Royal Courts of Justice
Strand
London, WC2A 2LL
B e f o r e:
LORD JUSTICE SINGH
MRS JUSTICE LANG DBE
THE RECORDER OF CARDIFF
HER HONOUR JUDGE REES QC
(Sitting as a Judge of the CACD)
R E G I N A
v
ALAN P
Computer Aided Transcript of the Stenograph Notes of Epiq Europe Ltd 165 Street London EC4A 2DY, Tel No: 020 7404 1400 Email: rcj@epiqglobal.co.uk (Official Shorthand Writers to the Court)
Non-Counsel Application
J U D G M E N T (Approved)
If this transcript is to be reported or published, there is a requirement to ensure that no reporting restriction will be breached. This is particularly important in relation to any case involving a sexual offence, where the victim is guaranteed lifetime anonymity (Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992), or where an order has been made in relation to a young person.
MRS JUSTICE LANG: The provisions of the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992 apply to this offence and so nothing shall be published which may lead to the complainant being identified.
On 6 October 2016 at Basildon Crown Court, the applicant was convicted of 12 counts of indecent assault, contrary to section 14(1) of the Sexual Offences Act 1956. He was sentenced to a total of six years' imprisonment.
The offences were committed against his stepdaughter in about 1980/81 when she was aged 15 and 16.
Permission to appeal against conviction and for an extension of time of 28 days were refused by the single judge.
We agree with the detailed reasons which the single judge gave as follows:
"First, it is suggested that the police failed to investigate the allegations made against you properly. Various points are made in this regard. You say that the officer in charge of the case had been pregnant during a part of the investigation and this may have affected the quality of that investigation. There is absolutely nothing in this point which is speculative and misconceived. You also say that the police failed to interview various family members who may have been able to give evidence in support of your defence. Again, there is nothing in this point: it was for you to call evidence in support of your case. As your counsel has explained, a decision was taken in relation to your former wife and your son, D, which was that it would be better if they were not called to give evidence. That decision was a decision which you made in conjunction with your counsel, and has nothing to do with the steps taken by the police in relation to their investigation....
You go on to refer to a list of some 35 questions which you maintain ought to have been addressed by the police. Your complaint appears to be that these questions were not asked in the ABE interview. Your counsel has explained, however, that he told you that there is a difference between an ABE interview and an interview under caution. The questions were ... explored to the extent appropriate during cross-examination of the prosecution witness and raised in your counsel's closing speech.
You add that your property ought to have been searched. Again, however, this is a matter for the police and not the matter for complaint by you. The same applies in relation to your criticism that the police did not interview either of your sons despite their having visited the house at the relevant time.
Secondly, you complain about the representation provided by your counsel (and, indeed, your solicitors). You complain specifically about the 35 questions which you suggest were not pursued. The answer to this is that, as your counsel has explained, they were pursued to the extent appropriate. You also complain that your counsel did not take exception to the prosecution counsel's reference during the course of opening to the offences having been committed during a 'matrix of violence'. It was, however, a matter for prosecution counsel to present the case as she thought fit. Likewise, to the extent that you criticise the practice adopted by the prosecution of reading out your police interview, this is utterly misconceived. This practice is widespread and your counsel cannot be criticised for failing to object to its adoption at your trial.
Thirdly, you suggest that the judge pressurised the jury into making a rushed decision by making it clear at the outset of the trial that the trial should conclude within four days. Your counsel has explained that there is nothing in this point. He is not, indeed, sure that any mention was made of the judge being unable to sit on the Friday in the presence of the jury. If any such mention was made, whether in the presence of the jury or in the jury's absence, your counsel has explained that there was, in any event, no pressure of the sort which you suggest. On the contrary, the judge gave every indication of being content that the trial should, if necessary, go into a second week."
For these reasons, given by the single judge, we conclude that there are no arguable grounds of appeal against conviction and leave ought to be refused. In those circumstances, the application for an extension of time also ought to be refused.
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