to her niece.

He persuaded AMM to give him money for a car and to fund a dialysis machine for his brother’s invented kidney disease. Without her knowledge, he also took pictures of her performing a sex act on him, so that he could use these against her in the future, should the occasion arise.

When, in late 2016, AMM attempted to change her will in the appellant’s favour, coincidentally she went to the same firm used by PF and the solicitor became suspicious. She informed AMM that the appellant had inherited from PF’s will, causing AMM to change her mind. However, the appellant increased his efforts and eventually in December 2016, she altered her will, despite, as she was to express to police later, feeling uncomfortable about doing so.

In November 2017, AMM became ill and went into hospital. While she was there, the appellant removed items from her home that he feared may incriminate him. Her niece, AnnMarie Blake, who encountered him at the premises, became suspicious of his behaviour and alerted the police. Shortly afterwards, however, AMM passed away from natural causes.

The prosecution relied on the hearsay statements of AMM to the police prior to her death, regarding her relationship with the appellant. There was evidence on this issue from AnnMarie Blake. The Crown introduced medical evidence, regarding AMM’s various health conditions and her visits to doctors prior to her death.

During the ensuing investigation into AMM’s death, the police reconsidered the death of PF. The appellant was initially arrested on the fraud offences but in due course he was charged with the murder of PF and conspiring/attempting to murder AMM. Other than a short, prepared statement, the appellant gave no account when interviewed by the police.

On count 1 (murder), the Crown alleged, therefore, that the appellant falsely persuaded PF that he loved and cared for him and PF as a consequence fell in love. This was the beginning of a detailed plan, about which the appellant kept a detailed record in journals and notes. He had determined to manipulate PF into changing his will, with the intention thereafter of killing him. He sought to make PF’s death appear to have been suicide.

Having moved in with PF in November 2013 and following the “betrothal ceremony” in 2014, the appellant set about covertly drugging PF. From at least January 2015 to the end of September 2015, the appellant regularly administered prescription and hallucinogenic drugs to PF, often disguised in food or drink. The toxicological analysis of PF’s remains demonstrated repeated administrations of sedating drugs in the months preceding his death.

The appellant “gaslighted” PF, that is he persistently manipulated and brainwashed him, thereby instilling self-doubt and a diminished sense of perception, identity, and self-worth. He secretly moved objects around the house and hid things. His purpose was to ensure there was no suspicion that PF had been murdered but instead, whilst ill and when alone, he had drunk himself to death.

Once PF had changed his will in the appellant’s favour, the latter took the next step in the plan and murdered him on 25 October 2015. The prosecution relied on the simple and self-evident proposition that in order for the fraud relating to the will to succeed the victim had to die. The prosecution needed to prove that the appellant gave PF the alcohol and/or the Dalmane, and/or smothered him in circumstances that materially contributed to his death.

The evidence the Crown relied on came from a variety of sources. The prosecution presented a detailed timeline identifying the key events which they linked to the relevant documentary evidence. The journals kept by PF provided hearsay evidence chronicling his life and thoughts over the period he was being deceived by the appellant. The prosecution relied on evidence from the friends and family of PF, regarding his character, his drinking habits and his relationship with the appellant. There was medical evidence detailing the prescription drugs taken by PF and his various visits to doctors in the months before his death. As to the death of PF, the Crown introduced evidence from PF’s cleaner, along with the paramedics and the police, about the finding of PF’s body on 26 October 2015. DNA and fingerprint evidence matching that of the appellant was found on the glass and the bottle next to PF when he died.

There was pathology evidence as to the cause of death and the presence of alcohol and drugs in PF’s system both before and at the time of his death. In this regard we note a number of expert witnesses examined PF’s body after he had died. It was suggested that there was no medical evidence to support the suggestion that PF was an alcoholic or had any mental health issues. When this evidence was considered with the other evidence in the case, in particular the notes and journals, it suggested a systematic campaign by the appellant to drug PF and encourage him to drink, in order to make it look like there was something wrong with him, when in fact there was not.

