Anthony & Ors, R v

LORD JUSTICE RICHARDS: The court has before it an appeal by Yvonne Anthony against her conviction on 19 July 2006 at Kingston upon Thames Crown Court after a trial before Her Honour Judge Barnes and a jury on a count of conspiracy to evade the prohibition on the importation of a controlled drug of class A drug, namely cocaine. The conviction was by a majority of ten to two. She was subsequently sentenced to six years' imprisonment with one day on remand to count towards sentence.

A large number of co-defendants were convicted on the same count. Some of them have renewed applications for leave to appeal against conviction or sentence, or for extensions of time for the purpose of making such applications, which are also before the court today. Those with applications before the court are Paul Williams, who was sentenced to 22 years' imprisonment, Delroy Gibson sentenced to 21 years' imprisonment, Anson Charles sentenced to 20 years' imprisonment, Derek Anthony sentenced to 15 years' imprisonment and Stephanie McQueenie sentenced to 23 years' imprisonment.

Other co-defendants, but in relation to whom there are no applications before the court, were Charles Gordon, sentenced to 20 years' imprisonment, Keran Burris-Gordon sentenced to ten years' imprisonment, Wayne Brown sentenced to ten years' imprisonment, and Stacey Burris sentenced to seven years' imprisonment.

In respect of all the custodial sentences to which we have referred the judge directed that time served on remand was to count towards sentence.

The case concerned a conspiracy between May 2003 and August 2005 to import substantial and regular amounts of cocaine from the West Indies for onward supply. The operation involved the recruitment and organisation of numerous couriers who flew from British airports and returned from the West Indies having either swallowed the cocaine or hidden it in their luggage. Some 21 couriers were arrested here, carrying a total of approximately 13.5 kilogrammes of cocaine, but it is unlikely that they were the only ones. The probability is that many others went undetected. The conspirators supplied the couriers with travel tickets, often through a firm called E and M Travel, and documents purporting to be genuine letters of introduction, together with crib sheets containing personal information which the authorities would require. Transport was provided to and from the airports.

A kilogramme of cocaine purchased in the West Indies for £3,000 was worth between £25,000 and £30,000 on the streets of this country. Accordingly, large profits were made, out of which, over time, a total sum of about £300,000 was transferred to the West Indies so as to finance the purchase of the drugs and the activities of the couriers.

The conspirators were found to have different roles as follows, concentrating, first, on the applicants and the appellant.

Williams was the mastermind and central figure. He had set up a bakery business in the London area and employed some of the other defendants, such as Charles, Gibson and Derek Anthony. He used monies from the bakery to set up the conspiracy. He had a relationship with Stacey Burris and stayed regularly with her at an address referred to as 65 Alexander Drive. They also stayed at 12 Broadstone House which was said to have been the administrative centre of the conspiracy. But both addresses featured in the conspiracy and a large number of the relevant documents, including letters of introduction and crib sheets for couriers, were seized there. Williams's telephones were used for regular contact with co-conspirators and those dealing with couriers at critical times. He also had an important role in obtaining travel tickets for couriers through E and M Travel.

Gibson was Williams's number 2 and controlled the day to day operation of the conspiracy which he delegated as needed. He was in contact with the couriers and dealt with their arrival in this country. He personally attended the airports and arranged for others to do so, for example, someone called Ricky Alexander and also the co-defendant McQueenie. He was connected with some of the documentation and he sent over £14,000 to the Caribbean, which was said to be for purchasing drugs and financing couriers. The Crown also said he was involved in the supply of cocaine there. When arrested he was in possession of Williams's details.

Charles was a significant lieutenant in the conspiracy and was involved with recruitment of couriers, including a girlfriend called Marissa Jones. His details were found on a number of couriers. He admitted knowing Alexander. He had lived with Burris at 65 Alexander Drive. He was at the airport when McQueenie was arrested. His telephones were used for frequent contact with co-conspirators, especially Gibson and Williams, at the times of the importations. He was deported to Grenada in July 2004 but returned to this country in November 2004 under a false name. The Crown said he had used his time in Grenada to further the conspiracy by dealing with couriers. His alias, "Paper", was found on a crib sheet seized at 12 Broadstone House and his fingerprints were found on other documents. On his arrest he possessed documents linking with other members of the conspiracy, including McQueenie.

