Mitchell, R. v

On 9 March 2009, in the Crown Court at Bournemouth, the appellant pleaded guilty to an offence of causing grievous bodily harm contrary to section 20 of the Offences against the Person Act 1861. On 3 April 2009 he was sentenced to 30 months' imprisonment. He appeals against that sentence by leave of the single judge.

At about 1.30am on 5 July 2008, the complainant, John Coupe, was awoken at his home by his wife who thought she heard something being thrown against the front of their house. The complainant, who had consumed alcohol before going to bed, left the house wearing only his boxer shorts. He saw the appellant and the appellant's girlfriend and assumed that they were responsible for whatever had happened at his home, if indeed anything had. According to the appellant, the complainant took hold of his (the appellant's) arm. The appellant then punched the complainant, which caused them both to fall to the ground. The appellant accepted that he may have punched the complainant more than once and he accepted that he overreacted.

The result of the attack was that Mr Coupe sustained a fracture to his left cheekbone and his lower jaw, which required surgery. He also sustained a fracture to his ankle during the incident, but that was not laid directly at the door of the appellant.

There was a written basis of plea which was accepted by the Crown. The appellant and his girlfriend made off. He was not traced for ten days. When he was arrested, he initially gave a lying account, claiming that the victim had been carrying a knife. At the time of the offence the appellant had been on bail for an offence of battery, which was accurately summarised by the sentencing judge as a form of road rage.

There were a pre-sentence report and a number of character references before the sentencing judge.

The grounds of appeal rely principally upon the assertion that the judge took the wrong starting point in the definitive guideline published by the Sentencing Guidelines Council. In addition, the appellant says that insufficient weight was given to his personal mitigation and the damage done to his career because he was a solicitor.

We are not impressed by that latter point and agree with the observations of the single judge that the appellant brought these matters upon himself. However, we think that his principal complaint has merit. Accordingly, we are minded to quash the sentence of 30 months' imprisonment and to substitute for it a sentence of 18 months' imprisonment.