The evidence of Dr Bailey, who conducted the first post-mortem, was that PF’s body showed a blood alcohol level of approximately three times the legal drink drive limit. At the time, he concluded that the quantity was sufficient to cause acute alcoholic intoxication, coma, and death in a person who was not a persistent heavy drinker, and he recorded the cause of death as “acute alcohol toxicity”.

However, once the police investigation into the appellant’s behaviour towards AMM was underway, a second post-mortem examination was carried out by Dr Lockyer. He found that the cause of death was acute alcohol toxicity and Dalmane use. Alcohol and Dalmane should not be used in combination and Dr Lockyer’s evidence was that the combination of the two was likely to have resulted in the potentiation of the sedative effects of both substances, and could have proved fatal by decreasing the level of PF’s consciousness, thereby creating a threat to the maintenance of an adequate airway. He could not rule in, nor rule out, the possibility of smothering as it was possible to do this without leaving any evidence. However, there was no pathological evidence that PF had been smothered.

In the light of this evidence, the prosecution argued that the appellant had a motive to kill PF (in order to inherit from his will) and his notes as to how he intended to go about the murder accorded with the method he had actually used on the night of 25 October 2015. By way of detail, the jury were provided with extracts from the journals and notes of the appellant, evidencing his thoughts and intentions, detailing his covert drugging and “gaslighting” of PF and his research into alcoholism, strong whisky, suicide and the methods by which one might kill another. The appellant had a white notebook which contained extensive notes concerning

The prosecution suggested that the appellant in one of his notes set out what he had planned, and thereafter put into effect, in order to kill PF on 25 October 2015 – “High percentage malt £. Suffocation only a mistake if either survival or evidence ensues. Feed Dalmane and alcohol and less air”.

Diana Davis, the solicitor, gave evidence concerning the changes to PF’s and AMM’s wills. The prosecution relied on the appellant’s propensity, namely his guilty pleas in relation to various frauds and burglaries, and a video made by the appellant at the care home where he worked which established his exploitation of another elderly person. There were various relevant emails between the appellant and his co-accused. The Crown relied on the appellant’s failure to mention multiple facts in interview which he relied on at trial. There was a schedule of Agreed Facts.

The defence case was that, despite the appellant’s admitted and repulsive behaviour towards PF, he had not, in fact, intended to kill PF and he had not murdered him. He accepted he had lied to and deceived almost everyone he came into contact with between 2012 and 2017. He admitted he had lied to PF as to his true feelings and that he had intended to inherit from him on his death. He had similarly lied to AMM and had defrauded her of various sums of money. He burgled the properties owned by other elderly people in the street, because, in his words,

He acknowledged that he had drugged and gaslighted PF, causing him great suffering. He had manipulated AMM (although he denied having drugged her or encouraged her to commit suicide) and he accepted this had caused her regret and misery when she discovered what he had done, shortly before her death. He accepted that he was a “snake talker” and prided himself on his ability to manoeuvre people to achieve his ends without ever actually asking them directly to do what he wanted them to do. However, he denied ever intending to kill PF, he denied having any part in his death and he denied conspiring to or attempting to kill AMM.

Between 2012 and 2017, he had also engaged in casual relationships with various women, including particularly Lara Busby and Satara Pracha to whom, he accepted, he had consistently lied. He maintained that he was not homosexual, albeit had had a number of sexual experiences with men, which he suggested he had not enjoyed but had used to test himself. He accepted he had lied about the extent of his sexual experiences with men during examination-in-chief because, as he suggested, he had felt ashamed talking about these experiences in front of his parents. He insisted, however, that he had told the truth in evidence about all other matters.

Focussing on the journals and notes, the appellant suggested he had lived an isolated and internalised life since his school days. He had acquired the habit of reading extensively, including dictionaries, and he made copious notes (some of which the police found within computer files). He maintained that in the absence of genuine relationships or communication with others, he used to write as a means of working out his thoughts and as an outlet for frustrations and feelings that he could not otherwise express. While the appellant’s notes included numerous references to various ways in which both PF and AMM might die, his writings also included many references to other – what he suggested to be – wholly fantastical ideas.

