Sargeant, R. v

On 5^th October 2018, in the Crown Court at Stafford, before His Honour Judge Chambers QC and a jury the appellant was convicted of murder.

On 11^th December 2018, she was sentenced by the trial judge to imprisonment for life; the period of 4,842 days, or 13 years and 97 days, was specified as the minimum term under section 269(2) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003.

She appeals against conviction by leave of the single judge.

The appellant and her mother, Rocky Sargeant (the deceased), lived together at 2 Sun

After she was arrested the appellant told police "She drove me to it. I killed her" and "I’m guilty… will I go to prison for life… I can't believe that I have done this… She drove me to

Dr Lockyer, a forensic pathologist, found the deceased to have a number of old scars, reflective of self-harm. There were fourteen stab wounds directed to the neck and chin, caused during what he described as a sustained attack. The force used was at least moderate. She also had abrasions on her head that were likely to have been caused when she fell. Death was likely to have been caused by a combination of blood loss from the wounds, partially incised damage to veins which would have resulted in an air embolism, and incised damage to the laryngeal structures that allowed blood to enter the respiratory tract, resulting in aspiration.

There was an agreed summary chronology, created from Social Services and Housing Association records, and from medical records for both the appellant and the deceased. They demonstrated that the deceased had psychiatric problems, which had manifested in aggression and violence. She suffered from psychosis and had a history of self-harming. This behaviour had a negative effect on the appellant who was exposed to all of this and on two occasions was referred to mental health agencies. Records demonstrated that school and Social Services staff had expressed concerns about the effect that her mother's condition was having on her.

Accepting that the appellant had been subject to a history of abuse, which had resulted in a diagnosis of adjustment disorder with features of post-traumatic stress disorder, autistic spectrum disorder and mild intellectual disability, the prosecution case was that on this occasion the appellant had simply lost her temper and had stabbed her mother, following an argument about money.

The defence case was that the appellant had been mentally and physically abused by her mother for many years. She relied on the evidence of Professor Elliott who said that she had experienced a range of psychological symptoms as a result of the abuse, representing an "Adjustment Disorder with Post Traumatic Stress (PTS) features". She was more likely to become angry and act impulsively in the circumstance due to her combination of pre-existing aspects of Asperger's syndrome, Adjustment Disorder with PTS features, and the previous abuse. She said that on 16^th March 2018, she was in the kitchen with her mother who was angrily shouting about the payment of bills. She appeared to be mentally unstable. She said that the deceased had taken a pair of scissors from the drawer and held them up. Since her mother had previously made threats that she would cut her (the appellant) open with scissors, she feared serious violence. She felt "under the control" of her mother, she felt trapped and unable to escape her predicament. She did not intend to kill her mother. She did not know what she was doing when she stabbed her mother; she was unable to exercise self-control. Further, she was suffering from an abnormality of mental functioning; she had diminished responsibility for the alleged offence.

The issues for the jury to determine were: was the appellant acting in lawful self-defence; had she intended to kill or seriously injure her mother; had she lost control; or was her responsibility diminished by reason of her adjustment disorder?

The prosecution evidence included background evidence from Greta Eggleston, the deceased's adoptive mother, and Ashlea Adewumi, a neighbour.

Evidence was given of the various accounts given by the appellant from the 999 call, the paramedic Peter Tansey, PC Lauren Amison and bodycam footage, DC Burton and a nurse,

The appellant's police interview was in evidence. In that interview she spoke about suffering from sexual, mental and physical abuse inflicted by her mother for at least eight years. She said that she felt trapped and unable to escape. She said that she lost control; it was an accident; she did not intend to hurt her mother. Her mother had a complex psychiatric history and had told the appellant that she was a failure as a daughter. She said that the deceased had started an argument about the bills and "My emotions blew out of proportion, and that's why I got the knife out of the drawer and stabbed her with it, and she pleaded [with] me to do it. It was an accident". Her mother had been threatening her with scissors and said that she was going to end the appellant’s life. The appellant had put the scissors back in the drawer. She repeated that she her emotions had "flipped" and she had lost control. She had tried to revive her mother and staunch the blood, but there was too much.

