Rennison, R. v

This is an appeal against sentence brought with the leave of the single judge by the appellant, Daniel Rennison, who is aged 25. On 10^th April 2018, in the Crown Court at Leeds, he was sentenced by Her Honour Judge Belcher for an offence of using threatening behaviour, contrary to section 4 of the Public Order Act 1986, to which he had earlier pleaded guilty. The plea was entered late, at the point of trial, as an alternative to more serious offences. He was sentenced to a 12 month community order with a Rehabilitation Activity Requirement of 15 days and Unpaid Work Requirement of 100 hours. He was also ordered to pay the statutory victim surcharge and was made the subject of a Restraining Order.

The victim of this offence is entitled to the protection of the provisions of the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992. Under those provisions, where a sexual offence has been committed against a person, no matter relating to that person shall during that person's lifetime be included in any publication if it is likely to lead members of the public to identify that person as a victim of the offence. This prohibition applies to these proceedings unless waived or lifted in accordance with section 3 of the Act.

The appeal against sentence, for which leave was granted, is on the grounds that the sentence imposed upon the appellant was manifestly excessive or wrong in principle. By the time that he was sentenced on 10^th April 2018, the appellant had spent three months and thirteen days remanded in custody. The maximum sentence for an offence contrary to section 4 of the Public Order Act 1986 is six months' imprisonment. The appellant contends that this time on remand is equivalent to a sentence of six months and 26 days, which is a sentence which would exceed the maximum permitted for the offence.

The background to the offence was a trial held at Leeds Crown Court between 29^th November and 1^st December 2016. The complainant in that trial, which involved allegations of sexual offences, was related to the appellant. The defendant in that trial was the appellant's uncle. After the complainant gave evidence, he remained at court to observe the proceedings through to verdict. The complainant remained outside the courtroom on the concourse during the retirement of the jury. A number of other members of the appellant's family were inside court and also on the concourse. Throughout the final day of the trial the appellant, together with his brother and another, periodically wandered in and out of court, being upset and annoyed by the allegations that had been made during the trial. Threatening remarks were directed towards the complainant whilst he was on the concourse of the court building. The appellant, together with others, was hostile and threatening towards the complainant. Overt threats were also made which caused the complainant to feel frightened. Witnesses observed the behaviour of the appellant and other members of his family in their conduct towards the complainant. Such behaviour during the course of a sensitive trial had a potential to cause significant disruption to the course of justice.

The appellant was charged with more serious offences, but, at the point of his own trial, he pleaded guilty to using threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour with intent to cause fear, contrary to section 4 of the Public Order Act 1986.

In sentencing the appellant, the judge expressly stated that she had in mind to impose a suspended sentence of imprisonment because of the seriousness of the circumstances of the offence. However, given that the appellant had served a period on remand in custody of three months and thirteen days, after having been recalled for a breach of the terms of a post-custodial licence for a conviction on 7^th June 2017, the judge imposed a twelve month community order with activity and unpaid work requirements.

The appellant has 36 convictions for 77 offences between 2003 and 2017. Included in those previous convictions were public order offences in 2008 and in 2014. He also had convictions for dishonesty, including for robbery, burglary and theft, and also for offences of violence and breach of court orders.

On behalf of the appellant it is submitted that but for the time served on remand, the sentence would not have been the subject of any appeal. It is submitted that the maximum sentence of six months' imprisonment for an offence contrary to section 4 of the Public Order Act 1986 means that the period of three months and thirteen days spent on remand is equivalent to the maximum sentence, whilst allowing for release at the halfway point of such an order; and that the imposition of a fifteen day Rehabilitation Activity Requirement and Unpaid Work Requirement as conditions of the community order made the sentence manifestly excessive or wrong in principle.

We have considered the short point in this appeal with care. We do not accept that it is wrong in principle to impose a community order with activity requirements and unpaid work after an offender has served on remand at least half of the maximum sentence for the offence. A sentence of six months' imprisonment is not completed at the halfway point when the offender is entitled to release upon post-custodial licence. It is a misconception, therefore, to contend that the imposition of a further non-custodial sentence in these circumstances is wrong in principle. Indeed, when passing sentence, the judge expressly imposed a lesser sentence to reflect the very fact that the appellant had served a period of custody on remand. Such a point was taken in R v Sutherland [2017] EWCA Crim 2259. As did the court in that case, we reject the argument based on principle, given that the sentencing judge took into account the period spent on remand before sentencing to the non-custodial term. Accordingly, we reject the submission that this sentence was wrong in principle.

The alternative contention, now advanced more strongly by the appellant, is that the sentence was manifestly excessive, given the time served on remand. We disagree. The judge correctly took into account the seriousness of the offence in the context of a sensitive trial, as well as the appellant's extensive previous convictions. The sentence was entirely justified. It cannot be criticised as being manifestly excessive.

In these circumstances, therefore, we dismiss this appeal against sentence.