He used the white notebook to write about PF. He claimed that he was genuinely interested in PF’s journals, which he copied out in large part. He also made notes about characters and storylines for PF’s last book, on which he claimed they were collaborating. He said that although some of the things he had written represented his thinking and intentions, others did not and were simply for amusement, to blow off steam or to see how they looked on paper. He maintained that he had written many of the notes in the white notebook, including the note

On 25 October 2015, the appellant went away for the weekend and he asked MS (Martyn

The appellant accepted that whilst the bottle of whisky must have played some part in the fatality, he had not intended to kill PF. He maintained he had played no direct part in PF drinking alcohol that night and he was not present when he died.

His case was summarised by the judge as follows:

The appellant accepts that the jury must have rejected his account that he left the whisky for PF as a temptation and a test that night. They must have concluded that the appellant was present and provided alcohol (and/or Dalmane and/or smothered him).

Mr Jeremy Q.C., on behalf of the applicant, submits that the grounds of appeal should be viewed in the context of the relevant background evidence. PF was found dead by his cleaner on 26 October 2015 slumped on his sofa. Next to him, on a side table, was a bottle of 60% proof whisky, with a glass on the floor by his feet. As set out above at [26], the initial postmortem concluded that the cause of death was “acute alcohol toxicity” with no signs of trauma or other suspicious circumstances. There was evidence to suggest that PF liked malt whisky and drank it often (indeed, submits Mr Jeremy, by his own estimation he drank it excessively).

When PF’s body was exhumed in 2017 and the second post-mortem was carried out, only a relatively small amount of Dalmane was found in his body, consistent with a therapeutic dose. No trace of the drug was found in the remaining whisky or in the glass found at his feet. PF had been prescribed Dalmane for insomnia but only took it intermittently. As set out above at

It is submitted that the prosecution case at trial was conspicuously silent as to how it was alleged the appellant had killed PF. It is argued this was the inevitable result of the lack of evidence as to what happened. The theory that the appellant may have suffocated PF was based, as the appellant contends, on an erroneous interpretation of the evidence, including what is described as a rather obscure note “Feed Dalmane and alcohol and less air” (see [35] above). On the appellant’s account, it is stressed this was allegedly part of a fictional version of PF’s death written after he had died.

It is submitted that this case involves consideration of the circumstances in which the voluntary act of the victim displaces the responsibility of the principal or perpetrator, with the result that the victim became the “doer of the act” and the “causer of his death”, particularly as considered by House of Lords in R v Kennedy (No 2) [2007] UKHL 38; [2008] 1 AC 269. The act of suicide is suggested to be one example of such a voluntary act.

It is highlighted that it was only shortly before the legal directions were given to the jury by the judge that the prosecution indicated that they would argue that PF’s drinking of the alcohol should not be regarded as voluntary because the appellant had deceived him into drinking by not revealing his intention to kill PF. The judge was persuaded to adopt this approach. In the event, his directions prompted a note from the jury on the issue, to which the judge responded, as set out below at [55] and [57], by repeating his original directions (albeit in a slightly different order).

Mr Jeremy argues that the crucial question for the jury was causation. They needed to determine whether the appellant had caused PF’s death, given, as the appellant suggests, the voluntary consumption by PF of alcohol or drugs would displace the appellant’s responsibility as the doer of the act that caused PF’s death. Mr Jeremy submits that the judge should have left to the jury the question as to whether PF’s consumption of whisky broke the chain of causation. The judge’s direction, therefore, needed to be explicit as to, first, the alleged acts by the appellant that were capable of being more than a minimal cause of death, and second, the events that were potentially capable of breaking the chain of causation vis-à-vis the appellant’s liability for the death. It is contended that the judge should have directed the jury that in order to convict the appellant they needed to be sure that his deception as to his intention to kill PF was the cause of the latter’s decision to consume alcohol and/or drugs and that, but for the deception, PF would not have consumed the alcohol and/or drugs.

