Sliogeris v R

On 24^th July 2014 in the Crown Court at Norwich before His Honour Judge Holt, the Honorary Recorder of Norwich, the appellant was convicted of murder (count 1) and doing acts tending and intended to pervert the course of justice (count 2).

The following day he was sentenced on count 1 to imprisonment for life; the period of 210 months was specified as the minimum term under s269(2) Criminal Justice Act 2003. He was sentenced to 15 months’ imprisonment concurrent on count 2. He now appeals against his conviction for murder by leave of the single judge.There were three co-accused: Saidas Janulevicius and Algirdas Pocius were acquitted of murder and discharged. Mantas Staponka was convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment with a minimum term of 16 years.

On 11^th November 2013 Sergejs Cvics a resident of Flat 3 46 Wellesley Road found the body of Paulius Jakovlevas in the communal stairwell (107F). The post mortem concluded that death had occurred some two to three days prior to discovery. The victim had suffered some 80 injuries from a sustained and brutal attack during which he had been kicked, punched or hit multiple times with a blunt weapon. A knife had been used to cut him. The pathologist, Dr Swift, concluded from the finding of an acute subdural haematoma that the cause of death was a serious head injury resulting in internal bleeding to the brain. The deceased would have been unconscious for some time prior to death.

The prosecution case was that each of the four defendants had been jointly responsible for the attack on Paulius Jakovlevas in the appellant’s flat which led to his death, and that they either intended to kill him or to cause him really serious injury.

The only direct evidence of the attack came from Rasa Petrosiene who was a close friend of the appellant. On the evening of Friday 8 November she went with friends to the appellant’s house for a drink. She had to telephone to get the appellant to open the door. She heard a loud noise and shouting, and the appellant telling everyone to get out. The appellant let her into the flat and she pushed the door open to the bedroom/kitchen/living room. The centre of the room was dark although there was light from the kitchen area. She had a snapshot of what was going on. She saw three people, including the appellant, who was standing next to her; Pocius was sitting on a stool at the breakfast bar.

There was a man on the floor, half his body towards the kitchen and upper half towards the bed. Staponka was standing side on to her in the kitchen area, looking straight and frozen. His right leg was pulled back behind his left, with the heel off the ground, and his right arm pulled back. He was about half a metre to a metre from the man on the floor. The man on the floor was on his side leaning on one arm and he lifted the other and turned to face her. He seemed to be bleeding from his face, possibly his nose. He held a small blood stained cloth and the appellant was saying: “Clean it.” She did not know to whom this was addressed. He was also saying: “Clean it, tidy up and leave.” This was in a raised voice. She looked for a short minute and left. The appellant had chased after her and had asked if he could come with her but she told him it was his flat and for him to sort out.

Both the appellant and Mantas Staponka relied upon a cut-throatdefence in that each blamed the other as being solely responsible for the violence inflicted on the victim. The appellant said that Staponka had a dispute with the deceased over a ring; there had been a fight and Staponka had attacked the deceased with fists, his feet and a knife. Staponka said that he was asleep throughout the incident through drink and drugs and had nothing to do with the attack at all. The cases for both Janulevicius and Pocius were that they had left the flat before the violence had started.

The evidence against the appellant was circumstantial. The prosecution contended that he was seeking to distance himself from his association with the deceased when in fact telephone schedules showed that they had probably been in contact a few days earlier; that when Rasa turned up, he did not say that the other men were out of control and that she should get an ambulance or the police as he might have been expected to do had he been innocent; and that he was the oldest of the four and was looked up to by the others. There were injuries to his hands and face which he explained for the first time at trial by saying that an associate had hit him and he had fallen into the bushes. Moreover, his slippers were found to be stained with the blood of the deceased. They were used to kick the deceased because the imprint of the sole was found on the right side of his head. The appellant explained this by saying that he was told by Staponka to wash Staponka’s trainers, which he did. When he returned, Staponka was wearing his slippers and was kicking the deceased. No mention was made of this in interviews or his defence statement; this explanation surfaced for the first time at trial. The prosecution contended that it was manufactured to meet the forensic evidence.