Derek Anthony was a senior manager in the conspiracy and performed the role of head of transport, picking up the couriers on arrival at airports. He also sent over £100,000 to the Caribbean.

McQueenie's primary role was that of courier. She was arrested at Gatwick Airport on arrival from Tobago with 2.44 kilogrammes of cocaine. Her travel had been arranged through E and M Travel and Gibson and Charles were waiting for her at the airport. The judge was sure she had been involved in other acts as well. In addition, a solicitor's letter concerning her arrest was found at 65 Alexander Drive where Burris and Charles lives. Her previous flight to Grenada had been booked through E and Travel by one Patrick, an alias of Williams. Her mobile phone and diary revealed contacts with other conspirators and others named in the evidence.

The appellant Yvonne Anthony was married to Derek Anthony and it was alleged that, whilst she had played a lesser role in the conspiracy, she had assisted it to import the cocaine by transferring over £10,000 to the Caribbean.

As to the other conspirators, Gordon played a vital role as head of administration. He was married to Burris-Gordon and resided at 12 Broadstone House. He led the preparation and onward transmission of the documents essential for the couriers and was involved in transferring funds to the Caribbean.

Burris-Gordon herself was a personal assistant to him. She was involved in sending money and in writing documents and was in the hub of the administration.

Brown came late into the conspiracy but was a willing party to what was required of him by contacting couriers and writing proformas.

Burris was said to be the equivalent of the office girl but was aware of what was happening and she sent some £50,000 to the Caribbean. She was in a relationship with Williams, who was the father of her daughter. She lived for some time at 12 Broadstone House and subseq uently 65 Alexander Drive which she shared with Charles. She visited the courier Marrisa Jones, Charles's girlfriend, in prison, and had other contacts was her and other conspirators.

At the trial the jury had before them various schedules showing the effect of expert evidence regarding fingerprints and handwriting on documents, scientific evidence regarding the cocaine and the use of the various mobile phones. Witnesses, largely unchallenged, were called to deal with the search of the properties and seizure of the documents, the transfer of monies, the identities of persons named in the phone memories or in documents or who were involved in the transfer of monies and other matters.

In summing up the judge suggested to the jury that when they considered whether a conspiracy had existed they should look at various named conspirators, together with the links through phone numbers, crib sheets, letters of introduction and the documents found at the addresses in the case, especially at 12 Broadstone House.

That is all we need by way of introduction to the matters before us. We turn to consider, first, Yvonne Anthony's appeal against conviction. As the judge said in summing-up, the Crown had much less to say about her than about other defendants. The background evidence in relation to her was that she came to this country from Jamaica in 2002 and within six months married Derek Anthony with Williams as best man. She was a long-standing friend of Gibson, who was from Jamaica.

She went to Trinidad in 2002, two days after Williams. In May 2003 she made another trip to Trinidad and at some point she also went to Guyana. A question raised by the Crown was: how could she afford those trips? The telephone schedule also showed contact by her with Williams, Gibson and her husband Derek Anthony at important times, for example, when McQueenie was arriving, which took place at a time when Yvonne Anthony and her husband were separated and she claimed not to have seen Gibson for ages. As to that separation from her husband, we should mention that in her police interview she said she had suffered abuse at his hands and had had to go to a refuge.

We have referred to the fact that the case against her husband included evidence that he had sent over £100,000 to the Caribbean and that she too was alleged to have sent money to the Caribbean. On one occasion they had both gone to the same outlet, presumably to send money.

According to details set out in Mr Pearse Wheatley's skeleton argument on her behalf, there was evidence, at least in the first place, of a total of nine transactions by her, five of which were to people alleged by the Crown to be involved in the conspiracy. It was said that these were made over a period of 15 months and were to the value of just over £6,000 and that the total transferred in all nine transactions was just over £9,000, with the largest being a sum just under £3,000 sent to a person in Canada who was not named as a conspirator.

In her police interview she denied that she had been sending money to further the purchase of cocaine in the Carribean. She went on to say that she had made the transfers at the behest of Gibson. He had what appeared to be a successful and legitimate business and so she believed that the cash was legitimate. She said he had given plausible reasons for wishing to transfer the cash and being unable to do so himself.

In essence, therefore, her explanation in interview, and indeed her case at trial, was that she accepted the transfers but knew nothing about the supply of drugs.