The appellant gave evidence in her defence. She said that the night before her mother died, they were at home and they had argued about bills. They had regularly argued about the appellant's bills or debts. They had also argued because she was in touch with her father over social media. She was looking for somewhere else to live as she felt that the abusive family relationship was a toxic situation. The following morning, the argument started again and escalated. She had tried to take control of the situation but could not. Her mother had taken a pair of scissors from the drawer and she had picked up a knife. She had tried to hug her mother and had tried to cut her. As that had changed nothing, she stabbed her again. Her mother said what a bad daughter she was and was swearing. She had not stabbed with full force. She felt emotionally at breaking point. The argument continued and she stabbed her again. From that moment, it escalated. She thought that she had stabbed her four times by the back door. Her mother had tried to block the knife and had followed her when she tried to escape. They ended up on the other side of the kitchen. They were both upright. Then she "did the final stab to her when I lost control of the knife. I struck next. She collapsed". The appellant had wiped up the blood, called the ambulance and had tried to save her mother's life. At the time she could not face the truth of what she had done. She had lost control.

In cross-examination she agreed that she had wanted to move away and had told a neighbour that her mother stopped her. She agreed that the row was about money and that she had told the police that she hoped it was a chance to move on. She was not able to think straight at the time. She had tried to back away when her mother had threatened her. The argument had continued even after she had cut her mother on the hand. She agreed that the scissors had been put back in the drawer, but said that because of her mother’s psychosis she did not believe that the threat had gone. She was emotionally not in control of the situation. She said that she had not mentioned the scissors in the prepared statement because she was in an emotional state, she maintained that it was true and denied that she was trying to hide anything. She denied that she had waited to call the emergency services until after she had cleaned up. She had put the knife in her mother’s hand because she had panicked.

There was various medical evidence before the court. Anthony Brown had carried out a psychiatric assessment on the appellant, when she was arrested. It was his opinion that she had presented with symptoms of an adjustment reaction disorder due to her current situation which were exacerbated by more persistent depressive disorder from her social circumstances and past abuse. Her depressive symptoms could be trauma-related. They were evidence of her response behaviours, which were maladaptive and disproportionate to the stressor due to being overwhelmed and in emotional distress at the time of the offence. She was able to recognise this and was regretful of her actions as she had never wanted her mother to die.

There were various psychological assessments, which evidence was read. Dr Greenhaf said that the appellant had traits of ongoing depressive and self-defeating personality. These features were likely to have resulted from years of having been the carer for a mother with mental illness and the experiences this will have brought her as an adolescent and a young adult. She was likely to continue to experience years of significant stress due to caring for her mother without any professional support or treatment. She had experienced anxiety symptoms as a result of difficulties with her mental and psychological functioning, because of her personality functioning.

Dr Beattie said that appellant had met the criteria for ASD diagnosis. She presented evidence of deficits in her reciprocal social interactions, abnormalities in her verbal communication and evidence of restricted or repetitive behaviours.

Dr Trent concluded that the appellant was functioning at the upper end of the mild intellectual disabilities range of intellectual functioning, with an additional diagnosis of trauma and stress-related disorder, and a borderline personality disorder. She was likely to demonstrate markedly poor planning and judgment, impulsiveness, emotional lability and anxiety. Testing had indicated a well of anger and hostility, which was likely to have been generated due to the chaotic and abusive nature of her childhood, if her description was accurate.