At around ten o’clock on the Friday night he phoned two people, including Rasa. He did not then blame Staponka for the attack; and he did not either then or later call an ambulance as Rasa suggested, which the Crown say indicated that he did not want the authorities involved. Furthermore, he remained in the company of Staponka throughout the weekend when they went to Peterborough together. From the evidence about their activities, it could be inferred that they were intending to return to Lithuania together. In his interviews – and there were seven in all – he lied consistently, maintaining that he did not know the deceased, knew nothing about the killing and did not know who was responsible. The prosecution submit that this was very powerful evidence.

The appeal relates to an additional piece of evidence implicating the appellant. It was an out of court statement allegedly made by Pocius to the landlord of the premises Pocius rented, Ricardos Mikolaitas. Mikolaitas gave a statement to the police (it was in fact his fourth statement) in which for the first time he recounted a conversation he had had with Pocius on Saturday 9 November when Pocius had said that he had seen the appellant beat a man to death. Subsequently Mikolaitas gave evidence but was more equivocal as to what he had been told. In his evidence in chief he said that Pocius told him that the appellant was one of the people present when a man was attacked, but he did not say that Pocius had actually identified the appellant as the attacker. In cross examination by counsel for Staponka, the relevant part of his police interview statement was put to him and it is arguable that an ambiguous answer could be read as confirming his original statement that Pocius had indeed identified the appellant as the attacker.

The co-defendant, Staponka, sought to have this alleged hearsay statement put in evidence before the jury. It supported his case that he was not the attacker. Pocius had neither been interviewed (because he had been extradited from Lithuania for the trial) nor had he chosen to give evidence. As a co-defendant he was not, of course, a compellable witness.

The issue for the judge was whether the out of court statement made by Pocius should be admitted. Even if Mikailis’ evidence before the jury could be construed as confirming his statement in interview as to what Pocius had said about the appellant being the attacker, it was still hearsay rather than direct evidence and the question was whether it ought to be admitted.

There were potentially two routes by which it could be admitted. First, if it could be said to constitute a confession, it could be admitted pursuant to section 76A of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (“PACE”). At common law, which is now reflected in section 76 of PACE, a statement constituting a confession by a defendant in a criminal trial is admissible as evidence against him, but it is not admissible in relation to anyone else, either against him or in his favour. That principle was modified by the House of Lords R v Myers (Melanie) 1998 AC 224 so as to allow the confession in certain cases to be used in a co-defendant’s favour but not against him. Section 128 (2) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 has inserted a new section 76A into PACE which incorporates and clarifies that principle:

“(1)

In any proceedings a confession made by an accused person may be given in evidence for another person charged in the same proceedings (a co-accused) in so far as it is relevant to any matter in issue in the proceedings and is not excluded by the court in pursuance of this section.”

The confession will be excluded if it has been obtained by oppression or as a result of anything said or done which is likely to render it unreliable (see section 176A(2)). That was not the case here. This provision only applies where there is a confession and that is defined by section 82 of PACE as follows:

“Any statement wholly or partially adverse to the person who made it; whether made to a person in authority or not; and whether made in words or not.”

The second and more fundamental route to admissibility results from the change in the law of hearsay effected by the Criminal Justice Act 2003. Section 114(1)(d) makes hearsay admissible if it is in the interests of justice to admit it. Section 114(1)(d), which lays down the general principle, is as follows:

“In criminal proceedings a statement not made in oral evidence in the proceedings is admissible as evidence of any matter stated if, but only if— …..

(d)

the court is satisfied that it is in the interests of justice for it to be admissible.”

