Royal Courts of Justice
The Strand
London
WC2A 2LL
B e f o r e:
LORD JUSTICE McCOMBE
MR JUSTICE SPENCER
and
MR JUSTICE PHILLIPS
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R E G I N A
- v -
WILLIAM JOSEPH
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Mr M Smith appeared on behalf of the Applicant
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J U D G M E N T (Approved)
LORD JUSTICE McCOMBE: I shall ask Mr Justice Phillips to give the judgment of the court.
MR JUSTICE PHILLIPS:
On 24th May 2017 in the Crown Court at Warwick the applicant (now aged 35) pleaded guilty to conspiracy to convert criminal property. On 3rd July 2017 he was sentenced to three years and seven months' imprisonment.
The applicant renews his application for leave to appeal against sentence following refusal by the single judge. He has been represented on the application by Mr Smith of counsel, who appears pro bono and who has said all he can in support of the application.
The facts of the offence are these. The applicant joined a conspiracy to launder the proceeds of fraud. He was initially involved innocently. He provided his own business account to facilitate payment, but later in 2014 he became aware that the payments in question were fraudulent. Rather than withdrawing, he became heavily involved by opening and operating several other bank accounts for the receipt of what he knew to be funds in the region of £1 million.
The applicant was involved in three transactions. The first related to a forged cheque purportedly drawn on a company named Oxford Biomedica in the sum of £55,000 odd, which was paid into an account set up by the applicant in the name of Ligna Contractors Limited. In the event, the fraud was detected and the cheque was not paid.
The second related to the transfer of £35,983 by City Link, intended for a company named AJG Parcels. It was diverted to the Ligna Contractors Limited account. The proceeds were quickly withdrawn and thereafter divided between the conspirators.
The third related to an attempt made to divert a further payment of £66,000 from City Link to Ligna Contractors Limited, but that payment was queried and stopped.
The total of those transactions was in excess of £150,000.
In sentencing the applicant, the judge placed the offence within category 4A of the sentencing guidelines for money laundering. He regarded it as a sophisticated conspiracy conducted over a sustained period. The applicant was at its heart, although not at the top. The sums in question totalled approximately £150,000. Category A covers sums between £100,000 and £500,000. The sentencing range for category A is three years to six years' custody, with a starting point of five years, based on £300,000. The judge recognised that the sum in question was less than £300,000 and therefore took a starting point of four years, before reducing it further because of the applicant's late guilty plea to three years and seven months' imprisonment. The judge did not take into account to any significant degree the applicant's previous convictions for resisting a police officer and making false statements for benefits.
Mr Smith contends that the sentence is manifestly excessive. He does not, however, challenge the judge's categorisation of the offence or the amount of credit he gave for the guilty plea. His argument is that, as the total sum involved (£150,000) was only half the sum which forms the basis of the starting point in the category, and as only £35,000 was actually received, the starting point should have been nearer to three years (the bottom of the range) than five years.
We see no merit whatsoever in that argument. Sentencing is not a mathematical exercise with a formulaic or linear approach. The fallacy is demonstrated by the fact that the top of the range of the category below (category 5A) is itself four years' custody, based upon an amount of £100,000.
The judge placed this offence in the correct category and at the correct end of the range.
The single judge expressed the view that a lower sentence would have been unduly lenient. We agree. It is not remotely arguable that the sentence was either manifestly excessive or wrong in principle.
The renewed application is accordingly refused.
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