Professor Elliot gave oral evidence. He said that he agreed with the findings of Dr Trent. The appellant was suffering from autistic spectrum disorder. She had long-standing difficulties in communication, difficulties in social interaction, and difficulties in coping with stress. She may be more prone to acting impulsively and had a mild intellectual disability. She would be able to function on a day to day basis but largely only doing fairly simple things. She had been suffering from an adjustment disorder, adjustment to the stress of her previous abuse with features of post-traumatic stress disorder. This was the product of longstanding exposure to abuse and stress. Observing a parent self-harming would be very distressing and the nature of the distress would be pervasive, would lead to severe expression of inner fear, of tension and dread, which would manifest itself in forms of agitation and impulsivity. This would typically resolve once the source of the stress had been removed. It was the opinion of Professor Elliot that the appellant was suffering from an abnormality of mental functioning that arose from a recognised medical condition. It could have had a substantial impairment on her ability to make a rational decision and could have impaired her ability to exercise rational control. But it did not impair her understanding of the nature of her conduct. He said that it was capable of providing an explanation as to what had happened, if it had happened as the appellant had described. He said that his opinion would not differ even if there had been no threats with scissors. The situation was like a "powder keg" likely to go off at any time. Her attempt to lead the police to believe that her mother had committed suicide had been an immature, child-like attempt to deal with the situation in a way that was likely to be found out very quickly. It was a reflection of her autistic spectrum disorder.

The Grounds of Appeal are:

The judge erred in failing to give appropriate safety warnings in his direction on diminished responsibility.

In his ruling that there was a case to answer, the judge noted that it was submitted by the defence that the charge of murder should be withdrawn from the jury, on the basis that the defence psychiatric evidence was unchallenged by the prosecution, namely the evidence of

It was submitted by the prosecution that the incident had occurred as the result of a loss of temper in the context of an argument about money. There was evidence both of an intention to kill and to rebut the defence of diminished responsibility. The deceased had been stabbed repeatedly in the neck. The appellant had given a false account to the police and had taken steps to indicate that her mother had attempted suicide, and that all the injuries were self-inflicted. She had not told the police that her mother had threatened her with scissors, either at the house or in her prepared statement. Further, these scissors had been returned to the drawer by the time of the stabbings, so her mother no longer presented a threat. This formed the basis for a rational explanation.

The judge observed that the thrust of the evidence of Professor Elliot was that at the time of the fatal incident, and due to the history of abuse caused by her mother, the appellant was suffering from adjustment disorder with features of post-traumatic stress disorder, autistic spectrum disorder and mild intellectual disability. This diagnosis was accepted by the prosecution. Professor Elliot gave evidence that the diagnosis could have substantially impaired the appellant's ability to exercise self-control. The prosecution did not disagree. However, there was still a live issue as to whether, in fact, it did. Further, the prosecution did not accept that it provided an explanation for the killing. This was still a live issue. The judge ruled that having assessed the evidence there was an evidential basis on which a jury properly directed could return a verdict of murder.

Mr Miskin QC submits that, given that the evidence of Professor Elliot was

Mr Heywood submits that the judge's decision that there was a case to answer on the charge of murder was correct. Upholding the defence submission would have amounted to a usurpation of the jury's function. The jury's decision would be largely influenced by their view of the particular circumstances surrounding the killing. The issue for the jury's determination was whether the abnormality in fact impaired the appellant's responsibility as the time of the killing; and if so, did it explain the killing so as to reduce her criminal culpability from murder to manslaughter?

As stated by Lord Hughes in Golds at [9]:

In the present case the prosecution accepted that the expert medical evidence established that the appellant suffered from an abnormality of mental functioning and that this arose from a recognised medical condition. On the facts of the present case, that left questions (3) and

As explained in Golds at [50], whether the impairment was substantial (question (3)) and causation (question (4)) are essentially jury questions:

As stated by this court in in R v Blackman [2017] EWCA Crim 190 at [43]:

In the present case the prosecution did not accept that the medical evidence established that the appellant's abnormality of mental functioning “substantially” impaired her ability to exercise self-control or that it caused or significantly contributed to the killing. It contended that these were matters of fact for the jury.