Section 114(2) then sets out a number of factors which a court must consider in deciding whether a statement should be admitted under section 114(1)(d):

“(2)

In deciding whether a statement not made in oral evidence should be admitted under subsection (1)(d), the court must have regard to the following factors (and to any others it considers relevant) —

(a)

how much probative value the statement has (assuming it to be true) in relation to a matter in issue in the proceedings, or how valuable it is for the understanding of other evidence in the case;

(b)

what other evidence has been, or can be, given on the matter or evidence mentioned in paragraph (a);

(c)

how important the matter or evidence mentioned in paragraph (a) is in the context of the case as a whole;

d)

the circumstances in which the statement was made;

This provision is capable of applying to out of court statements made by a co-defendant even if that statement constitutes a confession within the terms of section 82: see R v Y [2008] EWCA Crim [2008] 1 WLR 1683 where this court, in a judgment delivered by Hughes LJ, carefully analysed the scope of the section and gave a number of reasons for that conclusion. As Hughes LJ (as he then was) pointed out, there is nothing in the section which requires confessions to be treated differently from other out of court statements, although the fact that a statement is an accusation against a defendant will be very relevant when considering whether the interests of justice justify admitting it in evidence. Hughes LJ also said (para. 59) that the identity of the applicant is relevant to the interests of justice test; it does not follow that the interests of justice are the same when the Crown seeks to adduce the evidence as they are when a co-defendant is the applicant. Moreover, he emphasised that out of court statements should not be routinely admitted.

In principle, therefore, a co-defendant’s confession as defined by section 82 may be admissible under either of these provisions although if the statement does not constitute a confession within the meaning of section 82, it can only be admitted under section 114. An important distinction between the two provisions, however, is that where the conditions of section 76A are met, there is no discretion to exclude the evidence on the grounds that it would not be in the interests of justice to admit it. Section 78 of PACE would not apply since that only bites where the evidence is being relied upon by the Crown.

In this case the prosecution accepted that it could not properly have sought to have the evidence admitted under either provision. But the application was made by a co-defendant. The judge concluded that the evidence was admissible under both section 76A and section 114. The submission ably advanced by Mr Spence QC, counsel for the appellant, is that he ought not to have admitted this evidence under either of those provisions and that given its potential significance, it rendered the verdict of guilty unsafe.

The judge deliberately delayed ruling on this application until it had become clear that Pocius would not give evidence at the trial. All parties had been alerted to the fact that the application was going to be made if Pocius did not give evidence; and also Pocius’ counsel had indicated that it was highly unlikely that he would give evidence. Evidence of the statement was admitted on the grounds that it was potentially evidence against Pocius himself and as a consequence, when Mikolaitis was cross-examined by counsel for the appellant, Mr Spence was able to question him about the reliability of Pocius and whether Mikolaitis had believed the statement made to him. The judge obtained a transcript of Mikolaitis’ evidence before determining whether the evidence was admissible on either of the bases advanced by counsel for Staponka. Had the parts of the conversation relating to the appellant not been admitted as part of Staponka’s case, the jury would have had to have been directed to ignore them and not hold them against the appellant.

The judge set out in his ruling the context in which the application was made. He had obtained a transcript of the evidence given by Mikolaitis. The judge noted that Mikolaitis had said that Pocius was an inveterate liar and a drunk. He also observed that in certain respects Mikolaitis was more guarded in evidence about what Pocius had said than he had been when interviewed. The judge summarised his analysis of the evidence thus:

“So that is the evidence which we now have, and it seems to me that if this matter does go to the jury, it was very much a matter for the jury as to what they make of that evidence. It seems, on one understanding of it, he was definitely saying it was [the appellant]. He was very – perhaps for understandable reasons – reluctant to spell it out. On the other hand, Mr Spence points to various bits in his evidence where he is not saying it is [the appellant]. But, as I say, if this matter is left to the jury, it is something that they will have to consider.”

The judge focused upon section 76A first. He considered whether the statement made by Pocius constituted a confession within the meaning of section 82(1) and he took the view that it clearly was, at least, a partial confession, because Pocius was admitting to being present in the flat when the deceased was beaten to death. That was an admission against interest.