At the close of the prosecution evidence at trial a submission of no case to answer was made on Yvonne Anthony's behalf but was rejected by the judge. Leave to appeal in relation to the judge's ruling on that issue has been refused.

When her turn came in the course of the defence cases Yvonne Anthony decided not to give evidence. This meant, we are told, that, amongst other things, the jury did not have her responses to questions about three areas of evidence which had emerged during the trial and had not therefore been raised with her in the police interview. First, there had come to light two further money transfers which she was alleged to have made, but which, as we are told, she does not in fact accept having made. The second matter was her explanation for the trips to the Caribbean. The third was her explanation for various telephone communications with her husband, Williams and Gibson. Furthermore, and entirely properly in the circumstances as they appeared at time, the result of her decision not to go into the witness box was that the judge gave the jury a direction under section 35 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 that they could draw an adverse inference from her failure to give evidence.

The appeal to this court arises out of the circumstances in which Yvonne Anthony decided not to give evidence. We are told that throughout the months leading to the trial and during the weeks of the trial her instructions were that she would be giving evidence and she expressed no reservations about it. That was the position communicated to the judge. But on day when she was originally due to give her evidence she was not reached.

The following day she arrived at court in a distressed state and refused to give evidence. At the time she would give no explanation to her legal representatives. The judge was informed of the matter but nothing further could be said in relation to it.

Following her conviction, however, Yvonne Anthony informed the defence team that she been threatened and was too frightened to give evidence or to tell anyone about it earlier. What she said was put into an affidavit signed by her. The relevant paragraphs of the affidavit read as follows:

No application in proper form was made for this court to receive any fresh evidence from the appellant in relation to those matters. The suggestion was made by Mr Pearse Wheatley this morning that we might hear evidence from Yvonne Anthony. That suggestion came far too late. We are, however, prepared to proceed with the matter by having regard to the matters that are set out in the affidavit from which we have quoted.

The submission advanced by Mr Pearse Wheatley is that the facts set out in that affidavit are sufficient to render the conviction unsafe. He submits that whilst much has been done in recent years to protect vulnerable or intimidated witnesses and there is guidance available in relation to them, to which the court has been referred, there is no equivalent guidance for dealing with defendants who may be intimidated. This, he says, is a remarkable distinction and may give rise to injustice.

He submits that the correct approach to intimidation is subjective not objective. Words or actions which might not appear to be particularly intimidating in themselves may be so when account is taken of the circumstances of the person to whom they are directed. Regard must therefore be had to the effect on Yvonne Anthony herself, a woman of very little education and little experience, of threats from the husband from whom she separated as the result of abuse and from another co-defendant.

In summary, it is submitted that she can be seen to have been threatened. That she was thereby prevented by intimidation from giving evidence, or saying why she was not giving evidence, and, as a result, a direction under section 35 was given without counsel being able to make any submissions against the giving of such a direction. Had she given evidence on the matters to which we have already briefly referred, the additional money transfers, the trips to the Caribbean and the telephone contacts with other conspirators, it is submitted that this may have resulted in the jury not drawing an adverse inference against her and acquitting her. The case against her is said to have been not strong, though it has to be accepted now that there was a case to answer. It is pointed out that she was convicted by a majority of ten to two. The submission made is that her giving evidence might therefore have made a difference to the outcome and the result of the matters to which we have referred is that she was unfairly convicted.

The single judge gave leave to appeal on this issue only so that the Full Court could consider:

It seems to us, however, that, given the particular facts of this case, it is unnecessary for us to engage with any wider issue of principle as contemplated in the single judge's observations.

Mr Dawson for the Crown has set out in his skeleton argument what appear to us to be a series of cogent points directed towards the particular facts of this case. First, Yvonne Anthony, in common with the other defendants who did not give evidence, was warned by the judge of the consequences of not going into the witness box. It was her choice not to give reasons for not giving evidence. The directions subsequently given to the jury were undoubtedly correct and fair. There was no unfairness in the trial process.

Secondly, the so-called threats were, it is submitted, nothing more than explanations of the co-defendants' tactics in the trial. At that point two defendants had given evidence and had been far from convincing. The others, it is suggested, all plainly thought it better to rely on submissions which minimised their involvement, and, in the case of the women, emphasised the hardship their children would suffer if convicted. Yvonne Anthony was being warned that giving evidence was likely to be harmful to her case.

