Buckley, R. v

MR JUSTICE CRANSTON: This originally began as an appeal against the penalties imposed at the Crown Court at Chester. The appellant had pleaded guilty in January of 2009 to being an owner of a dog dangerously out of control in a public place contrary to section 3 of the Dangerous Dogs Act 1991. He was conditionally discharged for two years, ordered to pay £1,000 prosecution costs and disqualified from owning a dog for ten years under section 4 of that Act. There was also an order for forfeiture of and destruction of the dog.

The brief background is that the appellant was originally charged with an aggravated offence under section 3 of the 1991 Act. Following his election, he was committed for trial, but at the case management hearing he pleaded guilty to the non-aggravated form of offence; in other words, that there was no injury caused by the dog.

As a result of the diligence of Mr Michael Catterson in the Criminal Appeal Office a more fundamental problem than sentence arose in relation to what had happened before His Honour Judge Edwards at Chester Crown Court. To put it simply, the issue is: did the Crown Court at Chester have jurisdiction to deal with this case? As a result of Mr Catterson's diligence, Mr Blythin, for the appellant advanced before us today an application for leave to appeal the conviction itself. We agreed with this course. The lack of jurisdiction of the Crown Court has been conceded by Mr Christian, on behalf of the Crown. The difficulty is that there are no relevant statutory provisions enabling the Crown Court to accept a plea of guilty for the summary offence.

The other matter we have to consider, given that we have quashed the conviction, is whether the aggravated form of the offence, which at the time was allowed to lie on the file, ought to be resuscitated. The Crown through Mr Christian have informed us that they do not intend to reinstate proceedings. On that basis we give leave to appeal, we allow the appeal, and we quash the conviction.

THE COURT ASSOCIATE: My Lord, I think counsel should have a representation order for conviction.

LORD JUSTICE HOOPER: You can have a representation order for conviction.

MR BLYTHIN: I am grateful, my Lord.

MR CHRISTIAN: Does that apply to both counsel?

MR BLYTHIN: My Lord, may I express my indebtedness to Mr Catterson.

LORD JUSTICE HOOPER: I think a letter to Mr Catterson, or a letter to Registrar Venne. I have to say, this happens a number of times and we are always hugely thankful to the registrar's office for finding these issues.

MR BLYTHIN: Yes, my Lord.