He was satisfied - and this is not disputed - that the evidence was plainly relevant to an issue in the proceedings, namely who had attacked the deceased. He identified what he considered to be the key question in the following way:

“Can the confession of D4 (Pocius) that includes identifying D1 (the appellant) as the man responsible for the murder of the victim be relied upon by D3 (Mantas Staponka) under section 76(A)? ”

He was satisfied that the wording of section 76(A) was broad enough to permit the confession to be adduced in those circumstances.

He then went on, in case he was wrong in relation to section 76A, to consider the application of the hearsay provisions in section 114(1)(d). He considered a number of the authorities, including McLean [2007] EWCA Crim 219 and Y, and noted that Y allowed the statement to be admitted under section 114 even if it was a confession. He observed that he would have refused the application had the Crown been the applicant, but that different considerations applied where it was a co-defendant.

The judge then went through each of the matters identified in section 114 (2). He noted that it was potentially very important evidence; that only one witness had seen any part of the attack (Rasa Petrosiene) and that it was a voluntary statement to a third party who was a landlord and effectively a friend. He then said this in relation to the matters identified in paragraphs (d) to (f):

“The circumstances in which the statement was made.’ ‘Well, the circumstances are perhaps again slightly unusual. This is not a confession by [Pocius] (D4) in an interview to the Police. This was a voluntary statement made to his landlord – effectively a friend – and this was made very recently after [the deceased] had been killed. And it seems that at that stage [Pocius] was … or did not have self-interest in mind, as one might have expected if he was telling somebody in authority about who had carried out these acts.

‘How reliable the maker of the statement appears to be’. Well, that is Mikolaitis. And ultimately it would be a matter for the jury … it will be a matter for the jury as to how reliable he is.

The point has been made in cross-examination that he didn’t mention this until a month afterwards, in his fourth statement. His answer is: “Well, in my country, because I didn’t inform the authorities, I myself am in serious trouble, and that’s why I didn’t.”

‘(f) how reliable the evidence of the making of the statement appears to be?’ Again I’ve really covered that in (e). …’

He noted that Pocius was not a compellable witness but that because of the advanced notice that he probably would not give evidence, Mr Spence had been able to cross examine Mikolaitis about Pocius’ credibility. He observed that there was other independent evidence supporting the Crown’s case, referring to the slipper print in particular. He concluded that in all the circumstances it was in the interests of justice that the evidence should be admitted in fairness to this co-defendant, Staponka.

With respect to the admissibility under section 76A, it is submitted that the judge erred in two respects. First, he was wrong to say that Pocius’ statement that it was the appellant who had beaten the deceased was admissible as a confession. It did not properly fall within the terms of section 82A at all. Second, and in any event, the intention of section 76A was only to allow evidence to be adduced against a co-defendant where it was in his favour. So even if the judge had properly admitted it, he should have told the jury in his summing up not to use it as evidence against the appellant but only as evidence in favour of the co-defendant, Staponka.

The appellant also submits that the judge erred in his approach to section 114. First, he confused the identity of the maker of the statement; it was not Mikolaitis as he had stated but Pocius. Moreover, he erred in the way in which he approached section 114(2)(e) and (f). He said these were matters for the jury to assess, whereas the proper reading of the section makes it clear that they are issues for the trial judge himself to decide. He submits that that was particularly important here because there was good reason to question the reliability of both Pocius who allegedly made the hearsay statement, and Mikolaitis, who had failed to confirm in his evidence what he had alleged was said in his interview. Finally, he submits that the evidence was so unsatisfactory, and its benefit to Staponka was in truth so slight that the judge was wrong to allow it to go before the jury at all.

We first consider the judge’s approach to section 76A. The first issue is whether the evidence sought to be adduced is, properly analysed, a confession. We accept that the statement by Pocius that he was present is a statement against interest and may be said to fall under the terms of section 82. However, that is not the statement which the co-accused, Staponka, wishes to have admitted in evidence. He is relying upon another comment made by Pocius, which is logically quite distinct from his admission of his presence, namely that the appellant had committed the offence. That is an exculpatory statement and does not itself amount to a confession; nor is it so inextricably linked with the (partial) confession to justify it being treated in that way.