As the judge observed, the medical evidence was that the appellant's ability to exercise self-control could have been substantially impaired, not that it had been. The prosecution advanced a rational basis for contending that it had not been, namely that this was a case of loss of temper in the context of an argument about money rather than loss of control. This was not a matter of semantics. It was the central issue in the case. The prosecution case was that this was a killing in anger, uninfluenced by medical condition. The prosecution contends that there was evidential support for this case, not only in the appellant's own account of the context in which the altercation arose, but in her subsequent actions, explanations and false scene setting, including wiping up bloodstains and clearing up the scene; trying to make it look as if her mother had killed herself; putting the knife in her hand; giving an elaborate initial false account as to what had occurred; and creating what the prosecution contended was an invented back story about being threatened with scissors. This showed a person who was in control of herself and who was looking for ways to avoid the consequences of what she had done.

We agree with the prosecution and the judge that these were matters for the jury to evaluate and decide upon in the light of the evidence as a whole, and that this was not one of those rare cases where the judge should have exercised the power to withdraw a charge of murder from the jury in circumstances where the prosecution did not accept that the evidence gave rise to the defence of diminished responsibility. We accordingly reject Ground 1.

This ground has not been developed orally before us, so we shall address it briefly. The statement which it is said should have been put before the jury was made at the direction of the judge and was written before the chronology was compiled and before the prosecution had conceded that the appellant had been abused for many years. It had concluded as follows:

For the prosecution, it is submitted that the "joint statement" referred to was simply a memorandum setting out the points about which the experts agreed. It is not accepted that its evidential value was more than minimal. It is observed that it was open to the defence to call Dr Kennedy on the issue, but that its resolution ultimately depended upon the view the jury took of the facts. The jury was repeatedly advised that Professor Elliot's evidence was uncontradicted and it is submitted that the introduction of the "joint statement" would have had no material influence on the verdict.

Whether or not to admit this statement was a matter of trial management. The decision to refuse to do so was well within the range of reasonable conclusions open to the judge. The joint statement was prepared in order to identify the extent of agreement between the experts and to clarify whether there was a need for them to be called. In the event, the prosecution decided not to call Dr Kennedy but Professor Elliot was called and could have dealt with these matters himself. His evidence was undisputed. The statement itself begged questions as to exactly what was meant by the appellant's "account", given that she had proffered various accounts. In all the circumstances, the judge was entitled to conclude that the statement should not be admitted. On any view, its non-admission does not call into question the safety of the conviction. We accordingly reject Ground 2.

This ground was also not developed orally before us. We shall address it briefly. In relation to the character of the deceased, whilst it is accepted that there was ample evidence of her violent tendencies and her propensity for aggression, it is submitted that the direction would have been helpful to the jury in understanding how the evidence could properly be used. The character and propensity of the two witnesses was important and relevant to the jury's consideration of what had occurred in the kitchen.

For the prosecution it is submitted that the jury had ample evidence of the deceased's violent tendencies from various sources, which gave them a powerful insight into her propensity for aggression. A propensity direction about the deceased would have added nothing to the case.

We agree with the prosecution. There was a detailed agreed schedule put before the jury which set out in considerable detail the history of the deceased's behaviour over many years and made clear her propensity for aggression. There was no need for the judge to give any formal direction as to how this evidence may be used in relation to the events of 17^th March 2018. On any view a failure to do so does not call into question the safety of the conviction. We accordingly reject Ground 3.

It is submitted that the judge's direction on self-control failed sufficiently to explain the objective test and left highly relevant matters "in the background". It is said that the key characteristics to be looked at were not those of a temperamental or volatile person arising from a mental malfunction but of one who had been abused and coercively controlled by the woman she killed. It is submitted that the circumstances of the appellant at the point that she lost her self-control were those of an abused daughter in a highly toxic and controlling relationship where her mother knew of her intellectual limitations and had over the years relied on her acquiescence in response to gross provocative behaviour. It required a full and generous direction about the circumstances of the hypothetical 24 year old woman who might have responded in the same way.

