Collins, R v

MR JUSTICE EDIS: Clive Stuart Collins is now 76 years old.

He now renews his application for an extension of time in which to seek leave to appeal against both conviction and sentence.

The provisions of the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992 apply in this case and no matter relating to the two victims in this case shall, during their lifetimes, be included in any publication if it is likely to lead members of the public to identify them as victims of any offence dealt with in this case.

On 15 June 2017, in the Crown Court, the applicant was convicted of 11 counts of indecent assault, contrary to section 14 of the Sexual Offences Act 1956 and two counts of indecency with a child, contrary to section 1 of the Indecency with Children Act 1960. The jury acquitted of three other offences. The convictions were in respect of offences which were specimen counts.

The case was dealt with by the sentencing judge on the basis that consecutive terms were imposed on some counts resulting in a total sentence of 10 years' imprisonment. Although the judge appears to have used the word "consecutive" when sentencing in respect of one 12-month sentence when he clearly meant 'concurrent', the court record was correctly marked with a sentence of 10 years and not 11 and that slip therefore did not cause any difficulty. This application relates to a total term of 10 years' imprisonment which is the sentence recorded in the order of the Crown Court.

The facts of the prosecution case are set out in the Criminal Appeal Office summary and it is unnecessary to set them out in any detail here. There were convictions for 12 offences, relating to the sexual abuse of the applicant's stepdaughter, between 1975 and 1985, when she was between the ages of 5 and 15 and there was one conviction relating to a friend of her’s who was staying over in the house in 1985. That offence was committed against that young woman when she was 17 years old.

The nature of the offences involved a variety of different forms of sexual abuse, ranging from offences towards the lower end of seriousness to offences of very substantial gravity involving rubbing the applicant's penis around his stepdaughter's mouth and touching her vaginal area. The offending against the friend of the stepdaughter was substantially less serious, involving touching her breasts and thighs but nevertheless not to be underrated.

The grounds of appeal against conviction are threefold. First, the applicant says that Crown counsel incorrectly referred to photographs of naked children on a computer in the applicant's possession. He says that there were not any and that this was not corrected by his counsel. Secondly, he says his counsel at trial did not use his best endeavours and did not really pursue any line of questioning to its fullest conclusion. Thirdly, he says the arraignment took place at the end of the trial.

The single judge, in refusing leave to argue any of those three grounds and in refusing to extend time to enable such argument to take place, dealt with them on the merits. Because of the nature of the complaint about defence counsel privilege was waived and the response was obtained from trial counsel which revealed that the complaints are entirely without merit.

The computer, which is referred to in the first ground, was not part of the prosecution case but was raised by trial counsel, on the applicant's instructions, in order to demonstrate that there were arguments between him and his stepdaughter which might explain why she made what he said were malicious allegations against him. She said, when being asked to deal with that, that there were photographs of naked children on the computer but subsequently it was established, through her evidence, that there were not. There were photographs of her on the computer but she was not at the time when they were taken a child. Counsel dealt with that, established the truth and made submissions about it in his closing speech.

The complaint about bad representation is entirely without substance and contains no detail at all. It is merely a generalised assertion. The response obtained from trial counsel shows that he was conscientious in the preparation of the case and, as an example of this, that he carried out some research on the Electoral Register which established the date when an address changed which explains the acquittals on three of the counts on which the Crown failed to prove. There is no merit in that complaint at all.

The third ground of appeal against conviction is based on a technical argument which is entirely without merit, As the decision of this court in R v Williams 64 Cr App R 106 makes clear. It is not in fact certain that there was no arraignment at an earlier stage in the proceedings before the start of trial at which the applicant pleaded not guilty. In case there had been no arraignment there was an arraignment towards the end of the trial in order to correct any technical difficulty which might otherwise have arisen. That is entirely by the by. No injustice of any kind has flowed from that because the applicant has always maintained that he is in fact not guilty of these offences. The taking of that plea was not a matter of substantial importance in the proceedings in those circumstances. It did not matter when it happened.

For those reasons this application for leave to appeal against conviction is refused and it is also unnecessary to extend time. That application is refused too.

So far as sentencing is concerned, the sentencing judge followed what is the appropriate procedure in cases of this kind which are now very familiar before the Crown Court and indeed in this court too. The appropriate steps involve applying the current guidance but having regard to the maximum sentences available at the time and also to all relevant aggravating and mitigating features. The sentencing judge clearly did that and referred to, in sentencing remarks which were carefully structured, all the appropriate considerations before arriving at a sentence for this campaign of sexual abuse over a 10-year period, against a child, in breach of trust, of 10 years' imprisonment.

There can be no possible complaint about that sentence and this application for leave to appeal against sentence is similarly refused.