Thirdly, there was no threat of violence and it is incredible that she should have thought that her former husband would have the ability to send her to prison. It is also extremely odd if she thought a threat had been made that she should destroy the note rather than keep it.

Fourthly, the other defendants had nothing themselves to fear from her giving evidence. Her case was that she was an innocent dupe who knew nothing of drug dealing. This could not damage anyone else's case since it was essentially what they all said in interview. As far as her former husband was concerned, she could not implicate him in the crime without implicating herself.

Fifthly, it is speculative to believe that she might not have been convicted if she had given evidence. The Crown's submission is that the case against her was strong given the evidence concerning the cash transfers, the trips to the Caribbean and the telephone contacts with other conspirators.

We agree with those submissions. In particular, we see take the view that the contention that she was prevented from giving evidence as a result of intimidation does not get off the ground factually. The contents of the alleged note from her former husband and the remark said to have been made by the other co-defendant could not sensibly be regarded as amounting to serious threats or intimidation even when directed to a person in Yvonne Anthony's position. We are not prepared to read into the material anything further or deeper than appears on the face of that material. Even if the circumstances as now set out had been known at the time, we are satisfied they would not have provided a good reason for her not to go into the witness box. They would not have affected the giving of a direction under section 35.

In our view, there is no realistic possibility of their having affected the outcome of the trial. Thus the matters canvassed before us do not cause us to doubt the safety of Yvonne Anthony's conviction and her appeal is dismissed.

We move to consider briefly the various other applications before us. We deal first with Williams. He has been represented before us today by Mr Sutton. Williams applies for an extension of time of one year and one month in which to renew his application for leave to appeal against conviction following refusal by the single judge. The explanation that Williams himself gave for the delay is that he did not understand the renewal form because of his dyslexia and reading and writing difficulties. He was also under immense pressure because of family problems which meant he could not focus and give his full attention to matters.

Mr Sutton has been unable to add much to that, save to say that it was apparent in the course of the trial that Williams had reading and writing difficulties. Further, Mr Sutton had understood Williams to be keen to renew his application and he suggests that that supports what Williams says about having been prevented by the various matters referred to from renewing within time.

We have to say that we regard the explanation provided by Williams in a short handwritten letter and without supporting material as an insufficient excuse for such a long delay, even when account is taken of the matters put forward on his behalf by Mr Sutton. Nevertheless, we have looked at the substantive grounds of appeal to see if there is any merit in them. Those grounds cover two broad areas.

By way of introduction to them Mr Sutton has suggested that the Crown case against Williams was itself far from overwhelming. But one of the strongest factors in it was that Williams had been to the West Indies a few months before the conspiracy started and there had been phone calls by him to people in the West Indies linked to other conspirators. It is in that context that it is submitted that Williams was prejudiced in the proper presentation of his case at trial by the fact that there was admitted into the evidence in the course of his cross-examination a number of phone calls made from his phones to persons in Trinidad and Tobago in 2004. That, it is said, was in its context important evidence, and the submission made is that, because of the fact that this evidence was put in at such a late stage, Williams was denied a proper opportunity of dealing with it, including an opportunity for his legal team to find out about the people to whom the calls were made.

It is accepted that the calls were documented in the material served by the Crown and they could, therefore, have been considered by the defence when examining the unused material, but they had not previously been relied on by the prosecution. It is conceded, too, that had the Crown given proper notice of these matters, the evidence in question was plainly admissible, but it is said that the judge was wrong to allow it to be put at this late stage in the case.

Whether it should be allowed in during cross-examination, as occurred, was within the discretion of the trial judge. The judge gave a reasoned ruling, refusing an application that the evidence should be excluded under section 78 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act. In our view, there was no error in the exercise of her discretion. It seems to us that the evidence was properly put even at that stage of the trial and we do not accept that the timing of its admission created a situation in which Williams was unable properly to deal with it. In particular, he was able to give any explanation he wished to give in evidence as to the nature of the calls and of the persons to whom they were made.