It is argued that the judge erred in his direction to the jury regarding causation in that he conflated the concept of a “more than a minimal cause” with “deceit”, thereby misleading the jury as to the issue of voluntariness. In this context, it is suggested he failed to explain the critical importance of a voluntary decision by PF to consume alcohol and/or drugs. In a similar vein, it is contended that the judge failed to identify the evidence – if any existed – to the effect that the victim’s consumption of alcohol and/or drugs was involuntary. As set out in the preceding paragraph, it is argued the judge should have directed the jury that they needed to resolve “whether the appellant’s failure to reveal his intention that the victim should die, in fact, caused the victim’s consumption of alcohol and/or drugs to be involuntary”.

Additionally, it is asserted that the judge’s directions failed to distinguish between the act of giving any amount of drink and giving a sufficient quantity to equate to more than a minimal cause of death. Mr Jeremy argues that the judge should have directed the jury that they had to be sure that PF’s consumption of alcohol or drugs needed to be involuntary in the sense of having been obtained by force, duress or deceit, with the result that the appellant rather than PF did the act which caused the latter’s death. In this context, Mr Jeremy accepts that PF’s consumption of drink or alcohol would not have been voluntary – it would not have been free, deliberate and informed – if he had been forced to commit the act or had been misled as to the nature of it. By way of example, Mr Jeremy uses the image of the victim who is given a drink that, unknown to him, had been laced with cyanide. It is accepted that this would be capable of rendering his consumption of that drink involuntary because the deceit would have left the victim uninformed as to the true nature of his act.

If – says Mr Jeremy – the victim, therefore, is informed (viz. knows the facts that are relevant, most particularly as regards the contingent risks of harm) the decision will be voluntary. The fact that he or she is unaware of other facts that were not relevant to the nature of the act, and the risks attaching to it, would not remove the voluntary nature of the act. PF’s ignorance of the appellant’s secret intention thus did not change the nature of PF’s act or his perception of the risk of harm attaching to it. Accordingly, on the appellant’s submissions PF’s decision to take drink was informed and voluntary.

It is accepted by Mr Jeremy that a defendant’s intention can, in certain circumstances, be relevant to the risk attaching to a course of action. He gave this example. If an accused, for instance, encouraged a weak swimmer to take to the water having promised to provide assistance if the swimmer encountered difficulties, but privately had no intention of doing so and did not do so, the accused could be criminally liable for the victim’s death by drowning in these circumstances. The victim had volunteered to swim on the false assurance of rescue if the need arose. The victim’s uninformed state as to the defendant’s actual intention would have changed the nature of the act embarked upon and rendered it more dangerous.

Although Mr Jeremy advanced, as a significant part of his submissions, a highly detailed criticism of the prosecution for the way they presented and developed their case, along with an analysis of the genesis of the final arguments of the parties as to the approach to be taken to the charge of murder in the circumstances of this case, this appeal turns on the single question of whether the judge’s directions to the jury were legally correct. Although we have considered the detail of Mr Jeremy’s criticism and the development of the submissions, they are not in any sense determinative of this appeal. It follows that in this analysis we have, instead, focussed on the judge’s directions to the jury.

Having reminded the jury to bear in mind all the relevant directions, the written direction provided to the jury on the “ultimate question” on count 1 set out the following:

The judge in an earlier written direction in the same document described the prosecution’s case on count 1 to the jury in the following way:

As delivered during the summing up, the judge said:

Otherwise, the judge’s summing up followed the written directions set out above, and he added at the conclusion of this section:

Having retired during the afternoon of 16 July 2019, during 18 July 2019 the jury sent a note as follows:

As set out above at [52], the “4th paragraph”, to which the jury note referred, contained the following:

The judge responded as follows:

The concession made by Mr Jeremy in relation to the weak swimmer is both correct in our view and important. As he accepts, the victim’s uninformed state of mind in this example as to the accused’s real intention would have changed the nature of the undertaking on which the victim embarked, by rendering it more dangerous. The false friend was potentially liable to a conviction for homicide on account of his or her undisclosed intention that the victim should die by not providing assistance in the event of difficulty. This is highly pertinent in the present case. Mr Jeremy’s concession also recognises that whether the victim’s ignorance of the accused’s real intention does relevantly change the nature of the undertaking on which the victim embarks, as in his example, will depend on the specific nature of the individual case. The concession acknowledges, moreover, the appropriateness of the trial judge addressing the nature of the individual case in deciding how to direct the jury. It follows that in situations exemplified by the weak swimmer example, it would be appropriate for the judge to give the jury a direction on causation referable to the victim’s knowledge or ignorance of the accused’s intentions.