This conclusion is supported by the decision of this court in McLean [2007] EWCA Crim 219 [2008] 1 Cr. App. R. 11. In that case three co-defendants were charged with killing the deceased. He received a single stab to the heart. They were all alleged to have been part of a joint enterprise. At trial two of the co-defendants, M and P, ran cut throat defences and blamed each other for the stabbing. As in this case H did not give evidence nor did he answer questions in interview but he made a statement to a police officer that he had been present facing the deceased when P had stabbed him.

This was again therefore an admission of presence but a denial of any direct involvement and an exculpatory statement purporting to identify the co-defendant as the person who had struck the fatal blow. The Court of Appeal noted that section 76A did not apply, adding that it had never been suggested that it did. As Hughes LJ put it (para. 16) “What M wanted in evidence was not a confession by H but an out of court accusation by H of P”.

Hughes LJ had foreshadowed this distinction in Finch [2007] EWCA Crim 36; [2007] 1 Cr. App. R. 36 when he said (para.12):

“We are conscious of the definition of “confession” in s.82 of the 1984 Act, that is to say as including “any statement wholly or partly adverse to the person making it”. However, to accept (as we do) that a statement may remain a confession whilst partially exculpatory and partly inculpatory, is not the same as to say that everything which is said at the same time as an admission falls within the definition “confession”.”

The prosecution submit that McLean is distinguishable. In that case the statement may not have been a confession but in principle a statement by a defendant that he is present at the scene of a crime is capable of constituting an admission within the meaning of section 82, and it did so here.

We do not doubt that it is, but that is not the issue and nor was it the basis of the decision in McLean. The question is whether the statement which the co-defendant sought to have adduced identifying the appellant as the attacker was part of the confession or should be treated as an assertion independent of it. In our judgment, as in McLean, this was not part of the confession itself and therefore section 76A did not come into play.

This is a far cry from cases like Myer [1998] A.C.224 or the more recent case of Nazir [2009]j EWCA Crim 213. In each of those cases a defendant admitted in an out of court statement that he alone had attacked the deceased although at trial he alleged that it was his co-defendant. In each case there were cut-throat defences. As the court pointed out in Nazir, that is an admission that he acted alone which in turn was highly important evidence for the co- defendant who had denied carrying out the attack. In such cases the confession both inculpates the maker of the statement and by implication exculpates the co-defendant. It is a classic example where section 76A can be invoked by the co-defendant.

In the circumstances we do not have to resolve the further ground of appeal, which essentially raises the question whether, once evidence of a confession by a defendant is properly admitted in favour of a co-defendant, it can in principle thereafter be used against all defendants and not merely the maker of the statement. In the light of the purpose behind the provision, there is a cogent case for saying that it should not be treated as evidence in the case generally but only in favour of a co-defendant. That would require the judge to direct the jury that it should not treat that statement as evidence against a co-defendant (other than the party making the confession) but that the jury may treat it as evidence in favour of the co-defendant who has successfully applied for it to be admitted. However, we leave that issue to be decided on another occasion.

We turn to consider section 114. As we have said, it is now well established that a confession is in principal admissible in evidence against a co-defendant under this section and that was established in Y. The critical question is whether the interests of justice require it and in order to determine that question the judge has to have regard to the matters set out in section 114(2) and any other relevant considerations.

We begin by observing that it is well established that this court will only interfere with the exercise of a judge’s discretion if the judge went wrong in principle or reached a decision which was outside the band of decisions available to him: see Finch para. 23. In this case the judge plainly did make an error, as the prosecution concede, as to the identity of the maker of the statement. It was not Mikolatis, but Pocius. The potential significance of that was that Mikolatis himself said that Pocius was an inveterate liar, a professional liar, a clown, and somebody whose word could not be relied upon.

Mr Spence submits that in any event the judge failed properly to seek to make any kind of assessment of the reliability of the maker of the statement, nor did he consider how reliable the evidence of the making of the statement was, as paragraph (f) requires. He simply ob served that it was a matter for the jury.