The second area raised by Mr Sutton arises from the fact that Williams, unlike most of his co-defendants, gave evidence at the trial. In relation to those other co-defendants the jury only had the explanations given by them in their police interviews. It is said, and the matter is developed in various grounds of appeal, that what the judge said in her summing-up about the interviews of those co-defendants worked unfairly to the disadvantage of Williams. In particular it is suggested that the judge gave too much weight to the evidential status of the interviews so that Williams lost the advantage he should have got relative to his co-defendant by reason of the fact that he gave evidence whereas they did not. As Mr Sutton put it in his submissions, the distinction between evidence on oath and was said in interview was blurred to Williams' disadvantage.

As to that, we agree with the single judge when he refused leave, that the trial judge gave and repeated an entirely appropriate direction about the status of a defendant's interview and that the jury cannot have been in any doubt about the significance in Williams's favour of his having given oral evidence having regard to the directions that the judge gave and her separate direction as to the significance of most of the other defendants not having given evidence. It seems to us, as it did to the single judge, that the judge struck a fair balance between the position of the various defendants.

Accordingly, we take the view that there is no arguable point in the grounds of appeal. It follows that there is no reason why an extension of time should be granted and the application for an extension is refused.

We turn to the case of Gibson who renews an application for leave to appeal against conviction and sentence following refusal by the single judge. The basis of his conviction application is that the prosecution case at trial included evidence relating to a count of conspiracy separate from that on which the various defendants were ultimately convicted. At the close of their case the prosecution decided not to continue with that count. Gibson's counsel then applied for the jury to be discharged on the ground that the jury had heard irrelevant and highly prejudicial evidence on the withdrawn count, the result of which, it was submitted, was that Gibson could not receive a fair trial.

The judge ruled that the prejudicial effect could be neutralised by removing part of the documentary evidence that was before the jury. The submission made is that the judge erred in so ruling and that she also failed to direct the jury adequately in her summing-up as to how this evidence was to be treated.

We agree with the single judge that the trial judge's decision was within the permissible bounds of her discretion and that she gave an appropriate direction to the jury. There is no good reason to believe that Gibson's conviction is unsafer.

As regards sentence, the case advanced is that the judge failed to differentiate sufficiently between Williams and Gibson. It was accepted that Williams was the main organiser. Gibson, by contrast, was Williams's employee and followed the directions given to him by Williams. A difference of one year, it is said, did not adequately reflect the difference in their respective roles.

The single judge's reaction to that was that the trial judge was entitled to regard Gibson as managing director of the cocaine smuggling enterprise and to sentence him to nearly as long as with, whom she described as the chairman. The sentence was severe but not manifestly excessive.

Again, we agree with that view. It follows that Gibson's renewed application for leave to appeal against conviction and sentence is refused.

The next case to consider is that of Charles who makes a renewed application for leave to appeal against conviction following refusal by the single judge. The main grounds of appeal relate to the judge's rejection of an application that evidence from the Caribbean should be excluded under section 78 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act because of alleged breaches by the investigating officers of the Code of Practice under the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 and of the Attorney General's guidelines on the disclosure of information. It is submitted that the judge erred in various ways in making the ruling she did and that her ruling resulted in Charles not having a fair trial because information or material received by the officers in the Caribbean, which may have cast doubt on the reliability of the prosecution case, was not recorded and was not therefore made available to the defence.

In our judgment, there is no merit to those grounds. The judge was very well placed to assess the complaint made about the conduct of the investigating officers, to decide whether there had been a breach of the codes or guidelines and to reach a decision in the exercise of her discretion whether any of the evidence obtained by those officers from the Caribbean should be excluded. On the basis of the matters put forward in the grounds and in the supporting advice we can detect no error of law or wrong exercise of discretion by the judge.

The advice also suggests that there was a misdirection by the judge in the summing-up but the matter does not appear to have been carried forward into the perfected grounds and is, in any event, supported and unsustainable. Charles's renewed application is therefore refused.

We turn to the case of Derek Anthony who renews an application for an extension of time for leave to appeal against conviction and applies for an extensions of time in which to renew an application for leave to appeal against sentence. In relation to his conviction application he needs an extension of time of approximately a year. His explanation for the delay is that he came to learn of new evidence which revealled gaps in the evidence against him at trial regarding the transfer of money. In relation to sentence he needs an extension of approximately seven months. His explanation for the delay includes delay caused by transfer to another prison and the effect of the conviction on his physical and mental health. He relies in this context too on the late discovery of what he says is new evidence.

We regard the explanations given in each case as very weak but have thought it right in the circumstances to consider whether there is any substantive merit to the applications for leave to appeal before ruling on the extensions of time.

