Love, R. v

those provisions where a sexual offence has been committed against a person, no matter relating to that person shall during that person's lifetime be included in any publication if it is likely to lead members of the public to identify that person as the victim of that offence. This prohibition applies unless waived or lifted in accordance with section 3 of the Act. We shall accordingly refer to the victim by initials only.

he saw her in company with a male. He denied there was any sexual motivation. He said that he was "in the moment", but would not elaborate any further.

first made at the time of the incident or shortly after. The victim said she was very scared and did not know what was happening to her and was having flashbacks. She made a further statement, which although couched in impressively generous terms, expressing concern for the offender, made it clear that she was indeed traumatised. In particular, she speaks of how she was robbed of the ability to walk around her own town carefree.

convictions, though none for sexual offences. His convictions included 18 months in a Young Offender Institution for a section 20 wounding against his father, an offence which involved many stitches being necessary. He was then sentenced to 18 weeks' imprisonment, suspended for 18 months with unpaid work, and a programme requirement and supervision for a section 47 assault against his partner. In 2015 there was an offence of causing unnecessary suffering to a protected animal, that is causing the death of young dog, for which he was sentenced to 16 weeks' imprisonment, at which point the term of imprisonment for the section 47 was activated with a reduced term of 10 weeks.

he wished he had never put the girl through the experience and that he was sorry every day since for what he had done. He was, however, unable to explain his offending further.

foster care due his mother's mental illness and his father's violence. He described a traumatic childhood. He often saw his father beat his mother and felt resentment.

Impulsivity was identified as a significant problem for the appellant. The PSR said that given what appeared to be an escalating pattern of offending towards women, further exploration of his attitude towards women was required. All in all, he was assessed as being a high risk of re-conviction for a sexual offence. A psychological report stated that the appellant showed signs or traits of borderline melancholic and compulsive personality style.

It opined that his risk of reoffending was most suitably managed in the custodial setting.

"So for the next seven years you must not enter any public footpath, other than a footpath that forms part of a public highway, and for the next seven years you must, from the date of your release, comply with the installation of a body-worn GPS monitoring device. You must not tamper with it. You must not attempt to remove the device and you must permit the repair, maintenance and/or replacement of the device.

If you breach either of those terms within the next seven years, you commit a further criminal offence for which you can be sent to prison and the maximum penalty is five years."

gave a clue as to the unsuitability of the GPS component and that this was an unusual order proposed by the Crown in an unprecedented way and advanced with a degree of unclarity. She submitted that the authority relied on demonstrated that it was not an order which was made in similar situations. In that case there had been multiple offending and breaches of notification. She submitted, indeed, that it was unclear as to why the order was needed and how it was planned to be used. Certainly, she said, taken together the order made was oppressive in the context of this single, albeit troubling offence, bearing in mind the other orders to which the appellant would be subject on release.

in relation, at least, to the first part of the order. This was a serious sexual assault which left

the victim in fear that worse would happen and which has had a long-term effect on her. Ms Wilks rightly accepted that this was a serious offence. We reject the submission that the motive was not sexual. Indeed, the appellant's own account in interview of why he performed the assault indicates that it was.

surprising, given the fact that he has now committed this assault and that it is plain from his history and his previous convictions, as well as the Pre-Sentence Report, and Psychological Report that he has problems with impulse control more generally. This is reinforced by his own explanation for the offence of being "in the moment". Yet further basis for concern is found in the apparent escalation of issues with women, noted in the PSR, in relation to his recent offending. Given those long-standing problems of impulse control, the seriousness of the assault and the appellant's lack of any explanation as to what otherwise drove him to commit this offence, we are persuaded that on the facts of this case the hurdle of necessity was met for a Sexual Harm Prevention Order. Given the appellant's actions, based on his own account in following the victim from the road and waiting until the victim had reached a suitable quiet place before committing the offence, the focus in the order on paths away from the road, necessity likewise seems to be established in terms of affording protection to possible victims.

ambit of the order very carefully. We have noted that the judge was unwilling to make such an order without separate consideration. We have read the transcript of the prosecution's Opening of Facts at the hearing in relation to the Sexual Harm Prevention Order and have noted how carefully the judge pressed the prosecution as to the proposed order, ultimately declining to make it in the form sought but only in a narrower form, which as Ms Wicks advises us, the Judge herself considered and effectively drafted.

activities, but given the isolation of the places identified in submissions and the appellant's assessed risk which we have already noted, this cannot be seen as oppressive or disproportionate. It is also an order which we consider is perfectly clear and realistic and thus capable of simple compliance and enforcement. It is an order which is or should be clear to a person in the position of the appellant. It marks a distinction between paths which are away from the road and paths which are by the road, which should be perfectly capable of being followed. So far as any difficulties arising from a future change in residence is concerned, those could perfectly well be taken care of by a return to court if necessary, but there is no issue with the order as matters stand. So far as the first limb is concerned, on the facts of this case we are not persuaded that this order as made was contrary to principle or manifestly excessive.

confined to a period of five years or further order. That order was imposed after the Crown had conceded that its original application for a twelve-month order was not within the Act. In those circumstances, we accept Ms Wicks' submission that where the Crown had not originally thought of the five-year term, there must from the outset be concerns about proportionality, as indeed the judge noted. Those concerns are not, in our judgment, allayed by any further consideration on the facts of this case. While we do not see the order as being contrary to principle necessarily, we are persuaded that given the facts of this case and given the other order which has already been made, it is an order which is manifestly excessive and, there being no ability to impose an order for a shorter period, we are persuaded that this order as drafted should not be imposed.