The undisclosed murderous intention of the appellant, in our judgment, substantively changed the nature of the undertaking upon which PF embarked, in this particular case. The jury must have rejected the appellant’s account that he was not present when the victim drank this large quantity of whisky which he had supplied. PF, therefore, would have believed that he was drinking 60% proof whisky in the company of someone who loved and would care for him, not someone who wished for his death. As a consequence, PF would not have had an informed appreciation of the truly perilous nature of what was occurring. In providing the whisky, he was being encouraged by the appellant to consume a significant quantity of a powerful alcoholic drink, which inevitably would have started to impair his judgment, most particularly as it interacted with the Dalmane. Engaging in this activity was not, as a consequence, the result of a free, voluntary and informed decision by PF. To the contrary, he was being deliberately led into a dangerous situation, as with the weak swimmer, by someone who pretended to be concerned about his safety: as was undisputed on the evidence in the case, the appellant posed as his lover and partner – someone who PF would undoubtedly have assumed would be solicitous of his wellbeing – whereas, in reality, the appellant simply desired PF’s demise. The appellant, therefore, manipulated and encouraged PF into a position of grave danger, given the combination of the sedative effects of the substances risked decreasing the levels of the victim’s consciousness, thereby fatally impairing his airway. The appellant’s undisclosed homicidal purpose, in these circumstances, changed the nature of the act: PF was to a material extent unwittingly lured into a perilous drunken and drugged position by someone who feigned to be his loving partner. Once the effects of the substances started to affect PF’s judgment and as he succumbed, the appellant would have been a mere bystander, or worse. He certainly would not have sought medical assistance, given he admitted he wanted to increase the risk of PF dying.

It follows we are of the view that the position of the appellant is to be likened to that of the deceived swimmer. It would be open to a jury in either case to conclude that the victims (real and fictional) had been lured into a false sense of security by the accused’s undisclosed murderous purpose, embarking as a consequence on a fatal course of action uninformed as to or unaware of the true dangers of the undertaking, so that the deceit was a cause of death.

Whether or not the deceased acted freely and voluntarily, when in a position to make an informed decision, will always depend on a close analysis of the facts of the case. If, in the context of a decision by the deceased, there is a significant deception by the accused that changes the truth or the reality of what is happening, such as materially to increase the dangerous nature of the act, then he or she may be criminally liable for what occurred. That

For these reasons we consider that the approach of the judge was correct. He left it to the jury to determine whether the appellant’s actions were a more than minimal cause of PF’s death. He told the jury if they were sure that, with intent to kill, the appellant in person gave PF drink, and PF drank it, it was open to them to conclude that the giving of drink was a cause of the death; but he told them that conclusion would not be open to them if PF knew the drink being offered was intended to cause his death. He also told them that if PF agreed to drink – not knowing that it was intended by the appellant that it was to kill him – it would be open to them to conclude that the appellant’s giving of drink was a cause of death. These directions rightly recognised that in this particular case the jury had to be sure that the drink was given to the appellant with intent to kill, that the drink was a (more than minimal) cause of death and that PF’s act of drinking was not a free, voluntary and informed decision such as to break the chain of causation. The judge’s directions captured the essence of the issue in a clear and admirably succinct manner. Those directions were, moreover, given in the broader context of the supposedly caring and protective nature of the relationship, whose falsehood lay at the centre of the undisputed evidence in the case, as the jury undoubtedly understood.

We dismiss the appeal against conviction.

The appellant received a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment. When determining the appropriate minimum term, the court should take into account the effect of section 240ZA Criminal Justice Act (crediting periods of remand in custody) (section 269(3)(b) Criminal Justice Act 2003). The judge omitted to address the 346 days the appellant had spent on remand prior to sentence.

We grant the extension of time and leave to appeal against sentence. The sentence will remain that of imprisonment for life, with a minimum term of 36 years. From that minimum term there will be deducted 346 days.