The grounds of appeal are extensive. They were developed in number of documents originally filed with the court by Derek Anthony. They were then incorporated into a 26-page final case summary document dated 14 October 2008 to which Mr Anthony has since added points contained in letters of 21 and 31 October. We have taken all that material into account. It goes beyond the grounds as originally considered by the single judge.

As regards conviction the areas covered relate in broad terms to alleged non-disclosure by the Crown of evidence relating to the money transfers and other matters, coupled with a request that Derek Anthony be allowed to rely on or obtain further evidence in relation to the transfers. There are various criticism of the judge's summing-up and directions to the jury and criticisms of the conduct of the defence by his legal representatives at trial, especially in failing to challenge the prosecution evidence concerning the money transfers.

The criticisms of his legal representative led to a waiver of privilege and to a filing of detailed responses by his counsel and solicitors on which he himself has made his own further comments.

The case has been developed by Mr Anthony since it was considered by the single judge, but we agree with the single judge's rejection of his application as it stood at that time, and having considered all the material now available, we can still find nothing in it to provide a tenable ground of appeal or to cast doubt on the safety of the conviction. In the absence of any substantive merit in the application for leave to appeal there can be no basis for granting the extension of time required. The application for an extension is therefore refused.

As regards sentence, the essence of the submissions made is that the judge erred by attributing to Derek Anthony too high or central a role in the conspiracy. To a large extent this rests on points we have already rejected in the context of his conviction application, namely a challenge to the evidence as to the extent of his involvement in money transfers. But other matters are also put forward to support the contention that his role was not as extensive as alleged. Here, too, there is criticism of the way the case was handled by defence legal team.

Again we have considered all the material but again we can find nothing in it to give rise to an arguable ground of appeal. The judge who presided over the trial was in an excellent position to assess the defendants' respective roles within the conspiracy and where they stood in the hierarchy and the matters put forward by Mr Anthony do not cast doubt on the correctness of her assessment. We agree with the single judge that the sentence imposed was severe but not manifestly excessive. In absence of substantive merit in the application for leave to appeal we will deal with this sentence issue too by refusing the required extension of time for the making of the application.

Finally we turn to McQueenie who makes a renewed application for an extension of time in which to apply for leave to appeal against sentence after refusal by the single judge. The delay was relatively short and, as counsel's advice makes clear, entirely the fault of trial counsel.

The written grounds advanced are that the sentence of 13 years imposed on McQueenie gave rise to an objectionable disparity between her position and that of her co-defendants and was in itself manifestly excessive. Reference is made to the fact that she was stopped at the airport in possession of approximately 2.5 kilogrammes of cocaine and to the evidence concerning her links with the various conspirators.

The mitigating features identified are that she was a young woman aged 26 -- in fact she is now 28 -- a single mother with a six year old son who suffers from asthma and whose father has not been seen since the child was born. the son is being cared for by his grand mother. It is said that McQueenie behaved impeccably while on remand with positive reports from no fewer than six prison officers. Her role in the conspiracy is submitted to have been at the lower end of the scale and not much more than a courier. It is said to be put it any higher would be speculative in the absence of any evidence of a higher role. Her sentence is said to have been disparate with those imposed, in particular, on Burris, Brown, Burris-Gordon and Yvonne Anthony, all of whom received lower sentences than McQueenie did. It is also submitted that, taking into account recent guidance in the case law, the sentence of 13 years can be seen to have been manifestly excessive.

Before us today Miss Broome has appeared on McQueenie's behalf and has presented brief and helpful oral submissions underlining a number of the points made in the written material.

The single judge in refusing the application observed that the sentencing judge was entitled to take the view that she did of McQueenie's role in the light of the evidence at the trial and that the role was not limited to the single importation of some 2.5 kilogrammes of cocaine, though even that was an amount that would itself attract a sentence of the order of ten years and upwards.

We agree. We see no reason to disagree with the trial judge's assessment of where McQueenie stood within the conspiracy as a whole and the argument on disparity must fall. In absolute terms the sentence was within the range properly available to the judge. In the absence of arguable grounds of appeal we will depose of the matter but refusing the renewed application for an extension of time.

That, we hope, deals with all the matters before us. Neither the appeal nor any of the applications succeeds. We are grateful to those counsel who have attended before us today.