We agree that it is for the judge to consider the factors identified in section 114(2), including making an assessment of the reliability of the maker of the statement and the circumstances in which it was made. He cannot abrogate that responsibility by saying that it is a matter for the jury: see Musone [2007] EWCA Crim 1237 [2007] 2 Cr. App.R.29, paras. 25-26 where in similar circumstances, Moses LJ said that it would render section 114(2)(e) nugatory if the judge could always say that the assessment of the evidence was for the jury. That is not to say that a judge has to reach a concluded view on reliability or, indeed, on the other matters identified in section 114(2). But as Moses LJ observed, if the judge does not consider the evidence to be reliable, that would be a powerful factor against admitting it. At the very least it seems to us that the judge must be satisfied that the evidence is properly capable of being considered reliable by a jury.

We accept, therefore, that the judge erred in his approach to paragraphs (e) and (f). But having said that, it seems to us plain from the judge’s observations set out at paragraph 26 above, that he did think that the evidence of Pocius was potentially reliable notwithstanding the evidence that Pocius was generally untrustworthy. The judge pointed out when considering paragraph (d) that this was not a statement given to someone in authority, and it did not seem that Pocius had self interest in mind. Indeed, he seemed proud of his connection with the appellant. Accordingly, while we accept that the judge did not expressly analyse the reliability of Pocius’ evidence, he did in our view identify the factors which demonstrated that he was in fact satisfied that the statement, if made, was plainly capable of being believed by a jury. Similarly, as regards paragraph (f) concerning the making of the statement: he recognised that there was the equivocal evidence given by Mikolaitis but noted that this appeared to be because he was reluctant to spell out in terms before the jury what he had said in interview. Again, it seems to us that the judge is recognising that the jury could properly accept that the original statement given by Mikolaitis in interview did accurately record what Pocius said, notwithstanding Mikolaitis’ reluctance to confirm it in his evidence.

Mr Spence submits that even if the evidence is in principle capable of belief, nonetheless the judge ought to have excluded it, having regard to all the relevant circumstances. It was not a legitimate exercise of discretion, not least because it was not, when properly analysed, of any real assistance to Staponka. His case was that he was asleep throughout; it was not material which of the others carried out the attack.

We recognise that a court will not readily admit an out of court statement by one defendant as evidence against another. But in our view a critical feature of this case, as the judge recognised, is that the application was made by a co-defendant who sought to have the evidence admitted in support of his case. Staponka was saying, by implication, that the appellant was responsible for the attack, and this was potentially important evidence in support of his case. Notwithstanding the errors in the way the judge dealt with paragraphs (e) and (f), it is clear in our view that the judge did believe that the evidence was potentially reliable and after a very careful consideration of all relevant matters, he came to the conclusion that the evidence should be admitted. In our judgment that was a cogent and proper conclusion properly available to him.

The case of McLean indicates that once evidence is in under section 114 it is in for all purposes. Hughes LJ observed (para. 20) that “there is no doubt that if and when hearsay evidence of this kind is ruled admissible it becomes evidence in the case generally”. Mr Spence did not seek to suggest otherwise.

There is no criticism of the way in which the judge summed up. He pointed out to the jury that they had to decide on the reliability of this evidence and they also had to bear in mind that the maker of the statement had not been subject to cross-examination and they must be careful not to give it undue weight. In fact the judge also directed the jury that even if they considered that Mikalaitis’ evidence was inconsistent with his earlier statement, the jury could still if they wished rely upon the earlier statement if they thought it right to do so. There has been no complaint about that direction.

It follows that, in our judgment, the judge was entitled to conclude that it was in the interests of the applicant and co-defendant, Staponka, that this evidence should be admitted.

In the circumstances we need not need to go on to consider whether, had we found that the evidence had been wrongly admitted, we would have concluded that the verdict was safe in any event. We would simply observe that there is a very powerful argument that it was, given the strength of the case against the appellant as summarised in paragraphs 8-9 above.

Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.