For the prosecution, it is submitted that the direction on loss of control was legally correct, appropriate and indeed generous to the appellant. The suggested approach would have flown in the face of the statutory prohibition. The judge directed the jury that the appellant's mental disorders were relevant when it came to their assessment of whether or not she lost self-control and the gravity of the qualifying trigger. Section 54(3) expressly excludes the appellant's mental disorders as matters for the jury to take into account when measuring a hypothetical person's normal degree of tolerance and self-restraint. It is submitted that the judge's approach was entirely in keeping with the approach of the Court of Appeal in Rejmanski.

The direction given by the judge was given in the following terms:

The partial defence of loss of control is set out in sections 54 and 55 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009. Section 54 provides:

In R v Rejmanski, this court considered the effect of section 54(3). Its conclusion was as follows:

In our judgment, the judge was careful to follow this guidance. He correctly made it clear that the appellant's mental disorders were not relevant to the question of the degree of tolerance and self-restraint which would be exercised by the hypothetical normal person. He did, however, recognise that they may be relevant to the gravity of the qualifying trigger, as set out in the earlier part of his direction.

In relation to background circumstances other than the appellant's mental disorders, the judge recognised that the jury could have regard to them, save in so far as they were only relevant to the appellant's general capacity for tolerance or self-restraint. This accords with section 54(3) and Rejmanski. In our judgment the direction given was sufficiently clear and full. We accordingly reject Ground 4.

We give leave for this further ground to be raised.

In relation to the direction on diminished responsibility, it is submitted that the judge failed to give the safety warnings said to be required as a result of what was said by the Supreme Court in Golds at [51], as follows:

It is submitted that in the light of this guidance the judge should have given the following safety warnings:

We would deprecate any suggestion that Golds requires specific legal directions to be given in every case involving a diminished responsibility defence. The appellant's suggested warnings (1) and (2) are introduced in Golds by the words "If the facts of the case give rise to it". The amateur psychiatrists warning is said to be "ordinarily" advisable, and the failure to add those words did not, for example, call into question the safety of the conviction in R v Hussain. What is important is that it is made clear that there is a rational basis for rejecting the medical evidence and what that is.

In the present case the relevant part of the judge's direction on diminished responsibility is as follows:

On the issue of substantial impairment, the judge correctly pointed out that the medical evidence was that the appellant's mental disorders could have substantially impaired her ability to exercise self-control and that the issue was whether in fact it did so. As he stated, this depended on an assessment of the evidence as a whole, not merely the medical evidence, which included the appellant's conduct "leading up to the killing and its aftermath".

On the issue of causation, the judge identified the alternative rational explanation put forward by the prosecution, namely that "this was simply a loss of temper in the context of an argument about money".

As already addressed in relation to Ground 1, this was a case in which the medical evidence effectively answered questions (1) and (2) of the diminished responsibility defence. It did not, however, compel the answer to be given to the jury questions (3) and (4). These were to be answered by the jury in the light of all the evidence, including the medical evidence.

In our judgment the judge's direction on diminished responsibility was appropriate and he was not required specifically to set out the suggested safety warnings. In any event, warnings to like effect were given elsewhere in the judge's clear and full summing-up.

In relation to suggested safety warning (1), the judge had made this point expressly when giving directions in relation to the jury's approach to the evidence. He said:

In relation to suggested safety warning (2), this did not arise on the facts since the prosecution did not contend that this was a case involving pre-planning.

In relation to suggested safety warnings (3) and (4), the judge gave the jury clear and appropriate guidance as to their approach to the expert evidence. He said:

In our judgment the directions given by the judge in his summing-up were appropriate and sufficient on the facts of this case.

We would also observe that the summing-up as a whole was a model of clarity and was conspicuously fair to the defence. We accordingly reject Ground 5.

Mr Miskin QC has helpfully and persuasively put forward every possible argument that could be said in support of this appeal. However, for the reasons outlined above, the appeal is dismissed.