Case No. No: 200903756/A1
Royal Courts of Justice
Strand
London, WC2A 2LL
B e f o r e:
SIR ANTHONY MAY
(PRESIDENT OF THE QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION)
MR JUSTICE ANDREW SMITH
MRS JUSTICE NICOLA DAVIES DBE
R E G I N A
v
LEE ROBERT PELL
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Mr B Bhatia appeared on behalf of the Appellant
Miss D Pritchard appeared on behalf of the Crown
J U D G M E N T
MRS JUSTICE NICOLA DAVIES: On 2 June 2009 at the Crown Court at Nottingham the appellant pleaded guilty to causing death by careless driving when under the influence of drink. On 2 July 2009 His Honour Judge Milmo QC sentenced the appellant to 10 years' imprisonment and disqualified him from driving for 10 years, thereafter taking an extended re-test. The appellant was granted leave to appeal against sentence by the court.
At 7.35 pm on 17 May 2009 Hilda Jepson, aged 88, was walking along the pavement of the B6026 road in Nottinghamshire in order to attend a social event at her local community centre. The sun was shining but the road was wet. The road is a single carriageway with a 30-mile per hour speed limit. It is a straight piece of road but drivers travelling in the direction taken by the appellant, drive up to the brow of the hill and over it, shortly before the point where the accident occurred. Mrs Jepson had been involved in a campaign for crossing at that particular stretch of road because although the speed limit is 30 miles per hour it is a fast road.
Mrs Jepson stopped at the side of the road. She looked both ways and began to cross. As she approached the central white line, a car travelling in the same direction as the appellant's slowed down to pass her and she held back onto her side of the road. The car having passed Mrs Jepson began to complete her crossing of the road. She walked with the aid of a stick. It would appear that she saw the approach of the appellant's car because CCTV coverage showed her to increase her speed. The appellant was driving a Renault Clio vehicle. He drove towards Mrs Jepson. He did not slow down or take any evasive action. The appellant struck Mrs Jepson who was knocked onto the bonnet. The car continued for another 20 metres before she was thrown from the bonnet as the car came to a stop. The impact was to the centre nearside of the appellant's car; it occurred about halfway across the appellant's side of the carriageway.
The appellant remained at the scene and called 999 for the ambulance. At the scene he was challenged by another driver and he said that Mrs Jepson had run out in front of him. The ambulance crew attended but Mrs Jepson was pronounced dead at the scene. The police attended. The appellant was arrested. He failed a roadside breath test and was taken to a police station. The line intoximeter procedure was conducted just before 9.00 pm. The lowest of the two readings was 76 micrograms of alcohol in 100 millilitres of breadth. Calculations carried out after the accident indicated that the appellant was travelling at an average speed of 44 miles per hour.
The appellant was interviewed on 18 May 2009. He said he had been at a friend's house that afternoon where he had drunk four bottles of Magners cider. The previous evening he had gone out and he was "bladdered drunk". He said that he had driven the car because he wanted to clear his head: a good friend of his had committed suicide some days earlier. He said prior to the accident he had put his foot down in order to travel up a hill. He was travelling at about 45 miles an hour and the sun was beaming straight into his eyes. When he came over the hill he saw the side of a lady walking with a stick. He had slammed on his brakes to try to steer into the opposing carriageway but the tyres had locked. At that point the appellant thought his speed was about 40 miles per hour.
At interview the appellant accepted responsibility for Mrs Jepson's death.
In fact the sun at the time of the accident would have been behind the appellant not in the face. Further, there were no brake marks shown on the road.
The appellant pleaded guilty to the offence at an early hearing. He has a bad history of driving offences. On 16 December 2002, for driving a motor vehicle with excess alcohol, the appellant was fined £420 and disqualified from driving for 18 months. On 8 January 2003 he drove a vehicle whilst disqualified, uninsured and with excess alcohol. He was sentenced to 2 months' detention and disqualified from driving for 3 years. On 8 February 2005, for driving whilst disqualified, uninsured and with excess alcohol, having taken a vehicle without consent, the appellant was sentenced to 4 months' detention.
In sentencing the appellant, the judge stated that the collision occurred because the appellant was driving too fast and in excess of the speed limit. He failed to avoid the collision when he had every opportunity to do so. If the road was wet he failed to adjust his speed to take account of the road conditions. He was not keeping any proper lookout and if the sun was in his eyes, which the judge did not accept, the onus was upon the appellant to adjust his speed accordingly.
The judge took account of the sentencing guidelines. He regarded the appellant's previous driving convictions as aggravating factors. The judge gave as the starting point for the offence a sentence of 7 years' imprisonment, the range being 6 to 12 years. This places the offence in the highest category of the guidelines. The judge identified the mitigation as the appellant's plea of guilty and his genuine remorse. He did not give full credit for the plea of guilty because the nature of the Crown's case was so overwhelming. The judge assessed the appellant's culpability as being particularly high and said that, after a trial, the proper sentence would have been in the range of 12 years. He reduced it by 2 years to give credit for a guilty plea.
Before the judge a member of Mrs Jepson's family read out an eloquent and considered statement, which spoke of the loss sustained by her family. Before the court today is a letter from Mrs Jepson's family which speaks of their concern. We acknowledge that no sentence passed by this court will adequately reflect the loss of a much loved member of this family. Nothing we say can alter the fact that, as the letter states, a dignified lady died in an undignified way.
In approaching this appeal the court has to look at the driving of the appellant and its consequences; the character and previous history of the appellant and his conduct both at the time and subsequently. The appellant did plead guilty at the earliest opportunity. To the probation officer and to the court he has expressed what has been accepted to be genuine remorse. It was he who called for emergency assistance at the scene.
In our judgment, the sentence passed was severe. It was at the top end of the sentencing range. Taking account of the high level of culpability of the appellant in driving, his appalling record of relevant previous convictions, we are unable to say that the sentence passed was manifestly excessive. The appeal is dismissed.